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Terms of reference 
INQUIRY INTO THE ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL POTENTIAL 
OFFERED BY ENERGY EFFICIENCY 
Productivity Commission Act 1998 
I, ROSS CAMERON, Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, pursuant to Parts 2 and 3 
of the Productivity Commission Act 1998, hereby request that the Productivity Commission 
undertake an inquiry into the economic and environmental potential offered by energy 
efficiency and report within 12 months of receipt of this reference. The Commission is to 
hold hearings for the purpose of the inquiry. 
Background 
Australia’s access to low cost, reliable energy is a source of competitive advantage for 
Australia. However, Australia’s historic energy efficiency performance has been weak in 
comparison with other OECD countries. In this context, improvements in energy use which 
are cost-effective for individual producers and consumers have the potential to enhance 
Australia’s economic prosperity and at the same time lower Australia’s greenhouse 
signature. 
Energy efficiency in this context refers to maintaining or increasing the level of useful 
output or outcome delivered, while reducing energy consumption, and encompasses both 
supply side and demand side efficiency. 
Scope of the Inquiry 
The Commission is to examine and report on the economic and environmental potential 
offered by energy efficiency improvements which are cost-effective for individual 
producers and consumers, including through consideration of: 
1.  the economic and environmental costs and benefits arising from energy efficiency 
improvements, including, but not limited to, research undertaken in the context of the 
National Framework for Energy Efficiency and international studies; 
2.  existing and recent Australian and state government energy efficiency programmes, 
including consideration of the level of coordination between these programmes and 
comparison with international experiences; 
3.  barriers and impediments to improved energy efficiency, including, but not limited to, 
information asymmetries and implementation costs; 
4.  the potential for energy efficiency improvements which are cost-effective for 
individual producers and consumers arising from actions including: 
-  energy market reform to facilitate improved demand and supply 
management, including, but not limited to, more efficient cost-reflective 
price signalling in the market, particularly at peak times;     




-  improved financial information on energy efficiency, including, but not 
limited to, provision of additional financial information on energy 
efficiency to firms’ internal and external investors and decision makers; 
-  improved energy efficiency information, including, but not limited to, 
provision of additional energy efficiency information in relation to plant and 
equipment, appliances, vehicles and fuels, and residential and non-
residential buildings; 
-  minimum energy efficiency standards, including, but not limited to, 
minimum standards for plant and equipment, appliances, vehicles and fuels, 
and residential and non-residential buildings; 
-  new and improved technologies and equipment, including, but not limited 
to, improved technologies in relation to plant and equipment, appliances, 
vehicles and fuels, and residential and non-residential buildings;  
-  financial incentives for improving energy efficiency, including, but not 
limited to subsidies, private sector rebates or discounts and levies on energy 
use; and 
-  improved operational practices at the level of consumers and households, 
governments, and the industrial and commercial sectors.  
5.  policy options for energy efficiency improvements which are cost-effective for 
individual producers and consumers, including: 
-  improving industrial and commercial energy efficiency, including, but not 
limited to, energy efficiency agreements, and increased disclosure through 
public energy efficiency reporting; 
-  improving consumer and household energy efficiency; 
-  improving the efficiency of government energy use; 
-  improving transport related energy efficiency, including, but not limited to, 
urban planning, congestion pricing, intelligent transport systems, travel 
demand management, and increased efficiencies in the business and freight 
sectors (including opportunities for better matching of transport choices 
with transport tasks undertaken); and 
-  introducing a national energy efficiency target, including, but not limited 
to, the establishment of an annual requirement for major users of stationary 
energy to generate, or otherwise acquire, a target level of efficiency related 
energy savings. 
The Commission is to provide both a draft and a final report. The Government will 
consider the Commission’s recommendations, and its response will be announced as soon 
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Key points 
•  Firms and households generally do not deliberately waste energy. But energy has 
been cheap and is only a small percentage of total outlays for most Australian firms 
and households. Energy efficiency has not been a high priority for them.  
•  Compared to other OECD countries, Australia has a relatively high level of energy 
consumption per unit of output. However, such comparisons can be misleading 
because of significant differences between countries in climate, energy prices and 
the size of energy-intensive industries. Australia must achieve the right level of 
energy efficiency for its own circumstances. 
•  Many governments see energy efficiency improvements as a low-cost means of 
reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. However, the scope for achieving 
environmental gains through increasing the uptake of only those energy efficiency 
improvements that are privately cost effective appears to be modest at current and 
expected energy prices. 
•  The most important barriers to the adoption of privately cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements appear to be: 
–  a failure in the provision of information; and  
– the different incentives facing those who take decisions about installing 
energy-efficient products and those who might benefit from using them.  
•  Some government intervention to address these problems is appropriate. The 
Commission favours light-handed regulatory responses and information provision, 
rather than more prescriptive and intrusive approaches: 
–  mandatory labelling can be an appropriate way of providing information, but 
–  other mandatory measures — such as minimum performance standards — may not 
be privately cost effective; and  
–  a sufficient case has not been made for the imposition of a national energy efficiency 
target and tradeable obligations.  
•  The Ministerial Council on Energy has improved the coordination of energy efficiency 
programs. Elements of the National Framework for Energy Efficiency Stage One 
could result in further improvement, particularly if there is:  
–  greater clarity as to the objectives of government intervention; 
–  more emphasis on priority setting; and 
–  rigorous evaluation of past policies and programs including in particular the energy 
efficiency regulations in the Building Code of Australia.  
•  The various educative, suasive and regulatory approaches to encourage or mandate 
greater energy efficiency continue to conflict with the signals given to energy users 
by Australia’s relatively low energy prices. 
•  Some energy efficiency measures may not be privately cost effective, and yet may 
generate net public benefits because of their environmental outcomes. Those 
measures may prove to be sound public policy, but they should be considered 
against other means of achieving those environmental objectives. 
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Overview 
Energy efficiency has long been a policy issue, first because of concerns about 
energy scarcity and depletion of energy reserves, exacerbated by the oil shocks of 
the 1970s, and more recently, because of links between fossil-fuel use and climate 
change. Policy interest has been heightened by the diverse positions of governments 
over the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, emissions trading and carbon taxes. 
Governments around the world have been seeking low-cost opportunities to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. The combustion of fossil fuels is a key source of 
greenhouse gas emissions, so reducing their consumption (or of electricity derived 
from them) seems like an obvious focus.  
Energy efficiency measures, unlike energy conservation, aim to reduce energy 
consumption while at the same time maintaining or increasing the level of useful 
output or outcome delivered. Put simply, on hot days, electricity consumption could 
be reduced through:  
•  an  efficiency measure, for example, installing insulation (which reduces the 
amount (and cost) of electricity used to maintain a cool home); or  
•  a conservation measure, for example, turning up the thermostat (and tolerating a 
hotter house) or by turning off the air conditioner and going to the pool or the 
movies.  
Achieving greater energy efficiency is understandably attractive to many 
governments and environmental organisations concerned about climate change. It 
offers the prospect of significant reductions in emissions — at low or negligible 
costs to energy users. It may even save users considerable amounts of money. 
The pursuit of energy efficiency would also seem to be in the interests of any 
rational producer or consumer, firm or household. And yet the issue at the heart of 
this inquiry is why producers and consumers do not always seek greater energy 
efficiency, even when it seems cost effective for them to do so. Why isn’t the 
market working — or is it? Answering these questions is important in framing a 
policy response that will provide net benefits for the community. In part, the answer 
is one of perspective — individual producers and consumers seek to economise on 
the use of all inputs, not just energy.      
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What did the inquiry cover? 
The subject of this inquiry is ‘the economic and environmental potential offered by 
energy efficiency improvements which are cost-effective for individual producers 
and consumers’ (inquiry terms of reference). It has both narrow and broad 
perspectives. 
The narrower focus has been on identifying: energy efficiency improvements where 
the private benefits exceed the costs to individual producers or consumers; the 
barriers and impediments to the adoption of such improvements; and the case for 
government intervention. Policy options have been canvassed for various sectors of 
the economy: commercial and industrial; consumers and householders; government 
(as a user); and transport. Different policy instruments and government programs 
have been examined: labelling and the provision of other information; standard 
setting; financial incentives; energy market reforms, such as how electricity prices 
are regulated; and the introduction of a national energy efficiency target.  
Private cost effectiveness is a much narrower focus than the more commonly 
adopted public perspective that underpins the Commission’s economywide charter. 
That the Commission was required to take this narrower approach was a matter of 
great concern to many participants in this inquiry.  
The Commission recognises that many energy efficiency measures can yield 
environmental benefits. It also recognises that governments should be motivated by 
the broader public interest (including effects on the environment), not by private 
cost effectiveness. Yet energy efficiency policies have been frequently rationalised 
by their alleged private benefits. This is understandable because it is harder to 
quantify environmental benefits and costs than it is to quantify private benefits and 
costs, and the latter have been frequently viewed by policy makers as sufficient to 
justify government intervention. But it is important that this basic principle be 
tested: are such policies truly ‘no regrets’ measures in the sense that they are good 
for energy users and good for the environment? If it is difficult to overcome the 
barriers to the adoption of privately cost-effective improvements in energy 
efficiency, then it will be even more difficult to drive the adoption of measures that 
will require private sacrifices for the greater public good. As governments push 
beyond ‘costless’ or ‘no regrets’ policies, it becomes increasingly important that net 
social benefit (including environmental benefits) is substantiated, not just asserted. 
Furthermore, the inquiry terms of reference direct the Commission to examine and 
report on the broader economic and environmental costs and benefits arising from 
privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements. Thus, although the 
Commission is constrained to look at only a subset of all possible energy efficiency 
measures, it is required to have regard to the public benefits of those measures.     
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It is appropriate for governments to evaluate the social impacts of all energy 
efficiency proposals, whatever their underlying rationale. But the first task is to 
examine why measures that appear to be privately cost effective are not being 
adopted.  
Policy interest in energy efficiency 
All levels of government in Australia are involved in various, and changing, energy 
efficiency programs. Some effort is being devoted to developing a more coordinated 
approach as a means of adopting best practice nationally, of achieving economies of 
scale in the development of programs and of reducing costs of compliance for 
national firms. However, there can also be benefits from so-called ‘regulatory 
competition’, where different approaches by different governments provide 
opportunities for exploring and piloting innovative policies. These tradeoffs come 
into play at various points in this report. 
In June 2001, the Council of Australian Governments established the Ministerial 
Council on Energy (MCE) to oversee energy market reform and related issues. The 
MCE subsequently established the Energy Efficiency Working Group to develop a 
National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE). Following public consultation, 
the MCE has adopted an extensive nine point plan for promoting energy efficiency 
(NFEE Stage One). It involves:  
•  tightening residential building energy efficiency regulation;  
•  introducing commercial building energy efficiency regulation;  
•  extending  labelling and standards for electrical appliances and applying the 
same approach to gas appliances;  
•  various awareness-raising programs targeted at consumers, the financial sector 
and the private sector (the latter including through mandatory audits for large 
energy users); 
•  developing commercial and industrial sector capability (for example, through 
establishing best-practice networks);  
•  imposing additional reporting requirements on governments; and  
•  trade and professional training and accreditation. 
In its August 2004 White Paper, Securing Australia’s Energy Future, the Australian 
Government announced its commitment to ‘energy prosperity, security and 
sustainability’. Measures which were endorsed included: mandatory audits for large 
energy users; the extension of minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) for     
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appliances and buildings (both as set out in NFEE Stage One); and a ‘solar cities’ 
demonstration trial.  
Other more ambitious initiatives proposed during the drafting of the White Paper, 
such as a national energy efficiency target (NEET), were not included but were to 
be referred to the Commission for inquiry. This led to the perception among some 
people that this inquiry would be constrained to only consider policies additional to 
the NFEE Stage One policies. However, the terms of reference quite clearly 
stipulate that the Commission should look at all existing and recent policy 
considerations, including a NEET.  
Is there an energy efficiency gap? 
Throughout these processes, much attention has been given to the ‘energy 
efficiency gap’, defined as the gap between actual energy efficiency and the level of 
energy efficiency believed to be achievable and affordable. Evidence of a gap (or 
gaps) can be found in cross-country comparisons and case study results. 
Australia’s aggregate energy intensity, and rate of improvement in aggregate energy 
intensity, are below OECD norms. This is sometimes taken as sufficient evidence of 
a problem that needs to be fixed by government action. The terms of reference for 
this inquiry include this notion. But for each country the economically efficient 
level of energy use, intensity or efficiency depends on such factors as the price of 
energy, any comparative advantage in energy-intensive industry, the climate, and 
the cost of other inputs. The costs of making the necessary changes and other 
options for investment must also be considered. 
The second body of evidence comes from micro studies of individual firms, 
factories and households, or even individual machines and appliances. Claims made 
during the early phases of the NFEE process suggested that, even using pessimistic 
assumptions, energy efficiency improvements could achieve reductions in energy 
consumption of between 20 per cent and 34 per cent in different sectors of the 
economy. The implication was that these measures would not only be cost effective 
for energy users but also highly effective at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
More recent modelling undertaken for the NFEE suggests that the economic and 
environmental potential of closing these gaps might be considerably less than was 
first thought. Using a bottoms-up approach, the modelling has estimated that energy 
efficiency gains of between 5 and 14 per cent of current energy usage could be 
achieved, depending on the industry sector. It was estimated that, relative to a 
business-as-usual scenario, implementing 50 per cent of the identifiable gains would     
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increase GDP by 0.09 per cent (or about $1 billion) and reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2.8 per cent in 2016.  
The Commission has reviewed such claims and considers that there is such 
uncertainty about the size of the gains to be made (and so many unknowns), that it 
is impossible to say just how big they are. Rather than debate the size of these gaps, 
the Commission considers it more productive to accept that they exist, and then ask 
why they exist, and how government intervention could help increase uptake of 
energy efficiency improvements in a way that is best for the Australian community. 
The first step is to understand the barriers and impediments that explain the 
existence of these gaps. 
What are the barriers and impediments?  
Inquiry participants identified different reasons for the behaviour of individual 
producers and consumers where investing in energy efficiency improvements is 
concerned (box 1). This behaviour reveals that many different barriers and 
impediments can be at work. This report has grouped these into three broad 
categories: market failures; organisational failures, and behavioural and cultural 
norms; and other barriers and impediments.  
 
Box 1  Some attitudes to energy efficiency 
The attitudes of a number of producers and consumers to improving their levels of 
energy efficiency can be summarised as follows: 
•  My production decisions are driven by the combined costs of all inputs, and not just 
the most efficient use of energy — energy efficiency does not fully equate with 
marketplace economic efficiency. 
•  I’m not across all of the options — there are information gaps, asymmetries and 
costs. 
•  I can’t afford the extra costs of the latest or most efficient machinery or appliance — 
producers and consumers are generally capital constrained. 
•  For the savings it will give me, it’s not worth my effort — satisficing behaviour is a 
fact of business and household life, especially if energy costs are low. 
•  What might be cost effective for some people is not cost effective for me — 
producers and consumers are heterogeneous, and the potential costs and benefits 
of one individual’s actions to increase energy efficiency will be different from the 
benefits and costs in a ‘model’ energy-efficient firm or household. 
•  From my experience, making the changes won’t be straightforward — there are 
implementation costs and risks, some of which may be uncertain. 
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Market failures  
There are well-known circumstances in which markets will not achieve the best 
returns for the community. In terms of the uptake of privately cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements, the market failures of most policy relevance are caused by 
information failures. Lack of information may account for many such opportunities 
being forgone. Some information may not be provided at all, or will be 
underprovided, if firms and households can free-ride on the efforts of others. And 
information asymmetries can put buyers of energy-using products at a disadvantage 
to sellers. 
Split incentives might also be important. Split incentives can exist where, for 
example, the incentives facing a builder (to choose a technology with low capital 
costs) diverge from the incentives facing the user (to choose the technology with 
lower running costs). While these problems may be worse where information 
asymmetries are present, they may exist even where both parties have the same 
information. For example, both landlord and tenant could benefit from installing 
insulation or a solar hot water system, if they could agree on a rent adjustment that 
makes both better off. Yet frequently this does not happen because of difficulties 
and risks in negotiating the rental adjustment. However, the importance of split 
incentives as a market failure needs to be kept in perspective. To the extent that 
energy costs are important, it will become worthwhile for both parties to sort out a 
new contract. 
The presence of market failure does not of itself warrant government intervention. 
Government intervention can be costly and introduces its own distortions, especially 
if the intervention is poorly targeted to achieving the relevant objective. 
Government intervention is only warranted when it produces net economic, social 
or environmental benefits to the community. 
Organisational failures and behavioural norms 
A second set of barriers and impediments include behavioural norms and 
organisational constraints. The difficulties faced by individuals in obtaining and 
processing complex information can lead to satisficing (‘close enough is good 
enough’) rather than optimising behaviour. However, to the extent that this 
behaviour has lower information costs (including cognitive effort), it might itself be 
a realistic, cost-effective outcome. 
Constrained or defective internal communications within organisations might also 
account for some of the energy efficiency gap. Even within households there are 
communications gaps (‘turn the lights off, kids!’). But the extent to which this set of     
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barriers should influence policy is doubtful. For firms, encouraging a competitive 
environment is a better approach, as this will exert pressure on them to be as 
efficient as possible, in all areas, including their use of energy.  
Other barriers and impediments  
A final set of barriers and impediments are associated with a range of costs that are 
difficult to capture in the ‘engineering–accounting’ models typically used to 
estimate the cost effectiveness of energy efficiency improvements. The limited 
resources of management, the costs of implementing new technologies, risk and 
uncertainty, access to (and the cost of) capital, and the sunk nature of many 
investments provide a reminder that many energy-efficient technologies may not be 
sufficiently cost effective, once all of the costs are considered. Generally speaking, 
these are not barriers that warrant policy intervention. 
Furthermore, energy costs are often quite a small component of total costs. In the 
face of competing demands, households and firms may not consider that it is worth 
the time or effort to obtain information about energy used and then undertake the 
consequent investment, for relatively small (private) benefit. For example, in 
2003-04, households only spent on average around $24 per week on non-transport 
energy. Thus, even if a 10 per cent saving were achieved, it would amount to only 
about $2.40 per week. Energy costs are similarly quite small for the commercial 
sector, amounting to 1.6  per  cent of total expenditure. Energy costs in 
manufacturing and transport are somewhat higher at levels of 6.8  per  cent and 
4.5 per cent of total expenditure respectively. 
The influence of energy prices 
The Commission has separately considered the price of energy. Changes in energy 
prices would clearly influence what energy efficiency measures individual 
consumers or producers would be prepared to adopt. For example, higher prices 
would encourage more investment in energy-efficient technologies as people and 
firms think of creative new ways for economising on the input that has become 
more expensive. Higher prices would not, however, change the intrinsic nature of 
the barriers and impediments in the market for energy-efficient technologies, just 
their relative importance. Even in Europe, where energy prices are much higher 
than in Australia (and energy efficiency appears also to be somewhat higher as a 
result), the same sorts of barriers and impediments still persist. This is not to imply 
that energy prices should be artificially increased just for the purpose of promoting 
energy efficiency. Access to low-cost energy is important for economic and social     
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reasons. What is more appropriate is that prices be fully cost reflective so that they 
promote overall economic efficiency in the production and use of energy.  
Table 1   Governments’ responses to identified barriers and impediments 
to adopting energy efficiency improvements 
Barrier and impediment  Typical government responses  Australian examples 
Market failure 
  
Asymmetric information  Help buyer discover relevant 
information or require seller to 
disclose 
Labelling appliances 
ACT house energy efficiency rating 
scheme 
Split incentives  Mandate installation of chosen 
technology 
Minimum energy performance 
standards for appliances; Building 
Code of Aust; Building star ratings 
Public good information  Provide or subsidise provision of 
relevant information  
AGO Green Vehicle Guide; 
TravelSmart; Smart Housing; 
brochures; energy efficiency 
shopfronts 
Positive externalities  Provide or subsidise research 
and development and 
demonstration projects  
Encourage business networks 
General R&D tax concessions and 
grants; cooperative research centres 
Energy Efficiency Best Practice 
program 
Behavioural and cultural   
Bounded rationality  Reduce choice; eliminate ‘inferior’ 
products; mandate certain 
equipment 
Minimum energy performance 
standards for appliances; Building 
Code of Aust; Building star ratings 
Organisational barriers  Mandatory audits & disclosure  Energy Efficiency Opportunity 
Assessments; Victorian EPA 
licensing requirements; NSW 
Energy Savings Action Plans 
Other barriers and impediments     
Implementation costs  Subsidies for audits, 
consultancies and equipment 
SEAV/DEUS programs 
 
Risk and uncertainty  Subsidise use of energy-service 
consultants 
NSW Energy Smart Business 
program 
Capital constraints  Special funds for energy 
efficiency 
Energy Efficiency Program for Low 
Income Households (SA) 
Asset replacement costs  Subsidies  Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
program (DEH); subsidies for solar 
hot water systems 
Responding to barriers and impediments 
The Commission has summarised how governments have typically responded to the 
various barriers and impediments to adopting energy efficiency improvements 
(table 1). Some existing policies and programs arguably address several perceived 
barriers and impediments at the same time. But the existence of others that do not     
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address a source of market failure should be questioned. Many such policies and 
programs may be quite effective in increasing energy efficiency and/or reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases, but they are unlikely to be privately cost effective 
for producers and consumers, and should not be justified on such grounds.  
Policy responses 
A key policy question this inquiry has been asked to address is: what is the case for 
government intervention to promote the uptake of energy efficiency improvements 
that are ostensibly cost effective for individual producers or consumers but are not 
being taken up? If there is a case for intervention, a supporting question is: how 
should governments intervene? 
The case for intervention varies according to the sector of the economy. The market 
failures of most policy relevance are more profound in the residential/consumer 
segment than elsewhere, typically relating to information asymmetries and split 
incentives. In the commercial and industrial area, information problems are less 
significant, particularly for larger firms, and especially for those who face large 
energy bills and/or have strong links to like firms around the world. However, for 
many small businesses, the issues are similar to those confronting householders.  
Governments have used various policy instruments to address barriers and 
impediments. These can be grouped in an order of increasing intrusion: 
•  providing information directly; 
•  voluntary partnership programs (for example, Greenhouse Challenge Plus); 
•  subsidies and other financial incentives; 
•  requiring disclosure of information by sellers/producers; 
•  preventing access to less energy-efficient products (for example, MEPS and the 
energy efficiency standards in the Building Code of Australia (Building Code)); 
•  setting a NEET; and 
•  mandating investment in more energy-efficient equipment and technologies. 
The Commission’s assessment of the case for using each of these classes of policy 
instruments is presented below.     
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Providing information 
Information programs are provided by all jurisdictions and are pitched mostly at the 
householder level. For example, the Queensland Government provides a general 
energy efficiency advisory service and a more specific Smart Housing service that 
provides information on how to build homes that are more energy efficient.  
Governments have a role to play in providing such information directly where the 
information has public good characteristics (or positive spillovers) that would result 
in it being otherwise underprovided. Government provision might also achieve 
economies of scale and scope, and thus lower costs to users; and it might be 
justified for social reasons if it aids accessibility or provides credibility by deriving 
from a neutral source. 
However, judgements are required about how much information governments 
should provide directly. For example, the Australian Greenhouse Office’s Green 
Vehicle Guide provides fuel consumption information that largely replicates what is 
available from private sources. And some advice on home energy efficiency options 
can be obtained from commercial and other non-government sources. To some 
extent, the most productive role for government is to be the facilitator that draws 
together this information and packages it in a form that ensures that relevant and 
trusted information gets to those who would otherwise not get it. 
The case for governments providing general information is weakest where the users 
are larger commercial and industrial organisations. The information needs of such 
firms are usually very specific and, to the extent that energy costs are significant, 
firms have strong incentives to obtain that information and the resources to do so. 
Where there is sufficient private incentive, markets can be expected to provide 
information. Producers of energy-efficient goods and services (for example, 
insulation, solar hot water systems, and more efficient motors) vigorously advertise 
the merits of their products. Energy services companies (ESCOs) are widespread in 
North America and are rapidly emerging in Australia, with business propositions 
that guarantee energy savings for their clients. 
Governments very clearly have a role to provide information on energy efficiency 
regulations where they exist. In the interests of maximising regulatory compliance, 
no fees should be charged for access to the regulations themselves. In this respect, 
the Commission reiterates its concern over the high costs of accessing the Building 
Code and affiliated standards.      
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Voluntary partnership programs 
Most jurisdictions operate partnership programs in which participating firms 
voluntarily commit to invest in agreed measures, usually targeted at achieving 
greenhouse objectives. In return, the firm receives some assistance (though not 
usually cash subsidies) and the right to promote itself as an ‘eco friendly’ company. 
The most prominent of these is the Challenge Plus — Enhanced Industry 
Partnerships program operated by the Australian Government. This program has 
attracted the participation of a large proportion of manufacturing industry, 
particularly the larger firms.  
The Commission considers that voluntary agreement programs can be effective 
policy tools for promoting energy efficiency improvements as a means of achieving 
greenhouse gas abatement objectives. Voluntary agreements give organisations the 
flexibility to self-select as well as to choose the level and nature of their 
undertaking. There is, therefore, a lower risk of firms being forced into adopting 
practices which are not privately cost effective for them.  
However, at least in the case of Greenhouse Challenge Plus, it is likely that firms 
are motivated partly to prove their green credentials and as a precaution against the 
possibility of more intrusive measures being adopted. Furthermore, despite their 
neutral overtones, a certain amount of financial coercion or incentive is present in 
these schemes. The Commission notes that from 1 July 2006 participation in the 
Challenge Plus program will be a requirement for Australian companies receiving 
fuel excise credits of more than $3 million. The presence of financial incentives (or 
sanctions) may increase the probability of such companies undertaking projects that 
are not privately cost effective (though they may have net social benefits overall).  
Subsidies and other financial incentives 
Subsidies and rebates are used by governments to encourage energy efficiency 
improvements in various ways. Most jurisdictions have provided or currently 
provide subsidies to encourage firms to undertake audits, invest in research and 
development or participate in demonstration projects. Residential users may also 
receive rebates to take up energy-efficient practices, technologies and/or appliances 
(such as solar water heating), and subsidised house energy audits. 
There may be good public policy reasons for using financial incentives in some or 
all of these cases. An incentive to encourage the uptake of energy-efficient practices 
may be justifiable on the grounds of reducing environmental damage associated 
with energy use, or because the practices generate positive spillover effects, like     
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demonstration effects. But in the absence of these spillovers, the role of financial 
incentives is questionable.  
Financial incentives do not directly address the market failures preventing the 
uptake of privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements. They might 
make cost effective what is not otherwise, and they might help address internal 
organisational issues within firms (for example, by inducing involvement of 
different managers within the firm), but the Commission considers that these are not 
sufficient reasons for policy intervention. 
Levies 
The Commission was also asked to consider the role of levies, and has presumed 
this to mean a way of raising revenue for subsidising the uptake of energy 
efficiency improvements. That is, the income of the levy is hypothecated to a 
particular purpose. Levies have been used in some overseas countries in this way, 
and such a levy has recently been announced in New South Wales. That levy will be 
used to raise a $40 million annual fund over 5 years to support energy saving 
initiatives.  
Levies can be an important revenue-raising tool where there is some connection 
between the payment and the services received, and are sometimes likened to 
benefit taxes. The use of the fuel excise paid by truck operators to fund the repair of 
road damages is an example.  
A levy on energy users to pay for energy efficiency improvements has some appeal 
on equity grounds — all users of energy derived from fossil fuels contribute to 
environmental externalities and hence might be asked to contribute to their 
amelioration. However, such a levy would have some serious drawbacks because 
there is no necessary nexus between the appropriate level of taxes and funding 
needs. It would be more distortionary and have higher administration and 
compliance costs than existing broad-based taxes. The Commission considers that 
the case for government subsidies for promoting energy efficiency should be 
separated from the means of funding those subsidies.  
Requiring disclosure of information 
Governments can pass regulations that require information to be provided. 
Examples include compulsory labelling schemes (such as apply to electrical 
appliances and passenger motor vehicles), requiring that energy efficiency ratings 
be provided when selling or leasing a house, and compulsory auditing and reporting     
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for large energy users. Governments typically also require that their own agencies 
provide information on energy consumption or intensity. 
Appliance and vehicle labelling 
Labelling is used to indicate the energy efficiency of electrical and gas appliances 
and cars. Mandatory labelling directly addresses a source of market failure — the 
asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers of energy-using products. By 
providing information in a readily-accessible and easily-understandable format, 
labelling can help consumers to make better-informed choices about energy 
efficiency.  
Previous research had suggested that energy efficiency labels were not a prime 
consideration in choosing appliances or motor vehicles, but may have come into 
play once consumers had short listed products on the basis of price, performance, 
capacity and style. However, there is some evidence to suggest that consumers are 
now paying more attention to labels than they have in the past. A positive 
characteristic of labelling is that it does not directly limit consumer choice. 
Suppliers might chose to withdraw low-ranking appliances from sale, but that is 
essentially a commercial decision on their part.  
However, labelling involves both administration and compliance costs, such as 
those incurred by suppliers in having their products tested. Even so, the 
Commission has concluded that, at least in the case of electrical and gas appliances, 
labelling has probably produced net social benefits. The Commission has also 
concluded that labelling should be more actively considered as an alternative to 
minimum performance standards. Other forms of labelling, such as disendorsement 
labels (for example, ‘this product is not recommended for frequent usage’), and 
positive labelling (where suppliers are permitted, but not compelled, to display 
labels on appliances that exceed a minimum standard) might also be considered.  
This is not to say that labelling should extend to all appliances. It is most suited 
where there is a wide spread in the range of energy efficiency performances of 
comparable appliances, where energy-rating tests bear some resemblance to the way 
appliances are used, and where information failures are most pronounced.  
House energy performance rating 
The ACT Government currently requires anyone selling or leasing a house to obtain 
an energy-performance rating that must be disclosed in advertisements and in the 
contract of sale. The NFEE Stage One proposals include the extension of this 
scheme to all other States and the Northern Territory. These sorts of schemes     
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address market failures arising from information asymmetry and split incentives 
between vendors and purchasers, and can be broadly likened to appliance labelling. 
However, the Commission is not convinced that in its current form the ACT scheme 
produces net social benefits and considers that there are fundamental problems with 
such schemes. They add to transaction costs and may not be very effective in 
encouraging the uptake of energy efficiency improvements. This is because energy 
operating costs are a very small cost of home ownership and other features will 
most likely have a far more important impact on house-purchasing decisions. 
Furthermore, there are serious problems in using rating tools to assess the energy 
efficiency of different homes. 
The Commission welcomes the intention to undertake an independent evaluation of 
the ACT scheme before it is extended to other jurisdictions. The evaluation should 
assess how well house ratings predict actual energy performance, and the costs, 
benefits and effectiveness of the scheme, including the extent to which the 
information disclosed has influenced purchasing decisions.  
Mandated audits for large energy users 
The recently announced Energy Efficiency Opportunity Assessment (EEOA) 
program will make it mandatory for firms using more than 0.5 petajoules of energy 
per annum, to undertake energy audits and report the results publicly. The program 
is the culmination of a long history of governments trying to persuade firms to 
invest in energy efficiency improvements that external auditors consider to be cost 
effective but which are not being adopted. The public-reporting requirement is a 
significant development that is presumably intended to encourage management to 
adopt cost-saving opportunities that others (both within and outside the firm) might 
identify. The features of the EEOA suggest that it is designed to address perceived 
organisational and behavioural weaknesses within firms.  
The proposition that large energy users are forgoing cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements is questionable. These users, particularly those who use energy 
intensively, have strong incentives to use energy prudently within the total mix of 
all inputs. Unnecessarily wasting energy will cost them money, and damage their 
competitiveness.  
It is also questionable whether mandatory assessments and reporting will lead to 
appropriate changes in behaviour. Publicly-listed firms are already answerable to 
shareholders and the capital market generally. And as has been seen with earlier 
audit programs, many energy efficiency opportunities are not taken up by 
management because they are perceived to be uneconomic when all costs of     
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implementation are considered. A common criticism of external auditors is that it is 
difficult for them to fully appreciate the way their clients operate and hence to 
anticipate the implications of their recommendations. This can lead to unacceptable 
operating and personnel changes, risk or inconvenience to personnel, disruptions to 
production and changes in product quality. To the extent that mandatory 
assessments influence behaviour, there is the risk that managers will be pressured 
into investing in lower-return projects. 
As noted previously, the Commission considers that organisational and behavioural 
limitations/barriers are not a sufficient reason for government intervention. 
Governments’ attention would be better focused on continuing to promote a 
competitive environment within which firms focus on cost control as part of 
maximising shareholder value.  
It is doubtful too that the EEOA scheme could be justified on environmental 
grounds. It contains no incentives to address environmental objectives other than to 
avoid the possible embarrassment associated with publishing audit results. On the 
basis of the evidence currently before it, the Commission is not able to support this 
program. Furthermore, the Commission notes the inconsistencies that are now 
emerging between the EEOA and the recently announced (and similarly flawed) 
commitment by the New South Wales Government that requires large energy users 
in that state to separately undertake energy audits.  
Preventing access to energy-inefficient products 
Governments can prevent the sale of energy-inefficient products by using minimum 
standards. These standards apply to gas and electrical products through the MEPS 
program, and for residential buildings (and shortly, other buildings) through the 
Building Code (and State and Territory-specific standards).  
Minimum Energy Performance Standards 
MEPS apply to appliances such as refrigerators and freezers, air conditioners, 
electric water heaters, electric motors, lamp ballasts and so on. If appliances do not 
meet the minimum standard they cannot be sold in Australia. Some appliances are 
covered by both MEPS and by labelling (for example, refrigerators). These 
instruments can be complementary, with MEPS penalising the worst energy 
performers, and labelling rewarding the better performers. In practice, MEPS have 
sometimes been used quite aggressively to remove whole swathes of product from 
the market (albeit with advance notice), to achieve a step change in average energy 
efficiency.     
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Appliance standards have most relevance where products are purchased 
infrequently, consumers rarely inspect the appliances in the showroom, and split 
incentive problems are significant. These conditions may apply for appliances such 
as electric water heaters (where householders may have little influence on choice), 
but are less relevant for most other household appliances, such as refrigerators and 
freezers, and equipment used by commercial and industrial consumers. But it does 
not necessarily follow that minimum standards will achieve privately cost-effective 
outcomes for consumers purchasing such appliances. Indeed, it seems 
counterintuitive that a measure that denies consumers choice and can increase 
purchase prices could be in their interests.  
Notwithstanding these reservations, many ex ante assessments have alleged that 
MEPS can generate substantial savings in operating costs and net benefits overall 
for appliance users. But these assessments depend on what would have happened in 
the absence of MEPS, and this is largely unknowable. Clearly MEPS will have a 
dramatic effect when first introduced, but to the extent that they bring forward 
technological developments that would have occurred anyway, their effectiveness is 
limited.  
Furthermore, higher levels of energy efficiency may only be sustained through 
trading off other features that consumers value, cost cutting that affects quality, or 
increases in price. Many of these effects will go unnoticed because most consumers 
will be unaware of the (now unavailable) options. But that does not decrease their 
importance.  
Some participants argued that minimum standards are privately cost effective 
because they decrease the search costs associated with purchasing energy-efficient 
appliances. The presumption is that if consumers had the time and ability to search 
out the most energy-efficient appliance they would come to the same conclusion as 
the regulator. However, if information failures are the main problems, providing 
information — including through labelling — would be a less intrusive alternative.  
MEPS may also have adverse distributional effects. Consumers with limited capital 
may prefer to purchase a less-efficient but cheaper appliance even if it would cost 
them more to operate over its lifetime.  
A more practical problem with MEPS (and labelling), is in relating measures of 
energy efficiency to actual use. For ‘set and forget’ appliances (such as freezers and 
refrigerators), laboratory measurements of energy consumption are likely to relate 
reasonably closely to actual use. But where energy consumption is influenced more 
by the user than by the design of the appliance, this connection is more tenuous.      
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Although net social benefit should be the criterion by which such interventions are 
judged, the Commission considers that to the extent that private cost effectiveness is 
to continue to be an evaluation criterion, future MEPS need more rigorous analysis. 
Greater consideration also needs to be given to other policy instruments, including 
labelling. Furthermore, since abatement of greenhouse gases is the primary 
objective of MEPS, it would seem appropriate to give more emphasis to how well 
they achieve this objective. This is becoming more important as the opportunities 
for new privately cost-effective MEPS appear to be diminishing. The practice of 
always selecting standards on the basis of world’s best practice (or leading the 
world) also needs to be reconsidered as it can lead to over-engineered standards that 
excessively reduce private cost effectiveness.  
Building energy efficiency regulations 
The explicit objective of the energy efficiency regulations in the Building Code 
(and variations on these adopted by particular states and territories) is to achieve 
greenhouse gas abatement. But they have also been promoted as cost effective for 
householders and building owners to implement. In the Commission’s view, these 
regulations suffer from many of the same problems as appliance standards: they 
limit consumer choice (and innovation in design); add to costs; and may have 
adverse distributional effects.  
Assessments of building energy efficiency standards have invariably suggested that 
the standards will be cost effective for individual producers and consumers. Yet 
evidence is now appearing of compliance costs being much higher than expected. 
For example, the Victorian Government predicted that the cost of a new house 
would rise by 0.7–1.9 per cent, but a recent survey shows that the average cost 
increase has been 6  per  cent. And a survey by Master Builders Australia of its 
members revealed that the cost of a three-bedroom brick-veneer dwelling had 
increased by between $13 000 and $18 000, depending on design and location. In 
comparison, the Victorian Government had predicted an average cost increase 
of $3300. 
In addition, there appear to be serious doubts about the effectiveness of these 
regulations in improving energy efficiency in a systematic way. Buildings and their 
occupants are heterogeneous in nature and, other things being the same, no two 
occupants will use energy, or their buildings, in the same way. Assessments of 
building standards have largely overlooked the consequences of this heterogeneity 
by simulating energy savings for a limited number of building designs and types of 
occupant behaviour. Energy savings are also uncertain because standards can be 
difficult to enforce; there are various compliance methods and they lead to different     
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energy savings for a given building and occupant; and standards are not specified in 
terms of energy consumption. 
The Commission is concerned that the analytical basis for these regulations 
(computer simulations of energy loads within buildings in each climatic zone) may 
be flawed. When added to the emerging evidence on costs of compliance, the 
Commission considers that there is a compelling case for existing standards to be 
fully evaluated as a matter of urgency.  
The Commission also considers that it is vital to achieve national uniformity (but 
with appropriate allowance for climatic variation) with respect to the energy 
efficiency regulations in the Building Code. In this respect, it welcomes the recent 
commitment by the jurisdictions to a new intergovernmental agreement, and the 
expressed intention of the states and territories to implement measures to prevent 
local governments undermining the Building Code.  
A national energy efficiency target 
Another recent idea to promote energy efficiency is to implement a NEET. While 
no formal policy proposal is available, one general idea is that a NEET would 
require large energy users or retailers to achieve efficiency-related energy savings 
(compared to projected energy use under business-as-usual assumptions). While 
such targets could be voluntary, energy efficiency targets and related schemes 
implemented in Australia and internationally generally impose mandatory 
requirements on individual firms. A firm that failed to meet its mandatory target 
would be penalised. If trading was allowed, firms would be able to sell or purchase 
credits in a market for energy efficiency certificates (sometimes called white 
certificates). 
A NEET would not directly address the market failures that may account for the 
energy efficiency gap. There would also seem to be many practical difficulties 
involved with establishing business-as-usual baselines for each regulated entity, and 
with measuring improvements in energy efficiency against these baselines:  
•  There is the potential that firms that were already energy efficient could be the 
most disadvantaged by the introduction of a NEET.  
•  A NEET is likely to encourage gaming by firms — they would have a strong 
incentive to artificially inflate business-as-usual projections and delay energy 
efficiency improvements that are already in the pipeline. Certification of 
activities that would have occurred anyway (in the absence of a NEET) is likely 
to be prevalent.      
  OVERVIEW  XXXIX
 
•  Isolating energy savings resulting from energy efficiency measures from other 
influences on energy use — such as market and technological changes — is 
likely to be difficult. Consequently, verification of white certificates is likely to 
be time consuming and incur significant administration costs. 
Due to these difficulties, trading in white certificates would not allocate 
energy-saving obligations in an economically-efficient way. A NEET would alter 
investment patterns and encourage energy efficiency projects that are not privately 
cost effective under current expectations about energy prices. 
It is also unlikely that a NEET would be an appropriate policy to capture the wider 
social benefits (avoided costs) of greenhouse gas abatement. A NEET would not be 
the most directly-targeted instrument to address emissions, and is therefore unlikely 
to be the most efficient or cost-effective option. Notwithstanding European 
experiments with trade in energy efficiency (white), renewable energy (green) and 
greenhouse gas emissions (black) certificates, it is unlikely that a white certificate 
scheme would be a cost-effective complement to other measures to address 
greenhouse gas abatement objectives.  
Mandating investment 
At its most interventionist, government policy might require compulsory investment 
in technologies to achieve greater energy efficiency. This is a feature of the 
regulatory framework covering Victorian firms licensed by the Environment 
Protection Authority (EPA). Similarly, allowance has been made for mandating 
investment in a recently introduced NSW scheme that will require ‘designated’ 
energy users to undertake energy audits. Under the EPA scheme, firms seeking 
works approval for proposals involving energy use of 500 gigajoules per annum or 
more must undertake an audit, and are required to invest in projects that meet 
specified investment criteria (a three-year payback is the norm).  
Such requirements could distort firms’ investment decisions. Even if the audit 
assessment is accurate — and the proposed investment passes normal profitability 
criteria — the regulator is not required to assess whether the firm has access to the 
capital required or if the project represents the best use of that capital.  
Although justified primarily for their environmental objectives, these schemes also 
illustrate the preparedness of governments to force firms to supposedly ‘help 
themselves’. The Commission does not support this approach. A better approach 
might be to attach (explicitly justified) environmental-performance conditions to the 
licences of such firms and allow them to choose the means of achieving those 
objectives.     
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Energy market and transport reforms 
The Commission has been asked to examine energy efficiency in the context of 
other important reform agendas: the influence of energy market reforms; and 
transport. In both cases, there appear to be compelling economic reasons for 
building on the pro-competitive reforms introduced in these areas in the past. The 
direction of those reforms is fundamentally about getting the prices of energy and 
transport right, so that producers and consumers face appropriate signals that will 
lead to better resource allocation in the economy. This will influence energy 
efficiency, but energy efficiency is not the prime policy objective. Indeed, while 
many reforms in these areas will enhance overall community wellbeing, their 
impacts on energy efficiency may be small, zero or even negative. 
Energy market reforms  
Significant microeconomic reforms of electricity and gas markets have occurred 
under the aegis of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and various 
State and Territory Governments. Of most interest in this inquiry is the electricity 
industry, and the potential for achieving even more cost-reflective pricing in the 
future. Past reforms have driven down costs but little attention has been given to 
demand-side measures. A number of obstacles to more cost-reflective pricing of 
electricity remain. 
Retail price regulation  
Retail electricity prices are regulated in one form or another in all States and 
Territories (typically through price or revenue caps on tariffs for residential and 
small business users or though price-equalisation schemes). Without a price 
mechanism to moderate demand during periods of congestion and high wholesale 
prices for electricity, many consumers have little or no incentive to conserve 
electricity, invest in energy efficiency, or reschedule their use to off-peak times. The 
result is the overinvestment in infrastructure needed to meet the needs of the 
community for those relatively few hours in the year when demand peaks, and an 
undue dependence on non-price means of rationing demand. 
Many participants advocated the deregulation of retail pricing to allow more 
cost-reflective tariff arrangements to be introduced. There was a great deal of 
interest in time-of-use pricing and variations on this theme. While consumer 
demand is likely to be quite inelastic to increases (and decreases) in prices in the 
short term, there is potential for more significant medium to longer-term adjustment     
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as behaviour changes. The early results of trials being conducted in New South 
Wales illustrate that savings are being achieved.   
Some participants were concerned that competition might not yet be sufficiently 
robust to contain price rises. Others were concerned that adverse distributional 
effects would follow from unravelling the cross subsidies that exist in current tariff 
structures (for example, between small and large users and between urban and rural 
users). Distributional issues are clearly a concern for governments but, where 
hardship occurs, may be better addressed by more direct policy intervention, such as 
through explicitly funded community service obligations.  
The Commission strongly supports the deregulation of retail pricing of electricity, 
as soon as there is effective competition in retail and generation markets.  
However, the Commission notes that it will then largely be up to network operators 
and electricity retailers to decide how to translate wholesale prices into retail tariffs. 
To put time-of-day pricing into practice will require a substantial investment in 
metering technologies, and it is by no means clear that this will be worthwhile for 
all small customers. Ordinarily, this might seem to be a commercial decision for 
network operators, retailers and their customers to contemplate. However, it might 
be difficult for any one party to capture sufficient benefits to warrant making the 
investment unilaterally. There may be a case for government intervention to speed 
up the rate of adoption and address free-rider problems. Regulatory initiatives are 
already occurring in some States. For example, Victoria has mandated the roll out of 
interval meters in all new dwellings. 
‘Postage-stamp pricing’ of networks disguises location-based costs 
Price regulation of distribution and transmission networks generally involves cost 
averaging over classes of customers, including ‘postage-stamp’ pricing where the 
transmission charge is the same irrespective of the distance the electricity is 
transported. This can mean that users do not face the full (location-based) costs of 
delivering electricity to them. This may encourage the inefficient consumption of 
energy in some areas, while also discouraging distributed generation (that is, 
smaller-scale generators located close to local users).  
It is not straightforward what effect distributed generation could have on energy 
efficiency. Energy losses during transmission would be reduced, but for a given 
primary fuel type, the smaller generators involved are likely to have lower 
generation efficiencies than the traditional and much larger centralised generators. 
Energy efficiency may be enhanced where cogeneration opportunities allow the 
joint production of process steam and electricity. On the down side, distributed     
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generation can potentially lead to localised pollution impacts, which must be 
compared with the impacts of centralised generation.  
Disincentives to invest in demand-side management measures 
Some participants were concerned about regulatory disincentives for network 
operators to invest in demand-side management (for example, voluntary cuts in 
energy consumption, greater energy efficiency, or peak-load shifting) as an 
alternative to expanding their networks. There can be more incentive for network 
operators to invest in poles and wires than to invest the time and effort in 
demand-side measures that will lose them sales revenue, particularly if regulated 
prices make allowances for such capital expenditures. The Commission supports the 
actions of some regulators to address this bias through measures that attempt to 
recognise revenues forgone as a result of demand-side management measures. Peak-
load congestion in the distribution systems might be more cost effectively addressed 
through demand-side management than through expanding the network, especially 
where the new capacity will only be utilised for a few hours per year. 
Does transport reform improve energy efficiency? 
Most important energy efficiency improvements in transport flow from policies 
which have major objectives other than energy efficiency. For example, the primary 
rationale for congestion pricing of road usage is that it will achieve valuable time 
savings, but it will also have some fuel efficiency benefits. Similarly, improved 
regulatory environments for road freight and the rail industry offer significant 
productivity gains and are also likely to provide energy efficiency improvements 
within each sector as well.  
Efficient road pricing to alleviate congestion, at least in some cities at some times, 
could deliver significant net benefits (including improved fuel efficiency). Analysis 
by the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics suggests that substantial net 
social benefits could be achieved from implementing congestion pricing at least in 
Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. Continued reform and improvements in 
passenger public transport should accompany any road pricing initiatives.  
There is scope for further regulatory improvements in road transport, although the 
road agenda has progressed much further than rail. These additional reforms may 
permit the more flexible and efficient use of larger trucks (B-doubles and triples), 
which would increase the average fuel efficiency of road freight. But whether such 
changes should be made will depend on many other factors as well (road safety, 
road damage, noise, etc) — energy efficiency is but one consideration.      
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Improvements in the economic efficiency of the rail sector would improve energy 
efficiency directly and, by shifting demand from road to rail, would be likely to 
increase national energy efficiency further. But again, other factors would need to 
be considered, in addition to energy efficiency. 
The existing voluntary fuel target for the Australian vehicle fleet seems a fairly 
innocuous policy. And the compulsory fuel and greenhouse gas label scheme gives 
consumers low-cost information that might not have been provided so extensively 
or in such a reliable, comparable and easy-to-access form by the market. As these 
schemes do not compel consumers and producers to move to more energy-efficient 
vehicles, any improvements they encourage should be privately cost effective. Both 
schemes are part of the environmental strategy for the motor vehicle industry and 
hence have broader objectives than financial benefits to consumers. 
The way the fringe benefits tax on company cars and parking is calculated provides 
encouragement to overuse those vehicles. However, any change to this arrangement 
would require balancing any reductions in the administrative efficiency of the tax 
system against the benefits of removing this distortion, including increased energy 
efficiency, and greenhouse gas and air pollution abatement. 
The influence of urban planning on transport-related energy efficiency is included 
in the terms of reference for the inquiry. Planning is a very broad and complex 
process that should be focused on optimising outcomes (including transport) for 
individuals and firms (within the constraints of the private and social costs of 
meeting desired locational decisions). Energy-efficient transport solutions should be 
only one of the many considerations in urban planning. 
Greater use of ‘intelligent transport systems’ (for example, coordinating traffic 
lights on major roads, traffic lights responding to traffic flows, more sophisticated 
scheduling of public transport) might offer some energy efficiency gains as well as 
other vehicle cost savings and reduced travel times. However, where government 
funding is involved, these investments need to meet benefit–cost criteria. 
The Commission’s recent review of national competition policy recommended as 
national priorities further separate inquiries into freight and passenger transport. 
These would be useful forums within which the issues raised in this inquiry with 
respect to transport could be further explored. 
Concluding comments 
Energy efficiency improvements that are privately cost effective are true ‘no 
regrets’ measures — the individual producer or consumer concerned saves costs and     
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the (global) community benefits from reduced pollution, including greenhouse gas 
abatement. There is no doubt that such opportunities exist. But the potential for 
making such improvements, and the scope for governments to efficiently intervene 
to address barriers and impediments preventing their uptake, appears to be modest. 
In many cases, the improvements are not as cost effective for individual producers 
and consumers as they might seem, once all of the costs (including the opportunity 
cost of using those funds elsewhere) are considered. And few of the many perceived 
barriers and impediments are areas where government intervention is justified.  
There is nevertheless a reasonable case to be made for governments to address 
information failures. Supplying information directly, or requiring market 
participants to provide information indirectly, is warranted in some cases. But it is 
more contentious to argue that mandatory measures (such as the EEOAs) should be 
introduced to force producers and consumers to take up opportunities that are 
ostensibly in their own interests. Mandatory measures not only override consumer 
and producer sovereignty but are inconsistent with the proposition that energy 
efficiency improvements are privately cost effective. They should be used with 
some caution and only where broader benefits are clearly demonstrable.  
None of this is to deny that firms and individuals are sometimes not acting as 
rationally as they might. Energy efficiency opportunities are sometimes overlooked, 
but so too are other income-raising or cost-saving measures. There is nothing 
intrinsically different about energy in this regard; nor does failure to take up such 
opportunities necessarily warrant policy intervention.  
In a policy environment where emissions trading or carbon tax options are 
struggling to gain widespread acceptance, energy efficiency policies and programs 
have been pursued with some vigour. Building on the presumption that many 
energy efficiency improvements are privately cost effective and that the many 
existing programs are well founded, the MCE and the various Australian 
jurisdictions have been pushing ahead with new policy proposals. The nine-point 
plan endorsed by the MCE as NFEE Stage One would appear to be just the 
beginning. Although some existing and proposed programs appear to be well 
founded, others do not.  
The Commission considers that the NFEE is a promising framework for developing 
a sound, coordinated approach to energy efficiency policy. However, neither the 
MCE nor the jurisdictions involved appear to have an adequate information or 
analytical base on which to make good policy choices at present. Indeed, few 
programs in this area seem to have been rigorously evaluated.  
Formal, independent evaluation of key programs would help establish the 
knowledge base needed for considering the way ahead. These should all be made     
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publicly available. The Commission recommends that Stage One proposals of the 
NFEE that expand the scope of existing programs (to new jurisdictions or products) 
should only proceed after the net social benefit of those programs has been 
established and a convincing case can be made for their expansion. The enthusiasm 
for tightening the energy efficiency regulations in the Building Code without having 
first tested the effectiveness of existing regulations, is a case in point. 
An alternative perspective can be brought to bear on energy efficiency policy — 
namely that government intervention might be warranted for its pollution-abatement 
benefits. Even if some measures are not cost effective for individual producers and 
consumers, they might result in a net social benefit (after considering the costs of 
government intervention) and hence warrant action by governments. However, it is 
not clear that directly targeting energy efficiency is the best, or only, response that 
should be made to address greenhouse gas and other environmental externalities. A 
consideration of other approaches is outside the scope of this inquiry.  
What is apparent from this inquiry, however, is that the objectives of energy 
efficiency policy need to be clarified and private cost effectiveness placed in a more 
realistic light. The temptation has been to overstate the private cost-effectiveness 
aspect of energy efficiency programs when public benefits from greenhouse gas 
abatement often seem to be the real policy target. Clarifying objectives will also 
influence the instruments that are chosen. As the Commission has argued in this 
report and elsewhere, piecemeal responses to greenhouse gas externalities have the 
potential to be costly and ineffective. A coherent, soundly-based national response 
is required. 
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 Findings and recommendations 
General 
 
Cross-country comparisons of energy intensity must be used with caution, given 
that the observed levels of energy intensity of any economy reflect local 
circumstances, including climate, energy prices and economic structure. 
Failures in markets for energy efficiency technologies can inhibit the adoption of 
energy efficiency improvements at current (and expected) energy prices: 
•  imperfect information (including asymmetries of information) and split incentive 
problems can lead to the non-adoption of energy efficiency improvements that 
are privately cost effective; and  
•  positive externalities associated with research and development and 
demonstration projects can limit the adoption of energy efficiency improvements 
that are socially but not privately cost effective. 
Government intervention may be warranted on these grounds if the social benefits 
of intervention exceed the social costs. 
The case for government intervention rests primarily on the benefits of reducing 
harmful environmental externalities. 
Behavioural, cultural and organisational barriers do not of themselves provide a 
rationale for government intervention. Understanding these barriers may, however, 
be helpful in designing efficiency programs that address environmental 
externalities, information failures and other sources of market failure. 
FINDING 3.1 
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FINDING 4.2     
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FINDING 4.3 
Barriers and impediments, such as risk and uncertainty, asset replacement costs 
and implementation costs, increase the costs to energy users of adopting energy 
efficiency improvements. However, the role of governments in addressing these 
issues may be quite limited. 
Numerous case studies have found that producers and consumers fail to adopt some 
energy efficiency improvements that appear to be cost effective for them. However, 
there is considerable uncertainty about the estimated potential savings, because the 
case studies use many questionable assumptions, including the: 
•  criterion used to determine cost effectiveness (such as a simple payback period); 
•  use of a social discount rate rather than private discount rates that reflect the 
range of individuals’ circumstances; 
•  level of business-as-usual improvements in energy efficiency; 
•  costs associated with energy efficiency improvements; 
•  extrapolation of audit and best-practice study results to a whole sector; and 
•  representativeness of simulated producers and consumers. 
Appliance labels and standards 
Appliance energy-performance labels have some influence on consumers after they 
have short-listed products on the basis of characteristics such as price, 
performance, capacity and style. While the benefits of labelling may have been 
overstated in regulation impact assessments, it is likely to have produced net 
benefits for consumers. 
Future regulation impact assessments of appliance minimum energy performance 
standards (MEPS) should include a more comprehensive analysis of: 
•  whether MEPS reduce competition and how this affects prices and service 
quality; 
•  why individuals — with guidance from an energy-performance label — are 
not best placed to judge what is in their best interests;  
•  whether a disendorsement label and/or voluntary standard would be a more 
cost-effective policy; and 
FINDING 5.1 
FINDING 9.1 
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•  the distributional impacts, including the extent to which MEPS are regressive 
and prevent consumers from buying products that are more cost effective for 
them. 
The extent to which individuals are forced to forgo product features they value 
more highly than energy efficiency should also be reported in regulation impact 
assessments if MEPS are to continue to be promoted as privately cost effective. 
Building ratings and standards 
The Australian Greenhouse Office plans to commission an ex post evaluation of the 
ACT home energy-rating scheme on behalf of all Australian governments. The 
results should inform the Ministerial Council on Energy decision to mandate 
building energy ratings across Australia. 
There is considerable uncertainty about the extent to which building standards have 
reduced energy consumption and emissions. In addition, it is doubtful that the net 
financial benefits predicted in regulation impact assessments have been achieved in 
practice. The limited available evidence suggests that the costs of current standards 
have been much higher than were predicted. 
The Australian Building Codes Board should, as a matter of urgency, 
commission an independent ex post evaluation of building energy efficiency 
standards to determine: 
•  how effective the standards have been in reducing actual (not simulated) 
energy consumption; and 
•  whether the financial benefits to individual producers and consumers have 
outweighed the associated costs. 
This evaluation should include the standards for residential buildings in New 
South Wales (BASIX), Victoria (5 star) and the ACT (ACTHERS), as well as the 
national standards in the Building Code of Australia.  
FINDING 10.1  
FINDING 10.2  
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Commercial and industrial 
Government should not become directly involved in accreditation of energy 
consultants and energy service companies because this function can be adequately 
performed by an industry or professional association. 
The need for special energy efficiency research and development funds has not been 
substantiated. Sourcing funds from existing more general research and development 
programs enables contestability between proposals and selection of those yielding 
the greatest net benefit. 
The Commission does not support the provision of direct subsidies to firms to 
undertake energy efficiency improvements that would be privately cost effective for 
those firms. Subsidies may, however, have a role in encouraging the uptake of 
improvements that have important spillover effects. In such cases this policy 
mechanism should be evaluated against other policies pursuing the same objective. 
The case for government subsidies to encourage energy efficiency improvements 
should be separated from the means of funding those subsidies, such as by 
hypothecated levies. 
The policy of mandating assessments of energy efficiency opportunities is not 
warranted on private cost-effectiveness grounds. The demonstration effects that 
might be achieved by this policy could be pursued more effectively and at less cost 
by voluntary programs.  
Private cost effectiveness should not be a rationale for requiring firms to 
implement any recommendations arising from the Energy Efficiency 
Opportunities Assessments.   
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Governments as energy users 
Addressing cost-effective energy efficiency in procurement policies, provided there 
is sufficient flexibility, could lead to environmental benefits and a small increase in 
the overall efficiency and effectiveness of government operations. There may be 
some additional benefits through demonstration effects and market development, 
but these are unlikely to justify procurement decisions that are not cost effective for 
government operations. Moving beyond cost-effectiveness criteria may be justified 
on other grounds (such as greenhouse gas abatement), but this would require an 
evaluation that incorporated these broader considerations. 
Energy-intensity performance indicators, or targets, can help identify opportunities 
for cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency. Performance indicators are 
preferable because they provide less incentive to adopt measures that are not cost 
effective.  
Transport 
Markets provide extensive information to consumers regarding fuel consumption of 
motor vehicles. Nonetheless, the Australian Government’s Fuel Consumption 
Labelling Scheme and Green Vehicle Guide provide relatively low cost, accessible 
and comparable information to consumers, and may be justified as part of the more 
fundamental objective of encouraging consumers to reduce the adverse 
environmental impacts of motor vehicle use. 
Fleetwide fuel consumption targets for new motor vehicles sold in Australia are 
likely to have had only a limited impact on the fuel efficiency of the new vehicle 
fleet. Significantly tightening such targets and making them compulsory would be 
likely to impose additional costs on consumers. 
Efficient road congestion pricing would lead to communitywide, cost effective 
increases in energy efficiency. However, these gains will not be privately cost 
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fuel would also provide significant local environmental benefits and reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
Australian governments should investigate the feasibility of introducing 
congestion pricing where it is likely to improve the economic efficiency of road 
use (including greater energy efficiency). It may be appropriate for such a study 
to be incorporated in a wider examination of efficient road pricing or in a review 
of passenger transport reform as a whole. 
The TravelSmart program improves the energy efficiency of transport by providing 
consumers with information regarding less fuel-intensive travel options and means 
to reduce the need to travel. TravelSmart simultaneously addresses several policy 
issues — greenhouse gases, air pollution, and personal health and fitness — in a 
way that allows consumers to choose which options are most cost effective for them. 
There remains some scope for additional regulatory reform within both the road 
and rail sectors, that would improve overall efficiency and is likely to lead to some 
increase in energy efficiency within each sector. Some individual reforms may alter 
the competitive position of road freight compared to rail. This may change the 
energy efficiency of the overall freight task, in some cases reducing energy 
efficiency overall. However, this would not be an appropriate reason for delaying 
such reforms.  
Role of energy market reform 
The real costs of supplying electricity to final users vary significantly in terms of 
both the time and location of its use. Regulatory arrangements governing the 
transmission, distribution and retail price of electricity insulate consumers from 
these variations and dampen demand-side responses. 
Removing retail price caps (as soon as effective competition has been established), 
and exploring opportunities to improve the efficacy of price setting arrangements 
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More cost-reflective pricing should improve energy efficiency in peak-load periods, 
particularly in the longer term when consumers have both more information, and 
the opportunity to modify their behaviour, and suppliers can respond to changed 
market conditions. This would be facilitated by a roll out of ‘smart’ meters. 
Any mandated roll out of ‘smart’ metering devices should be subject to a 
comprehensive benefit–cost analysis. Mandated roll out of technologies should 
not preclude choice in the device or competition between service providers. 
Coordination 
National uniformity has been achieved in the regulation of energy labelling and 
minimum energy performance standards for electrical appliances and the same is 
planned for gas appliances. To the extent that appliance regulation is justifiable, 
national uniformity is appropriate.  
The current State and Territory-based variations in energy efficiency standards for 
new houses increase costs for the building and building products industries. The 
case for such variations appears to be weak. 
Australian, State and Territory Governments and the Australian Building Codes 
Board should examine ways to prevent local governments creating variations in 
minimum energy efficiency standards for buildings. 
A review of the requirements on firms to report on their energy use and greenhouse 
gas emissions has the potential to reduce compliance costs. The review should 
consider whether the information currently collected serves a useful purpose as well 
as examining opportunities to harmonise reporting formats and data definitions. 
The National Framework for Energy Efficiency will improve national coordination 
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enhanced by greater clarity on the rationale for, and the objectives of, government 
intervention and by more rigorous evaluation of existing policies and programs.  
Stage One proposals of the National Framework for Energy Efficiency that 
expand the scope of existing programs (to new jurisdictions or products) should 
only proceed after the net social benefits of those programs has been established 
and a convincing case can be made for their expansion. Evaluations should also 
consider the impact on private cost effectiveness.  
A national energy efficiency target, based on an annual requirement for major users 
of stationary energy (or energy retailers) to generate or otherwise acquire a target 
level of energy efficiency related savings, can not be justified on the grounds of 
privately cost-effective energy efficiency. It may help to drive investment in energy 
efficiency, but this would be at the expense of economic efficiency. It would also be 
very difficult and costly to implement effectively.   
As a measure to address greenhouse gas abatement, a national energy efficiency 
target has serious disadvantages compared to other more directly-targeted policy 
options. It is unlikely to complement those options, and could reduce the overall 
economic efficiency with which a greenhouse gas abatement objective is met. 
A national energy efficiency target, based on an annual requirement for major 
users of stationary energy (or energy retailers) to generate or otherwise acquire a 
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 1  Introduction 
 
Key points 
•  The Productivity Commission was asked to inquire into the economic and 
environmental potential offered by energy efficiency improvements that are ‘cost 
effective for individual producers and consumers’. 
•  Energy efficiency improvements have attracted considerable attention because of 
the perception that they can be win-win options: that is, they potentially achieve 
private cost savings for the producers or consumers concerned, improved economic 
performance, and environmental benefits through pollution abatement. 
•  The predominant focus of the inquiry is on the policy implications of the various 
barriers and impediments that are said to be preventing the adoption of these 
privately cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency. 
•  This is not an inquiry into global climate change or the least-cost options for 
greenhouse gas abatement.  
•  A National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE) has been developed to 
increase energy efficiency and lower greenhouse gas emissions. Stage One of the 
NFEE focuses on further development and greater national coordination of a range 
of energy efficiency programs, to both reduce compliance costs and improve 
outcomes. Nonetheless, most jurisdictions have their own policy frameworks which 
at times create interjurisdictional inconsistencies.  
•  The Commission consulted widely during this inquiry. It held two rounds of public 
hearings at which there were 61 presentations and received 155 submissions as 
well as holding informal discussions with over 30 organisations. 
 
Energy efficiency has long been a policy issue, first because of concerns about the 
depletion of fossil fuels leading to energy scarcity and, more recently, because of 
attributed links between fossil-fuel use and climate change. Policy interest has been 
heightened by the recent ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and attempts to negotiate 
more comprehensive longer-term international agreements to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
In this context, certain energy efficiency improvements are perceived to offer a 
win-win or ‘no regrets’ solution to conserving energy: they are good for the 
environment and because they are privately cost effective they are good for the 
firms or households concerned. The paradox is that if energy efficiency     
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improvements are privately cost effective, and hence in the interests of any rational 
producer or consumer, firm or household, why do they not spontaneously occur? 
Are there barriers or impediments preventing the market from working efficiently? 
What role is there for government? Answering these questions is important in 
framing a policy response that will provide net benefits for the community. The 
scope for appropriate policy intervention to encourage the greater uptake of 
cost-effective energy efficiency improvements is the focus of this inquiry. 
1.1   Scope of inquiry 
The Australian Government has asked the Productivity Commission (the 
Commission) to conduct an inquiry into the economic and environmental potential 
offered by energy efficiency improvements that are ‘cost effective for individual 
producers and consumers’. The scope of this inquiry is set by the Government’s 
terms of reference and the Commission’s approach, as set out in its authorising 
legislation, the Productivity Commission Act 1998 (Cwlth).  
The terms of reference 
The terms of reference are extensive and in effect constitute a series of mini 
inquiries. In summary, the Commission is required to consider: 
•  the impacts of barriers and impediments to improved energy efficiency; 
•  a range of different policy instruments including standards, labelling, 
information provision, financial incentives, energy-market reforms (for example, 
the development of better price signals) and a national energy efficiency target; 
•  existing and recent government energy efficiency programs, including the level 
of coordination between those programs; and 
•  policy options for improving energy efficiency within different sectors, 
including the commercial and industrial, consumers and householders, 
government (as a user), and transport sectors. 
The scope of the inquiry is largely determined by the focus of the terms of reference 
on energy efficiency improvements that are ‘cost effective for individual producers 
and consumers’. The terms of reference also require the Commission to comment 
on the economic and environmental costs and benefits of such privately 
cost-effective energy efficiency improvements.  
A further consideration is that the Commission’s enabling legislation requires it to 
take an economywide view that considers all costs and benefits, including the costs     
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of government intervention. However, the terms of reference imply that this 
economywide framework should apply to only those energy efficiency 
improvements that appear to be privately worthwhile but are not being taken up 
because of barriers or impediments facing individual producers or consumers. There 
may well be a broader set of energy efficiency improvements that would be justified 
on the grounds of net social benefit (including environmental benefits) but these are 
not the principle policy focus of this inquiry. The most appropriate means of 
achieving such energy efficiency improvements would need to be examined afresh 
as part of the possible policy mix to best address these environmental issues. 
Barriers and impediments 
Many technical experts perceive a significant gap between current levels of energy 
efficiency and the levels that are privately cost effective. This energy efficiency gap 
is usually explained by barriers and impediments. However, it is plausible that the 
actual gap is, in reality, much smaller than some of the technical experts believe — 
they may have overestimated the benefits or underestimated the various costs of 
achieving the energy efficiency improvements they believe are warranted.  
The pursuit of privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements would seem 
to be consistent with the self interest of any rational producer or consumer. And yet 
the issue at the heart of this inquiry is why producers and consumers do not react in 
this manner. The presumption that various barriers and impediments must be at 
work, and further that these require government intervention to close the gap, 
requires careful consideration. Barriers can arise for different reasons, and not all 
barriers suggest the need for such intervention. Government intervention is not 
costless for producers, consumers or taxpayers. If inappropriately introduced or 
poorly implemented, it can also create unintended distortions in the marketplace. 
(Barriers and impediments are discussed in more detail chapter  4 and, where 
relevant, in chapters 6 to 11 dealing with particular sectors or programs.) 
The influence of energy prices 
The impact on energy efficiency of the various barriers and impediments considered 
in this report will depend partly on current energy prices and consumers’ and 
producers’ expectations regarding future prices. However, the Commission has also 
considered the impact of possible distortions in the pricing of energy on the 
potential for privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements. The prices 
paid by energy users may not accurately reflect the costs of production and 
consumption of that energy due to factors such as the regulatory frameworks 
governing the energy industries, limited competition in some sectors of energy     
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production and distribution or due to government ownership of some energy sector 
producers (chapter 14).  
While changes to energy prices will influence the economically-efficient amount of 
investment in energy efficiency, they do not change the underlying nature of 
barriers and impediments that exist at currently-expected prices.  
Unpriced externalities (such as greenhouse gas emissions) in energy production and 
use are likely to mean that privately cost-effective levels of energy use (including 
the level of energy efficiency) differ from socially desirable levels. Policies for 
dealing with such externalities are beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
This is not an inquiry into climate change policies 
This inquiry is occurring at a time of great interest in the environmental 
implications of greenhouse gas emissions. While decreasing Australia’s 
‘greenhouse signature’ is mentioned in the terms of reference, the Commission has 
not been asked to comment on the Australian Government’s policy response to 
climate change. However, the role of privately cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements in decreasing greenhouse gas emissions as well as other 
environmental effects, such as reducing urban air pollution, is recognised. 
Apart from achieving currently privately cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements, there are many other ways to achieve greenhouse gas abatement, 
including: reducing land clearing; storing carbon dioxide in geological strata; 
increasing the use of energy from renewable and/or nuclear sources; and increasing 
energy conservation and energy efficiency by increasing the prices of carbon fuels. 
Policies to encourage cost-effective energy efficiency improvements can play a role, 
but this inquiry does not address the appropriate mix of abatement options or what 
should be the overall abatement objective.  
Influence of regulation impact statements on scope of inquiry 
Many participants in this inquiry misunderstood the Commission’s role in vetting 
regulation impact assessments though its Office of Regulation Review (ORR). 
Some felt that it was inappropriate for the Commission, in the course of this inquiry, 
to question or otherwise analyse the results of Regulation Impact Statements (RISs) 
that it had already assessed. However, RISs for initiatives such as MEPS and 
amendments to the Building Code contain a great deal of analysis and insight into 
how the government has approached the development of energy efficiency policy. 
They have been an important resource for this inquiry.      
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Just as importantly, what those RISs recommended has not in any way constrained 
the scope of this inquiry. This is because the ORR’s role is to provide advice and 
assistance on the preparation of these RISs and to monitor compliance with COAG 
guidelines (COAG 2004, attachment A). While this involves assessing whether a 
RIS meets minimum adequacy standards, the ORR does not verify the data or 
methodology underlying a RIS nor does the ORR comment on the merits of the 
regulation being considered. 
1.2 Policy  background 
This section briefly discusses some of the recent background to energy efficiency 
policy in Australia and the institutional framework for implementing those policies. 
Further detail is provided in appendix B. 
Greenhouse policy 
The increasing interest in energy efficiency policy in Australia has been closely 
linked to greenhouse gas abatement objectives. Various Australian, State and 
Territory Government greenhouse gas abatement programs were developed during 
the 1990s, culminating in the National Greenhouse Strategy (NGS) in 1998. Several 
components of the NGS involve improving energy efficiency in the government, 
industrial, power generation, commercial, residential and transport sectors. In this 
regard, the NGS focuses on: 
… cost-effective ways to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions in particular through ‘no 
regrets’ actions. The actions will deliver substantial non-greenhouse benefits to 
Australia. (AGO 1998, p. ix) 
Since the inception of the NGS, all jurisdictions have separately developed their 
own greenhouse abatement strategies, including measures to increase energy 
efficiency. In June  2005, COAG agreed to set up a Senior Officials’ group to 
examine the scope for national cooperation on climate change policy, particularly in 
areas of common ground between jurisdictions. The group will consider the scope 
for improving investment certainty for business, encouraging renewable energy and 
enhancing cooperation in areas such as technology development, energy efficiency 
and adaptation.  
At the international level, greenhouse policy has been largely progressed under the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. The Protocol established individual country targets for industrialised 
countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 2012. The Protocol 
formally came into force for ratifying countries in 2005, following its ratification by     
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countries that produced 55  per  cent of industrialised country emissions in 1990. 
Australia has signed but not ratified the Protocol, but nonetheless has committed to 
meeting its agreed emissions target of 8 per cent above 1990 levels by 2008–12. 
In 2005, Australia joined with the United States, China, India, Japan and South 
Korea in establishing the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate. The partnership will collaborate to develop and deploy existing and 
emerging cost-effective, cleaner energy technology and practices. Energy efficiency 
is one of a wide range of possible areas for cooperation between the members. 
Energy efficiency policy 
In 2001, COAG established the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) to take 
responsibility for national energy policy including energy security, energy market 
reform and energy efficiency. In doing so, it considers both economic and 
environmental issues. The MCE established the Energy Efficiency Working Group 
(EEWG) to advise it on the performance of end-use energy efficiency policies and 
programs.  
EEWG has developed a package of measures within a National Framework for 
Energy Efficiency (NFEE). These Stage One measures were announced by the 
MCE in August 2004 and consist of nine groups of measures designed to improve 
coordination among jurisdictions in delivering energy efficiency programs 
(box  1.1). Nonetheless, policy and implementation decisions remain at the 
discretion of individual jurisdictions.  
A number of participants were of the view that measures in NFEE Stage One were 
not to be re-evaluated in the current inquiry. However, the terms of reference direct 
the Commission to consider existing and recent government energy efficiency 
programs, which clearly includes NFEE Stage One. 
Further measures, including the possibility of incentives to encourage greater 
energy efficiency, are to be considered under a Stage Two NFEE (MCE 2004e). 
The EEWG has also developed administrative guidelines for appliance labelling and 
performance. These are administered by the National Appliance and Equipment 
Energy Efficiency Committee (NAEEEC) which comprises officials from 
jurisdictional agencies responsible for administering energy-performance labelling 
and performance standards. It is responsible for managing Australian end-use 
energy efficiency programs including mandatory minimum energy performance 
standards (MEPS) and mandatory energy labelling (appendix E).      
  INTRODUCTION  7
 
Box 1.1  National Framework for Energy Efficiency Stage One 
There were nine packages included in NFEE Stage One:  
•  Tightening  residential building energy efficiency regulation (including through 
nationally consistent standards for new buildings and major renovations, and the 
mandatory disclosure of energy performance at time of sale or lease). 
•  Introducing commercial building energy efficiency regulation (including nationally 
consistent standards for new and refurbished buildings, and the mandatory 
disclosure of energy performance at time of sale or lease). 
•  Raising awareness of senior management in the commercial and industrial 
sectors (including through mandatory audits for large energy users, and training and 
accreditation for energy auditors).  
•  Imposing additional requirements on governments (including through developing 
consistent measuring and reporting, establishing standards for government 
buildings and developing best practice models). 
•  Extending labelling and standards for electrical appliances and applying the same 
regulatory approach to gas appliances. 
•  Developing and integrating energy efficiency training and accreditation for key 
trades and professions that influence energy efficiency outcomes. 
•  Developing  commercial and industrial sector capability building (for example, 
through establishing best practice networks and generating highly visible examples 
of energy efficient equipment or processes). 
•  Raising consumer awareness (for example, through requiring energy retailers to 
report data on energy bills, promotional campaigns and through curriculum 
development for schools). 
•  Increasing finance sector awareness (for example, through providing tools for the 
valuation and risk assessment of finance proposals). 
Source: MCE (2004e). 
 
 
In 2004, the Australian Government (2004) released a white paper on energy policy. 
This included energy efficiency issues covering a range of new and existing energy 
efficiency policies (subsequently incorporated in NFEE Stage One) and the Solar 
Cities trial incorporating energy efficiency measures and more effective signalling 
of energy market prices.  
There have been significant changes in regulation and operation of Australian 
energy markets since 1990 which may impact on energy efficiency policy and 
outcomes. In both the gas and electricity sector the provision of services by 
vertically-integrated government monopolies has been dismantled. While details 
vary between jurisdictions, gas and electricity utilities have been structurally     
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separated and corporatised or privatised and competitive neutrality reforms 
introduced where some government ownership was maintained. Pricing has become 
more cost reflective and some cross subsidies between regions and groups of users 
have been removed. Discriminatory entry barriers have been removed and 
wholesale, and in some cases retail, customers have been given greater freedom of 
choice of suppliers.  
A national electricity market and a gas access regime have been established, 
promoting increased interstate trade and competition in energy. The development of 
these markets is ongoing with reviews of the national energy markets for gas and 
electricity (COAG 2002), the Gas Access Regime (PC 2004c) and the wholesale gas 
market (Allen Consulting 2005b) proposing further reforms to improve the 
efficiency of the markets.  
1.3  Conduct of the inquiry 
The Commission received the terms of reference for this inquiry on 31  August 
2004. The inquiry has been completed within the scheduled 12 months, including 
both a draft and a final report. As required by the terms of reference, and in line 
with normal inquiry procedures, the Commission has encouraged public 
participation in this inquiry. The Commission: 
•  advertised the inquiry widely and sent a circular to individuals and organisations 
thought likely to be interested; 
•  released an issues paper in September  2004 to assist participants to prepare 
submissions to the inquiry; 
•  held informal discussions with a wide range of organisations and individuals; 
•  encouraged written submissions — a total of 155 submissions were received, 85 
before the release of the draft report and 70 in response to the draft report;  
•  released a draft report for public comment in April 2005; and 
•  held two rounds of public hearings in Sydney, Brisbane, Canberra and 
Melbourne and by teleconference — initial hearings in November 2004 in which 
39 participants took part and post draft report hearings in May and June 2005 in 
which 22 participants took part. 
The Commission thanks all participants for their contributions to this inquiry. Those 
who attended informal discussions, made submissions and participated in hearings 
are listed in appendix A.     









•  The underlying goal of policy is to improve community wellbeing. Using resources in 
the most economically efficient way will contribute to this goal. Government 
intervention may be warranted to address market failures that prevent the 
economically efficient allocation of resources. 
•  A policy is generally described as ‘cost effective’ if it generates a net benefit. 
However, implementing a cost-effective policy will not necessarily improve overall 
economic efficiency.  
•  Energy efficiency improves if energy use decreases but the level of useful output or 
outcome stays the same, or increases. An energy efficiency improvement is 
‘privately cost effective’ if it generates a net benefit for the individual undertaking the 
improvement. Not all energy efficiency improvements are privately cost effective, 
nor are they necessarily economically efficient. 
•  Individuals face tradeoffs between using resources to improve energy efficiency, 
and using those resources to undertake other activities, some of which may 
generate greater private benefits. 
•  Some energy efficiency improvements may generate net social benefits but do not 
result in net benefits for the individual.  
•  Private cost effectiveness is not a sufficient basis for making policy decisions. 
However, understanding the various barriers to privately cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements — and where it is appropriate for government to intervene 
— is an important step in designing policies that would capture the wider social 
benefits of energy efficiency.  
 
 
The Commission recognises that government intervention should aim to improve 
community wellbeing, and not necessarily be limited by private cost effectiveness. 
However, as discussed in chapter 1, the terms of reference for this particular inquiry 
explicitly direct the Commission to consider energy efficiency improvements that 
are privately cost-effective — they being a subset of all possible energy efficiency 
improvements.     
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In this chapter, the Commission outlines how the policies to address privately 
cost-effective energy efficiency improvements are assessed within the broader 
process of policy design and assessment.  
2.1  Economic efficiency and the role of government 
intervention 
In this inquiry, the Commission has applied its economywide charter to the 
assessment of privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements. 
Underpinning this approach is a wide public perspective and an underlying goal of 
improving the wellbeing of the community. The framework for assessing the overall 
impacts of policy interventions on society — and where it is appropriate to 
intervene — are described in this section. 
Economic efficiency and cost effectiveness 
‘Economic efficiency’ and ‘cost effectiveness’ are concepts used extensively to 
evaluate the overall effect of policies and programs on the economy. However, 
these concepts are not interchangeable. 
Essentially, the concept of overall economic efficiency is about ensuring individuals 
in society maximise their utility, given all resources (including, but not limited to, 
energy) available in the economy. Increasing economic efficiency is necessary to 
achieve the ultimate goal of policy or regulatory endeavours — which is to improve 
the wellbeing and living standards of the community.  
Overall economic efficiency requires satisfaction of productive, allocative and 
dynamic efficiency (box 2.1): 
•  Maximum productive efficiency requires that goods and services be produced at 
the lowest possible cost. This is a question of the input mix used to produce the 
output of any good or service. 
•  Maximum allocative efficiency requires the production of the set of goods and 
services that consumers value most, from a given set of resources. This is a 
question of the output mix of the economy.  
•  Greater dynamic efficiency means that consumers are offered, over time, new 
and better products, and existing products at lower cost. 
An activity is economically efficient if there is no other use of the resources that 
would yield a higher value or net benefit. More commonly, an activity is said to be 
economically inefficient if its costs (including all costs associated with social and     





environmental externalities) exceed its benefits; or if it can be shown that the 
resources could be used to produce something with a higher net benefit. 
 
Box 2.1  Components of economic efficiency 
Economic efficiency is about maximising the wellbeing of the members of the 
community. Economic efficiency requires satisfaction of three components.  
Productive efficiency is achieved when output is produced at minimum cost. It 
incorporates technical efficiency, which refers to the extent to which, in the production 
of any good or service, it is technically feasible to reduce any input without decreasing 
the output, and without increasing any other input. If waste is avoided in this way, 
improvements in productive efficiency can generate more income and improve living 
standards. 
Allocative efficiency is about ensuring that the community gets the greatest return (very 
broadly defined) from its scarce resources. A nation’s resources can be used in many 
different ways. The best or ‘most efficient’ allocation of resources is the one that 
contributes most to community wellbeing. Improvements in allocative efficiency bring 
improvements in living standards because resources are used to generate more 
income and satisfy more needs and desires. 
Dynamic efficiency refers to the allocation of resources over time, including allocations 
designed to improve economic efficiency and to generate more resources. This can 
mean finding better products and better ways of producing goods and services. 
Investments in education, research, development and innovation are involved. 
Dynamic efficiency can also refer to the ability to adapt efficiently to changed economic 
conditions, a capacity for optimally modifying output and productivity performance in 
the face of economic ‘shocks’. Improvements in dynamic efficiency bring growth in 
living standards over time. 
Source: Adapted from PC (1999a).   
 
 
The term cost effectiveness is sometimes defined as achieving a stated objective or 
outcome using the lowest-cost mix of inputs. Cost effectiveness can also be used to 
describe the achievement of the best outcome for a stated level of inputs or cost. 
Cost-effectiveness analysis can be used to assess options where it is easier to 
identify benefits than to value them. However, if it is not possible to value all 
outcomes, it may be difficult to compare options which differ in both outcomes and 
costs.  
Cost effectiveness is sometimes used as shorthand for asserting that there is a net 
benefit — that is, the total benefits of an activity exceed its total costs. A policy 
option that generates net benefits will not necessarily be the preferred option, 
because other options could generate greater net benefits, and be more cost 
effective. Moreover, even if a policy option is the most cost effective one available     
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to achieve a particular policy objective, employing it will not necessarily improve 
overall economic efficiency. Consideration must be given to whether greater net 
benefits could be generated by abolishing the program and using the resources to 
produce something else entirely. Achieving the best input mixes to achieve stated 
outcomes does not guarantee that the mix of outcomes will be preferred over other 
feasible options.  
The role of government intervention 
If all individuals act to maximise their utility, in ideal circumstances perfectly 
competitive markets will, of themselves, allocate resources in an economically 
efficient way, maximising net benefits to society. However, in reality there are 
various sources of market failure that prevent markets from allocating resources in 
this way.  
Government intervention could be warranted to address market failures such as 
imperfect competition, imperfect information, public goods, and externalities. In 
this inquiry, the Commission has examined market failures in energy markets (such 
as imperfect competition in electricity generation) as well as market failures in the 
market for energy efficiency technologies, such as: 
•  information asymmetries in the markets for energy-efficient appliances, 
buildings and industrial equipment;  
•  public good characteristics of information about energy efficiency; 
•  split incentives arising from a divergence in incentives (typically those faced by 
landlords and tenants); and 
•  positive externalities resulting from research, development and the 
demonstration of energy efficiency technologies. 
Several participants suggested that government intervention might also be 
warranted to address the negative externalities associated with energy use — 
particularly greenhouse gas emissions. However, it is beyond the terms of reference 
to assess policy options to address this type of market failure. 
Regardless of the nature or extent of market failures, government intervention is not 
appropriate if the costs of intervention outweigh the benefits. The costs of 
intervention often take several forms, including administration costs to government; 
distortions associated with revenue raising to cover these administration costs; and 
compliance costs incurred by regulated firms, other organisations and households. 
An unintended consequence of a policy intervention might be that it imposes costs 
on participants in markets other than that originally targeted by the intervention.     





Governments also intervene on social grounds — such as to redistribute the gains 
from improvements in economic efficiency. Furthermore, as there are many ways to 
improve economic efficiency (each with different distributional consequences), 
decision makers also use other criteria — especially equity — to help determine 
which approaches are appropriate.  
2.2  Energy efficiency and its benefits 
Energy efficiency is generally described as output per unit of energy input, where 
output and energy input are measured in physical units. The pursuit of energy 
efficiency would seem to be in the interests of any rational producer or consumer, 
firm or household. However, energy efficiency measures do not capture the value of 
energy use to the individual — an individual will not necessarily benefit from 
improving energy efficiency. 
Nevertheless, regardless of benefits accruing to individuals, some energy efficiency 
improvements may generate net benefits to society as a whole — such as by 
avoiding costs of environmental damage associated with energy generation and use. 
Energy efficiency and related definitions 
There are various ways to define energy efficiency, depending on how output is 
specified.  
‘Thermal efficiency’ is a measure of energy efficiency in which output, as well as 
input, is measured in units of energy. This definition is commonly applied to the 
generation of electricity from primary energy sources — for example, 
ABS  (2004b,  n.p.) defined thermal efficiency as ‘electricity generated (energy 
output) as a proportion of energy consumed to generate the electricity (energy 
inputs)’. 
The terms of reference define (improving) energy efficiency as ‘maintaining or 
increasing the level of useful output or outcome delivered, while reducing energy 
consumption’. Under this definition, output can be measured in units of any 
physical quantity — including, but not limited to, units of energy. 
Energy intensity is commonly used to describe energy use per unit of GDP or 
income, or number of households. Energy intensities are often used to aggregate 
and compare levels of energy efficiency across individuals, organisations, regions 
or nations. However, as there are many factors that affect energy intensity, it is 
difficult to assess whether changes in energy intensity reflect technological     
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advances in energy efficiency. Furthermore, even if outputs are measured in dollar 
terms, energy intensities do not reflect the value of energy use, or energy efficiency 
improvements, to individuals or the economy.  
Seeking to maximise energy efficiency or minimise energy intensity in the economy 
would be analogous to pursuing an objective of maximising the value of output per 
unit of any one other resource — such as labour, capital or land. However, focusing 
on only one of the many scarce resources in the economy will not result in the most 
beneficial use of all these resources. Therefore, energy efficiency and energy 
intensity measures are not good proxy measures for economic efficiency: 
… differences in energy intensities between economies may simply reflect differences 
in the mix of more or less energy intensive sectors within each economy. Similarly, 
energy efficiency so defined tells us nothing about economic efficiency. For example, 
differences in energy efficiency in a given activity between economies may be due to 
differences in fuel prices and have no bearing on economic efficiency whatsoever. 
(ABS 2001, p. 102) 
Energy conservation is commonly defined as a reduction in energy use that also 
causes a reduction in the level of useful output or outcome. The term is sometimes 
used to describe situations where energy use can be reduced supposedly at no 
additional cost and without any changes in the level of output. For example, 
Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd suggested: 
… the point behind energy conservation is that many of the current uses of energy have 
no value, they are simply wasted resources. For instance, lighting, heating and cooling 
spaces which do not have people using them has no value. Addressing the situation 
requires an individual to take action — for instance turning off a light switch  … 
(sub. DR115, p. 5) 
Energy conservation measures that do not require upfront capital expenditure (such 
as the example above) are not necessarily costless, as they may require changes in 
behaviour or additional time. Nevertheless, within this inquiry, opportunities to 
reduce energy use without changing the level of useful output or outcome are 
included under the definition of energy efficiency improvements.  
Several inquiry participants suggested that the Commission should consider policies 
that target energy conservation, as well as energy efficiency (for example, 
Queensland Government, sub. 38, p. 3; South Australian Government, sub. 80, p. 4; 
Queensland Department of Energy, trans., p. 187). However, as defined by the 
terms of reference, energy conservation measures that require or cause a decrease in 
the level of outputs or outcomes are not the principal focus of this inquiry. 
Nevertheless, some policy instruments might lead to both energy efficiency 
improvements and energy conservation — such as cost-reflective pricing of energy 
(chapter 14).     





Due to the rebound effect, the reduction in energy use resulting from an 
improvement in energy efficiency may be less than expected (box 2.2). 
 
Box 2.2  The rebound effect 
The expected effects of energy efficiency improvements on energy consumption can 
be reduced through so-called ‘rebound effects’. In practice, when an energy efficiency 
improvement is implemented, some of the energy saved will subsequently be used by 
the individual undertaking the improvement. For example, Gottron (2001) estimated 
that for households, depending on the device concerned, rebound effects of between 
10 to 50 per cent might be expected.  
For an individual household, increasing energy efficiency makes energy appear 
cheaper, relative to other items — less money is required to purchase the same energy 
services. Consequently, the household will tend to use more energy, substituting away 
from other goods and services (the ‘substitution effect’). For example, after installing a 
more energy-efficient air conditioner, a residential consumer may choose to set the 
operating temperature lower or be less diligent in the use of other energy-conserving 
devices such as shades. Furthermore, increasing energy efficiency ‘frees up’ part of 
household income. The household might use all or part of the money they save to buy 
other goods and services that also use energy (the ‘income effect’). 
Firms are also likely to be affected by rebound effects because energy is only one of 
many costs of production. Increasing energy efficiency means that firms could (if 
possible) substitute away from other inputs towards energy, and could also respond to 
lower unit costs of production by expanding overall production. 
The potential for rebound effects could be difficult to estimate but should be taken into 
account when calculating the effects of energy efficiency programs on energy 
consumption — for example, to estimate anticipated demand for energy-related 




Privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements 
The Commission defines ‘privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements’ 
as actions that (a) reduce energy use per unit of useful output or outcome delivered, 
and (b) deliver a net benefit (at current and expected energy prices) to the individual 
producer or consumer undertaking the action. 
An individual household or firm could undertake many possible energy efficiency 
improvements, but not all of these improvements will be beneficial. In some 
situations, improving energy efficiency could impose a net cost on an individual — 
depending on the costs of other resources, and the extent of substitutability between 
energy and these resources (box 2.3).     
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Box 2.3  Not all energy efficiency improvements generate net benefits 
for the individual — an example 
Consider an individual who wants to drive 100 km. His car is most fuel efficient (uses 
the least amount of petrol per distance travelled) at a speed of 50 km/hr. At faster 
speeds, more petrol will be used to complete the 100 km journey. To maximise energy 
efficiency, the individual would choose to drive at 50 km/hr (point E), with a total travel 
time of 2 hours. 
However, at faster speeds the individual can complete the journey in a shorter period 
of time. The technical tradeoff between fuel consumption and travel time is illustrated 
by the curved line in the diagram below. Depending on how much the individual values 
time, relative to the cost of petrol (illustrated by the slope of the dashed line), he might 
prefer to complete the journey at a higher speed — for example, 100 km/hr (point A), 
which would result in a travel time of 1 hour.  
Reducing his speed from 100 km/hr to 50 km/hr reduces the amount of petrol required 
and represents an increase in energy efficiency. However, for this individual, the cost 
of extra travelling time would outweigh the money saved through lower fuel 












Furthermore, an individual faces tradeoffs between using available resources to 
improve energy efficiency, and using those resources to undertake other activities. 
An energy efficiency improvement could generate net benefits for the individual but 
in some situations, could mean that the individual had to forgo opportunities that 
would have generated greater net benefits. Therefore, depending on the 
circumstances of the individual, undertaking energy efficiency improvements that 
seem to be privately cost effective will not always be consistent with utility- or 
profit-maximising behaviour. For example: 
•  Consider an individual who has to choose which of two appliances to purchase. 
Information about the energy efficiency performance of the appliances is readily 










Technical tradeoff between 
travel time and petrol used 
to travel 100 kilometres 
Slope represents how much extra petrol 
an individual is willing to use to reduce 
travel time     





time, outweigh the higher upfront purchase cost of the more energy efficient 
model. However, by purchasing the more expensive appliance, the individual 
would forgo other opportunities to use that money in ways (such as on other 
purchases or investments) that could generate a higher level of overall utility. 
•  A firm almost invariably incurs upfront capital costs and/or requires increased 
management time to implement energy efficiency improvements. An individual 
firm may assess that an energy efficiency investment will create net benefits. For 
example, the net present value (NPV) of the investment might be positive (see 
chapter 5 for discussion of firm investment criteria). However, as the firm has 
limited capital funds and management time, it must choose between undertaking 
the energy efficiency investment, or undertaking other investments. A project 
might also be a mutually exclusive alternative to an energy efficiency 
improvement. If the firm assesses an alternative investment as yielding a higher 
NPV, undertaking this investment would contribute more to the overall market 
value of the firm than would improving energy efficiency. 
Some energy efficiency improvements that seem to be worthwhile for the individual 
(for example, those that result in monetary savings) might not actually be privately 
cost effective, once the benefits of forgone opportunities are considered. 
Furthermore, if individual households and firms were to forgo more beneficial 
activities in the pursuit of energy efficiency improvements, the overall allocation of 
resources across the economy is unlikely to be economically efficient. 
Environmental benefits of energy efficiency improvements 
Some energy efficiency improvements, although not privately cost effective, could 
generate net social benefits. Several participants suggested that energy efficiency 
policies could be justified on the grounds that they help avoid the external costs of 
environmental damage associated with energy generation and use. 
It is beyond the terms of reference to assess the wider social costs and benefits of all 
energy efficiency policies. It is also beyond the terms of reference to assess or 
design policies to address a greenhouse gas abatement objective. However, the 
Commission recognises that many privately cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements are also likely to benefit the environment. These benefits could 
include:  
•  greenhouse gas abatement;  
•  improved air quality from avoided transport, stationary sector and electricity 
generation emissions; and      
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•  reduced environmental impacts from exploration and processing activities of 
resource development projects (Australian Government 2004).  
Other external costs, however, could be imposed on the environment through the 
resources required and processes undertaken to implement energy efficiency 
improvements (such as the manufacture of new appliances or industrial equipment). 
Life-cycle assessments, rather than partial assessments based only on operational 
energy requirements, will provide a more accurate indication of net environmental 
impacts associated with an energy efficiency improvement (for example, see 
chapter 10).  
The possible environmental benefits of improving energy efficiency are mainly 
related to reducing energy use. However, the majority of opportunities for 
overcoming the market failures that inhibit privately cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements are likely to be in the household sector — which accounts 
for a relatively small proportion of total final energy consumption. Therefore, the 
overall potential for capturing environmental benefits through addressing these 
market failures appears to be modest. 
2.3  Assessing energy efficiency policies 
Private cost effectiveness is not a sufficient basis for making decisions about energy 
efficiency policies. As discussed in the previous section, the pursuit of all energy 
efficiency improvements that generate net benefits for individuals will not 
necessarily result in the most economically-efficient allocation of resources. 
Furthermore, some energy efficiency improvements that are not privately cost 
effective could improve community wellbeing, by avoiding external costs of 
environmental damages associated with energy generation and use.  
Nevertheless, many energy efficiency policies are promoted as ‘no regrets’ 
measures, implying that individual energy users (as well as the environment) will 
benefit. A policy that benefits the environment could be described as ‘no regrets’ if 
it addresses relevant market failures (such as those in the markets for energy 
efficiency technology), and if its costs (such as those associated with government 
administration, distortions or other unintended impacts) do not outweigh the 
resulting private benefits. 
Policies that result in privately cost-effective outcomes are likely to be more widely 
accepted than measures that are not privately beneficial. However, careful 
evaluation of benefits and costs is required to determine whether an energy 
efficiency policy is truly ‘no regrets’. If opportunities for implementing ‘no regrets’     





policies become limited, it will become increasingly important to assess the extent 
to which a policy results in a net social benefit (including environmental benefits). 
General guidelines for developing policy are described in box 2.4. These are 
adapted from the best practice processes for regulation described by the Office of 
Regulation Review (ORR 1998), and are intended to ensure that government 
intervention has the best outcomes for society in terms of welfare. In the rest of this 
chapter, some of the key principles are discussed in relation to policies to address 
privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements.  
 
Box 2.4  General principles for designing and assessing policies 
1.  Clearly specify the problem — Specification of the problem should include detailing 
its nature, estimating the size of impacts, and identifying the risks and consequences of 
not acting to address the problem. 
2.  Justify the need for government intervention — As government intervention is not 
costless, it is important to describe why it is required. The existence of market failure 
indicates that there may be a role for government action. 
3.  Clearly describe the objectives of government action — The objective should be 
clear, concise and as specific as possible, but specified broadly enough to allow 
consideration of all relevant solutions.  
4. Identify any regulation/policy currently in place to address the problem — The 
characteristics of existing regulations, responsible regulatory organisation(s) and any 
authoritative basis for review or amendment of regulations should be identified. 
5. Identify the most feasible options for achieving the stated objectives — The 
measures should target the problem, to minimise unintended impacts. The reasons for 
rejecting options without detailed analysis should also be clearly stated. 
6. Comprehensively assess the benefits and costs of each option — An economywide 
perspective must be taken, which means that all groups directly and indirectly affected 
by the problem and its proposed solution must be identified. The impact of the 
proposed option on existing regulations and the roles of existing regulatory authorities 
should also be assessed. 
7.  Consider how the option will be implemented and enforced, and establish a review 
strategy — The option should be assessed for clarity, consistency, flexibility and 
accessibility. The impact on firms and compliance costs should also be minimised. 
Source: Adapted from ORR (1998). 
 
 
     
20  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
Justifying the need for government intervention 
Government intervention may be warranted to address market failures. If 
governments intervene in ways that do not address market failures, it could impose 
costs on other markets and individuals, and decrease the overall efficiency with 
which resources are allocated in the economy. 
As discussed in this chapter, one reason why individuals might not undertake 
energy efficiency improvements that generate net benefits is that the cost savings 
are too small — the improvement is not sufficiently cost effective for the individual, 
given other possible uses of capital and other inputs.  
The various barriers and impediments inhibiting the uptake of energy efficiency 
improvements (including those improvements that would seem to be privately cost 
effective) are discussed in chapter 4. However, as discussed in section 2.1, 
government intervention — which aims to maximise community wellbeing — is 
only justified to address the barriers posed by market failures. 
Clearly describing policy objectives 
One of the key steps involved with assessing and designing policy is to clearly 
define the objectives of the government intervention. Common errors that occur 
when describing policy objectives are to confuse the desired final outcome of the 
proposal with the means of obtaining it, or to pre-justify a preferred solution 
(ORR 1998). Improving energy efficiency is not a policy objective per se, but could 
be one possible means to an end — for example, to address the external costs of 
greenhouse gas emissions, or to improve energy security. 
Many energy efficiency policies are often introduced to meet a broad policy 
objective such as greenhouse gas abatement, but are also promoted as being 
privately cost effective. However, it is sometimes uncertain whether some 
individuals might actually be worse off under the policy (for example, see the 
discussion of mandatory building ratings and standards in chapter 10). It is also 
sometimes uncertain whether the underlying objective is actually being achieved. 
For example, an assessment of the impacts of an energy efficiency policy might 
attempt to capture some of the social costs of energy use by using shadow prices for 
energy that are greater than market prices. However, if the assessment does not 
explicitly include greenhouse gas abatement benefits, it will be uncertain whether 
the greenhouse gas abatement objective will be met.     





Assessing the benefits and costs of different policy options 
Identifying different policy options is a key step to designing or assessing policy. 
As discussed in section 2.1, a policy option that is cost effective is not necessarily 
the best way to achieve an objective, because there may be other policy options that 
could be more cost effective and generate greater net social benefits — for instance, 
if they result in fewer unintended or distortionary impacts. 
Sometimes one policy option might be suitable for meeting multiple policy 
objectives. For example, it is possible that policy options that target energy 
consumption could contribute to meeting both energy security and greenhouse gas 
abatement objectives. More commonly, however, there will be tradeoffs between 
meeting different policy objectives — such as improving economic efficiency, 
whilst ensuring that equity objectives are not compromised. To enable decision 
makers to weigh up the equity implications of different policy options, a key step of 
policy assessment is to evaluate the distribution of benefits and costs across all 
affected parties. 
There could also be trade-offs between meeting objectives that target different 
sources of market failure. For example, Origin Energy identified imperfect 
information and environmental externalities as two market failures that warrant 
government intervention, but suggested: 
… it does not follow that the most effective and efficient overall policy response is to 
use energy efficiency policy to target both sources of market failure … it would be a 
coincidence if the same policy tool happened to be the most appropriate for targeting 
both sources of market failure. (sub. DR129, p. 5) 
Such tradeoffs are accounted for by examining the wider economywide impacts of 
policy options — including the effects on competition, distortionary impacts of 
revenue raising, compliance costs on firms and unintended third-party impacts (such 
as the external costs of environmental damages).  
This economywide policy assessment approach — justifying policy intervention, 
clarifying objectives and assessing the impacts of different policy options — has 
been applied throughout this inquiry to evaluate existing and proposed energy 
efficiency policies that claim to be privately cost effective.     
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 3  How is energy used in Australia? 
 
Key points 
•  Total primary energy consumption in Australia is dominated by fossil fuels — crude 
oil, black coal, natural gas and brown coal.  
•  Although some primary fuels can be used directly by end users, many need to be 
converted to a form which is more convenient for the end user, like electricity or 
petroleum. The electricity generation sector is the largest consumer of primary 
energy in Australia.  
•  Conversion processes consume significant amounts of energy. Around 70 per cent 
of the primary energy consumed to supply electricity to end users is lost in 
conversion, transmission and distribution. The losses represent 30 per cent of total 
primary energy used. 
•  Energy accounts for a small proportion of expenditure across most sectors (from 
1.6 per cent in the commercial sector to 6.8 per cent in the industrial sector) and 
accounts for around 3 per cent of total expenditure in the economy as a whole. 
•  Energy consumption has grown significantly over the last 30 years, because of 
growth in output. But primary energy consumption per dollar of output is estimated 
to have fallen, due largely to structural shifts away from energy intensive sectors of 
the economy. 
•  Compared to other OECD countries, Australia has a relatively high level of energy 
consumption per unit of output. However, such comparisons can be misleading 
because of significant differences between countries in climate, energy prices and 
the size of energy-intensive industries. 
•  Australian energy prices are low by international standards.  
•  Consumption of fossil fuels contributes to greenhouse gas emissions. Around 
48  per  cent of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions have been attributed to 
stationary energy users (70 per  cent of these are attributable to electricity 
generation). Around 14 per cent of emissions have been attributed to the transport 
sector.  
•  Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions from energy consumption have grown over 
the last 30 years as output has grown. However, emissions per unit of output fell by 
17 per cent between 1973-74 and 2000-01. 
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Energy is an important input into all the goods and services we consume; it 
underpins many aspects of our high standard of living. Most household activities, 
such as heating, cooling, cooking, lighting and transport, require energy in some 
form. Firms also use energy in virtually all of their activities, like processing and 
manufacturing materials, transporting goods, heating and cooling premises, 
providing telecommunication services or powering computers.  
Over time, the amount of energy used in Australia, the types of energy used and use 
by individual sectors have changed. This chapter examines these changes, within 
Australia and in comparison with other countries. It also examines changes in 
energy intensity (as an indicator of energy efficiency) and greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
3.1  Energy availability and use in Australia 
Descriptions of the energy system usually refer to energy being consumed. 
However, in physical terms, energy cannot be ‘consumed’ — rather, it is converted 
from one form (such as the chemical energy contained in fossil fuels) to other forms 
(box  3.1). Ultimately, most energy used by final consumers is dissipated as 
low-grade heat (Saddler, Diesendorf and Denniss 2004). 
 
Box 3.1  Summary of the energy system 
Primary conversion 
The energy system starts with the extraction or harvesting of what are termed primary 
fuels. These include fossil fuels such as coal, crude oil and natural gas, which are 
extracted from the earth, and renewable energy sources such as wind, hydro, biomass 
and solar-thermal energy, which are harvested from the atmosphere, from rivers, from 
the sea or directly from solar radiation. 
Some sources of energy can be used directly by final consumers (for example, burning 
firewood or coal), but many sources of energy undergo conversion or transformation to 
end-use fuels, which are more convenient or efficient for final consumers to use. The 
most important energy conversion processes are thermal electricity generation and oil 
refining. Each of these processes uses considerable amounts of energy. In addition, 
some energy is used or lost in the process of delivering energy to final customers.  
(Continued next page) 
 
     





Box 3.1  (continued) 
Consumption 
The final stage is consumption by end users of energy (that is, the use of energy for all 
activities other than the production of energy in another form). As a result of losses in 
primary conversion and distribution, the total quantity of energy available for use by 
final consumers is often significantly less than the quantity of primary energy supplied 
to the economy. 
Renewable energy sources 
Electricity obtained from renewable sources, such as hydro and wind, is treated as a 
form of primary energy, that is supplied directly to final consumers with no intermediate 
conversion step. Therefore, there are assumed to be no conversion losses, although 
there are losses in transmission and distribution.  
Source: Saddler, Diesendorf and Denniss (2004). 
 
At the primary conversion stage, primary sources of energy (for example, oil, gas 
and coal) are converted into more useful or convenient forms of energy (for 
example, petrol and electricity). The conversion sector comprises mainly electricity 
generation, electricity and gas transport and distribution, and oil refining and 
distribution.  
This section examines Australia’s energy supply and use in terms of: 
•  total primary energy consumption (also known as total domestic availability), 
which comprises domestic production less net exports; 
•  electricity generation; and 
•  total final consumption, which comprises total primary energy consumption less 
energy lost in conversion and distribution.  
Primary energy consumption 
Total primary energy consumption in Australia is dominated by fossil fuels. For 
example, crude oil and other refinery feedstocks accounted for 34.8 per cent (or 
1748 petajoules) of the 5055 petajoules of primary energy consumption in 2001-02. 
This was followed by black coal (comprising 28.9 per cent or 1463 petajoules) and 
natural gas (comprising 18.6 per cent or 941 petajoules). Renewables accounted for 
only small proportions of the total, ranging from 1.8  per  cent for wood to 
0.1 per cent for solar energy (figure 3.1).     
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Black coal Brown coal Crude oil and other refinery feedstocks  Natural gas Renewable resources ab
a Includes petroleum products and liquid petroleum gas. b Comprises wood, bagasse, hydro electricity, solar 
energy and biofuels. c Projected figures. 
Data source: ABARE (2004). 
Total primary energy consumption grew at an average annual rate of 2.4 per cent 
between 1973-74 and 2001-02, almost doubling from 2615 petajoules to 
5055 petajoules.1 Although most of the growth is attributable to increasing use of 
coal (black and brown), natural gas consumption has become relatively more 
pronounced. Consumption of natural gas grew at 6.5 per cent per annum over the 
period, increasing its share of the total from 6.6 per cent in 1973-74 to 18.6 per cent 
in 2001-02. Solar energy recorded the strongest annual average growth between 
1973-74 and 2001-02 (14.5 per cent per annum on average), but from a very low 
base. As a consequence, it still comprised only 0.1 per  cent of primary energy 
consumption in 2000-01. 
ABARE forecasts suggest that Australia will remain reliant on fossil fuels in the 
near to mid-term future. Total primary energy consumption is projected to grow by 
2.2  per  cent each year between 2001-02 and 2019-20 (Akmal et al. 2004). The 
greatest contribution to this growth is expected to come from natural gas, growing 
at an average of 3.7 per cent per annum and accounting for 35.6 per cent of the total 
                                              
1 There was a break in the series between 2000-01 and 2001-02. The data indicate that total 
primary energy consumption grew by 1 per  cent over that year. However, this may reflect 
changes in how data were collected, as well as changes in consumption levels.      




change. Renewable energy resources, such as wind energy and biogas, are projected 
to record the strongest growth over the period (16.1 per cent and 7.5 per cent each 
year respectively), but from very low bases. These sources are still expected to 
account for only very small proportions of total primary energy consumption in 
2019-20 (0.2 per cent and 0.4 per cent respectively). By comparison, solar energy 
consumption is projected to grow more slowly at 2.6  per  cent per year, and is 
expected to account for only 0.1 per cent of total primary energy consumption in 
2019-20. 
Electricity generation and transmission  
The electricity generation and transmission sector is the largest consumer of 
primary energy in Australia and creates more greenhouse gas emissions than any 
other sector.  
Fuel sources 
Approximately 83 per  cent of the energy consumed in producing Australia’s 
electricity is sourced from coal. The overall share of coal in electricity generation 
has remained relatively constant in the period 1973-74 to 2001-02, although the 
relative contributions of brown and black coal have changed. The share of black 
coal has grown from 49 to 53 per cent, and the share of brown coal has fallen from 
33 to 29 per cent. Another important development in that period was the growth of 
the relative importance of natural gas for electricity generation — from 5 per cent in 
1973-74 to 11 per cent in 2001-02. The widespread use of coal in Australia reflects 
the low variable cost associated with coal-fired generators and the proximity of 
large recoverable coal reserves to electricity consumers (Allen Consulting Group 
and McLennan Magasanik Associates 1999).  
ABARE researchers (Akmal et al. 2004) have predicted that Australia’s preference 
for coal-fired generation will continue in the period between 2001-02 and 2019-20. 
However, natural gas-fired generation is expected to record strong growth, more 
than doubling its total output over the forecast period and overtaking brown coal in 
terms of electricity generation by 2019-20 (table 3.1).     
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Table 3.1  Electricity generation by fuel 
  Generation level  Annual growth in generation 
   
2001-02 2008-09 2019-20 




 TWha TWha TWha % % 
Black coal  125.7  142.4  185.3  1.8  2.2 
Brown coal  48.3  52.4  59.4  1.2  1.2 
Oil  2.3 2.3 2.4  0.3 0.3 
Natural gas  30.5  46.5  69.3  6.2  4.7 
Renewables 17.2  25.3  27.5  5.7  2.6 
hydro 15.9  17.3  17.8  1.3  0.6 
biomass 0.7  4.1  4.1  28.1  10.1 
biogas  0.3 1.5 1.5 24.1 8.8 
wind 0.3  2.4  4.1  35.3  15.9 
Total 224.1  269.0  343.9  2.6  2.4 
a 1terawatt hour = 1012 watt hours = 3.6 petajoules. 
Source: Akmal et al. (2004). 
Conversion losses 
The conversion sector includes losses from the transport and distribution of natural 
gas and from refining and distribution of oil, as well as losses from electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution. Electricity generation is by far the largest 
source of conversion losses, with most of the primary energy used to generate 
electricity being lost during that process. Conversion losses from electricity 
generation represent a significant (and growing) proportion of energy use in 
Australia (figure 3.2). 
Conversion efficiency (defined here as the ratio of electrical energy supplied to 
energy used in generation) is determined to a large extent by the fuel used in 
generation. The conversion efficiency of coal-fired generation, in particular, is low 
compared to other fuel sources and only about 30 per  cent of energy used in 
generation reaches the end users in the form of electricity. A modest improvement 
in conversion efficiency in the period 1973-74 to 2001-02 (figure 3.2) may be due 
to a shift in the generation fuel mix away from (the less efficient) brown coal 
towards (the more efficient) black coal and natural gas.     




Figure 3.2  Conversion efficiency and losses in electricity generation, 
















Share of conversion losses in primary energy use
Conversion efficiency
a Conversion efficiency and losses are shown as a share of total primary energy consumption. 
Data source: ABARE (2004). 
Final energy consumption 
Total final energy consumption is the amount of energy consumed by end users. It 
is calculated as total primary energy consumption less energy used or lost in 
conversion, transmission and distribution (Akmal et al. 2004).  
Final energy consumption in Australia grew from 1852 petajoules in 1973-74 to 
3308 petajoules in 2001-02, with all final energy-using sectors increasing their 
energy consumption (figure 3.3). The greatest contribution to the overall change 
came from the transport sector, which accounted for 39 per cent of the absolute 
change. The manufacturing (21  per  cent), mining (15  per  cent) and residential 
sectors (11 per cent) also made significant contributions to the change.      
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Mining Manufacturing and construction Transport Commercial and services Residential a
a Includes ANZSIC Divisions F, G, H, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and the water, sewerage and drainage industries.   
Data source: ABARE (2004). 
Projections developed by ABARE (Akmal et al. 2004) show that total final energy 
consumption is expected to continue to grow at roughly the same rate over time. 
Growth is projected to average 2.3  per  cent each year between 2001-02 and 
2019-20, taking total final energy consumption to 4714 petajoules in 2019-20. The 
transport sector is forecast to continue to dominate final energy consumption, 
accounting for 39 per cent of the total in 2019-20.  
Final energy consumption by sector and fuel source 
The importance of particular fuel sources varies across different industry sectors 
(table 3.2).      




Table 3.2  Consumption by sector and fuel source, 2001-02 
   
Mining 
Manufacturing 
and construction  Commercial 
 
Residential Transport
  Petajoules  Petajoules Petajoules Petajoules Petajoules 
Black coal  7  119  < 1  < 1  4 
Petroleum products   77  137  20  15  1237 
Natural gas  19  322  43  125  25 
Biomass  < 1  81  < 1  66  < 1 
Electricity 57  261  174  185  7 
Total consumption  161  919  238  393  1272 
Source: Akmal et al. (2004). 
Unsurprisingly, petroleum products are a dominant source of energy in the transport 
sector. Petroleum is also a major fuel source in the mining sector. The 
manufacturing and construction sector is a significant user of a range of fuels, but 
natural gas consumption is the largest contributor to final energy consumption.  
Electricity is a major energy source in the residential and commercial sectors 
because most of the energy consumed in those sectors is building and 
appliance-related. Electricity is also used extensively in the manufacturing and 
mining sectors.  
Attributing primary energy resources to sectors 
In view of the large conversion losses in electricity generation, a better idea of the 
relative magnitudes of total energy consumption by sector can be obtained by 
apportioning the resources required to generate electricity to the different sectors. A 
broad estimate can be made by calculating each sector’s share of total electricity use 
and applying these shares to the total primary energy used in electricity generation. 
When energy resources used in electricity generation are apportioned, the share in 
energy resource demand of electricity-intensive sectors, like the residential and 
commercial sectors, increases significantly (figure  3.4). The manufacturing and 
construction sector also overtakes the transport sector as the largest consumer of 
energy resources because of its large electricity usage.     
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Figure 3.4  Percentages of final energy consumption and primary energy 





















Final consumption Attributable primary resources
c b
a Resource consumption is apportioned on the assumption of uniform electricity conversion losses across 
sectors. b Includes construction. c Includes consumption of lubricants and greases, bitumen and solvents. 
Data source: PC estimates using data from Akmal et al. (2004). 
Importance of energy costs in different sectors 
Energy is generally a small item of expenditure in all of the final energy-using 
sectors of the Australian economy (table  3.3). Overall, in 1998-99, energy 
accounted for around 3 per cent of total expenditure in Australia, ranging from 6.8 
per cent for the industrial sector to only 2.5 per cent for residential and 1.6 per cent 
for the commercial sector. 
Table 3.3  Share of energy costs in total expenditure, 1998-99 
Sector  Share of energy costs in total expenditure 
  % 
Residential  2.5 
Industrial  6.8 
Commercial  1.6 
Transport  4.5 
Total for Australia  3.1 
Source: PC estimates from ABS (2004a).     




These broad sector-wide averages hide the variability of energy costs that would be 
evident if comparing different subsectors or different producers and consumers 
within those subsectors. For some businesses or individuals, energy costs represent 
a significantly greater proportion of expenditure than their sector average. For 
example, the Australian Aluminium Council (sub. 29, p. 4) submitted that energy 
accounted for 23 per cent of the costs in alumina production and 22 per cent of 
aluminium smelting costs. Conversely, there will be many businesses and 
individuals for whom energy expenditure would constitute a lower share of total 
costs than the sector average. 
3.2 Energy  intensity 
The energy efficiency of a specific process or piece of equipment can be evaluated 
by comparing the output of useful services to the energy input. It is much more 
difficult to measure energy efficiency at aggregate levels, such as for industry 
sectors, geographic regions or nations, because of the heterogeneity of 
circumstances and outputs. Energy intensity is one simple measure that can give 
some limited insights into energy efficiency at sectoral or economywide level. 
Aggregate energy intensity 
Aggregate energy intensities are calculated for sectors of the economy and the 
economy as a whole. Typically, energy intensity is defined as energy consumption 
per unit of gross domestic product. But it could also be measured in other ways. For 
example, residential sector energy intensity could be calculated as energy 
consumption per household or per square metre, or as energy expenditure per dollar 
of total household expenditure. Manufacturing and commercial sector intensity 
could also be calculated as energy consumption per unit of output.  
ABARE researchers conducted an analysis of trends in Australia’s energy intensity 
between 1973-74 and 2000-01 (Tedesco and Thorpe 2003). They estimated that 
aggregate energy intensity fell in most sectors and in the Australian economy as a 
whole (figure 3.5).     
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Figure 3.5  Sectoral contributions to changes in Australian energy 


































Residential Manufacturing Commercial Transport Conversion Australia
1973-4 to 1979-80 1979-80 to 1984-85 1984-85 to 1989-90 1989-90 to 1994-95 1994-95 to 2000-01
a
a Includes mining and construction. 
Data source: Tedesco and Thorpe (2003). 
Overall, in the period 1973-74 to 2000-01, economywide aggregate energy intensity 
fell by 18.2 per cent or an average of 0.6 per cent per year. 
According to Akmal et al. (2004), aggregate energy intensity is forecast to decline 
by a further 1.1 per  cent a year until 2019-20, suggesting that 18 per  cent less 
energy will be needed to produce a unit of economic output in 2019-20. 
Factorising energy intensity 
Trends in energy consumption can be decomposed into the factors that underlie 
changes in energy use. ABARE identified three categories of effects (Tedesco and 
Thorpe 2003): 
•  Production effect — the effect of changes in the level of output on energy 
consumption. The production effect is excluded when calculating energy 
intensity. 
•  Structural mix effect — the first component of aggregate intensity that reflects 
the effect on energy consumption of changes in the mix of industries (such as a 
contraction in energy-intensive industries relative to other industries).     




•  Real energy intensity effect — the second component of aggregate intensity. It 
reflects the effect of changes in the mix of fuels, and the technical effect which 
accounts for all remaining changes (such as changes in industrial processes and 
input mix). 
Tedesco and Thorpe (2003) found that, if aggregate energy intensity had remained 
constant, the increase in production that had occurred would have raised total 
energy consumption by 136 per cent from 1973-74 to 2000-01. However, the fall in 
economywide aggregate energy intensity meant that final energy consumption only 
grew by 93 per cent. Two thirds of the change in energy intensity was attributed to 
structural shifts away from energy-intensive sectors of the economy, whereas 
fuel-mix effects accounted for the remainder. The estimate of the technical effect, 
showed that energy consumption would have increased by 0.5 per cent in the 
absence of structural or fuel-mix effects.  
The above findings appear to indicate that the reduction in Australia’s energy 
intensity was caused by structural and fuel-mix changes rather than improvements 
in energy efficiency. However, such economywide estimates hide the variability in 
energy consumption trends across the different sectors of the Australian economy. 
As discussed in chapters 6 and 7, between 1973-4 and 2000-01, energy efficiency is 
likely to have improved substantially in the residential sector but declined across 
most industrial and commercial subsectors. 
International comparisons of energy intensity 
According to the IEA (2004a), Australia’s energy intensity in 2002 (measured in 
terms of primary energy supply per dollar of gross domestic product) is higher than 
the OECD average, as was the energy intensity of Canada, United States and New 
Zealand (figure 3.6).      
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a Gross domestic product is expressed in 1995 US dollars.  
Data source: IEA (2004a). 
Further, Australia’s energy intensity reduction over the period 1973–2002 has been 
smaller than in most of the OECD countries.  
Chapter 2 outlined why energy intensity does not necessarily reflect energy 
efficiency or economic efficiency. The ABS (2001) argued that Australia’s high 
energy intensity reflects its economic structure and the fact that Australia has 
relatively more energy-intensive industries (such as the aluminium industry) than 
the OECD average. The ABS also attributed Australia’s relatively high energy 
intensity to the significant role that coal plays as a fuel source in these industries, 
and particularly for power generation (and coal’s relatively poor thermal 
efficiency).  
Australia’s relatively high level of energy intensity can also be explained in part by 
the fact that its energy prices are lower than in most other countries (figure 3.7).     




Figure 3.7  Index of international energy prices for industrya 










Australia Canada Japan New Zealand United
Kingdom
Germany United States
Electricity Natural gas Petroleum
b
a Electricity and petroleum prices are for first quarter 2004. Natural gas prices are for 1997. Electricity prices 
for Australia and the United States exclude taxes. b Data on Canadian electricity prices were not available. 
Data sources: IEA (2003; 2004b). 
Australian electricity prices are among the lowest in the OECD. Similarly, 
Australian petrol prices are fourth lowest in the OECD (IEA 2004b). Natural gas 
prices are also relatively low by OECD standards. The influence of energy prices, 
economic structure and other differences on consumption and energy intensity is 
crucial. In the absence of such consideration, it would not be appropriate to draw 
conclusions about Australia’s energy efficiency performance based solely on 
comparisons of its energy intensity to the rest of the world. Ultimately, Australia’s 
energy efficiency performance needs to be assessed in the context of the barriers 
and failures hindering the operation of Australian markets, rather than through 
comparisons with the performance of other countries. 
Cross-country comparisons of energy intensity must be used with caution, given 
that the observed levels of energy intensity of any economy reflect local 
circumstances, including climate, energy prices and economic structure. 
 
FINDING 3.1     
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3.3  Energy prices  
As mentioned in the previous section, Australia’s energy prices are low by world 
standards. This section analyses the changes in Australia’s energy prices over the 
last 10 years. 
Electricity prices 
The average electricity retail price in Australia was estimated to be 9.77 cents per 
kWh in 2003-04. The price for residential customers was 13.38 cents per kWh, 
while the price for non-residential customers was 8.23 cents per kWh. Electricity 
prices vary between states (box 3.2). 
 
Box 3.2  How average retail electricity prices are estimated 
Retail electricity prices (that is, what customers pay for their electricity) comprise 
wholesale electricity prices, network service charges, market (pool) fees and the 
retailers’ fees. 
Over 87 per  cent of electricity users in Australia receive their electricity from the 
national electricity market (NEM), which operates in New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland, South Australia and the ACT. Wholesale prices are set via a competitive 
bidding process. The Energy Supply Association of Australia (ESAA) estimates retail 
prices for customers in NEM jurisdictions based on these wholesale prices.  
Retail electricity prices in Western Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory are 
set within ranges regulated by the relevant State or Territory Government.  
The ESAA estimated that network service charges (transmission use of system and 
distribution use of system) can be between 30 per cent and more than 50 per cent of 
the end price to customers. They can be a significant factor in explaining differences in 
retail prices between and within states and territories.  
Source: ESAA (2004). 
 
 
Average retail electricity prices in Australia fell by 14.6 per cent (in real terms) 
between 1994-95 and 2003-04, an average fall of 1.7 per cent each year (figure 3.8). 
The fall was greatest in Queensland, where average retail prices fell by 
23.1 per cent overall (or 2.9 per cent each year). By contrast, average retail prices 
rose in South Australia, up 20.8 per  cent since 1994-95 (average growth of 
2.1 per cent each year).  
For residential customers, retail prices fell overall by 1.5 per cent over the period. 
Falls were recorded in New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia and the     




Northern Territory, with residential retail prices rising in Victoria, South Australia, 
Tasmania and the ACT. 
Non-residential retail prices fell by 20.1 per cent. At the state/territory level, falls 
were recorded in all jurisdictions except South Australia, where prices rose by 
11.1  per  cent (or 1.2 per  cent each year) over the period. Some of the relative 
movements in electricity tariffs can be explained by retailers rebalancing tariff 
structures following the general deregulation of electricity markets. 






































Data source: ESAA (2004). 
Petroleum prices 
Petroleum products are internationally-traded commodities and their prices are 
influenced by world prices. Caltex (2005) identified the following major 
determinants of retail petrol prices in Australia: 
•  price of petrol from Singapore refineries (these being the major source of 
Australia’s imported petroleum) in US dollars; 
•  exchange rate; 
•  taxation regime; and     
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•  profit margins in Australia for storage, distribution, wholesaling and retailing. 
Caltex (2005) data show that average city retail prices for unleaded petrol at Ampol 
and Caltex stations grew in all states between December 1997 and May 2005. In 
real terms, prices increased by 12 per cent in Western Australia; 14 per cent in 
Tasmania; 16 per cent in Victoria; 19 per cent in New South Wales and 
Queensland; 20 per cent in South Australia and 26 per cent in the ACT. Caltex 
attributes these increases to the increase in international crude oil prices. In 
addition, Singapore refinery prices have been increasing due to the reduction of 
excess refinery capacity. 
Gas prices 
Data on gas prices are quite sparse. The PC (2005) has estimated that between 
1990-91 and 2003-04, average real gas prices for households in state capital cities 
rose by approximately 13 per cent. On the other hand, real gas prices for 
manufacturers fell by around 12 per cent over the same period. 
3.4  Greenhouse gas emissions 
Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and 
chlorofluorocarbons. The production and use of fossil fuel-based energy is a large 
source of greenhouse gas emissions. For example, stationary energy use 
(comprising electricity generation, and non-transport fuel combustion in the 
industrial, commercial and residential sectors) accounted for almost half 
(49 per cent) of the 550 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent gases emitted by 
Australia in 2003 (figure  3.9). Other large contributors were the agriculture and 
transport sectors (respectively accounting for 18 and 15 per cent of the total).     





















a Calculated in terms of carbon dioxide equivalents. 
Data source: AGO (2005f). 
Among stationary energy users, electricity generation made the largest contribution, 
accounting for 71 per  cent of stationary energy emissions in 2003. Within the 
transport sector, road transport accounted for 90 per  cent of carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions from that sector in 2003.  
Overall, Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions rose by 1.1 per cent between 1990 
and 2003, growing on average by 0.1 per cent each year. However, significant but 
largely one-off falls in emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry have 
partially offset large increases in emissions from the stationary energy and transport 
sectors (which grew by 37 per cent and 29 per cent respectively). 
Tedesco and Thorpe (2003) analysed trends in carbon dioxide emissions per unit of 
economic output — carbon dioxide emission intensity — in Australia for the period 
1973-74 to 2000-01. Their analysis showed that, if there had been no growth in 
output during 1973-74 to 2000-01, Australia’s carbon dioxide emissions would have 
fallen by 17 per cent (table 3.4). All of the primary energy-using sectors of the 
Australian economy registered significant reductions in their emission intensity, 
except the mining and conversion sectors whose emission intensity increased 
markedly.  
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Table 3.4  Changes in carbon dioxide emission intensity during 1973-74 to 
2000-01 — total energy usea 
Sector  Change in carbon dioxide emission intensity 
  % 
Residential  -42 
Manufacturing  -60 
Construction  -17 
Mining  99 
Commercial  -46 
Transport  -24 
Conversion  10 
Total for Australia  -17 
a The numbers given in the table were derived by recalculating the results reported by Tedesco and Thorpe  
(2003). The sectoral numbers provided in that study estimated the percentage impact of the change in 
emission intensity of particular sectors on Australia’s total emissions. To derive the emission intensity change 
for individual sectors, the absolute value of the change in emissions for the sector was calculated and then 
divided by the 1973-74 level of emissions for that sector. 
Source: PC estimates based on Tedesco and Thorpe (2003). 
The Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO 2004o) estimated that greenhouse gas 
emissions during 2008–12 will on average be 8 per  cent above 1990 levels 
(accounting for emission reduction programs). This means that Australia is on track 
to achieve its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol of 108 per cent of the 1990 
level of emissions in 2008–12. The largest contribution to the rise in emissions is 
predicted to come from stationary energy users (approximately 70 per cent of which 
will originate from electricity generation). These are forecasted to increase by 
46 per cent over the period. Transport emissions (over half of which are from cars) 
are also expected to make a significant contribution to the rise in emissions, 
growing by 43  per  cent between 1990 and 2008–12. Despite these significant 
increases, the overall emissions target will be met due to substantial reductions in 
emissions resulting from reduced land clearing and the expected emergence of 
carbon sequestration in Kyoto-compliant forest plantations. In the longer term, 
AGO (2004o) forecasted that greenhouse gas emissions will increase by 23 per cent 
between 1990 and 2020 with the largest contributions coming from the growth of 
stationary and transport energy use.  
As noted earlier, since the 1970s, growth in energy consumption has been driven 
primarily by growth in the level of output. Ongoing economic growth suggests that 
foreseeable improvements in energy efficiency may only marginally reduce 
production-related growth in energy consumption. Improvements in end-use energy 
efficiency must, therefore, be seen as just one of the many drivers for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions from the use of energy. In announcing the Asia-Pacific 
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, the Australian Government     




(Howard 2005b) stated that fundamental technological advances in areas such as the 
use of low-emission fuels; efficiency of conversion of primary energy to final 
energy; and carbon capture and storage, will be required to achieve a significant 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. 
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•  Barriers and impediments to the adoption of energy-efficient investments result in 
an energy efficiency gap. At issue is whether government intervention is warranted 
to reduce or remove such barriers and impediments so as to benefit individual 
energy users and/or society. 
•  The various barriers and impediments to the adoption of energy efficiency 
improvements can be categorised as: 
– market  failures 
–  behavioural and organisational barriers 
– other barriers and impediments that increase the costs of energy efficiency 
investments. 
•  Market failures provide the strongest rationale for government intervention at current 
(and expected) prices: 
– imperfect information (including asymmetries of information) and split incentive 
problems can lead to the non-adoption of energy efficiency improvements that are 
privately cost effective; and 
–  positive externalities associated with research and development and demonstration 
projects can lead to the non-adoption of energy efficiency improvements that are 
socially but not privately cost effective. 
•  Government intervention may be warranted to address market failures provided the 
social benefits of intervention exceed the social costs. 
•  Behavioural, cultural and organisational barriers do not of themselves provide a 
rationale for government intervention. Understanding these barriers may, however, 
be helpful in designing efficiency programs that address environmental externalities, 
information failures and other sources of market failure. 
•  Other barriers and impediments, such as risk and uncertainty, asset replacement 
costs and implementation costs, may increase the costs to energy users but do not 
represent failures in markets for energy efficiency investments. The role of 
governments in addressing these issues may be quite small. 
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Many participants in this inquiry have pointed to the existence of a variety of 
barriers and impediments that increase the costs to energy users of adopting energy 
efficiency investments and which result in an energy efficiency gap. It has also been 
argued that government intervention is warranted to reduce or remove such barriers 
and impediments as this will benefit both individual energy users and/or society. 
This chapter provides a framework for assessing those barriers and impediments. In 
so doing, the Commission recognises the widespread use of the terms barriers and 
impediments in this policy area. Whereas a barrier might prevent the adoption of an 
energy efficiency improvement altogether, an impediment might mean the 
improvement is taken up but not as fully as it otherwise might. In practice, the terms 
are used more or less interchangeably, depending on the circumstances. 
4.1 Introduction 
Understanding the nature of the barriers and impediments facing individual 
consumers and producers is important in devising policy responses that will 
improve energy efficiency in a way that maximises economic efficiency (and 
thereby brings net benefits to the Australian community as a whole). Drawing on 
some of the features of a taxonomy adopted by Jaffe and Stavins (1994) and 
Sorrell  et  al. (2000), and which was also used by the Allen Consulting Group 
(2004c), three classes of barriers and impediments are considered in the subsequent 
discussion: 
•  market failures — which arise where the market fails to provide or allocate 
goods and services to their most efficient use (that is, the allocation of goods and 
services is not one that maximises overall wellbeing of the community); 
•  behavioural, cultural and organisational barriers — which arise because of 
limits on the decision-making abilities of individuals and organisations; and  
•  other barriers and impediments — such as the additional costs of adopting 
energy-efficient investments or the impact of those investments on output. 
This framework can be broadened to consider how the case for policy intervention 
would change if there was a change in the price of energy. That is, if energy was 
priced at its true economic cost, by which it is meant that the price includes all of 
the costs of resources used in its production and any associated externalities (such 
as pollution or greenhouse gas emissions).  
There are several reasons why energy is not priced at its true economic cost: there 
are natural monopoly influences in the transmission and distribution of energy (such 
as gas and electricity), there is imperfect competition in the generation of electricity     




in some jurisdictions, and environmental externalities are not included in the price 
of energy. A related issue concerns the regulatory failures that could follow from 
imperfectly addressing natural monopoly (such that prices are not as cost reflective 
as they might be) or as the result of the inadvertent side effects of other policies 
(such as the effects of taxation on the incentives to consume energy). 
Addressing such distortions to the price of energy in turn would influence what 
energy efficiency measures might be privately cost effective for individual 
consumers or producers to adopt. These issues are discussed in chapter 14. What is 
important to note here is that, while changing energy prices would alter the size of 
the perceived energy efficiency gap (for example, higher prices would encourage 
more investment in energy-efficient technologies), they do not change the intrinsic 
nature of the barriers and impediments in the market for energy-efficient 
technologies. For example, European policy literature also refers to barriers and 
impediments to energy efficiency even though prices for electricity, gas and oil in 
many European countries are often substantially higher than in Australia, and levels 
of energy efficiency are also higher than in Australia (Sorrell et al. 2004). 
4.2  Failures in markets for energy-efficient 
technologies 
Failures in markets for energy-efficient technologies have the potential to impede 
the adoption of energy-efficient investments whether privately cost effective or not. 
Three broad types of market failure are considered: 
•  imperfect information — markets may undersupply energy-efficient 
technologies and services because consumers (and sometimes vendors) do not 
have access to sufficient or accurate information about their energy efficiency 
options;  
•  split incentives — markets may undersupply technologies and services because 
the person purchasing an energy-using technology is different from the person 
who benefits from its use, and the incentives facing the purchaser differ from 
those of the user; and 
•  positive externalities — markets may undersupply investment in new 
technologies and processes because market participants are unable to fully 
capture the benefits from undertaking an activity.     
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Imperfect information 
Markets work best when consumers and producers have sufficient information 
about energy-using technologies and services to make choices that will maximise 
their welfare and profit respectively. However, consumers might not be able to 
access the necessary information on the energy efficiency of a product, or the price 
and performance of competing products. Similarly, producers might not have 
sufficient information about their competitors or their consumers’ preferences. 
Consequently, consumers and producers may make choices that they later regret 
when they become better informed. 
Some commentators have drawn attention to information deficiencies in the market 
for energy-efficient technologies. For example, the Institute for Sustainable 
Futures (2004, p. 74) commented: 
… in general, participants identified a lack of knowledge about the actual functioning 
of appliances …  
Participants also lacked information to inform purchasing decisions  …  Without 
knowledge, householders are unable to make informed choices about energy-reduction 
actions available to them. 
And as the Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd pointed out ‘… you can’t implement 
something if you don’t know it exists’ (sub. 18, p. 5). 
Some of the reasons why market information may be imperfect include: 
•  information can be costly to obtain 
•  information can have public good characteristics 
•  information is available to some parties in a transaction but not others. 
Costs of obtaining information 
In some ways, information is like any other commodity in that it can be costly to 
obtain. Consumers would be acting rationally by incurring costs to obtain 
information up to the point where the additional cost of an extra piece of 
information just equals the additional benefit. The costs of obtaining information 
are not just financial — they may include the opportunity costs of devoting time and 
effort that could be spent elsewhere. For consumers, this might mean less leisure 
time, and for firms it might mean less attention is given to other business activities 
and obligations. Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd implied that the opportunity cost 
of time can be significant, referring to the:  
Lack of time or resources to look at all the options prior to making a decision  — 
renovators often complain about choices they made under stress that they have become     




unhappy with; sole business operators rarely have the time to look at non-core business 
issues, even if it would be to their advantage. (sub. 18, p. 5)  
Transaction costs  
The costs of obtaining information are part of overall transaction costs. For 
instance, they are part of the costs a producer might incur in purchasing and 
installing more energy-efficient equipment. As well as gathering, assessing and 
applying information, transaction costs can also include the costs of negotiating, 
drawing up, monitoring and enforcing contracts.  
In some cases, transaction costs may prevent individual producers and consumers 
from undertaking investments that might be otherwise economically efficient. 
Where economies of scale and scope are present, other arrangements may make 
such investment feasible. For example, market intermediaries such as energy 
efficiency auditors and energy-performance contractors might be able to meet a 
firm’s information needs at a lower unit cost. Similarly, for consumers, 
governments or other intermediaries might be able to supply general information on 
energy efficiency, through, for example, appliance labelling (see also the discussion 
below on public goods and chapter 9). 
Transaction cost theory can also be useful in explaining the way people behave 
(section 4.3). 
Public goods 
Information can have some of the characteristics of a public good. Information can 
be used many times over without reducing what is available to others, and it can be 
difficult to exclude its use by others, even if they do not pay for it. This decreases 
markedly the incentives for private providers to supply such information. The extent 
to which this is an issue in energy efficiency is debatable and requires a distinction 
to be made between product-specific information and general information. Vendors 
in markets for energy-efficient technologies have incentives to provide information 
that is specific to their particular product. For example: 
•  To the extent that it may give them a marketing advantage, suppliers of 
energy-efficient appliances could be expected to provide information on the 
energy efficiency features of their products. 
•  Builders and vendors of properties and landlords may draw the energy efficiency 
features of their properties to the attention of potential buyers and renters where 
such features will save money on energy bills or significantly enhance comfort 
or productivity.     
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However, other suppliers, builders or vendors may not provide comparable 
product-specific information when it is not to their advantage, such as if their 
products or properties were less efficient. In these circumstances the consumers do 
not have a readily-available comparable information base. 
Where information is less product specific and offers less opportunity for cost 
recovery, producers will have little incentive to provide it. For example, information 
on general energy-saving techniques or practices, such as how to incorporate 
passive design principles into house design, might not be readily supplied. 
However, possibly motivated by social and environmental concerns and the spinoffs 
that might be generated by being seen to be ‘eco friendly’, some energy and product 
suppliers are supplying some general information on energy efficiency. For 
example, on their respective websites, CSR Bradford provides some basic 
information about passive solar design for houses and AGL provides advice on the 
typical energy consumption costs of various household appliances. Furthermore, 
these matters are often referred in specialist journals and magazines and are often 
promoted by enthusiasts through the internet. 
In the Commission’s view, the public good nature of general information about 
energy efficiency may provide some rationale for government intervention. 
However, the method and extent to which governments actually intervene will 
depend in part on the material nature of this problem and the relative cost 
effectiveness of the various policy options. 
Asymmetry of information 
Imperfect information includes cases where the information is not available equally 
to all participants in the market. Such information asymmetries abound in energy 
efficiency and other markets. They can lead to policy problems where there are 
incentives not to share information or information is difficult to verify. Typically, 
information asymmetries occur where producers (or vendors) have more 
information about the energy efficiency of their products than their consumers.  
Market participants nevertheless have incentives to obtain information or to verify 
the credibility of information supplied by other parties. For example, motor-vehicle 
buyers often subject second-hand cars to independent vehicle inspections. And 
prospective building owners and tenants may assess the quality and likely repair and 
maintenance requirements of a building as well as its energy costs. Yet the 
transaction cost of obtaining and verifying the claims of other parties can at times 
be prohibitive. If the problem of verification is sufficiently widespread, the 
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard can arise (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; 
Phlips 1988).      





Adverse selection can occur if sellers are much better informed than buyers about a 
product’s energy efficiency. This information asymmetry could persist because 
sellers have an incentive to promote products as energy efficient even when they are 
not. If consumers think this is the case, then they will be unwilling to pay a 
premium for actual higher energy efficiency. This will in turn lead to a ‘lemons 
effect’ in which only poorer quality (less efficient) products are supplied to the 
market (the logic of the lemons effect was detailed by Akerlof 1970). As a result, 
markets may undersupply cost-effective energy-efficient technologies (Howarth and 
Sanstad 1995).  
Moral hazard 
In some situations, the buyer can possess more information than the seller. If after a 
contract is agreed, the seller is unable to verify the behaviour of the buyer, the buyer 
may act in an opportunistic manner to the detriment of the seller (Sorrell et al. 2000; 
Phlips 1988). This is known as the moral hazard problem.  
Known primarily for its presence in insurance markets (where insured parties may 
become less risk averse after taking out insurance), moral hazard may also be 
relevant to energy efficiency. For example, Origin Energy described the difficulties 
facing energy efficiency auditors in verifying energy savings made by their clients 
after contracts for energy efficiency audits were signed: 
… there is less incentive for the client, after undergoing an energy audit, to recognise 
fully (and attempt to measure) the benefits that are possible from the consultant’s 
advice. Where the contract involves implementation of the consultant’s advice, there is 
less incentive for the client to attribute fully the actual benefits accruing from that 
advice. One would expect the party with less information ex post (the consultant) to 
design a contract upfront to minimise the client’s incentive in this regard, but the costs 
are likely to be prohibitive relative to the size of auditing fees (especially if the 
consultant is a small operator). (sub. 25, p. 7) 
Repeat purchasing 
One way in which consumers can address information asymmetries is through the 
experience gained from repeat purchasing. For example, repeat purchasing of 
grocery items allows consumers to compare and contrast the performance of 
different competing products quite quickly and inexpensively. But where 
transactions are large and infrequent (such as with major appliances, cars and 
houses), consumers might have little past experience to draw on, creating the 
potential for poor decisions. If disgruntled customers have little or no influence on     
52  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
future sales, producers (or vendors) have little incentive to provide full and accurate 
information. Examples can be found in one-off sales of real estate in private 
markets, although this form of market failure might be less severe in the new 
property market, where the reputation of a builder or property developer can be 
established and made known in the marketplace.  
Split incentives 
Split incentives arise when the person purchasing an energy-consuming product is 
different from the person who benefits from it and the incentives facing the 
purchaser differ from those of users.  
This problem can occur in real estate markets, where it is sometimes called the 
landlord–tenant problem. Landlords, it is argued, do not have strong incentives to 
install more energy-efficient appliances because they might not be able to recoup 
the additional capital costs through increased rent. Tenants on the other hand might 
be prohibited from replacing appliances, or might not be confident that they will be 
able to recoup the savings (through lower energy bills), when the term of their lease 
is uncertain. 
Rheem Australia noted that split incentives is potentially a large issue: 
Approximately 30  per  cent of Australian households are in rented accommodation 
rather than owner occupied. In this market segment the decision maker is primarily 
concerned about minimising capital cost and is less concerned about the running cost of 
the water heater. (sub. 46, p. 1) 
Alternatively, it might be argued that landlords want to maximise the net returns on 
their investment and if tenants were willing to pay the higher rent (while still saving 
overall), the more energy-efficient appliances would be installed. But in many cases 
the benefits are not sufficient to warrant renegotiating leases. As Sanstad and 
Howarth (1994, pp. 814–5) noted: 
In the absence of transaction costs, landlords and tenants would presumably enter into 
contracts to share the costs and benefits of energy efficiency. But structuring efficient 
contracts is by no means a simple task, and the net gains achievable through improved 
energy efficiency might be swamped by the associated transaction costs.  
The Commission notes that split incentives can occur where there is an information 
asymmetry, but this is not essential. Even where the buyer and seller have the same 
access to information, the transaction costs of overcoming their different incentives 
may result in the non-adoption of what would otherwise have been a worthwhile 
investment. The case for government intervention would be strongest where it 
lessens these transaction costs.      





Positive externalities (or spillovers) occur where the actions of one person have 
beneficial spillover effects for others that are not reflected in market prices. If the 
person making the investment is unable to capture all of the benefits, they might not 
provide as much of the good or service as would be appropriate from the broader 
community perspective.1 
The positive externalities of greatest relevance in terms of market failures in the 
supply of energy-efficient technologies concern research and development (R&D) 
and the demonstration effects of firms adopting energy efficiency improvements. 
R&D is an important determinant of technological advances in energy efficiency in 
the long term. It tends to push out the technical frontier, but because of the need to 
commercialise new technologies and the inevitable lags in turning over the capital 
stock, can take time to diffuse through the economy. Addressing barriers to 
undertaking R&D would contribute to the supply of (potentially cost effective) 
energy-efficient technologies and potentially increase Australia’s energy efficiency 
and overall economic efficiency. Where R&D externalities are strong, a firm’s 
incentive to undertake R&D is weakened (IC 1995; Banks 2000).  
The incentives for adopting new and innovative technologies and services may also 
be weakened because of demonstration effects. A firm that adopts a new technology 
demonstrates the net benefits of the investment to its competitors. In doing so, it 
reduces the risk to the competitor of adopting the same technology. If firms are 
unable to appropriate all of the benefits from being the first mover, there will be an 
underadoption of new technologies (Sorrell et al. 2000; Jaffe and Stavins 1994). 
Australian governments currently support R&D in energy efficiency technology and 
other areas in many ways. These include the provision of a patent system and other 
intellectual property laws, and the direct funding of government bodies (such as 
cooperative research centres, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation, universities and government agencies), and the provision of general 
and selective R&D incentives (such as the R&D tax concession, competitive grants, 
and concessional loans). The extent to which it is appropriate for governments to 
provide incentives specifically for energy efficiency is addressed in chapter 7. 
                                              
1 Positive externalities and public goods are similar in nature — both involve free riders. The 
difference is largely one of degree. With public goods, the private benefits are assumed to be so 
small (that is, the private costs of addressing the market failure are so large) that no private 
investment takes place. With positive externalities, sufficient private benefit can be captured to 
ensure some provision of the product but not as much as would be appropriate from a broader 
community perspective.     
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Market failure and government intervention 
The presence of market failure does not of itself warrant government intervention. 
Such intervention can be costly and introduces its own distortions, especially if the 
intervention is poorly targeted (chapter 2). Intervention is only warranted when it 
produces net benefits to the community (including economic, social or 
environmental benefits and the public and private costs). One way that this might be 
achieved would be to target the market failure as directly as possible. For example, 
some information asymmetries may be virtually insurmountable for most consumers 
at any reasonable cost. Government intervention that provided such information 
directly or that required that it be provided (through labelling, for example) could 
reduce the search costs of obtaining information. 
The reduction of harmful greenhouse gas emissions is a stated policy objective for 
many energy efficiency measures — even though such benefits are frequently not 
quantified in their regulatory impact assessments. Since government intervention is 
warranted only when it produces net social benefits, the case for energy efficiency 
measures is likely to be strengthened if such net benefits are included and if they are 
significant. 
Failures in markets for energy efficiency technologies can inhibit the adoption of 
energy efficiency improvements at current (and expected) energy prices: 
•  imperfect information (including asymmetries of information) and split incentive 
problems can lead to the non-adoption of energy efficiency improvements that 
are privately cost effective; and 
•  positive externalities associated with research and development and 
demonstration projects can limit the adoption of energy efficiency improvements 
that are socially but not privately cost effective. 
Government intervention may be warranted on these grounds if the social benefits 
of intervention exceed the social costs.  
The case for government intervention rests primarily on the benefits of reducing 
harmful environmental externalities. 
4.3  Behavioural, cultural and organisational barriers 
There are times when individuals, small businesses and larger organisations appear 
(to an outsider) not to choose privately cost-effective energy-efficient technologies 
FINDING 4.1     




even when market information is available to them. This can be because of 
behavioural, cultural and organisational barriers that limit their decision making. 
Behavioural and cultural norms 
Behavioural and cultural norms are the values and attitudes of individuals towards 
energy use. According to the Institute of Sustainable Futures (2004, p. xvi): 
These factors reflect the interaction between past experiences, socially established 
norms and expectations, present living conditions and social contexts. They represent 
long standing and deeply held convictions and understandings that play out in 
behaviour. 
The Australian Consumers’ Association argued that consumers ‘do choose, and are 
likely to continue to choose, an energy intensive lifestyle’ (sub. 52, p. 1).  
Several inquiry participants argued that behavioural and cultural norms are 
influenced by economic factors, such as the opportunity cost of management time: 
Behavioural norms are clearly a factor influencing the way energy is used. These norms 
are likely to reflect many commercial and non-commercial factors operating and 
evolving in the economy and the community more broadly. (Origin Energy, sub. 25, 
p. 8; Electricity Retailers Association of Australia, sub. 26, p. 31) 
Behavioural and cultural norms can also bear on the decision-making processes of 
individuals: 
Another important aspect to behavioural norms is that they may in many instances, for 
example small business decisions, be driven by time-poor managers. (Building 
Products Innovation Council, sub. 44, p. 4) 
Bounded rationality 
In an ideal world, individual consumers and producers would have sufficient 
information and the ability to process that information, to make the most 
appropriate decisions. But individuals are limited in their ability to obtain and 
process complex information and to handle the uncertainties that invariably arise in 
a dynamic and evolving operating environment. In this sense, their rationality is 
said to be bounded.  
In response to such constraints, individuals adopt several decision-making 
strategies. One is to follow satisficing, rather than optimising, behaviour. Satisficing 
individuals may downgrade the standard of their goals, and settle for outcomes that 
are less than ideal but which are reasonable in the circumstances.     
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Individuals can also follow a rule-of-thumb routine (sometimes called a heuristic) 
when arriving at a decision. Routines can include: 
•  Purchasing the same make or brand of equipment that a competitor, family 
member or friend purchases (following the pack). 
•  Purchasing the same make or brand of equipment as previously (relying on past 
experience). In this respect the Australian Conservation Foundation noted that 
‘some organisations find it easier to continue using the same technologies and 
processes that they already have in place’ (sub. 24, p. 6). 
•  Using simplified selection criteria that focus on key features and overlook more 
technical and (to them) less seemingly-important considerations such as energy 
efficiency.  
In a study of the electric motor market in France, de Almeida (1998) reported that 
managers of small companies adopted rule-of-thumb routines, such as continuing to 
purchase the same type and brand of low energy efficiency electric motor. When 
required to replace electric motors in an emergency, they were principally 
concerned with minimising delivery time and price. As a result, they frequently 
purchased the same type and brand as the failed motor.  
In a further example of bounded rationality, DeCanio (1994) also found that many 
senior executives economised on management time and resources by following 
simple payback rules to determine the cost effectiveness of competing investments. 
This was despite the deficiencies of the payback rule as a decision-making tool, 
particularly given its inherent inaccuracy and potential to contribute to poor 
decision making (chapter 5). The payback rule was popular because it is easy to 
communicate, intuitive and saves managerial effort. 
The effect of satisficing behaviour and rules-of-thumb routines is that individuals do 
not arrive at the same decisions as they would if they were able to costlessly process 
all the available information. 
The concept of bounded rationality has some potentially important policy 
implications. First, it helps to explain that, in some cases, supplying information 
might not be sufficient — decision makers might not be able to process it. This 
suggests that different ways of providing information might need to be explored. 
Second, given that information is costly to obtain and process, there might be a role 
for governments to minimise transaction costs.  
However, while individuals might not make ideal choices from the perspective of an 
outside observer, they may well be optimising something else that is just as 
important to them — such as the value of their time — which might be better spent 
     




on core projects or leisure activities. As Conlisk (1996, p. 671) said:  
…  heuristics often provide an adequate solution cheaply whereas more elaborate 
approaches would be unduly expensive.  
In other words, concepts of bounded rationality help explain how firms and 
individuals achieve entirely appropriate, if somewhat constrained, approximations 
of economically-efficient outcomes. They might not be ideal outcomes, but given 
the limits on cognitive abilities, and the transaction costs involved in seeking out the 
ideal solution (which may include the opportunity cost of management time), they 
are as economically efficient as it is practical to contemplate achieving. 
Although bounded rationality helps explain decision making generally, it is not 
immediately apparent that there is much that governments can or should do to 
address it. Some participants and commentators have advocated that intervention is 
warranted. For example, noting that bounded rationality will limit the benefits of 
policy measures such as providing improved information, Sorrell et al. (2000, 
p. 176) observed: 
…  individual and organisational routines can be overridden through the use of 
regulatory standards, such as minimum levels of performance. Such market 
transformation initiatives focus on the supply of energy services, rather than attempting 
to modify the behaviour of customers who are preoccupied with other priorities.  
They went on to argue that bounded rationality (and organisational failure) can 
provide a rationale for intervention: ‘governments can help individuals and 
organisations to help themselves’ (Sorrell et al. 2000, p. xxvi). This work is also 
cited by the Insulation Council of Australia and New Zealand, the Australian Glass 
and Glazing Association and the Australian Business Council for Sustainable 
Energy (sub. DR144) and by the Allen Consulting Group (2004c) in defence of the 
case for government intervention.  
The Commission considers that the bounded rationality of consumers is an 
insufficient ground for justifying intrusive measures such as minimum standards. 
The case for intervention relies on notions of omniscient regulators who are capable 
of making decisions that are in the best interests of energy users. If those users were 
capable of collecting and digesting the relevant information, the presumption is that 
they would come to the same conclusion as the regulator, that is, to not purchase the 
energy-inefficient appliance. This might decrease search costs but, given the diverse 
preferences of energy users, must inevitably leave some consumers worse off. 
Where bounded rationality is on stronger grounds is in its application to labelling 
systems that help consumers to cut through the information haze without curtailing 
choice. Even then, the argument for intervention can be mounted more strongly 
from the grounds of information asymmetries. These issues are taken up in more 
detail in chapter 9.     
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Understanding the bounded nature of decision-making processes may nevertheless 
be useful in regard to how information is packaged and to whom it is targeted. Such 
information should be specific and personalised, vivid, clear and simple, and 
available close in time to the decision (Sorrell et al. 2000). Governments may have 
a role in ensuring that general and specific product information is provided in a 
manner that is readily used and understood. 
Organisational barriers 
Barriers and impediments to the adoption of cost-effective energy-efficient 
technologies also occur within organisations — including larger firms and 
government agencies (Sorrell et al. 2000; DeCanio 1993). Larger organisations may 
not adopt cost-effective energy-efficient technologies even if such technologies can 
improve their profitability or help meet the objectives of the organisation 
(Sorrell et al. 2000).  
This may be because they face principal–agent problems. In many organisations, 
the owners (the principals) are faced with a problem of how to ensure that its 
employees (the agents) act in the owners’ interests, given that the interests of the 
owners and employees are not always aligned. A range of management tools (such 
as task allocation and incentives) may be employed to enhance the alignment. 
However, the complexity of designing incentives and allocating tasks is 
compounded by the difficulties posed by imperfect information within the 
organisation and by the bounded rationality of owners and employees 
(DeCanio 1993; Button and Weyman-Jones 1992; and Sorrell et al. 2000).  
Overseas research on this topic has demonstrated a number of examples of how 
principal–agent (and related) problems can impede the adoption of energy-efficient 
technologies in organisations: 
•  Risk aversion — Managers have an incentive to avoid risky projects and actions 
in areas like energy efficiency if they are more risk averse than the owners of 
firms. Managers are likely to be risk averse if the personal consequences of 
failure are larger than the payoff from success (DeCanio 1993). 
•  Short time horizons — Managers might operate with a shorter time horizon than 
the owners of a firm. Sorrell et al. (2000) claimed that this is an example of split 
incentives operating inside a firm. Short time horizons might result from policies 
of rotating managers or of linking managers’ compensation to recent 
performance (short-term profitability) rather than longer-term performance 
(long-term profitability) (DeCanio 1993). In this environment, projects with 
short paybacks will be preferred over those with longer paybacks, even if they 
have lower net present values.      




•  Lack of cooperation — Managers within different parts of an organisation might 
not cooperate if their incentives have not been appropriately aligned by the 
owners. DeCanio (1994, p.  114) observed that managers make decisions in 
response to incentives that are established to ‘get the best possible effort’ from 
each unit rather than maximising the firm’s overall profits.  
•  Decentralisation — Organisations with decentralised management were shown 
to be poorly equipped and less likely to pursue large-scale projects spanning the 
entire organisation. On the other hand, organisations with centralised 
management were constrained in adopting small-scale localised initiatives which 
required the active cooperation of their employees (Cebon 1992). 
Some inquiry participants cited the role of organisational barriers in inhibiting the 
uptake of energy efficiency improvements. For example, the Department of the 
Environment and Heritage, paraphrasing EEWG (2004), argued: 
•  [senior management can have a] … poor understanding  …  of the potential for 
improved energy efficiency to increase productivity; 
•  companies, particularly small manufacturers, often see any change to working 
processes and practices as a significant risk; and 
•  finite resources within companies, both staff and financial, to focus on a limited 
number of issues. This means that energy efficiency falls off the priority list. (sub. 30, 
p. 7) 
The Australian Industry Greenhouse Network noted: 
The pursuit of energy efficiency improvements may be influenced by factors such as: 
the firm’s size and corporate structure; information asymmetries within the firm; 
alignment of management incentives with company objectives; decision making 
authority of management and rules of procedure; and management acumen.  
These things are all symptoms of poor management and no doubt energy efficiency is 
prejudiced when it is prevalent. (sub. 57, pp. 7–8) 
A number of inquiry participants have also suggested that the relatively low 
attention given to energy efficiency by many organisations could also reflect the 
low priority given by managers to energy use. For example, the Australian 
Conservation Foundation said: 
…  the relatively low cost of energy, the effort required to contemplate energy 
efficiency options and the risks in implementing them means decisions are often driven 
by other priorities. (sub. 24, p. 6) 
In contrast, the Australian Aluminium Council (sub. 29, p. 9) said that for relatively 
intensive energy users in the aluminium industry, ‘energy efficiency is a priority’ 
for continual improvement because of its effect on costs.      
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As the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network implied, many of the 
organisational issues cited above could be used to explain inefficiency in many 
firms’ activities, not just energy use (sub.  57). Poor management, and therefore 
inefficiency, in some aspects of business some of the time is not unusual in many 
industries. For example, in a review of the empirical evidence of the incidence of 
inefficiency among firms, Button and Weyman-Jones (1992) found that the 
minimum possible operating costs ranged between 61 and 97 per cent of the actual 
costs of the firms surveyed.  
Button and Weyman-Jones (1992) and Conlisk (1996) both observed that 
competitive market forces serve to place a discipline on the extent to which such 
inefficiencies can occur. As Conlisk (1996, p. 671) argued: 
…  market discipline, through repeated transactions with significant stakes, can be 
potent in attenuating discrepancies between optimising and observed behaviour ...  
In the Commission’s view, there is no clear case for government intervention to 
address internal organisational issues. The most important policy implication is that 
governments should strive to provide a competitive environment within which firms 
operate. Attention may be needed to encourage incentive structures in non-
competitive firms (such as natural monopoly utilities and government agencies), but 
the case for additional measures beyond those already applied would need to be 
established. This is taken up in later chapters. Another policy implication is that, in 
conjunction with the lessons to be learned from understanding bounded rationality, 
information asymmetries within firms might provide some rationale for targeting 
information programs to both technical staff and senior managers within firms — to 
the extent that such programs can be separately justified on the grounds of market 
failure. 
Behavioural, cultural and organisational barriers do not of themselves provide a 
rationale for government intervention. Understanding these barriers may, however, 
be helpful in designing efficiency programs that address environmental 
externalities, information failures and other sources of market failure. 
4.4  Other barriers and impediments 
Barriers and impediments other than market failures and the influence of 
organisational, cultural and behavioural factors may also be at work. Failure to 
consider all of the costs associated with adopting energy efficiency investments or 
the impact of those investments on output, can make energy efficiency investments 
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less attractive to households and firms than they might appear to an outsider. Some 
of these include: 
•  Implementation costs — some energy efficiency technologies and processes 
entail additional costs when implementing an investment. 
•  Risk and uncertainty — some energy-efficient investments are inherently risky, 
financially and/or technically. The presence of such risks may reduce the level of 
investment, or even restrict access to finance. 
•  Asset replacement costs — upgrading plant and equipment to the latest energy-
efficient technologies may require the premature scrapping of existing assets.  
A further factor to consider is the heterogenous nature of consumers and producers. 
Although not a barrier as such, heterogeneity can account for differences in the 
uptake of energy efficiency. Estimates of the cost effectiveness of a particular 
energy-efficient technology or service are often based on characteristics of an 
average user within a particular class, or based on assumptions of the performance 
of the technology or process under specific or average conditions. If cost-
effectiveness studies do not reflect these variations, they will overstate the potential 
for the uptake of energy efficiency improvements (Jaffe and Stavins  1994; 
Sorrell et al. 2000). 
Implementation costs 
Households and organisations may not invest in apparently worthwhile 
energy-efficient technologies because of additional costs that can be involved in the 
implementation phase (that is, additional to the direct capital and operating costs of 
the energy efficiency improvement). Estimates of the size of the energy efficiency 
gap may be overstated if the models do not take all such costs in to account, given 
that those costs would be considered by individual firms and households. 
Implementation costs can arise for a variety of reasons. Costs can be incurred when 
the workplace or household must change its behaviour to accommodate the new 
investment before the new technology can reach its peak performance. Such costs 
include retraining the workforce or hiring new staff, and adopting new workplace or 
household practices. 
Alternatively, benefits may be forgone when the new replacement technology is not 
perfectly substitutable for the old technology. In these instances, the firm or 
household may either incur additional costs to maintain productivity or 
functionality, or forgo benefits from the new technology (Jaffe and Stavins 1994). 
The new technology might also pose problems with safety, noise, working 
conditions or require extra maintenance and service quality. As a result, either the     
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cost effectiveness of the technology might be diminished because of decreased 
returns, or additional costs might be incurred to ensure that it performs at the same 
level as the old technology (Sorrell et al. 2000). 
Risk and uncertainty 
Investment in a new appliance or plant and equipment involves some degree of risk 
or uncertainty.2 If the degree of risk and uncertainty facing producers and 
consumers is not adequately recognised, estimates of the potential for taking up 
energy efficiency related investments will be overstated. 
Three sources of risk and uncertainty associated with energy efficiency investments 
are: 
•  technical — those associated with the management of the energy efficiency 
investment, such as the irreversibility of many energy efficiency investments or 
its effects on production processes;  
•  external — those over which the household or firm has little direct control, such 
as sovereign risk; and  
•  financial — those associated with the household’s or firm’s capacity to respond 
to changes in costs and prices, including the costs and availability of capital and 
energy prices (Sorrell et al. 2000; Hassett and Metcalf 1993). 
Origin Energy identified technical risks as being important for new investments: 
Risks include operational difficulties associated with changing to new processes and 
opportunity loss of management time and effort as it is diverted away from higher 
priority areas of the business and toward[s] energy efficiency. (sub. 25, p. 5)  
Technical risks can be very high when investments are irreversible. Even where the 
prima facie evidence suggests that an investment is capable of generating high 
returns, it may be rational for firms and households to delay making such 
investments until more information is obtained that would help resolve its 
uncertainties (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).  
The Australian Aluminium Council pointed to sovereign risk as an important issue 
for long-term investments: 
Equally rational is the decision not to proceed with energy efficiency investments 
where policy certainty is not adequate to support the investment required; this is 
                                              
2 Risk refers to those possible future outcomes of an investment for which the probabilities of 
possible outcomes are known, and uncertainty refers to those possible outcomes for which the 
probabilities are not known.     




exacerbated by the large capital requirements and by the length of time required to 
recover the new capital investment; the involvement of state governments often causes 
further uncertainty within the market, with policy activity directly and indirectly 
(eg greenhouse policy actions). (sub. 29, p. 10)  
Financial risk also includes the uncertainty about the cost and availability of capital. 
Faced with uncertainty, constraints can be externally imposed by the capital market 
or internally imposed within a household or firm. In the presence of such 
constraints, households and managers may ascribe a hurdle rate of return that is 
higher than the prevailing market rate, reflecting the need to allocate limited 
financial resources between competing investments. 
Sorrell et al. (2004) observed that firms apply high discount rates to energy 
efficiency projects when internal finance is constrained. For example, senior 
managers in larger firms will impose high hurdle rates on non-core projects being 
administered by more junior staff.  
Sanstad and Howarth (1994, p. 815) noted that financial institutions similarly place 
borrowing limits on low-income households for energy-efficient investments 
because such investments are perceived to be risky: 
… [Households] frequently must pay substantial premia to obtain loans from lending 
institutions; indeed, they may be unable to obtain credit at any price. Under these 
conditions, the poor might rationally use high discount rates in evaluating the merits of 
energy efficiency improvements. 
In effect, capital constraints encourage households and firms to purchase cheaper 
and less energy efficient appliances and investments: 
In many cases consumers do not have ready access to capital to purchase more efficient 
equipment (more expensive). This is particularly so in the residential end use sector. 
Here, initial investment in energy efficiency can be seen to be large compared with 
significantly lower purchase costs, but higher operating costs of less-efficient 
alternatives. (TransGrid, sub. 62, p. 3) 
Similarly, Origin Energy observed that capital constraints effectively reduce the 
attractiveness of energy efficiency investments: 
Even if risk-adjusted IRRs [internal rates of return] are substantial, it may be that the 
net present value of energy efficiency investments are small relative to alternative 
investment projects, and not pursued as a result (given the practical limits on the 
availability of capital that often apply). This is likely to be a rational explanation of the 
reluctance of businesses (and financial institutions) to underwrite investment in energy 
efficiency improvement in some cases. (sub. 25, p. 5)      
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However, some financial intermediaries are actively courting business in this area. 
For example, the Bendigo Bank provides home loan mortgages with reduced 
interest rates for borrowers prepared to invest in energy-efficient technologies. 
Are risk premiums for energy efficiency investments unreasonably high? 
A number of inquiry participants and commentators have argued that the high risk 
premiums accorded to energy efficiency investments act as barriers to their 
adoption. For example: 
The South Australian Government believes there is a strong case for government 
intervention to encourage energy efficiency  …  Key barriers to energy efficiency 
include the high risk premiums businesses often apply when evaluating energy-
efficiency investments… (South Australian Government, sub. 80, p. 2) 
The Energy Efficiency Working Group (EEWG 2004, p. 8) reported that: 
Uncertainty within organisations on the success of energy efficiency projects, has often 
resulted in higher investment return hurdle rates being applicable to these investments 
relative to others. 
Similarly, the Total Environment Centre argued: 
… that a very high effective discount rate is applied to energy efficiency opportunities 
for both households and industrial customers, when capital is available at all. … In 
effect, energy efficiency opportunities developed by consumers [households and 
industrial customers] typically must meet far more demanding requirements for 
financial performance than do other projects. (sub. 81, pp. 4–5) 
To some extent, the use of high discount rates is a reflection by the household or 
firm of the additional but not readily identifiable costs that the investment might 
entail. It might also be explained by senior managers using high hurdle rates as a 
discipline on more junior staff and as a substitute for the cost of their time.  
Though high risk premiums can reduce the estimated cost effectiveness of energy 
efficiency investments, it is not clear that they warrant government intervention. 
Risk and uncertainty per se do not represent a source of market failure. As Jaffe and 
Stavins (1994, p. 805) noted:  
It is reasonable and appropriate for individuals to take uncertainty into account in 
making investment decisions, and to apply relatively high discount rates to irreversible 
investments whose returns are uncertain. To the extent that consumers’ true discount 
rates were high for these reasons, this would not represent a market failure.  
It is also not clear to what extent households and firms are attaching higher risk 
premiums to energy efficiency investments than to other comparably risky 
investments. The Atech Group (2003) argued that energy efficiency investments in     




commercial applications represent a relatively low risk investment and, as a result, 
should attract lower risk premiums than for the average commercial sector 
investment. 
Yet other authors have argued that energy efficiency investments were risky and 
justified their high discount rates. Greely et al. (1989), in a study of actual energy 
savings obtained from commercial building retrofits, found that actual savings 
varied significantly from the predicted energy savings. Very few predictions of 
actual energy savings came within 20 per cent of the expected savings. 
Nor is it clear that government intervention is justified on the basis of incorrect 
perceptions of risk — apart from providing information. The Commission notes that 
market intermediaries, such as energy service companies, can play an important role 
in helping their customers to manage risk and uncertainty. Such contractors operate 
by undertaking to develop, install, and manage projects that will improve the energy 
efficiency and maintenance costs of their customers, in exchange for an agreed 
portion of the energy savings (chapter 7). 
Although risk and uncertainty are not the sources of market failure in themselves, 
there are important lessons for policy if the source of uncertainty stems from 
sovereign risk. Minimising sovereign risk is always important, but clearly 
governments will need to change policy settings from time to time as circumstances 
change, so some risk is inevitable. As this report notes, there is considerable 
uncertainty in the current policy framework, particularly in relation to a national 
response to greenhouse policy. 
Asset replacement costs 
Many energy-using technologies have long asset lives. Since the adoption of more 
energy-efficient technologies can require either the replacement or the 
refurbishment of existing assets, new investments will usually occur relatively 
infrequently and will be governed by a variety of economic considerations, energy 
efficiency being only one of them.  
For example, the Electricity Supply Association of Australia said that large 
electricity customers would only change their energy use if their capital stock 
changed: 
For large electricity customers, the level of consumption tends to be embedded in 
existing plant and equipment and only replacement investment can effect a substantial 
change in the efficiency of their energy use. (sub. 68, p. 8)     
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In some cases, very large improvements in energy efficiency may be needed to 
bring forward asset replacement, other things being the same. This issue is taken up 
in more detail in chapter 7. 
In the Commission’s view, these other barriers and impediments to the adoption of 
energy-efficient investments are rational explanations for their non-adoption by the 
private investor. Though some energy efficiency investments will not be privately 
cost effective because of them, they are not necessarily problems that need to be, or 
can be, addressed by government intervention. As a result, these issues are not 
considered to be barriers and impediments to privately cost effective increases in 
energy efficiency, later in the report. There is, however, always a role for 
governments to reduce sovereign risk, such as that which arises from the 
involvement of governments in energy efficiency investment markets. 
Barriers and impediments, such as risk and uncertainty, asset replacement costs 
and implementation costs, increase the costs to energy users of adopting energy 
efficiency improvements. However, the role of governments in addressing these 
issues may be quite limited. 
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•  An energy efficiency gap is the difference between actual energy efficiency and 
what is considered to be the most energy-efficient processes and technologies that 
are achievable. 
•  Defining the highest achievable energy efficiency is not straightforward. A common 
approach, and the one set out in the terms of reference for this inquiry, is to only 
include energy efficiency improvements that would be cost effective for individual 
producers and consumers. 
•  To the Commission’s knowledge, nobody has quantified the full extent of the energy 
efficiency gap in Australia. Many researchers have, however, undertaken case 
studies of selected energy efficiency improvements. 
•  The case studies typically find that producers and consumers have failed to adopt 
energy efficiency improvements that appear to be cost effective for them. However, 
there is considerable uncertainty about the estimated potential savings, because the 
case studies use many questionable assumptions, including the: 
–  criterion used to determine cost effectiveness (such as a simple payback period); 
–  use of a social discount rate rather than private discount rates that reflect the range 
of individuals’ circumstances; 
–  level of business-as-usual improvements in energy efficiency; 
–  costs associated with energy efficiency improvements; 
–  extrapolation of audit and best-practice study results to a whole sector; and 
–   representativeness of simulated producers and consumers. 
 
 
Various studies have identified energy efficiency improvements that seem to be cost 
effective for individual producers and consumers, but for some reason are not 
adopted. This apparent underinvestment in energy efficiency improvement is often 
said to result in an ‘energy efficiency gap’.  
This chapter clarifies what is meant by the term energy efficiency gap, and reviews 
recent case studies of potential energy efficiency improvements in Australia.     
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5.1  What is an energy efficiency gap? 
An energy efficiency gap describes the difference between actual energy efficiency 
and what is considered to be the most energy-efficient processes and technologies 
that are achievable. Such a gap could be assessed at a national level, for particular 
industries, or for individual producers or consumers. 
Defining what are the most energy-efficient processes and technologies that are 
achievable is not straightforward. At the extreme is the technologist or pure 
engineering view that any technically feasible improvement in energy efficiency is 
achievable (regardless of its cost). Few would claim that this is practical or 
economically efficient. 
The approach set out in the terms of reference for this inquiry is to only assess the 
economic and environmental benefits of those energy efficiency improvements 
which are privately cost effective. As noted in chapter 2, the Commission defines 
‘privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements’ as actions that (a) reduce 
energy use per unit of useful output or outcome delivered, and (b) deliver a net 
benefit (at current and expected energy prices) to the individual producer or 
consumer undertaking the action. The discussion in chapter 2 also explains why cost 
effectiveness is not synonymous with economic efficiency. 
Whether there is currently an energy efficiency gap is best assessed on the basis of 
current price expectations and output because they are the conditions under which 
present energy consumption occurs. To do otherwise is to ‘compare apples and 
oranges’ and so produce a misleading measure of an energy efficiency gap. 
Similarly, when forecasting a future energy efficiency gap, predictions of actual and 
maximum achievable energy efficiency should be based on the same price and 
output expectations. 
5.2  Case studies of energy efficiency potential 
The true extent of the energy efficiency gap in Australia, or any other country, is 
largely immeasurable. Quantification of the energy efficiency gap could, in theory, 
be achieved by using production frontier techniques that benchmark individual 
producers and consumers against best practice. However, this would require data on 
the many possible technologies and management practices available to producers 
and consumers, and how current practices compare with the ‘best-practice’ frontier. 
Numerous researchers have, however, used case studies of a subset of all possible 
energy efficiency improvements to demonstrate that Australian producers and 
consumers have failed to adopt energy efficiency improvements that are cost     




effective for them. Such case studies are reviewed in this section, with an emphasis 
on those that estimate the combined impact of energy efficiency improvements in 
several sectors. 
General methodological issues 
In broad terms, the case studies examined in this section use an   
‘engineering–accounting’ approach. An engineering estimate of how far energy 
efficiency can be increased is converted into predicted savings in running costs. An 
accounting or financial equation is then used to assess whether it is cost effective to 
incur the costs of investing in the energy efficiency improvement, in return for 
lower running costs in the future. 
There are various criteria that can be used to assess cost effectiveness, even within 
the definition specified in this inquiry’s terms of reference (box 5.1). This can, in 
turn, lead to different estimates of what is cost effective. 
 
Box 5.1  Possible cost-effectiveness criteria 
Various criteria can be used to determine cost effectiveness. The following are three 
possible options.  
Net present value (NPV) is positive — the present value of expected future savings 
in running costs exceeds the present value of expected additional capital costs. 
Present values are determined by applying a discount rate to future costs and benefits. 
Internal rate of return (IRR) is above a minimum threshold — the discount rate at 
which the present value of expected future savings in running costs equals the present 
value of the expected additional costs is above a certain level. 
Payback period is below a certain time period — the number of years it takes for 
cumulative savings in running costs to match the increase in capital costs is below a 
certain level. It is assumed that the benefit from having a dollar today is the same as 
having a dollar in the future, and so a discount rate is not applied to future cost 
savings. 
If an investment meets the selected criterion, but is not being adopted, this is regarded 
as evidence that producers or consumers are not adopting cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements.  
 
 
Another reason why estimates may differ concerns whose costs are considered 
when assessing cost effectiveness. The terms of reference for this inquiry require 
the Commission to consider changes in the costs of individual energy users. A 
broader approach would be to also consider changes in the costs that energy users     
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impose on others (such as from pollution), as would be done in a social 
(societywide) benefit–cost analysis. 
SEAV-NFEE estimates 
The Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria (SEAV), with assistance from several 
consultants, produced estimates of Australia’s energy efficiency potential for the 
National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE).  
The SEAV-NFEE estimates were produced in two phases. The first phase used 
readily available data to generate preliminary results. In the second phase, sectoral 
studies were undertaken to produce revised estimates of energy efficiency potential. 
Preliminary (phase one) estimates 
The preliminary SEAV-NFEE estimates were generated for two scenarios — low 
and high energy efficiency improvement (figure 5.1). The results suggested that 
there was significant scope for producers and consumers to adopt improvements in 
their energy efficiency that would be cost effective for them. 
The authors stressed the preliminary nature of their results: 
This work does not purport to be a definitive study on energy efficiency improvement 
potential in Australia, and its inherent limitations are recognised. (SEAV, Armstrong 
and Saturn Corporate Resources 2003, p. ii) 
They also listed various limitations of their study, including that the estimates were 
based on national averages and did not take account of the ‘rebound’ effect or future 
technological improvements that would lower the cost of adopting energy efficiency 
improvements. 
Although many claimed that the preliminary estimates of energy efficiency 
improvements were overly optimistic, Alan Pears (sub. DR113) commented that the 
estimates were revised downwards in order to reach a compromise with critics, not 
because the phase one results were too optimistic. Similarly, Moreland Energy 
Foundation Ltd noted: 
There was nothing wrong with the first set of estimates, except some of the industry 
stakeholders were kicking up a stink about them. In order to silence the critics and 
enable the process to move forward, the most conservative estimates were used. On the 
other side of the debate were many credible people who felt that the initial estimates 
were more conservative than they needed to be, but those in favour of NFEE had to 
accept the pragmatic position taken in order to see something happen. (sub. DR115, 
p. 7)     




Figure 5.1  Preliminary (phase one) SEAV-NFEE estimates of potential 
energy efficiency improvementsa 







Energy efficiency improvement potential (per cent)
Low scenario
High scenario
a Energy efficiency improvement potential is expressed as a percentage of current energy use. The low 
energy efficiency improvement scenario was based on current commercially available technologies with an 
average 4 year payback period. The high energy efficiency improvement scenario was based on existing or 
developing technologies potentially available during a 12 year projection period with an average 8 year 
payback period. 
Data sources: EEWG (2003); SEAV, Armstrong and Saturn Corporate Resources (2003).  
Phase two SEAV-NFEE estimates 
For the second phase of the SEAV-NFEE assessment, more detailed studies were 
commissioned on potential energy efficiency improvements in the residential, 
commercial and industrial sectors. Different estimation approaches were used for 
each of these sectors, as outlined below. 
Residential sector 
For the residential sector, the SEAV commissioned two studies: 
•  George Wilkenfeld and Associates (2004b) analysed potential improvements in 
the efficiency of water heating; and 
•  EMET Consultants (2004b) examined 15 potential energy efficiency 
improvements for lighting, cooking, refrigeration, dishwashers, clothes washers, 
building thermal performance and heating/cooling systems.     
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Both of these studies used spreadsheet models to quantify the benefit to 
householders from investing in specific energy efficiency improvements. The 
simulated investments were in addition to those that householders were expected to 
undertake under a business-as-usual scenario of continuing energy efficiency 
improvements and expected future increases in mandatory efficiency standards for 
residential buildings and appliances. 
In summary, the residential sector estimates suggested that, by 2014, householders 
will have overlooked additional cost-effective actions that could have reduced their 
energy consumption by at least 13 per cent in that year (table 5.1). The majority of 
these gains were from changes to heating and cooling appliances. This result is 
significantly lower than the 34 per cent improvement estimated under the ‘low 
scenario’ in phase one (figure 5.1). 
Table 5.1  SEAV-NFEE estimates of potential energy efficiency 
improvements for the residential sectora 
Relative to a business-as-usual projection for 2014/2015 
 
 










 in capital 
costsb 
 Petajoules  %  $m  $m 
Building shell, heating & cooling  37.7  16.4  459  2 175 
Lighting 2.7  12.4  98  384 
Refrigeration 3.5  10.9  126  439 
Cooking 3.9  17.7  100  330 
Dishwashers 0.3  8.0  11  63 
Clothes washers  0.2  13.5  9  35 
Water heating  21.2  14.9  427  1 038 
Total  69.5  13.0  1 230  4 464 
a Estimates in the table show changes relative to a business-as-usual projection for 2015 (water heating) or 
2014 (other measures). Water heating estimates are for measures with a payback period of no more than 
four years, as estimated by George Wilkenfeld and Associates (2004b, p. 15). Estimates for other energy 
efficiency measures have a payback period of no more than 6.5 years, as estimated by EMET 
Consultants (2004b). b Compared to annual energy use and costs in the final year of the business-as-usual 
projection (2014/2015). 
Sources: EMET Consultants (2004b); George Wilkenfeld and Associates (2004b); McNicol (2004). 
Commercial sector (buildings) 
The SEAV-NFEE analysis of the commercial sector focused on measures that could 
be implemented in existing buildings, refurbishments or new buildings. Estimates 
were generated by EMET Consultants (2004a) by using a database of 80 potential 
energy efficiency improvements, which covered: 
•  thermal performance of building fabric     




•  heating, ventilation and air conditioning 
•  lighting 
•  hot water services 
•  lifts and other services and plant. 
Individual energy efficiency improvements were ranked according to their 
estimated payback period. Measures that had a payback period of no more than four 
years were then combined to produce an overall estimate of energy efficiency 
potential in six subsectors (after taking account of any interactions between the 
energy efficiency measures). The results were compared to business-as-usual 
scenarios for 2010 (derived from ABARE sectoral forecasts and EMET 
Consultants’ assessment of future adoption rates for energy efficiency measures due 
to improvements in the cost effectiveness of technologies and their availability). 
In summary, it was estimated that, by 2010, the commercial sector will have 
overlooked cost-effective actions that could have reduced its energy consumption 
by a further 10.4 per cent in that year (table 5.2).  
Table 5.2  SEAV-NFEE estimates of potential energy efficiency 















 Petajoules  %  $m  $m 
Wholesale and retail trade  15.2  11.9  920.8  846.9 
Accommodation, cafes and 





Communication services  0.5  7.6  25.6  27.3 
Finance, insurance, property 






education, health and 







Culture and recreation, 





Total  30.2  10.4  1 767.5  1 572.4 
a Estimates in the table are for energy efficiency improvements (beyond those under the business-as-usual 
scenario) that have a payback period of no more than four years. The average payback period was much less 
than four years for all subsectors because most of the energy efficiency improvements examined had a 
payback period well below four years. b Compared to annual energy use in the final year of the business-as-
usual projection (2010). c Before taking account of business-as-usual changes in running and capital costs. 
This has the effect of overstating the increase in capital costs and fall in running costs.  
Source: EMET Consultants (2004a).     
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Around half of the estimated potential energy savings were from initiatives to 
improve lighting and management of hot water systems and processes (such as 
cooking and heating) in the wholesale and retail trade. Again, this estimate 
(10 per cent improvement by 2010) is substantially less than the phase one estimates 
of 28 to 70 per cent (figure 5.1). 
Industrial sector (mining and manufacturing) 
The SEAV-NFEE estimates for the industrial sector were produced by 
Energetics (2004). There were some key differences from the assumptions used for 
the residential and commercial studies, including that: 
•  there is no change in the size of the industrial sector over the projection period;  
•  there are no energy efficiency improvements under the business-as-usual 
scenario for some industries (mining, ceramics, bakery products, flour milling 
and cereal products); and 
•  there is no interaction between different energy efficiency measures when they 
are combined to estimate overall energy efficiency potential. 
Energetics (2004) compared the energy that individual subsectors used for specific 
processes  — such as use of a blast furnace  — with that found in best practice 
studies and site audits. The results were used to estimate how far the energy 
efficiency of a specific process in a subsector could be improved. ‘Implementation 
rate factors’ were used to recognise that not every firm in a subsector could achieve 
the energy efficiency improvement. Process-specific energy efficiency measures 
were then ranked according to their payback period. Measures that had a payback 
period of no more than four years were combined to produce estimates of energy 
efficiency potential in each subsector. The results were compared to a twelve year 
business-as-usual projection that, for some sectors, included energy efficiency 
improvements. 
In summary, the estimates suggested that, in the final year of the projection period, 
the industrial sector will have overlooked additional cost-effective actions that 
could have reduced its energy consumption by at least 6.2  per  cent in that year 
(table 5.3). This is smaller than the percentage improvements estimated for the 
residential and commercial sectors (13.0 and 10.4 per cent respectively) and can be 
attributed to a number of reasons. Unlike the commercial sector study, the industrial 
sector analysis excluded greenfield projects and did not take account of reductions 
in non-energy costs, such as lower maintenance.     




Table 5.3  SEAV-NFEE estimates of potential energy efficiency 















 capital costsc 
 Petajoules  %  $m  $m 
Mining (excluding oil, gas and 
bauxite)  8.0 8.8  100.0  212.0 
Meat and meat products  1.0  8.3  24.1  63.6 
Dairy product manufacturing  1.7  11.9  23.9  81.8 
Bakery products, flour milling 
and cereal products  1.5 13.5  19.2 58.1 
Pulp and paper manufacturing  3.5  7.4  54.2  149.3 
Chemical products 
manufacturing  9.3 8.9 89.0  211.0 
Ceramic products 
manufacturing  2.1 8.6 13.2  44.8 
Cement manufacturing  2.8  9.6  28.3  42.9 
Iron and steel manufacturing  6.6  4.0  117.0  160.0 
Bauxite mining and alumina 
refining  1.0 0.6 45.7  111.6 
Aluminium smelting and 
semi-fabrication  11.4 8.8  143.7  438.2 
Total  48.9 6.2  659.0  1  574.0 
a Estimates in the table are for energy efficiency improvements that have a payback period of no more than 
4 years when implemented over a 12 year period starting from 1999. b Compared to annual energy use in the 
final year of the business-as-usual projection. c Before taking account of business-as-usual changes in 
running and capital costs. This has the effect of overstating the increase in capital costs and fall in running 
costs. 
Source: Energetics (2004). 
The potential reduction in energy consumption was estimated to be similar in 
percentage terms in most subsectors (around 7 to 9 per cent in the final year of the 
projection period). The exceptions were bauxite mining and alumina refining, and 
iron and steel manufacturing, where energy efficiency potential was found to be 
relatively small; and dairy product manufacturing and bakery products, which had a 
high energy efficiency potential. In terms of the amount of energy that could be 
saved, aluminium smelting and semi-fabrication was estimated to have the greatest 
potential. 
The relatively small energy efficiency potential (in percentage terms) for bauxite 
mining and alumina refining, and iron and steel manufacturing, can be partly 
attributed to the strong incentive for those industries to adopt cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements under the business-as-usual scenario. That is, energy 
accounts for a large proportion of their costs and so there is a strong incentive to 
reduce energy costs.      
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Such an incentive also applies to aluminium smelting and semi-fabrication, and so it 
is surprising that an above-average energy efficiency potential was estimated for 
that subsector (8.8 per cent versus 6.2 per cent for all industrial subsectors). 
Energetics (2004) did not explain the reason for the difference, but it did note that 
the information it had on energy efficiency opportunities in those industries was 
more limited than what it had for other industries. Alan Pears (sub. DR113) advised 
that the estimated potential saving in aluminium smelting and semi-fabrication is 
large because uncertainty about greenhouse policy has caused many firms to hold 
back from implementing energy efficiency improvements, and that long-term 
research and development has led to a potential for large savings. 
Input to SEAV-NFEE general equilibrium modelling 
The Victorian Government cautioned that the phase two SEAV-NFEE estimates do 
not provide a definitive measure of the energy efficiency gap. Rather: 
The work was undertaken to provide an estimate of the potential, costs of and savings 
of beyond BAU [business-as-usual] energy efficiency improvement across the 
Australian economy as the input data into macroeconomic modelling of the impact of 
implementing these over a 12-year period. (sub. DR125, p. 21) 
The results of the above-mentioned sectoral studies were integrated by the SEAV 
into a dataset that was provided to the Allen Consulting Group (2004a) in order to 
estimate the economywide impacts of adopting potential energy efficiency 
improvements (table 5.4). Estimates for agriculture, construction and some 
manufacturing industries were also provided to the Allen Consulting Group. These 
were based on the preliminary (phase one) SEAV-NFEE results (SEAV, Armstrong 
and Saturn Corporate Resources 2003) and an extrapolation of the industrial sector 
case study results (Energetics 2004). 
In its modelling of economywide effects, the Allen Consulting Group (2004a) 
assumed that 50 per cent of the potential energy efficiency improvements shown in 
table 5.4 would be achieved over a 12 year period from 2005 to 2016: 
For this modelling it was assumed that 50 per cent of the EEI [energy efficiency 
improvement] measures with a payback up to and including 4 years were introduced 
over the 12 year modelling period 2005 to 2016. The EEI potential was introduced 
uniformly over the modelling period, that is, 1/12 was introduced in each year so that 
the full potential had been applied by year 12 [2016]. (Allen Consulting Group 2004a, 
pp. 41–2) 
The ABCSE (sub. DR121, p. 11) stressed that the input to the economywide 
simulations was ‘extremely conservative’ because of the assumption that only half 
of the potential energy efficiency improvements estimated in the sectoral studies 
was achieved.     




Table 5.4  Comparison of SEAV-NFEE estimates of potential energy 
efficiency improvements 










 %  % 
Agriculture ne  5.0 
Industrial sector   6.2  6.4 
Mining   8.8  3.4 
Manufacturing   na  6.9  
Dairy Products   11.9     
Meat Products  8.3    11.2 
Milling & Baking  13.5     
Textiles, Clothing & Footwear   ne  6.3 
Pulp & Paper Manufacturing   7.4  7.4 
Chemicals (ex petroleum) – Basic chemicals   8.9  8.9 
Non-Metallic Minerals – Ceramics  
Non-Metallic Minerals – Cement 
8.6  
9.6 
  9.1 





  4.3 
Other Metals  ne  4.3 
Machinery & Equipment   ne  6.3 
Other Manufacturing   ne  6.3 
Construction   ne  6.3 
Commercial sector  10.4  10.4 
Wholesale & Retail Trade   11.9  11.9 
Accommodation, Cafes & Restaurants   14.1  14.1 
Communication Services   7.6  7.6 
Finance & Insurance, Property & Business 
Services  
11.1 11.1 
Government Administration, Education, Health & 
Community Services  
7.3 7.3 
Culture & Recreation, Personal Services   9.9  9.9 
Residential sector   13.0  13.0 
a EMET Consultants (2004a, 2004b); Energetics (2004); George Wilkenfeld and Associates (2004b). b Allen 
Consulting Group (2004a). ne Not estimated. na Not available. 
The Allen Consulting Group (2004a) estimated that, in 2016, its assumed increase 
in energy efficiency would, relative to a business-as-usual scenario for that year: 
•  increase gross domestic product by 0.09 per cent ($975 million); 
•  increase real private consumption by 0.12 per cent ($724 million); 
•  increase employment by 0.02 per cent (2600 people); and     
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•  reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2.8  per  cent (9.5 megatonnes of carbon 
dioxide equivalent). 
It therefore appears that, even if all of the potential energy savings identified in the 
sectoral studies were achieved, it would have a relatively minor impact on economic 
activity and greenhouse gas emissions. 
CEFG estimates 
The Clean Energy Future Group1 (CEFG) commissioned a study by Saddler, 
Diesendorf and Denniss (2004) to examine whether it was possible to achieve a 
50 per cent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from stationary sources by 2040 
with only minor improvements in existing technologies. 
A long projection period (36 years) was chosen so that most of the current capital 
stock could be retired or refurbished cost effectively. Importantly, and in a major 
departure from the approach adopted for this inquiry, it was assumed that there 
would be a future constraint on greenhouse gas emissions and this would lead to a 
significant increase in energy prices. The prices of primary fossil fuels were 
assumed to increase in real terms by between 25 and 50 per cent above current 
levels. As the study’s authors noted, their price assumptions would also increase the 
number of energy efficiency improvements that are cost effective. 
An assessment of the achievable energy efficiency improvements beyond a 
‘baseline’ scenario was made by drawing on other studies and data sources, such as 
information from the Energy Efficiency Best Practice program. One example of the 
resulting energy efficiency scenario was the assumption that solar hot water systems 
would displace 75 per cent of existing electrical hot water heaters and 90 per cent of 
gas hot water heaters.  
In summary, the CEFG study estimated that, in 2040, it would be cost effective 
(assuming the higher energy prices) to reduce energy consumption by 
590 petajoules (20 per cent) below the baseline scenario in that year (table 5.5). The 
largest percentage savings in energy consumption were estimated to be in sectors 
where energy accounts for a relatively small share of total costs (residential; 
commercial; agriculture, forestry and fisheries; and food, beverages and tobacco). 
Only modest savings were estimated for sectors where energy accounts for a large 
                                              
1 The Clean Energy Future Group comprises the Australasian Energy Performance Contracting 
Association, Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy, Australian Wind Energy 
Association, Bioenergy Australia, Renewable Energy Generators of Australia, and the 
Worldwide Fund for Nature.     




share of total costs (nonferrous metals; iron and steel; and wood, paper and 
printing). 
Table 5.5  CEFG estimates of potential energy efficiency improvements 
Relative to a baseline projection for 2040 
Industry  Reduction in energy use 
 Petajoules  % 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing  21  20 
Mining 66  16 
Manufacturing 138  11 
Iron and steel  17  8 
Food, beverages and tobacco  86  42 
Basic chemicals  12  16 
Cement, lime, plaster and concrete  10  16 
All other non-metallic mineral products  8  11 
Non-ferrous metals  0  0 
Wood, paper and printing  0  0 
All other manufacturing  5  5 
Construction 20  17 
Commercial services  197  39 
Residential 148  27 
Total final stationary energy consumption  590  20 
Source: Saddler, Diesendorf and Denniss (2004). 
The CEFG estimates are much higher than the SEAV-NFEE estimates because of 
the longer projection period and the assumed significant increase in energy prices. 
The SEAV-NFEE studies assumed that real energy prices would not change over 
the projection period to 2014. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the long projection 
period and assumed large increases in real energy prices in the CEFG study did not 
lead to an overall energy saving of more than 20 per cent. 
Regulation impact assessments 
Numerous regulation impact assessments have predicted that a proposed mandatory 
energy efficiency standard or label would benefit individual producers and 
consumers. The estimation approach typically used in these assessments is to 
calculate the net present value (NPV) of benefits and costs. The resulting net benefit 
is often large, implying that many individuals would fail, without mandatory 
labelling or the removal of less efficient products from the market, to adopt energy 
efficiency improvements that would have been cost effective for them (table 5.6).     
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That is, in the absence of government intervention, it is predicted that there would 
be a substantial energy efficiency gap. Further discussion of the results of regulation 
impact assessments for appliances and buildings is provided in later chapters. 
Table 5.6  Predicted benefits and costs of mandatory energy efficiency 
labels and standardsa 
Source/year 
assessment 






   $m  $m  $m  ratio 
Australian Building Codes Board          
2002  Houses (current standards)  1 150  665  485  1.7 
2004  Commercial & industrial buildings (class 2–4)  46c 32  13  1.4 
2005  Commercial & industrial buildings (class 5–9)  3 370  723  2 647  4.7 
2005  Houses (proposed 5 star upgrade)  558  364  194  1.5 
Energy Efficient Strategies      
2002  Houses (Victoria) (5 star, simulation method)  159  107  52  1.5 
Allen Consulting Group      
2003d  Houses (NSW) (BASIX)  na  na  339  1.2 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates         
1999e   Labels & MEPS (household appliances)  2 287  996  1 291  2.3 
2000  MEPS electric motors  165  92  73  1.8 
2000  MEPS air conditioners & heat pumps  480  78  402  6.2 
2001  MEPS upgrade household fridges & freezers  462  170  292  2.7 
2001  MEPS fluorescent lamp ballasts  623  152  471  4.1 
2002  MEPS electric distribution transformers  497  343  154  1.4 
2003  MEPS small electric water heaters  249  60  200  5.1 
2005  Labels & MEPS (2005–20 projections)  11 357   6 568  4 788  1.7 
Mark Ellis & Associates        
2003  MEPS linear fluorescent lamps  344  70  274f 4.9 
2004g  MEPS commercial fridge cabinets  182  93  89  2.0 
Syneca Consultingh          
2003  MEPS air conditioners  363  59  304  6.2 
2003  MEPS electric motors  201  72  130  2.8 
2004  MEPS miscellaneous electric water heaters   19  9  10  2.1 
2005  MEPS upgrade for room air conditioners & 
single & three phase units  209 127  82  1.6 
Queensland Government        
2004  Changes to building & plumbing regulations  1 009  689  320  1.5 
a Unless otherwise indicated, the reported estimates are social benefits and costs. b Benefits and costs are 
expressed in present value terms. c A predicted $8.2 million benefit from lower greenhouse gas emissions is 
not included in order to ensure consistency with the other studies in the table. d Includes the effects of BASIX 
water efficiency requirements. e Undertaken in conjunction with Energy Efficient Strategies. f Net benefit as 
advised by S. Beletich (Steven Beletich Associates, pers. comm., 22 July 2005). g Undertaken in conjunction 
with Steven Beletich Associates. h Benefits and costs are those estimated from a private user perspective. 
na Not available.     




5.3  Assessment of case study results 
The case studies described in the previous section appear to support the hypothesis 
that producers and consumers often fail to adopt energy efficiency improvements 
that are cost effective for them. However, the case studies need to be interpreted 
with caution because they are based on many questionable assumptions, including 
the definition of cost effectiveness. This section considers how such assumptions 
lead to a high degree of uncertainty about case study estimates of potential energy 
savings. 
Cost-effectiveness criterion 
The criterion used to determine cost effectiveness can have a large bearing on the 
number and type of energy efficiency improvements that are deemed to be cost 
effective.  
Defining cost effectiveness in terms of a maximum payback period (as the 
SEAV-NFEE sectoral studies did) could give undue emphasis to investments with 
short-term returns. This may cause analysts to overlook projects that have relatively 
large upfront capital costs, but nevertheless are worthwhile because they generate 
significant benefits over the longer term. These benefits could be far larger than 
those available from short-term projects. Projects with longer-term significant 
benefits are more likely to be deemed cost effective when using an NPV or internal 
rate of return (IRR) criterion (as was the case for the regulation impact assessments 
discussed in section 5.2). 
Despite the sensitivity of case study results to which cost-effectiveness criterion is 
used, few studies justify their selected criterion or examine the sensitivity of their 
results to a change in the criterion. 
The Victorian Government noted that the phase one SEAV-NFEE study would 
ideally have used an IRR criterion, but in practice used a payback criterion because 
of data limitations: 
While IRR is recognised by Armstrong/SEAV [the phase one SEAV-NFEE study] as 
the superior criterion (and is generally used for major business investments) it was 
noted that most available EEI [energy efficiency improvement] data in the commercial 
and industrial sectors is based on simple paybacks and that investment lives are rarely 
given. A simple payback approach was selected to suit the data available. This report 
also notes that this approach ultimately may lead to a conservative estimate of the EEI 
potential, as the total energy savings of many larger projects with long investment lives 
will not all be included under a simple payback criterion, especially with a relatively 
short payback time of 4-years … (sub. DR125, p. 22)     
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A related issue is whether the cost-effectiveness criterion used in a case study is the 
same as that used by the producers and/or consumers being studied. An ABARE 
survey of participants in the Australian Government’s Enterprise Energy Audit 
Program (EEAP) found that 80 per cent of firms used a payback rule to evaluate 
energy efficiency investments, 53 per cent used an IRR criterion, and 30 per cent 
used an NPV criterion (Harris, Anderson and Shafron 1998). Some firms used more 
than one criterion. Where a payback criterion was adopted, the average requirement 
was a maximum 3.5 year payback.  
A survey of about 400 companies in the United States found that small firms used a 
payback period criterion to evaluate investments almost as frequently as they used 
an NPV or IRR criterion (Graham and Harvey 2002). Large firms were significantly 
more likely to use an NPV criterion than were small firms. 
What discount rate should be used in assessing cost effectiveness? 
The NPV criterion typically used in regulation impact assessments deems an energy 
efficiency investment to be cost effective if, after applying a discount rate to future 
cash flows, the expected benefits exceed the expected costs.2 Discounting 
recognises that individuals value a dollar today more highly than a dollar next year, 
which in turn is valued more than a dollar in the year after. Discounting is also used 
in order to recognise the opportunity cost of forgoing potential returns from 
investments other than energy efficiency improvements. 
Table 5.7 summarises the discount rates that have been used in assessments of 
energy efficiency regulations. It can be seen that most assessments undertook 
sensitivity analyses using a range of discount rates from as low as 0 per cent to as 
high as 10  per cent. However, the range of discount rates used was sometimes 
small. For example, the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB  2002) used 
discount rates of 4, 5 and 6 per cent in its assessment of the current energy 
efficiency standards for housing. In contrast, a discount rate of 10 per cent was used 
by George Wilkenfeld and Associates (2005b) to predict the impacts of mandatory 
energy performance labels and standards for appliances over the period 2005–20.  
The discount rates used in the regulation impact assessments listed in table 5.7 were 
typically based on an estimate of the social opportunity cost of capital (OCC), 
which is the rate of return that society forgoes from the next best investment. This is 
                                              
2 The payback period criterion used in the SEAV-NFEE case studies could be re-expressed as the 
discount rate required to equate the present value of benefits and costs (the internal rate of 
return). For example, if a project costs $100, has a life of 10 years, and delivers a net benefit of 
$25 in each of those years, then it will be deemed cost effective using either a required payback 
period of no more than 4 years or a required rate of return of at least 21 per cent.     




an appropriate discount rate to use when assessing the societywide impact of an 
energy efficiency measure. It is not appropriate when considering cost effectiveness 
from the perspective of particular individuals. The relevant individual’s private 
OCC should be used instead. 
Table 5.1  Discount rates used in selected regulation impact assessments  
Source/year that 
assessment was 







    % % % 
Australian Building Codes Board       
2002  Houses (current standards)  4  5  6 
2004  Commercial and industrial buildings (class 2–4)  3  5  7 
2005  Commercial & industrial buildings (class 5–9)  3  5  7 
2005  Houses (proposed 5 star upgrade)  4.5  6  9 
Energy Efficient Strategies      
2002  Houses (Victoria) (5 star, simulation method)  0  4  10 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates      
1999a  Labels & MEPS (household appliances)  0  4  8 
2000  MEPS electric motors  0  10  – 
2000  MEPS air conditioners & heat pumps  0  5  10b
2001  MEPS upgrade household fridges & freezers  0  5  10b
2001  MEPS fluorescent lamp ballasts  –  10  – 
2002  MEPS electric distribution transformers  0  5  10b
2003  MEPS small electric water heaters  0  5  10b
2005  Labels & MEPS (2005–20 projections)  –  10  – 
Mark Ellis & Associates      
2003  MEPS linear fluorescent lamps  0  5  – 
2004c  MEPS commercial fridge cabinets  5  7 10 
Syneca Consulting       
2003  MEPS air conditioners  0  5  10 
2003  MEPS electric motors  0  7  10 
2004  MEPS miscellaneous electric water heaters  0  5  10 
2005  MEPS upgrade for room air conditioners & 
single & three phase units 
– 10d  – 
Queensland Government       
2004  Changes to building & plumbing regulations   3  4  5 
a Undertaken in conjunction with Energy Efficient Strategies. b These discount rates were the ‘base case’ 
scenario. c Undertaken in conjunction with Steven Beletich Associates. d Syneca Consulting (pers. comm., 
18  July 2005) advised that a discount rate of 10 per cent had been used, rather than the 6.3 per cent 
mentioned in the draft regulation impact statement (Syneca Consulting 2005b, p. 63).     
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It could be argued that regulation impact assessments evaluate private cost 
effectiveness for the ‘average individual’, and their cost of capital — the average 
private OCC across all members of society — will equal the social OCC.3  
However, the social OCC used in regulation impact assessments is not derived by 
calculating an average private OCC across all individuals. Instead, it is usually a 
general-purpose rate that is loosely based on an application of a financial model to a 
limited number of individuals. That model is based on assumptions that are not 
valid for many individuals and this tends to lead to an underestimate of the private 
OCC for such individuals (appendix F).  
The average private OCC could therefore be much higher than the estimated social 
discount rates normally used in regulation impact assessments. If this is the case, 
then many of the energy efficiency measures examined in regulation impact 
assessments may not be privately cost effective. This is because the assessment 
results are often very sensitive to small changes in the discount rate used. For 
example: 
… the discount rate has a major effect on the estimated value of energy savings that 
accrue in the medium to longer term. (Syneca Consulting 2003a, p. 18) 
The discount rates applied … are very sensitive. Every one percentage point increase in 
the discount rate decreases the net benefit by 20 per cent. (Queensland Government 
2004a, p. 62) 
A further problem is that the average private OCC (even if accurately measured) 
would not be sufficient to reflect the rate for all individuals above the average (and 
be higher than that of all those below the average rate), given the diverse 
circumstances of producers and consumers. At the extreme, poor households may 
have to forgo basic needs (such as for food and clothing) if they are to invest in an 
energy efficiency measure. The private OCCs for such households are probably 
much higher than the social OCC estimates used in regulation impact assessments.  
One way to take account of diversity among individuals would be to carry out a 
disaggregated analysis that assessed private cost effectiveness for different groups 
and tested the sensitivity of the disaggregated results to a wider range of discount 
rates than those shown in table 5.7. A study commissioned by the Australian 
Greenhouse Office noted that US regulation impact assessments have tended to 
involve more comprehensive distributional analysis than their Australian 
equivalents, possibly due to the availability of more disaggregated data: 
Australia uses average values, while the US uses full distributions. If data and resources 
permit, … [distributional analysis] will provide more information about the benefits 
                                              
3 Assuming there are no ‘externalities’ that would lead to differences in the costs and benefits 
borne by particular individuals versus society as a whole.     




and costs of the program, in particular identifying who benefits and who bears net costs 
so that programs can be designed to offset unintended negative consequences, and may 
assist the government in convincing affected parties of the justification for some 
MEPS  [minimum energy performance standards]. However, without a detailed and 
statistically representative national survey, such an approach may not be practical for 
Australia at this time. (McMahon 2004, p. ii)  
In conclusion, the Commission considers that, while the discount rates used in 
regulation impact assessments and case studies may be appropriate for the purposes 
of assessing cost effectiveness from a societywide perspective, they are probably 
too low to make definitive conclusions about private cost effectiveness. The case for 
private cost effectiveness is weakened by the inadequate consideration of 
distributional effects in the studies. 
Business-as-usual projections 
The potential for energy efficiency improvement is typically assessed by comparing 
the modelled scenario to a business-as-usual projection many years into the future. 
This requires judgements about many aspects of the future that are highly uncertain, 
such as future changes in the cost of energy saving technologies, relative prices 
(between different forms of energy, and relative to other goods and services), rate of 
capital turnover, and the impact of government energy efficiency programs. 
Examples are provided in box 5.2 from the SEAV-NFEE residential sector case 
studies. For the SEAV-NFEE industrial sector study, the business-as-usual 
projection assumed no increase in the size of the sector and, for some industries, no 
future improvements in energy efficiency.  
Sutherland (2003) concluded that US policy makers often overstate the potential for 
cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency because their assumed 
business-as-usual improvements in energy efficiency are too pessimistic and fail to 
anticipate the responsiveness of consumers to future reductions in the prices of 
energy-efficient products. His conclusion was based partly on the results of an 
econometric analysis by Newell, Jaffe and Stavins (1999) of innovation by suppliers 
of energy-using consumer appliances offered for sale in the United States. The 
econometric analysis showed that the direction of innovation was in some cases 
responsive to changes in energy prices, but a sizeable proportion of efficiency 
improvements occurred independently of changes in energy prices and regulations. 
While some participants in this inquiry questioned Sutherland’s method and 
findings (for example, ABCSE, sub. DR121; Alan Pears, sub. DR113), his analysis 
nevertheless illustrates the point that case study results are sensitive to the many 
assumptions used on matters where there is no unambiguously correct answer.     
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Box 5.2  A sample of the assumptions used for the SEAV-NFEE 
residential case studies 
The estimates produced for the SEAV and NFEE by George Wilkenfeld and 
Associates (2004b) and EMET Consultants (2004b)  relied  on  a  wide  range  of 
assumptions. These included: 
•  the prices that householders across Australia face for different forms of energy 
(electricity, gas and wood), including differences between peak and off-peak tariffs; 
•  business-as-usual projections ten years into the future for: 
–  the number of households and their distribution between different household types; 
– the distribution of residential buildings between different climatic regions and 
building types (such as floor area, whether brick veneer or double brick, and 
whether a detached dwelling); 
–  purchases of specific types of appliances (such as top loading washing machines of 
a certain capacity and reverse cycle air conditioners with a particular capacity) and 
their distribution between different levels of energy efficiency; 
– investment in specific energy efficiency improvements, such as insulation and 
weather stripping and sealing; 
–  detailed usage patterns for specific appliances (such as number of times a clothes 
washer is used each week and proportion of washes done at less than full capacity); 
–  amount of energy used for specific purposes (such as space heating, cooking, 
air conditioning, hot water for showering and hot water for clothes washing); 
•  no change over the next ten years in the prices of different forms of energy relative 
to each other, or relative to other goods and services; 
•  detailed characteristics of specific energy efficiency improvements, including: 
–  purchase and installation costs; 
–  reductions in energy used; and 
–  the rate at which the measure could be adopted by households, and the upper limit 
on the level of adoption, given household characteristics, usage patterns and the 
stock of buildings and appliances. 
 
 
Despite the uncertainty of business-as-usual projections and their importance to 
estimated energy efficiency potential, some case studies did not detail how they 
were constructed. For example, the SEAV-NFEE industrial sector study 
(Energetics 2004) gave limited detail about its assumed business-as-usual energy 
efficiency improvements. The basis for the assumed growth rates included recent 
performance of the industry (pulp and paper manufacturing) and the experience of 
companies involved in the relevant industry (meat and dairy). For bakery products, 
flour milling and cereal products, Energetics (2004, p.  32) assumed no energy 
efficiency improvements under the business-as-usual scenario because it had 
‘observed no overall decrease in energy usage within the industry over the last     




number of years’. Energetics (2004, p.  47) also assumed no energy efficiency 
improvements under the business-as-usual scenario for ceramic products 
manufacturing because it was ‘unaware of data that supports a BAU [business-as-
usual] decrease in energy usage in the future’. For other subsectors (cement, iron 
and steel, aluminium, and alumina), no justification for the assumed energy 
efficiency improvements under the business-as-usual scenario was provided. The 
Victorian Government defended the approach used by Energetics: 
For the industrial sector case studies an estimate of the BAU [business-as-usual] uptake 
of energy efficiency was provided by Energetics based on their experience working in a 
wide range of various industry sectors. Clearly this is not an exact measurement of the 
BAU uptake of energy efficiency, but the [Productivity] Commission does not put 
forward a better methodology. (sub. DR125, p. 23) 
Other case studies were more transparent about the assumptions underpinning their 
business-as-usual projections. For example, the CEFG study (Saddler, Diesendorf 
and Denniss 2004) detailed its future energy demand scenario, which is based on 
current energy intensity trends. However, the CEFG estimates are probably the most 
speculative among the studies examined in this report. The study projected almost 
four decades into the future and assumed that energy prices will increase by 
between 25 and 50 per cent (in real terms) by 2040. This has the effect of producing 
a much larger, and also much more uncertain, estimate of energy efficiency 
potential than that found in the other case studies. 
Extrapolation of audit results and best-practice studies 
A key input to a case study is the engineering prediction of what is the technically 
feasible reduction in energy use from adopting a particular measure. Such 
predictions are often derived by extrapolating to a whole sector the results of a trial 
or audit for a small number of producers or consumers.  
For example, the CEFG study relied on case study material from the Energy 
Efficiency Best Practice (EEBP) program, which targeted specific companies that 
could achieve energy efficiency improvements. Similarly, the SEAV-NFEE 
industrial sector study (Energetics 2004) was based on a number of energy audits, 
some of which were from overseas.  
Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (1999) noted that past attempts to extrapolate case study 
results to a whole sector have led to significant overestimates of achievable energy  
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savings: 
… there is evidence that analysts have substantially overestimated the energy savings 
that higher efficiency levels will bring, partly because projections often are based on 
highly controlled studies that do not necessarily apply to actual realised savings in a 
particular situation. For example, studies by Sebold and Fox, Hirst, and others have 
found that actual savings from utility sponsored programs typically achieve 50 to 
80 per cent of predicted savings. Metcalf and Hassett draw a similar conclusion based 
on an analysis of residential energy consumption data in which they found that the 
actual internal rate of return to energy conservation investments in insulation was about 
10 per cent, which is substantially below typical engineering estimates that the returns 
for such investments were 50 per cent or more. (Jaffe, Newell and Stavins 1999,   
pp. 7–8) 
With respect to audits, the ABARE survey of EEAP participants found that 
81 per cent of all audit recommendations were implemented. However, the authors 
of that study noted that a lower implementation rate could occur if audits were made 
compulsory for all firms (Harris, Anderson and Shafron  1998). This is because 
EEAP participants had a strong commitment to achieving energy efficiency 
improvements, and hence their pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits may be higher 
than for the typical firm. ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE (sub.  DR144, p.  37) 
contested ABARE’s assessment by arguing that ‘it is equally plausible, if not more 
likely, that firms that are not interested in energy efficiency (and hence do not self 
select for energy audits) have greater opportunities for energy savings, rather than 
less’. This again illustrates the degree of debate about the assumptions used in case 
studies of energy efficiency potential. 
A related issue is how case studies tend to simulate impacts for a representative 
producer or consumer (or several producer or consumer types). This is done because 
it is not practical to evaluate the cost effectiveness of energy efficiency 
improvements for every individual producer and consumer. ICANZ, AGGA and 
ABCSE noted: 
… the use of sectoral averages in modelling is reasonable, even in the presence of 
variance, provided that there is no significant skew in the target population. Even then, 
the sensitivity of the results is likely to be small, provided that sample sizes are 
adequate. There is no evidence to suggest that diversity in the use of energy is 
significantly skewed one way or the other. (sub. DR144, p. 37) 
However, Jaffe, Newell and Stavins (1999) observed: 
Heterogeneity … leads to differences in the expected value that individual purchasers 
will attach to more energy-efficient or carbon-efficient products. As a result, only 
purchasers for whom it is especially valuable may purchase a product. For example, it 
may not make sense for someone who will only rarely use an air conditioner to spend 
significantly more purchasing an energy-efficient model — they simply may not have     




adequate opportunity to recoup their investment through energy savings. (Jaffe, Newell 
and Stavins 1999, p. 7) 
It appears that energy use is most heterogenous in the commercial and residential 
sectors. Assessments of the benefits and costs for these sectors typically depend on 
many assumptions. For example, in its evaluation of energy efficiency measures in 
the residential sector, EMET Consultants  (2004b) had to make assumptions 
regarding the performance of existing technology, costs of implementing the 
improvements and the potential energy savings (boxes 5.2 and 5.3).  
Even if most of the assumptions seem plausible, such an approach still raises 
questions about whether the results provide a representative guide, under real world 
conditions, of the potential for cost-effective energy efficiency improvements across 
a sector (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Sorrell et al. 2000).  
As noted in chapter 4, there is a range of barriers and impediments that can make it 
sensible for producers and consumers to refrain from adopting a proposed energy 
efficiency improvement. They include: 
•  the opportunity cost of decision makers’ time  
•  implementation costs 
•  risk and uncertainty 
•  capital constraints 
•  tradeoffs between energy efficiency and other performance features. 
An indication of the relative importance of the various barriers and impediments 
faced by firms is given by the ABARE study of EEAP participants. It found that, 
where an audit recommendation was not implemented, the most likely cause was 
that the rate of return was too low (table 5.8). Other important constraints were 
investment risk, expertise of staff, and availability of finance. 
The ABARE findings are supported by overseas studies. For example, Anderson 
and Newell (2002) conducted an evaluation of why half of the recommendations 
from 9000 government-sponsored energy audits of US manufacturing plants were 
not taken up. From follow-up surveys, it was found that the recommendations were 
not adopted primarily because important implementation costs had not been 
recognised in the audits.      
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Box 5.3 Selected  measures  examined  in the SEAV-NFEE residential 
case studies  
Increased use of insulation in existing homes 
Energy efficiency improvements were estimated for a typical home in each State. Key 
assumptions included: 
•  60 per cent of households nationally were currently insulated (based on ABS data); 
•  the proportion of non-insulated buildings was assumed to be the same across all 
states; 
•  an upper limit of 70 per cent adoption could be achieved at a rate of an additional 
1 per cent a year; and 
•  the average cost of insulating a dwelling was assumed to be $750. 
Increased energy efficiency of reverse cycle heating and cooling 
Energy efficiency improvements were estimated for a typical household across all 
States. Key assumptions included: 
•  all existing air conditioners are replaced over a period of 10 years with units that 
have a coefficient of performance level of 0.5 better than the minimum specified by 
the relevant energy performance standard; 
•  electricity use for existing air conditioners is estimated assuming an average 
coefficient of performance of 2.0; and 
•  the additional cost of purchasing a more energy-efficient appliance is $400, based 
on an assumed 25 per cent price premium over a typical air conditioner. 
More energy-efficient lighting 
Energy efficiency improvements were estimated for a typical household across all 
States. Key assumptions included: 
•  30 per cent of kitchen lights, 30 per cent of lounge room lights and 50 per cent of 
bedroom lights are converted to fluorescent at a rate of 7 per cent a year; and 
•  the average cost of making the change is $130 per household. 
Source: EMET Consultants (2004b). 
 
 
With respect to capital constraints, case studies typically assume that producers and 
consumers are always able to finance an energy efficiency investment if the upfront 
capital cost is outweighed by future returns. In reality, there is usually a limit to 
what producers and consumers are able to finance and so they will tend to ration 
their scarce capital resources to the most highly valued uses, which may not include 
energy efficiency improvements.     




Table 5.2  Reasons why EEAP audit recommendations were not adopteda  
Reason for not  
implementing recommendation 
Proportion agreeing or 
strongly agreeing with reason 
  % 
Rate of return too low  53 
Payback period too long  45 
Auditor’s assessment inaccurate  38 
Energy efficiency often overlooked  35 
Unclear how to implement  28 
Investment irreversible  28 
Finance unavailable  20 
Investment too risky  20 
Lack of staff with expertise  17 
Not our decision  13 
a Based on a survey of participants of the Enterprise Energy Audit Program. 
Source: Harris, Anderson and Shafron (1998). 
In summary, there are many difficulties in extrapolating case study results to derive 
sectoral estimates of potential energy efficiency improvements. With considerable 
heterogeneity between producers and consumers in the way energy is used, case 
study results could be unrepresentative. Other influences, such as unaccounted costs 
(including managers’ time) and competing uses for scarce capital, could also limit 
the sectorwide application of case study results. 
Interaction between different measures 
Another issue arising from the analysis of case study methodology is how to 
account for the interdependence between the benefits that some energy efficiency 
improvements generate. For example, the energy savings from upgrading residential 
heating and cooling systems depends on whether or not measures are put in place to 
improve residential thermal insulation. All else being equal, if thermal insulation is 
undertaken first, energy consumption will fall and, hence, the energy savings from 
upgrading cooling and heating systems will be reduced. 
Where interdependence is present, but energy efficiency measures are analysed 
independently and are added, the overall energy efficiency potential will tend to be 
overstated. The SEAV-NFEE study of the industrial sector (Energetics 2004) did 
not take account of any interaction between different energy efficiency measures 
when they are combined to estimate overall energy efficiency potential. The other 
SEAV-NFEE studies did take account of interaction effects.     
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Changes in non-energy costs 
Energy efficiency improvements can change not only energy costs, but also other 
expenditure items. In many case studies, these changes in non-energy costs are 
ignored.  
For example, the SEAV-NFEE industrial sector study omitted changes in 
non-energy costs. It was claimed that this led to an understatement of what is 
cost effective: 
This study considers energy cost savings … In some cases other factors will be 
significant, including operating and maintenance savings and increased throughput. 
While some actions will entail new or ongoing maintenance …, most will involve 
lower maintenance requirements … The non-inclusion of additional benefits will tend 
to present a conservative view of potential paybacks. (Energetics 2004, p. 8) 
Whether the omission of changes in non-energy costs leads to an overstatement or 
understatement of what is cost effective can only be judged on a case-by-case basis. 
Feedback effects 
The case studies do not consider how ‘feedback effects’ could change the cost and 
energy savings that result from a given energy efficiency improvement. 
One possible example of feedback is an energy price effect — if lower energy 
demand due to greater efficiency led to a fall in energy prices. This would reduce 
the value of energy savings and so make it less likely that a given energy efficiency 
improvement is cost effective, ex post.  
Another example of feedback is known as the ‘rebound effect’ — some of the 
benefits of greater energy efficiency are used to purchase more energy-consuming 
goods and services. This would reduce the overall energy savings from an energy 
efficiency improvement. The Victorian Government (sub. DR125) noted that the 
SEAV-NFEE sectoral studies did not take account of rebound effects, suggesting 
that the studies may have overstated the likely reduction in energy use. However, 
rebound effects were simulated in the subsequent general equilibrium analysis by 
the Allen Consulting Group (2004a). 
Finally, greater use of an energy-efficient technology could enable economies of 
scale to be achieved in producing that technology and so lower its unit cost. This 
would tend to make the technology cost effective for more producers and 
consumers than otherwise.     




The net impact of feedback effects is uncertain and is likely to vary between energy 
efficiency technologies, depending on a range of factors.  
Numerous case studies have found that producers and consumers fail to adopt some 
energy efficiency improvements that appear to be cost effective for them. However, 
there is considerable uncertainty about the estimated potential savings, because the 
case studies use many questionable assumptions, including the: 
•  criterion used to determine cost effectiveness (such as a simple payback period); 
•  use of a social discount rate rather than private discount rates that reflect the 
range of individuals’ circumstances; 
•  level of business-as-usual improvements in energy efficiency; 
•  costs associated with energy efficiency improvements; 
•  extrapolation of audit and best-practice study results to a whole sector; and 
•  representativeness of simulated producers and consumers. 
FINDING 5.1     
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 6  Residential sector 
 
Key points 
•  On a per capita basis, energy efficiency has been increasing and carbon dioxide 
emission intensity has been falling in the residential sector since at least the early 
1970s. However, total residential energy use and emissions have grown because of 
the increasing number of householders and their rising per capita consumption of 
goods and services. 
•  Householders have not implemented the full range of potential energy efficiency 
improvements that may be cost effective for them. This could be due to information 
barriers and split incentives.  
•  The most significant government interventions to encourage greater adoption of 
energy efficiency improvements by householders are labelling and standards for 
appliances and buildings (dealt with in specific chapters on appliances and 
buildings). 
•  Governments also provide subsidies and advisory services. They appear to have a 
small, but positive, impact on energy efficiency.  
•  Subsidising people to take actions that are already cost effective for them is difficult 
to justify, unless the real policy goal is to reduce ‘negative externalities’ — such as 
pollution — rather than to increase energy efficiency per se. 
 
 
Around 12 per cent of Australia’s final (end use) energy consumption is attributable 
to the residential sector (ABARE 2004). Despite this relatively small share, the 
residential sector has been a major focus for energy efficiency policies.  
This chapter considers the rationale for such policy intervention in the residential 
sector and assesses the effects of current policies. The analysis is structured as 
follows: 
•  key features of residential energy use (section 6.1); 
•  why householders might fail to adopt energy efficiency improvements that are 
(or appear to be) cost effective for them (section 6.2); and 
•  assessment of residential energy efficiency policies (section 6.3).     
96  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
6.1  Key features of residential energy use 
Household expenditure on energy 
At current prices, energy is a relatively minor component of household expenditure. 
In 2003-04, Australian households spent, on average, 2.7 per cent of their total 
expenditure on domestic fuel and power (exclusive of motor vehicle fuels) 
(table 6.1). This amounted to around $24 per week. Thus, a 10 per cent increase in 
the energy efficiency of the average household would lead to a cost saving of about 
$2.40 per week. 
Table 6.1  Share of household expenditure on domestic fuel and power by 
state, 2003-04 
 NSW  Vic  Qld  SA  WA  Tas  Australia 
  %  %  % % % %  % 
Electricity  1.8  1.9  2.0 2.6 1.8 3.2  1.9 
Mains  gas  0.4  1.1  0.1 0.7 0.6 0.0  0.5 
Bottled gasa  0.1  0.1  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1  0.1 
Other  0.1  0.1  0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4  0.1 
Total domestic fuel and 
power expenditureb  2.3  3.2  2.2 3.5 2.6 3.7  2.7 
a  Excludes gas for barbeques. b  Excludes expenditure on motor vehicle fuels, which accounted for 
3.7 per cent of household expenditure at the national level in 2003-04. Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
Data source: ABS (2005b) and unpublished ABS data. 
For households whose gross income was in the bottom 20 per cent of all households 
in 2003-04, domestic fuel and power still accounted, on average, for only 4 per cent 
of their total expenditure (ABS 2005b). This does not mean that energy is an 
insignificant expenditure item for all householders. There will be a small group of 
households for whom energy is a significant expense. The Consumer Utilities 
Advocacy Centre (sub. DR107) noted that nearly a quarter of households in the 
lowest income quintile — that is, around 5 per cent of all Australian households — 
are unable to pay their utility bills on time due to a shortage of money. 
Nevertheless, it is evident from the ABS data that, for the vast majority of 
Australian households, domestic fuel and power accounts for only a small 
proportion of their total expenditure. 
What households use energy for 
The purposes for which households use energy are not reported on a regular and 
comprehensive basis in publicly available statistics. Rather, such information tends     
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to be contained in one-off and irregular studies (for example, State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria 1984; Fiebig and Woodland 1991; State Energy 
Commission of Western Australia 1991; Pacific Power et al. 1994; Harrington and 
Foster 1999; EMET Consultants 2004b). The results of these studies vary and some 
have become dated by changes in the prevalence and use of appliances. 
Among the more recent estimates of energy use are those prepared by EMET 
Consultants (2004b) as part of the modelling work undertaken for the National 
Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE). EMET Consultants projected that, in 
2005, most of the energy consumed by the residential sector would be for space 
heating and water heating (figure 6.1). Cooling was projected to account for only a 
small proportion (2 per cent) of average annual residential energy consumption, but 
it is a major source of peak electricity loads on a small number of hot days each 
year (chapter 14). 

















a Purchased energy only. Solar energy is excluded. 
Data source: EMET Consultants (2004b). 
Caution should be exercised in interpreting such aggregate data because the 
residential sector comprises a large number of small and very diverse energy users.     
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Factors such as differences in climate, income and household size can lead to 
marked differences in consumption patterns between households.  
Has residential energy efficiency been increasing or decreasing? 
The total amount of energy used by the residential sector grew by 70 per cent from 
1973-74 to 2000-01. This does not necessarily imply that the energy efficiency of 
individual householders has fallen. Much of the increase in residential energy 
consumption can be attributed to a growing population and standard of living. That 
is, there are more householders and their growing affluence has enabled them to 
enjoy more goods and services that use energy as an input. 
In per capita terms, to correct for population growth, residential energy use grew by 
19 per cent from 1973-74 to 2000-01. But the average householder’s consumption 
of all goods and services grew much faster over the same period (real per capita 
household final consumption expenditure grew by 64 per cent), suggesting that 
householders have become more energy efficient. It should be noted that this 
finding applies to the energy consumed directly by householders. The energy 
efficiency of industries that supply goods and services to households — including 
electricity — is examined in other chapters of this report. 
ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE (sub. DR144) cautioned that comparing the growth 
rates for energy consumption and real expenditure could provide a misleading 
impression of how energy efficiency has changed. They noted that real expenditure 
is a proxy — rather than a direct measure — for the utility that householders gain 
from energy use. They also observed that real expenditure might have grown at a 
faster rate than household energy use because of a shift by householders toward 
consuming goods and services that do not require energy use within their homes, 
rather than improvements in the energy efficiency of specific activities. ABARE has 
undertaken a more comprehensive analysis of trends in residential energy 
efficiency. 
ABARE researchers (Tedesco and Thorpe 2003) have confirmed that residential 
energy efficiency has increased. They found that changes in householders’ energy 
use during 1973-74 to 2000-01 would have reduced residential energy consumption 
by 28 per cent if there had not been an increase in the number of householders and     
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in their consumption of goods and services.1 About half of this reduction was 
attributed to a substitution toward fuels with a higher conversion efficiency. The 
remaining half was largely due to so-called technical effects, which include more 
energy-efficient use patterns, the use of appliances that are designed and built to be 
more energy efficient, price-induced substitution of energy for other inputs, and 
improvements in the conversion efficiency of particular fuels. 
Potential for cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency 
Despite the long-term trend of improving energy efficiency in the residential sector, 
case studies often find that householders have overlooked energy efficiency 
improvements that are thought to be cost effective for them. For example, case 
studies commissioned by the Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria indicate that, 
by 2014, householders will have overlooked cost-effective actions that could have 
reduced their energy consumption by at least 13 per cent in that year (chapter 5). It 
was estimated that failure to adopt the relevant energy efficiency improvements 
would, in 2014, lead to the consumption of an additional 69.5 petajoules of energy. 
This was greater than the potential energy efficiency improvements estimated for 
the commercial and industrial sectors (30.2 and 48.9 petajoules respectively), even 
though those sectors use more energy than the residential sector. Despite its 
relatively small share of Australia’s energy consumption, the residential sector has 
been a major focus for energy efficiency policies. 
Shift between different forms of energy 
Since the early 1970s, householders have made a significant substitution between 
different forms of energy. The relative importance of electricity and natural gas in 
per capita residential energy consumption has been growing since at least the early 
1970s, primarily at the expense of wood and petroleum products (figure 6.2). This 
could be due to a range of factors, including changes in the relative prices of 
different forms of energy, increased availability of reticulated gas, and air pollution 
controls on the burning of wood for space heating. 
                                              
1 Tedesco and Thorpe (2003, p. 20) reported that changes in residential energy use during 1973-74 
to 2000-01 would have reduced Australia’s total energy consumption by 2.5 per cent if there had 
not been an increase in the number of householders and their consumption of goods and services. 
In 1973-74, Australia’s total energy consumption was 2615 PJ, with 231 PJ of this attributable to 
the residential sector (Tedesco and Thorpe 2003, p. 9). Thus, a fall of 2.5 per cent in Australia’s 
total energy consumption amounted to a decline of 65 PJ (0.025 x 2615). A fall of 65 PJ in 
residential energy consumption was a decrease of 28 per cent (65/231).     
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a Fuels not shown on the diagram (such as coal briquettes and solar) accounted collectively for an annual 
average of 0.5 GJ per person during the period 1973-74 to 2001-02. 
Data sources: ABARE (2004); dX Database. 
In aggregate terms, almost half of the energy used by the residential sector was in 
the form of electricity in 2001-02, and about another one-third came from natural 
gas. This was the result of a long-term decline in energy consumed from wood 
(down 13 per cent during 1973-74 to 2000-01) and petroleum products (down 
67 per cent), and increased use of energy from natural gas (up 429 per cent) and 
electricity (up 159 per cent). 
From the 1950s until the oil price shocks of the 1970s, many households in southern 
Australia used oil heaters. Following the second oil price shock in 1979, there was a 
rapid and substantial decline in residential consumption of petroleum products 
(from 18 per cent of residential energy consumption in 1978-79 to 10 per cent in 
1980-81). Thus, householders generally demonstrated that they are capable of 
quickly changing their energy use when it is cost effective for them to do so, even if 
it means replacing appliances before they have worn out.     
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Emissions 
Using data assembled for the Australian Greenhouse Office, Reardon  (2001) 
reported that the largest single residential activity contributing to household 
greenhouse gas emissions was water heating (figure 6.3). 














a The data in this figure are not comparable with the decomposition of energy use in figure 6.1 because they 
are not for the same year (1998 versus 2005) and the respective authors used different methods to 
disaggregate the purposes of household energy use. 
Data source: Reardon (2001). 
Fuel combustion in the residential sector accounted for 1.6 per cent of Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2002 (AGO 2004i). Between 1990 and 2002, 
residential greenhouse gas emissions from fuel combustion increased by 
14.3 per cent. Most of these emissions arose from the burning of natural gas by 
householders. These data do not include the greenhouse gases that were emitted in 
converting primary fuels into electricity for residential users. 
Analysis by ABARE researchers (Tedesco and Thorpe 2003) shows that there has 
been a significant decline in the residential sector’s carbon dioxide emission 
intensity since the early 1970s.2 They estimated that residential carbon dioxide 
                                              
2 Carbon dioxide emission intensity is the amount of carbon dioxide emitted as a result of energy 
consumption per unit of output.     
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emissions from the use of energy would have fallen by 42 per cent during 1973-74 
to 2000-01, if there had not been an increase in the number of householders and in 
their consumption of goods and services.3 
Tedesco and Thorpe (2003) estimated that about two-thirds of the fall in residential 
carbon dioxide emission intensity during 1973-74 to 2000-01 was due to technical 
effects, which includes increased energy efficiency. The remaining one-third was 
attributed to a shift to less emission-intensive fuels, reflecting the previously noted 
shift by householders between different forms of energy. In particular, burning less 
wood and petroleum products reduced emissions at individual residences. This 
ignores householders’ increased reliance on electricity and natural gas, which raises 
the conversion sector’s total emissions. However, further analysis by Tedesco and 
Thorpe (2003, pp. 63 and 70) showed that emission intensity fell in the residential 
sector even after taking account of emissions from energy conversion. Thus, the 
analysis indicates that, since the early 1970s, householders have not only raised 
their energy efficiency, but also reduced their carbon dioxide emission intensity. 
Electricity use and relative importance of the residential sector 
As noted previously, the residential sector accounts for around 12 per cent of final 
(end use) energy consumption. However, this does not include the energy lost in 
converting fuels into electricity for residential users and in transmitting and 
distributing that electricity to individual residences. Accordingly, the Commission 
has broadly estimated the extent of this loss. The broad estimates were calculated by 
multiplying the energy used to generate all electricity by the share of electricity 
supplied to households (based on data from ABARE 2004). 
It is estimated that, in 2001-02, the energy lost in electricity conversion, 
transmission and distribution for households accounted for around 8 per cent of 
Australia’s total energy consumption. The energy consumed by householders in 
end-use applications (including electricity) was equivalent to an additional 8 per 
cent of Australia’s total energy consumption. Thus, a total of about 16 per cent of 
                                              
3 Tedesco and Thorpe (2003, p. 67) reported that changes in residential energy use during 1973-74 
to 2000-01 would have reduced Australia’s total carbon dioxide emissions from the production 
and use of energy by 1.2 per cent, if there had been no increase in the number of householders 
and their consumption of goods and services. In 1973-74, Australia’s total  carbon dioxide 
emissions from the production and use of energy was 174 Mt of carbon dioxide, with 5 Mt of this 
attributable to the residential sector (Tedesco and Thorpe 2003, p. 57). Thus, a fall of 1.2 per cent 
in Australia’s total carbon dioxide emissions from the production and use of energy amounted to 
a decline of 2.1 Mt (0.012 x 174). A fall of 2.1 Mt in residential carbon dioxide emissions was a 
decrease of 42 per cent (2.1/5).     
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Australia’s total energy use could be attributed to households in 2001-02. Similar 
shares were estimated for earlier years from 1973-74 onwards. 
6.2  Why would householders overlook cost-effective 
energy efficiency improvements? 
The trend of rising energy efficiency in the residential sector since at least the early 
1970s suggests that householders have a history of adopting energy efficiency 
improvements when it is sufficiently cost effective for them to do so. Nevertheless, 
it is possible that various sources of market failure cause householders to overlook 
some energy efficiency improvements that are cost effective for them. In addition, 
ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE (sub. DR144) cautioned that the observed 
improvement in residential energy efficiency since about 1991 could be at least 
partly due to the introduction of widespread government interventions — such as 
mandatory insulation requirements for houses — rather than being solely due to 
improvements initiated by householders. Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd 
(sub. DR115) claimed that government policies were a key reason why residential 
energy efficiency has been increasing. 
The many potential barriers to increased energy efficiency were outlined in the 
general review in chapter 4. Not all of those barriers are relevant to the residential 
sector, or lead to market failures that may justify policy intervention.  
There appear to be two broad reasons why householders might fail to adopt energy 
efficiency improvements that are cost effective for them: 
•  imperfect information — there are information asymmetries (sellers are much 
better informed than buyers about the energy efficiency of their products) and 
energy efficiency information has public good characteristics  (there is little 
incentive for the market to supply information because it is difficult to exclude 
householders who do not pay for it); and 
•  split incentives — energy-consuming products are purchased on behalf of 
householders by other parties (such as landlords and builders) who do not benefit 
from greater energy efficiency. 
Another constraint is the small potential benefits in monetary terms (table 6.1). In 
many cases, what appears to be marginally rewarding in monetary terms probably 
does not pass the cost effectiveness test after individuals take account of the time 
and effort required. 
The information and split incentive barriers that householders might face are 
described below.     
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Imperfect information 
It can be difficult for householders to determine the energy efficiency of an 
appliance or dwelling prior to using it. Physical inspection may not reveal much 
about energy efficiency because householders do not have the relevant technical 
expertise and/or ability to undertake comprehensive tests. For example, Rheem 
Australia noted: 
There is widespread ignorance and misconception amongst purchasers regarding the 
costs and benefits of solar water heaters and heat pump water heaters ... (sub. 46, p. 3) 
In principle, suppliers have an incentive to provide information about the energy 
efficiency of their products, especially when such information makes the product 
more attractive to consumers. In practice, such information is not always provided 
to consumers. 
Buyers tend to select products on the basis of qualities such as price, performance, 
capacity and style, and energy efficiency may not be an equally visible attribute: 
Marketing sources report that energy efficiency is often not a primary or even a 
significant consideration in consumer purchases. The apparent lack of concern is at 
odds with the fact that energy costs contribute significantly to the ‘whole of life’ costs 
of using an appliance. (Syneca Consulting 2003a, p. 4) 
In a free market, consumers may not have sufficient information to make rational 
decisions about energy efficiency. Where sellers are much better informed about a 
product’s energy efficiency than buyers, adverse selection can occur (chapter 4). 
This is more likely when the frequency of purchase is low, search costs are high 
relative to the purchase price, and the product is heterogeneous in price and quality 
(Sorrell et al. 2004). For householders, these conditions are most likely to apply 
when searching for a home. 
Household appliances are often homogeneous and so the unit cost of providing 
information on their energy efficiency can be quite low. However, as it can be 
difficult to exclude householders who do not pay for it, there is little incentive for 
market participants to provide information that could assist householders in 
selecting cost-effective products. As noted by the Energy Retailers Association of 
Australia: 
The information asymmetry between buyers and suppliers of appliances, equipment 
and building services is potentially significant (particularly for infrequent purchases). 
The cost associated with small consumers attempting to become informed, individually, 
is clearly prohibitive in most cases. While provision of this information on a larger 
scale may lower the cost, standard public good/free-rider problems associated with the 
provision of information may inhibit such provision by private providers. (sub.  26, 
p. 32)     
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Another information issue is that the energy consumption of a dwelling or an 
appliance (and the consequences of different usage patterns) can be difficult to 
determine, given that electricity bills are issued well after consumption has 
occurred, and individual appliances are not metered: 
Most customers act as if they have no control over their electricity bill. What limited 
feedback they get (a bill every three months, and limited information on that bill) is too 
late for them to respond. (Jeff Beal, sub. 64, p. 12) 
One means of addressing this problem is to install more informative electricity 
meters (chapter 14). 
Split incentives 
For the residential sector, split incentives are usually associated with dwellings. 
Energy-consuming fixtures — such as water heaters — are often selected by a 
builder or landlord who is primarily concerned about the capital cost, whereas users 
also have an incentive to reduce running costs. This was identified as a problem by 
many participants in this inquiry (for example, Rheem Australia, sub. 46; Energy 
and Water Ombudsman NSW, sub. 48; Government of Western Australia, sub. 58; 
TransGrid, sub. 62; AGL, sub. 66). 
A recent survey by the ABS (2005a) of South Australian householders confirms that 
there are marked differences in the appliances used by tenants and owner occupiers. 
For example, the survey found that tenants were more likely to use an electric heater 
(38 per cent of renters with a government housing authority and 27 per cent of other 
renters) than owner occupiers (15 per cent of owners without a mortgage and 
12 per cent of other owners) (figure 6.4). The use of electric heaters was also more 
prevalent for low-income households (figure 6.5). 
As noted in chapter 4, landlords/builders and tenants/home buyers could address 
split incentive problems by entering into a contract to share the costs and benefits of 
more energy-efficient products, or to separately negotiate contract prices of 
appliances. In practice, information barriers and transaction costs limit the instances 
of this happening. The Energy Consumers Council (sub. DR103, p. 5) expressed a 
concern that, even if information barriers and transaction costs were overcome, in 
‘many cases landlords hold the power, and tenants have little choice but to accept 
inefficient premises’.     
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Renter with a government
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a Data are for October 2004. 
Data source: ABS (2005a). 















































a  Data are for October 2004 and exclude households for which income data were not collected. b  An income 
quintile comprises 20 per cent of households that reported their income. Quintiles were ranked from lowest to 
highest according to gross household income, after adjusting for the number and age of each household’s 
occupants. 
Data source: ABS (2005a).     
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6.3 Residential  policies 
Governments intervene in various ways to encourage householders to adopt energy 
efficiency improvements. The most significant interventions are labelling and 
standards for appliances and buildings. These are examined in specific chapters on 
appliances and buildings later in this report because the policies apply to more than 
just the residential sector. 
Governments also intervene in the residential sector by providing subsidies and 
advisory services to householders. The remainder of this chapter considers whether 
such interventions are effective in lowering the three barriers to energy efficiency 
improvements mentioned above, and if the associated benefits outweigh the costs.  
Subsidies  
Subsidies do not directly address information barriers and split incentives, but they 
may lead to cost savings for householders that can be achieved by adopting energy 
efficiency improvements, or even increase the level of savings from improvements 
that are already cost effective for them. Subsidies may also be justified for policy 
goals such as lowering greenhouse gas emissions. 
Some participants in this inquiry advocated the use of financial incentives to 
encourage greater energy efficiency in the residential sector. For example, the 
Insulation Council of Australia and New Zealand stated: 
There are a range of areas where financial incentives or the removal of disincentives 
can assist in removing barriers to the implementation of energy efficiency in the 
regulation of building energy efficiency: 
•  The amount of the first home buyers grant could be tied to the energy efficiency of the 
home, and could decline as house size increased above the average. 
•  Infrastructure connection costs could be scaled to reflect the lower impacts of energy-
efficient development. 
•  The current rebate schemes for solar hot water, photo voltaic systems and water tanks 
could be consolidated into one grant and broadened to include further aspects of 
sustainability such as building fabric and appliance efficiency. 
•  Rebates for the installation of insulation in existing homes where costs are higher and 
are therefore a greater barrier to implementation ... (sub. 14, p. 14) 
Rheem Australia (sub. 46) supported subsidies for the purchase of solar hot water 
heaters. It noted that the higher capital cost of solar water heaters acts as a deterrent 
to their purchase.      
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The Queensland Government (sub. 38) noted that it already provides rebates to 
install renewable energy systems, including solar hot water systems. Queensland 
subsequently ceased its solar hot water rebate scheme on 30 June 2005. Similarly, 
the ACT had a rebate scheme for solar hot water systems that ceased on 30 June 
2005. Other jurisdictions still provide subsidies for solar hot water systems and 
other energy efficiency investments (box 6.1 and appendix C). 
 
Box 6.1  Subsidies for photovoltaic and solar hot water systems 
The Photovoltaic Rebate Program is funded by the Australian Government and 
administered by State and Territory Governments. This program provides rebates to 
householders who install photovoltaic systems with a peak output of at least 450 watts. 
For new systems, the rebate is $4 per peak watt up to a maximum total rebate of 
$4000 (1 kilowatt) for each installation. Extensions to existing systems are eligible for a 
rebate of $2.50 per peak watt up to a maximum total rebate of $2500 (1 kilowatt). 
In addition, the following jurisdictions have their own rebate programs for solar hot 
water systems: 
•  Victoria — rebates of up to $1500 to replace an existing gas or solid fuel hot water 
system, or convert an existing hot water system, to solar power; 
•  South Australia — rebates of up to $700 for new solar hot water systems installed at 
a person’s principal place of residence; and 
•  Western Australia — rebates of up to $1000.  
Householders can also obtain a cash back amount from manufacturers by signing over 
or 'trading' Renewable Energy Certificates they are entitled to receive under the 
Australian Government's mandatory renewable energy target. The cash back amount 
is based upon the performance of the solar hot water system purchased. 
 
 
It appears that subsidies for residential energy efficiency investments are relatively 
inexpensive. The impact on residential sector energy use is also probably minor, 
since few householders have been paid subsidies for energy efficiency measures. 
For example, in 2003-04, the South Australian Government approved 2526 rebate 
applications for solar hot water systems (Energy SA nd). 
The impact of subsidies on household energy efficiency is probably even lower than 
is suggested by the modest participation rates. This is because subsidies are often 
paid to householders that would have made the relevant energy efficiency 
investment anyway. This was evident for an ACT Government program that 
subsidised 25 per cent of the market price of cavity wall insulation. A survey found 
that at least 32 per cent of households that received the subsidy would have installed 
cavity wall insulation regardless of the subsidy (Beckman and Associates 2003).      
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The Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre claimed that subsidy programs would be 
more effective if they focused on improving the energy efficiency of low quality 
housing: 
We believe that uptake and impact [of financial incentives] could be increased if rebate 
schemes focused on improving low quality housing through insulation and the 
installation of high rating gas hot water tanks. These schemes may appear somewhat 
mediocre or mainstream but the reality for many households are that these are 
unaffordable improvements that could reduce non-discretionary energy consumption 
substantially. These rebates should be substantial enough to attract applicants (however 
eligibility could be restricted). (sub. DR107, pp. 3–4) 
The Centre also noted that governments currently spend far more on assisting 
householders with paying their energy bills than they do on capital grants that 
would reduce those energy bills: 
In 2002-03 the Victorian Government spent over 800 times more on utilities 
concessions and relief grants than they did on capital grants. The capital grants scheme 
delivers once-off assistance with the repair or replacement of an essential household 
appliance that is causing high utility costs. (Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre, 
sub. DR107, p. 4) 
It cited policy experience in the United Kingdom as an example of what could be 
achieved by giving greater emphasis to capital grants: 
In the UK the Warm Front program assisted over 300 000 households with an average 
grant of £445 (in 2002). The improvements undertaken to the grant recipients’ homes 
had the potential to reduce the fuel bill by £150 per annum (on average). The initial 
grant cost of insulation and heating is thus recouped in just three years by fuel savings. 
(Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre, sub. DR107, p. 4) 
While a capital grants program would benefit recipient households, it is unclear 
whether it is the most cost-effective means of achieving the policy goal that 
motivates energy bill assistance. Energy bill assistance is provided primarily for 
equity reasons, rather than to increase energy efficiency per se. It is possible that 
many households receive energy bill assistance today because of temporary 
circumstances (such as loss of employment) which are overcome in the longer term 
and so make them ineligible for future assistance. If this is the case, it may be more 
cost effective to achieve the equity goal by maintaining the current emphasis on 
energy bill assistance for households that are experiencing short-term financial 
stress. This is an empirical issue that individual governments will have to assess on 
the basis of the detailed information they have about participation in current 
assistance programs.  
More generally, the Commission considers that it is difficult to justify subsidising 
people to adopt energy efficiency measures that are already cost effective for them,     
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unless the real policy goal is to reduce ‘negative externalities’ — such as   
pollution — rather than to increase energy efficiency per se. 
Advisory services 
Governments have established advisory services to help householders overcome 
information barriers that limit householders’ ability to identify energy efficiency 
improvements that are cost effective for them (appendix C). For example, the 
Queensland Government (sub. 38) noted that it provides two such services: 
•  The Energy Advisory Service provides free advice on energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, and distributes information brochures and fact sheets. 
•  The Smart Housing initiative provides information on how to build homes that 
are more energy efficient. 
Similar services are offered in other jurisdictions, including Energy Smart (New 
South Wales and Western Australia), Energy SA Advisory Service (South 
Australia) and Home Energy Advice Team (ACT): 
The Western Australian Government … provides information to the community 
through the energy smart community program. Information is in the form of public 
seminars and community forums, a free telephone advisory service and attendance at 
trade exhibitions, brochures and a website that addresses key areas of energy use in the 
home. The community program also covers house energy-ratings programs in the State 
and promotes awareness of equipment energy ratings. (Government of Western 
Australia, sub. 58, p. 10) 
These programs often include internet-based advice. For example, the NSW Energy 
Smart website has an online calculator that enables householders to compare the 
cost of purchasing and operating different types of hot water heaters (SEDA nd). 
Some jurisdictions also have programs that provide energy efficiency audits of 
individual homes. 
Government advisory services could be useful in cases where information about 
cost-effective energy efficiency improvements has public good characteristics, and 
so would not necessarily be supplied by the private sector. Government-provided 
information may also have greater credibility than that provided by private-sector 
parties with a financial interest in promoting particular energy efficiency 
investments. But information provided by private parties without a vested   
interest — such as the Australian Consumers’ Association — could also be just as 
credible, if not more so, than government-provided information.     
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Government provision might also achieve economies of scale and scope, and thus 
lower costs to users; and it might be justified for social reasons if it aids 
accessibility or provides credibility by deriving from a neutral source. 
The public good rationale for government advisory services is more likely to apply 
to general advice than to information that is specific to an individual home. This is 
because there is greater scope for private-sector providers to exclude people who do 
not pay for home-specific information.  
Nevertheless, the private sector does provide general advice on energy efficiency 
improvements. For example, CSR Bradford provides information on its website 
about the cost effectiveness of building insulation and other energy efficiency 
investments. Similarly, AGL has an energy advice website: 
Interactive capabilities have recently been introduced that enable householders to visit a 
virtual home online to see how simple energy housekeeping techniques will reduce 
energy bills and help save the environment. By clicking on the appliances in each  
room — ovens, air conditioners, washing machines etc — users can calculate the costs 
of running different appliances, and discover tips to realise cost savings for each 
appliance. The site provides advice on a broad range of environmental issues and offers 
energy saving tips and advice on energy star ratings for different appliances. The site 
also contains an interactive energy efficiency calculator that provides quick reference 
information about how much energy appliances typically consume around the home. 
(sub. 66, p. 7) 
In summary, government advisory services can be justified on public good, 
credibility and accessibility grounds, but it does not follow that such services should 
always be provided by governments. The rationale for government provision is 
strongest in the case of general advice about energy efficiency. But even in that 
case, private sector providers — such as the Australian Consumers’ Association — 
have demonstrated that they can provide useful general information about energy 
efficiency.     
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 7  Industrial and commercial sectors 
 
Key points 
•  Improving energy efficiency is often not a major priority for Australian firms. This is a 
reflection of the fact that energy accounts for a small proportion of most firms’ costs. 
•  Information gaps, ‘split incentives’, and organisational and behavioural 
characteristics of firms have prevented some firms from undertaking cost-effective 
energy efficiency improvements.  
•  The energy services industry could provide a market solution to some of the barriers 
faced by firms. However, provision of government assistance to the energy services 
industry does not seem warranted. 
•  Voluntary agreements between governments and firms can encourage privately 
cost-effective energy efficiency improvements, so long as they are well designed. 
To the extent that privately cost-effective outcomes are a policy objective, the 
agreements should not be compromised by incentive or coercive elements. 
•  General information provision can increase the uptake of privately cost-effective 
energy efficiency improvements, but the usefulness of such programs for firms is 
limited. 
•  Provision of incentives for firms to undertake energy audits and research, 
development and innovation may be warranted if it generates spillover benefits from 
information diffusion.  
•  Provision of direct subsidies to firms to undertake privately cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements is not justified. Subsidies may have a role in encouraging 
energy efficiency improvements that generate broader positive environmental 
externalities. However, before this policy mechanism is applied on those grounds, it 
should be evaluated against other policy options for achieving the same objective. 
•  The mandatory energy audit and disclosure approach for large energy users — 
which is currently being implemented by the Australian Government — is likely to 
distort firms’ behaviour and investment patterns and is not warranted on private 
cost-effectiveness grounds.  
•  A policy of mandating implementation of audit results to achieve privately 
cost-effective energy efficiency improvements is not justified.    
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This chapter examines the issues surrounding privately cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements in the industrial and commercial sectors. The industrial 
sector has been defined to include all firms in the manufacturing, construction and 
mining industries. The commercial sector is comprised of firms which specialise in 
providing services, including hotels, motels, restaurants, wholesale firms, retail 
stores, and health, social, educational and financial institutions.  
A number of current and proposed policies for energy efficiency improvements in 
the industrial and commercial sectors are analysed in terms of their potential for 
achieving their objectives. 
The chapter is structured as follows: 
•  energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions (section 7.1); 
•  why firms might fail to adopt energy efficiency improvements that are cost 
effective for them (section 7.2); and 
•  assessment of policies (sections 7.3 to 7.9). 
7.1  Energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions  
Energy is an important resource in the industrial and commercial sectors. It provides 
a great range of services including driving manufacturing processes; heating; 
cooling and lighting firms’ premises; powering office appliances; and providing 
communication services. This section examines key features of energy consumption 
in these sectors.  
Energy consumption 
The commercial sector is a relatively minor energy consumer, accounting for 
8  per  cent of final (end use) energy consumption (table 7.1). However, over 
73 per cent of final energy use is in the form of electricity. When the conversion, 
transmission and distribution losses are taken into account, around 13 per cent of 
Australia’s total (primary) energy consumption was attributable to the commercial 
sector in 2001-02. Average annual growth between 1973-74 and 2001-02 was 
3.9 per cent, compared to annual growth in national final energy use of 2.2 per cent 
(ABARE 2004). ABARE projections (Akmal et al. 2004) suggest that final energy 
consumption in the commercial sector is expected to continue to grow at a relatively 
high rate over the next 15 years.      





Table 7.1  Energy consumption in industrial and commercial sectors, 
2001-02 
 Final  energy  consumption  Primary energy resources 
attributable to sectora 
  petajoules  % of total  petajoules  % of total 
Commercial   238  8 644 13 
Mining 161  5  379    7 
Manufacturing and construction  919  29  1 759   35 
   Basic non-ferrous metals  319  10  670  13 
   Other manufacturingb   192  6  289  6 
   Chemicals  156  5  191  4 
   Iron and steel  101  3  261  5 
   Non-metallic mineral products  96  3  128  3 
   Wood, paper and printing  56  2  96  2 
a  Resource consumption is apportioned on the basis of uniform electricity conversion, distribution and 
transmission losses across sectors. b Includes the food, beverages and tobacco sector; the textiles, clothing, 
footwear and leather sector; the machinery and equipment sector; and the construction sector. 
Sources: Akmal et al. (2004); PC estimates. 
The mining sector is also a relatively small user of energy, accounting for 5 per cent 
of final energy use in 2001-02. The mining sector relies more on petroleum 
products than electricity. When its electricity consumption is taken into account, 
however, around 7 per  cent of primary energy consumption was attributable to 
mining in 2001-02. The sector registered the strongest growth in final energy use in 
the past 30 years (5.9 per cent per annum between 1973-74 and 2001-02) and is 
projected to maintain that growth up to 2020 (Akmal et al. 2004).  
In contrast to the commercial and mining sectors, the manufacturing and 
construction sector is a major consumer of energy. Although no longer the largest 
final energy user in Australia, and registering a relatively low growth in final energy 
use between 1973-74 and 2001-02 (1.4 per cent per annum), the manufacturing and 
construction sector still accounted for over 29 per  cent of final energy use in 
2001-02. When the sector’s electricity consumption is taken into account, it 
overtakes the transport sector as the largest consumer of primary energy resources 
at around 35 per cent of the total energy consumed in 2001-02.  
Within the manufacturing and construction sector, some subsectors are particularly 
reliant on energy as an input into their production. The non-ferrous metals subsector 
is the largest final energy user in manufacturing, consuming about 10 per cent of 
final energy in 2001-02, followed by chemicals producers with 5 per cent of total 
final energy use.      
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Business expenditure on energy 
Energy costs amounted to less than 2 per cent of the total costs faced by firms in the 
commercial sector in 1998-99 (table 7.2). In the mining sector, energy is a larger 
(but still relatively small) contributor to costs, accounting for around 9 per cent of 
total expenditure. In the manufacturing sector, the importance of energy varies 
across sectors from 1.8 per cent of total expenditure in the food, beverages and 
tobacco sector to 11.5 per cent in the non-metallic mineral products sector. 
Table 7.2  Share of energy costs in total expenditure, 1998-99 
Sector  Energy costs as a share of total expenditure 
  % 
Commercial   1.6 
Mining  8.9 
Manufacturing and construction  6.8 
   Non-metallic mineral products  11.5 
   Iron and steel  10.9 
   Basic non-ferrous metals  8.5 
   Chemicals  3.6 
   Wood, paper and printing  2.4 
   Food, beverages and tobacco  1.8 
Source: PC estimates from ABS (2004a). 
Changes in energy efficiency 
The amount of energy used by the commercial and industrial sector has increased 
since the early 1970s, due mainly to an increase in the commercial and industrial 
sector’s output, although changes in energy efficiency have also had an impact. 
A quantitative analysis by ABARE researchers (Tedesco and Thorpe 2003) has 
separated the impact of energy efficiency changes from those of output growth. 
Their results show that movements in energy efficiency have differed markedly 
between industries within the commercial and industrial sector.      





In the mining industry, changes in energy use during the period 1973-74 to 2000-01 
would have increased the sector’s energy consumption by 104 per cent if there had 
been no change in the mining sector’s output.1 However, most of the sector’s 
increase in energy intensity was due to structural change — a shift within the 
mining industry to subsectors that used more energy per unit of output— rather than 
a drop in the energy efficiency of particular mines. The remainder was due to 
technical changes that increased energy use per unit of output. These technical 
changes could have included less energy-efficient usage patterns, the use of 
equipment that was less energy efficient, price-induced substitution of energy for 
other inputs, and a shift to fuels with a lower conversion efficiency. ABARE 
analysis shows that the trend of falling energy efficiency in the mining sector was 
largely reversed in the period 1994-95 to 2000-01. In that period, technological 
change reduced energy use per unit of output by approximately 5 per cent.  
In contrast, changes in manufacturing energy use during the period 1973-74 to 
2000-01 would have reduced the sector’s energy consumption by 44 per cent if 
there had not been an increase in that sector’s output. Most of the sector’s reduction 
in energy intensity was due to structural change. There was also a widespread shift 
by manufacturers toward fuels with a higher conversion efficiency which was 
partially offset by technical changes that increased the amount of energy used per 
unit of output. 
In the construction sector, energy use would have fallen by 20 per cent between 
1973-74 and 2000-01 if the level of output had stayed the same. This was largely 
due to a structural shift to less energy intensive parts of the industry. Energy 
efficiency declined in the  services (commercial) sector with energy use per unit of 
output rising by approximately 16 per cent. This could be attributed to a structural 
shift to parts of the industry that used more energy per unit of output, and technical 
changes that raised energy use per unit of output. There was, however, a shift to 
fuels with a higher conversion efficiency in the services sector. 
Table 7.3 shows how the changes in energy intensity of the above sectors would 
have affected Australia’s total energy consumption at 1973-74 levels of output.  
                                              
1 Tedesco and Thorpe (2003, p. 18) reported that changes in energy intensity of the mining sector 
would have increased Australia’s total energy consumption by 2.4 per cent between 1973-74 and 
2000-01 if the level of output did not change. In 1973-74, Australia’s total energy consumption 
was 2615 PJ, with 59 PJ attributable to mining (Tedesco and Thorpe 2003, p. 9). A 2.4 per cent 
increase of 2615 PJ is equal to a 104 per cent increase of 59 PJ (0.024 x 2615/59). The same 
method was used to calculate the changes in energy intensity of other sectors.      
118  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
Table 7.3 Impact  of  energy  efficiency changes on national energy 
consumption, 1973-74 to 2000-01 
Decomposition of impactb 
Subsector 
Impact of subsector 
energy efficiency 








 %  %  %  % 
Mining 2.4  1.4  0.0  1.0 
Manufacturing –11.9  –10.4  –4.0  2.5 
Food, beverages and tobacco –1.7  –1.0  –0.1  –0.7 
Textiles, clothing, footwear and leather  –0.4  –0.5  –0.1  0.2 
Wood, paper and printing products  –0.9  –0.8  –0.3  0.2 
Non-metallic products  –2.3  –1.7  –0.3  –0.3 
Metal products  –6.8  –6.5  –3.2  3.0 
Other manufacturing  –0.3  –0.3  –0.1  0.0 
Construction –0.2  –0.3  0.0  0.1 
Services 0.5  0.5  –0.5  0.6 
a Change in Australian energy consumption due to change in the energy efficiency of the relevant subsector. 
b May not add exactly to overall impact of energy efficiency changes (first column of numbers in the table) due 
to rounding. c  Portion of the overall impact of energy efficiency changes that is due to a shift within the 
relevant subsector between industries that use different amounts of energy per unit of output. d Portion of the 
overall impact of energy efficiency changes that is due to a shift in the relevant subsector between fuels with 
different conversion efficiencies. e Portion of the overall impact of energy efficiency changes that is not due to 
structural or technical change in the relevant subsector. 
Source: Tedesco and Thorpe (2003). 
In summary, much of the changes in energy use in the industrial and commercial 
sectors since the early 1970s can be attributed to the structural shifts within these 
sectors between more and less energy-reliant subsectors, rather than changes in the 
energy efficiency of particular industries. Most producers in the industrial and 
commercial sectors appear to have shifted to fuels with a higher conversion 
efficiency. However, this has been at least partially offset by technical changes that 
have increased energy use per unit of output in some cases. 
Emissions 
The commercial sector is a minor source of greenhouse gas emissions. According to 
the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO 2005e), emissions from fuel combustion in 
the commercial sector were 4.3 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, which 
accounted for 0.8 per cent of total emissions in 2003. This figure, however, does not 
include emissions from the generation of electricity consumed by the sector. If 
electricity generation, transmission and distribution emissions are allocated to the 
commercial sector on the basis of the sector’s share of electricity supplied, the     





commercial sector’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions rises to 
52  megatonnes or 9.5 per  cent of total emissions in 2003. Emissions from fuel 
combustion in the mining, manufacturing and construction sectors were 
39.4 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2003, accounting for 7.2 per cent 
of total emissions. If emissions from electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution are included, the sectors’ emissions rise to 127  megatonnes or 
23 per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions. 
ABARE researchers (Tedesco and Thorpe 2003) analysed changes in the carbon 
dioxide emission intensity from the end use of energy by the commercial and 
industrial sectors between 1973-74 and 2000-01. They estimated that, if there had 
been no change in the structure or level of output of the commercial sector, the 
sector would have reduced its carbon dioxide emissions from using energy by 
53 per  cent.2 Similarly, the manufacturing sector would have decreased its 
emissions by 28 per cent between 1973-74 and 2000-01, if the level of output and 
structure of the sector had remained the same.  
On the other hand, the mining sector would have increased its emissions by 
50 per cent between 1973-74 and 2000-01, if it had not increased its level of output 
and had maintained the same industry structure. The construction sector also would 
have increased its emissions by 10 per cent between 1973-74 and 2000-01, if the 
level of output and the structure of the sector had remained the same.  
The above estimates ignore the commercial and industrial sectors’ contribution to 
emissions in the energy conversion sector, whose emission intensity rose 
significantly during the period. If emissions from energy conversion were allocated 
to the sectors, ABARE concluded that all of the above sectors would have 
significantly increased their emissions for 1973-74 levels of output and economy 
structure.  
In summary, the carbon dioxide emission intensity in the industrial and commercial 
sectors has increased since the early 1970’s. However, this increase is largely 
attributable to the significant increase in the carbon dioxide emission intensity of 
the energy conversion sector, especially in the generation, transmission and 
distribution of electricity.  
                                              
2 Tedesco and Thorpe (2003, p. 69) reported that changes in the emission intensity of the 
commercial sector between 1973-74 and 2000-01 would have reduced Australia’s total carbon 
dioxide emissions from energy production and use by 0.9 per cent if the level of output and 
economy structure did not change from 1973-74. In 1973-74, Australia’s total carbon dioxide 
emissions from energy production and use were 174 Mt, of which 3 Mt were attributed to the 
commercial sector (Tedesco and Thorpe 2003, p. 57). A 0.9 per cent decrease of 174 Mt is equal 
to a 28 per cent decrease of 3 Mt (0.009 x 174/3). The same method was used to calculate 
changes in emission intensity of other sectors.     
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7.2  Why would firms overlook cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements? 
The previous section demonstrated that much of the observed changes in energy 
intensity in the commercial and industrial sectors could be explained by structural 
effects and not by improvements in energy efficiency per se. It is possible that 
Australian firms do not always take up energy efficiency improvements that are 
privately cost effective because of various barriers and impediments. These can be 
broadly categorised as follows: 
•  imperfect information arising from the public good nature of some information 
about energy efficiency and information asymmetries between firms acquiring a 
product (buildings, appliances and industrial equipment) and the seller of the 
product; 
•  split incentives arising from the fact that energy efficiency investment decisions 
in commercial buildings are made by people who are unlikely to bear the costs 
and benefits of those decisions; and 
•  organisational and behavioural issues within firms.  
The apparent lack of improvement in energy efficiency might also reflect the fact 
that, with energy being a minor component of most firms’ costs, Australian firms 
may have decided that their priorities lie elsewhere. Firms must have regard to 
many other considerations — product quality, marketing, competitors’ actions, 
other production inputs, occupational health and safety, to name a few — not just 
the benefits and costs of greater energy efficiency. If improving energy efficiency 
comes at the cost of forgoing other more cost-effective opportunities (because of 
capital or labour constraints or because the projects are mutually exclusive 
alternatives), it would be rational for the firm to give energy efficiency a low 
priority. 
The information and split incentives barriers, as well as the organisational and 
behavioural issues within firms, are discussed below. 
Imperfect information  
A number of inquiry participants argued that imperfect information prevented the 
full take-up of energy efficiency opportunities by firms. Information gaps for 
energy users were identified in the following areas: 
•  information about the various commercial building options and their cost (Royal 
Australian Institute of Architects, trans., p. 277);     





•  information asymmetries about construction and design characteristics of 
commercial buildings (ABCB, sub. 7; Exergy Australia Pty Ltd, sub. 40; 
Insulation Council of Australia and New Zealand, sub. 14); and 
•  information asymmetries in the market for energy services (Origin Energy, 
sub. 25). 
Some information gaps can be attributed to the public good nature of some 
information. For example, information on the best currently available technologies 
or consolidated lists of energy consultants may be underprovided in a private 
market if providers cannot capture the benefits. Sometimes information can be in 
the public domain but not in a form useful to a particular firm. For example, the 
Australian Meat Processor Corporation (sub. 12) submitted that general information 
on improving boiler energy efficiency was available but not in a consolidated and 
readily usable form. And Norske Skog (2004) observed that firms may have 
difficulty engaging the most appropriate energy services consultant in the absence 
of a consolidated register of consultants.  
Information-related market failure may also arise from information asymmetries. 
For example, the problem of adverse selection may exist in the markets for 
commercial buildings where the purchasers/renters are poorly informed about the 
characteristics of the building relative to sellers/landlords. The Insulation Council of 
Australia and New Zealand (sub. 14) argued that information asymmetries 
regarding the quality of insulation in buildings resulted in adverse selection and 
stated that this was a significant barrier to energy efficiency. 
When the tenants and purchasers of commercial buildings are large corporations 
with significant resources and good access to technological expertise to assess the 
characteristics of the building, the likelihood of adverse selection is low. 
Nevertheless, many firms are small and may be little, if any, better-informed about 
energy efficiency than householders. The adverse selection problem may also exist 
in commercial and industrial appliance and equipment markets, particularly for 
smaller manufacturing and commercial firms. However, high-cost (in dollar terms) 
purchases like commercial building leases or industrial appliances also create 
stronger incentives for the purchaser to investigate all relevant characteristics of the 
purchase. 
Split incentives 
A number of participants identified split incentives in the market for commercial 
building leases as a barrier to energy efficiency investments in buildings (ABCB, 
sub. 7; Lincolne Scott, trans., pp. 241–42). The Royal Australian Institute of     
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Architects observed that the split incentives barrier was less likely to be prevalent 
when the lessor or purchaser of the building was a large company: 
… a significant shift has occurred at the big end of town … in some of the major 
property trusts that are operating in Australia … They really know their stuff. They 
know about life-cycle costs because they end up being the primary facility manager, the 
owner long term … At the medium and the small end the frustrations … exist … 
because the developer has no other incentive other than to get the building up and fully 
leased out and then sold on possibly to the owner-occupier investors and they have to 
shoulder the ongoing costs. (trans., p. 277) 
The split incentives problem is exacerbated by the different needs of potential future 
users of the building. Even if the incentives of the developer and the first tenant (or 
purchaser) of the building are aligned, future tenants may have different energy 
usage preferences. Nonetheless, future users of the building could be expected to 
take the cost of refitting the building in accordance with their preferences into 
account when deciding whether to buy or lease the building. 
Organisational and behavioural issues 
Organisational characteristics of firms, such as their divisional structures and 
decision-making processes, may influence the uptake of energy efficiency projects 
(chapter 4). These may include barriers to communication flows between technical 
staff and management within firms that may result in decision makers not receiving 
relevant information or not correctly processing the information. In this context, the 
Australasian Energy Performance Contracting Association observed: 
The issue is often whether or not the perception of such great benefits that is evident —
self-evident even — to an organisation at the engineering level is very difficult to 
translate up to the decision-making level, and it is often the case that were an ESCO 
[energy services company] to approach an organisation at an engineering level, it can 
be very easily and very quickly demonstrated that there are great advantages to be 
achieved. (trans., p. 363) 
Misalignment of staff incentives and business outcomes may also be a problem. 
Exergy gave an example of one of its clients — a firm managing a commercial 
building portfolio: 
… the chief executive officer commanded from above that there shall be a program of 
energy work and we’re going to do something and middle management killed it by 
saying basically, ‘We can’t be bothered.’ There’s a lack of connection to the result. 
(trans., p. 328) 
The Australian Meat Processor Corporation (sub. 12) suggested that the flat 
organisational structure often found in smaller firms, with no consolidation of     





energy efficiency responsibilities in the hands of one person, hindered the uptake of 
energy efficiency improvements. 
Energetics (sub. DR104) claimed that poor management was the main barrier 
preventing energy efficiency improvement in Australian firms. Energetics 
conducted a survey of management practices within its client firms using a 
self-diagnostic software tool. The results showed that 84 per cent of Energetics’ 
clients that had operating expenses greater than five million dollars did not have a 
dedicated energy management system. Twenty per cent of the firms had no 
management system in place to manage energy waste. 
Energetics also observed that other organisational barriers could include: 
… shortages of internal skilled labour, engineering focus of services in this area which 
has discouraged companies from integrating energy into business practices … 
(sub. DR104, p. 4) 
Organisational characteristics of firms may combine with behavioural factors to 
inhibit energy efficiency improvement. Chapter 4 gave examples of economising 
behaviour in decision making caused by the bounded rationality of individual firms. 
Scarcity of staff resources within firms may contribute to constraints on the quality 
of decision making.  
As noted in chapter 4, the Commission does not consider that organisational and 
behavioural issues are sufficient grounds in their own right to warrant government 
intervention. However, these issues might be relevant in the design and delivery of 
government programs that are otherwise justifiable, for example as a response to 
environmental externalities or other market failure.  
The following sections analyse the policies for the industrial and commercial 
sectors, that have been introduced by governments purportedly to address the 
barriers and market failures identified above. The discussion starts by looking at 
less interventionist policies and proceeds to analyse the case for increasingly 
stronger intervention by governments. 
7.3  Promoting the energy services industry 
The Australasian Energy Performance Contracting Association (sub. 47) submitted 
that governments could promote the energy services industry in order to achieve 
greater adoption of privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements. Such 
government involvement could take the form of running an accreditation scheme for 
energy service providers or playing a facilitating role in transactions between 
energy service providers and firms.     
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Advantages offered by the energy services industry 
In the absence of government intervention, some energy efficiency improvements 
will take place as part of business-as-usual strategies. The energy services industry 
can provide market solutions to some of the barriers faced by firms in improving 
their energy efficiency.  
A number of participants suggested that the energy service industry could play a 
significant role in achieving energy efficiency improvement for firms 
(AGL,  sub.  66; ESAA, sub. 68; Insulation Council of Australia and New 
Zealand, sub. 14).  
The Energy Retailers’ Association of Australia observed that market demand for 
energy efficiency services could generate the supply of such services from energy 
retailers: 
In competitive energy markets customers looking to reduce their energy bill represent a 
commercial opportunity for energy retailers looking to differentiate their service 
offering (sub. 26, p. 23). 
AGL (sub. 66, p. 6) submitted that its Business Energy Services division has helped 
customers reduce their energy use, resulting in a net benefit of $3 million.  
Firms can engage energy consultants at a number of levels and can choose from a 
variety of services. These range from purchasing software which assists the 
maintenance and analysis of energy use records; to obtaining advice on 
energy-saving technologies; to hiring consultants to conduct energy audits; or 
entering into energy performance contracts.  
Conducting energy-use audits to identify cost-effective efficiency improvements is 
one of the most commonly offered types of service by energy consultants. This may 
allow firms to achieve energy efficiency improvements at a lower cost than if the 
firm conducted its own assessments, due to specialisation and consequent 
economies of scale. Further, consolidation of the responsibilities involved in 
completing an energy efficiency audit in the hands of one agent (the consultant) can 
also reduce the organisational transaction costs of the firm. 
An alternative approach to energy audits by a firm’s staff or outside consultants is 
energy performance contracting. Under this approach, energy service companies 
(ESCOs) can enter into energy performance contracts with firms to supply an 
integrated package of services ranging from identification of energy-saving 
opportunities to design and implementation of projects and post-implementation 
maintenance of equipment. An ESCO usually guarantees a certain level of energy 
savings and its compensation is tied to the realisation of those savings (box 7.1).     





Although energy performance contracting is relatively new in Australia, it has been 
used extensively in Europe and the United States for over 20 years. In the United 
States, projects worth over US$2 billion were commissioned to ESCOs in 2000 
(Osborn et al. 2002). The US ESCO industry has experienced rapid growth with 
revenues growing at the rate of 24 per cent per annum in the decade 1990–2000. 
Analysis of the projects commissioned through energy performance contracts 
showed that the median payback time for industrial and commercial sector projects 
was three years and that these projects achieved a median benefit–cost ratio of 2.1 
(Osborn et al. 2002).  
 
Box 7.1  Energy service companies and performance contracting 
An energy service company (ESCO) is a business that develops, installs, and 
manages projects designed to improve the energy efficiency and maintenance costs of 
facilities of a customer firm. Typically, ESCOs provide the following services: 
•  performing an energy audit of the firm;  
•  establishing baseline energy use for specific equipment, systems, or the facility as a 
whole;  
•  designing the energy efficiency project in consultation with the customer;  
•  supplying, installing and commissioning equipment;  
•  training customer personnel;  
•  operating and maintaining the equipment for the life of the contract; and 
•  conducting measurement and verification to determine the savings generated. 
A distinguishing feature of ESCO operation is the energy performance contract (EPC). 
An EPC is an agreement entered into by a firm and an ESCO where the ESCO 
undertakes to provide specific services and guarantees some level of energy savings 
for the firm. The ESCO’s compensation is usually paid from the savings generated by 
the EPC. Typical contract terms are between four and ten years. 
Source: AEPCA (2004).    
 
Energy performance contracting can reduce the information and organisational 
barriers identified in section 7.2. Further, since the ESCO guarantees a certain level 
of savings, there is a redistribution of implementation risk away from the firm to the 
ESCO, which would arguably face a lower risk of project failure due to its technical 
expertise.      
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Issues in using the energy services industry 
In practice, the energy services industry faces some barriers. A significant difficulty 
that has been identified by industry is that energy consultants tend to focus on 
reducing one of the inputs to production and that this may result in an increase in 
other business costs. The Australian Aluminium Council noted: 
While there are opportunities for the engagement of consultants who offer the promise 
of sharing the benefits from reduced energy consumption, care needs to be taken in 
avoiding the use of a single metric (energy consumption) when the bottom line may be 
influenced by changes in the other inputs to the activity. There is little point in 
engaging the services of an ‘energy efficiency specialist’ who is focused on a single 
performance metric without reflecting the impact on the ‘whole-of-business’ outcome 
(sub. 29, p. 11). 
As discussed in chapter 5, the dampening effect of implementation costs not 
observed by energy consultants is evident in survey results. A US survey of more 
than 9000 energy efficiency audits found that, while 50 per  cent of audit 
recommendations were not implemented by firms, 75 per cent of those decisions 
were made for legitimate economic reasons (Anderson and Newell 2002). The most 
significant factor reported was costs to the firm in other areas of its operation which 
were not taken into account by the energy auditors. Firms reported costs like 
unacceptable operating and personnel changes, risk or inconvenience to personnel, 
costs of installing new equipment including production halts and changes in product 
quality. 
A survey of the Enterprise Energy Audit Program that operated in Australia 
between 1991 and 1997 by offering subsidies for firms to conduct energy audits, 
revealed that the most common negative comment about the program was that 
auditors failed to understand the way the firm operated (Harris, Anderson and 
Shafron 1998). 
Another major problem identified by Origin Energy (sub. 25) involves the 
information asymmetries between the service provider and customer. The actual 
savings that arise as a result of the consultant’s advice will depend on many aspects 
of business operation. There is an inherent asymmetry of information between the 
consultant and the client about the client’s business. This makes verification of 
actual energy savings difficult for the consultant. The problem is exacerbated when 
the consultant’s remuneration is dependent on energy savings achieved, as in the 
case of EPCs.  
Greater upfront contract specification by the energy service provider could reduce 
this moral hazard problem. However, this would add to the transaction costs.     





Policies to promote the energy services industry 
The Australasian Energy Performance Contracting Association (AEPCA, sub. 47) 
and the Moreland Energy Foundation (sub. DR115) suggested that the perceived 
risk of engaging a consultant may be reduced through government intervention in 
running a national training, accreditation and standards program for energy service 
providers. This would provide some independently-sourced information to firms 
about the reliability of the consultant.  
The Australian Government committed to playing some role in providing this type 
of service as part of its policy of Mandatory Energy Efficiency Opportunities 
Assessment for large energy users (discussed in section 7.7). The program, which is 
currently in development, provides for government facilitation of capacity building 
in the energy services industry. This could involve training and accreditation of 
energy consultants.  
Accreditation of energy service providers can reduce the risk associated with 
engaging consultants. However, this does not necessarily require government 
involvement. As in many other industries, accreditation could be undertaken by an 
industry or professional association. Indeed, AEPCA has developed an accreditation 
process for energy service companies. The Green Building Council of Australia also 
runs an accreditation course for its Green Star ratings scheme and maintains an 
online directory of Green Star Accredited Professionals. The Green Building 
Council stated that currently there are 265 Green Star Accredited Professionals, and 
that these have provided very positive feedback about the accreditation course 
(sub.  DR137). The Commission considers that there is no particular case for 
government taking up this role for energy service consultants.  
Government should not become directly involved in accreditation of energy 
consultants and energy service companies because this function can be adequately 
performed by an industry or professional association. 
AEPCA (sub.  47) also suggested that governments could reduce the high 
contracting costs (arising out of information asymmetries) by playing a facilitating 
role in transactions between energy service providers and firms. One example of 
such facilitation is the Energy Smart Business Program administered by the 
Department of Energy Utilities and Sustainability in New South Wales. Under this 
program, the New South Wales Government acted as an intermediary between 
energy service providers and large energy users in the commercial and industrial 
FINDING 7.1     
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sectors.3 The Energy Performance in Commercial Buildings program in the ACT 
(which started in 2002 and was subsequently discontinued) operated in a similar 
fashion but also provided firms with financial incentives to enter EPCs. 
By acting as an intermediary between energy service providers and firms, 
governments could reduce the high transaction costs of selecting consultants and 
contract over-specification. Such involvement may provide an implicit guarantee to 
firms about the consultant, and hence might work in ways similar to a 
government-run accreditation scheme. However, such involvement is not costless 
and has some risks. The downside of being seen to endorse particular consultants is 
that governments implicitly take on the risks of those consultancies turning out less 
than satisfactorily. It also encourages favouritism and lobbying by consultants to 
gain an advantage over their competitors. To be able to provide firms with even the 
most basic advice on the capabilities of consultants, there is a need for a degree of 
expertise within government, and staff can be exposed to firm capture. If third 
parties are involved in the accreditation of consultants, governments could take a 
more neutral intermediary role by simply referring interested firms to the 
accrediting party or to any published list of consultants.  
Other approaches to reducing transaction costs might be more productive. For 
example, the Australasian Energy Performance Contracting Association and the 
AGO have jointly developed a National Standard Energy Performance Contract 
which can be used as a template by ESCOs to cover most standard projects. The 
contract can also be used in combination with additional provisions to reflect the 
heterogeneity of clients and requirements.  
7.4 Voluntary  agreements 
A number of programs facilitating voluntary initiatives by firms are currently run by 
governments. These tend to focus on reducing greenhouse gas emissions rather than 
on improving energy efficiency per se. Therefore, the market failure primarily 
addressed by these programs concerns the negative externalities associated with 
energy use, rather than market failures that might be preventing the uptake of 
privately cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency. Nevertheless, voluntary 
agreement programs can encourage such improvements. Voluntary agreements can 
                                              
3 The Commission has examined a summary of the evaluation of the New South Wales Energy 
Smart Business program that claims that the program achieved energy cost savings of 
$31 million. The evaluation provides no information on the administrative costs of the program 
or on the implementation costs borne by firms in realising the energy savings. The evaluation 
also does not state whether these savings are incremental to the business-as-usual scenario, in 
which some firms may have engaged the consultants independently of government facilitation.     





address organisational barriers within firms by focusing a firm’s attention on a 
specific issue. Voluntary programs can also address the information barriers faced 
by firms.  
The two largest voluntary agreement programs are the Greenhouse Challenge and 
the Australian Building Greenhouse Rating scheme. Analysis of these programs 
provides a useful basis for assessing potential benefits available from voluntary 
energy efficiency improvement.  
Greenhouse Challenge 
The Greenhouse Challenge was launched in 1995 by the AGO as a joint voluntary 
initiative between the Australian Government and industry to abate greenhouse gas 
emissions. The program was discontinued in 2005 and replaced by the Challenge 
Plus — Enhanced Industry Partnerships program which is funded to run until 
2007-08 and will operate in a broadly similar fashion to its precursor. One major 
change to the program is that participation in Challenge Plus will be compulsory 
from 2006 for recipients of fuel excise credits of more than $3 million. This would 
mean that the program would no longer be a purely voluntary one for some 
participants. For the purpose of this section, only the voluntary agreement aspect of 
the Greenhouse Challenge program is discussed here. 
In 1999, the Greenhouse Challenge scheme had an annual budget of $6 million. 
Although the main focus of the program was on emission abatement, one element of 
Greenhouse Challenge — the Managing Energy for Profits scheme — was a 
recruitment scheme that involved consultants promoting energy savings to potential 
participants. Participating organisations made certain undertakings with the 
government and were provided with limited technical assistance in the development 
of their agreements. This was given in the form of template workbooks and advice 
from industry advisers. Participants were required to report annually on actions 
planned and undertaken, and on actual emissions. Reports had to be independently 
verified.  
In 1999, the Greenhouse Challenge covered firms creating 26 per cent of Australia’s 
total greenhouse emissions, including 100 per cent coverage of the aluminium and 
cement industries, 98 per cent of oil and gas extraction and 91 per cent of coal 
mining.  
An evaluation of the program (AGO 1999a) listed some of the benefits and 
impediments to joining the Greenhouse Challenge, as identified by participants. The 
major benefits included reduced energy costs, improved corporate reputation as a 
responsible environmental manager, and improved relationships with the Australian     
130  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
Government. Major impediments included the absence of financial benefits in 
participating, difficulties in developing a cooperative agreement and the uncertain 
policy environment. The report suggested that greater participation could be 
achieved if the link between energy cost savings and greenhouse gas abatement was 
better communicated.  
Australian Building Greenhouse Rating Scheme 
The Australian Building Greenhouse Rating (ABGR) scheme is a voluntary 
program aimed at reducing the greenhouse gas emissions attributable to commercial 
buildings (box 7.2). ABGR was developed in 1999 by the New South Wales 
Department of Energy, Utilities and Sustainability (DEUS) in New South Wales 
and was expanded to operate nationally in 2000.  
 
Box 7.2  Australian Building Greenhouse Ratings 
Australian Building Greenhouse Ratings is a performance based rating system for 
office buildings. It covers three categories: 
•  base building, covering the services supplied by a landlord under a gross lease 
(where the tenant only pays directly for the energy use of office lighting and other 
specifically tenant driven loads such as office equipment, and the landlord pays 
directly for the energy use of the air conditioning and other building services); 
•  tenancy rating, covering the tenant loads only; and 
•  whole building, covering the total operation for the building. 
The rating is derived using the following process: 
•  building energy use is identified, based on actual bills; 
•  hours of occupancy are identified; 
•  for tenancy and whole-building ratings, the tenant load is characterised based on a 
count of computers; 
•  the climate region is identified; and  
•  the floor area is specified in terms of the net lettable area of productive office space. 
These factors are fed into a calculation that converts the energy use into a greenhouse 
gas equivalent, divides by floor area and applies normalisation factors to compensate 
for hours of occupancy, climate, and (if assessed) tenant loads. The resultant figure is 
then compared against a scale set on the basis of the statistical distribution of energy 
use in office buildings in the same state as the building. This estimate is converted into 
a rating between one and five stars, where one star represents very poor performance 
and five stars exceptional performance. 
Source: Exergy Australia Pty Ltd (sub. 40).   
     





The scheme offers a performance-based rating system for office buildings. Office 
building owners and tenants can initiate an ABGR assessment at their expense —
usually between $1000 and $3000 (NSW DEUS 2004b). Upon initiating the 
assessment, the firm is provided with a third-party accredited assessor who 
measures the building’s energy use and assigns it a star rating, which indicates the 
building’s relative energy efficiency. Ratings of one to five stars are given, with a 
three-star rating indicating current market standard practice (NSW DEUS 2004b). A 
database of building ratings derived using the ABGR methodology is maintained by 
DEUS. In December 2004, NSW DEUS (2004a) reported that 14 per cent of office 
space nationally and 20 per cent in New South Wales have been rated using the 
ABGR. 
Originally, the ABGR underpinned a voluntary labelling scheme for commercial 
buildings. However, it has subsequently expanded to include other government 
initiatives. Currently, a number of information provision programs are run 
nationally as part of the ABGR scheme. These include the Star Performer diagnostic 
software that provides advice on reducing greenhouse emissions on the basis of 
building characteristics; and the Tenant Energy Management Handbook. At a state 
level, some voluntary agreement programs involve building owners or tenants 
committing to achieve certain levels of emission reductions after undergoing an 
ABGR assessment. Examples of such programs include the 3CBDS Greenhouse 
Initiative and the Parramatta Greenhouse Leaders Project in New South Wales. 
DEUS has also developed a standard commitment agreement to achieve a certain 
ABGR rating that developers of new buildings can choose to adopt.  
Are voluntary agreements effective in improving energy efficiency? 
A number of participants submitted that the capacity of voluntary programs to effect 
energy efficiency improvements was very limited. The Moreland Energy 
Foundation stated: 
Our primary concern with the voluntary agreement model is that a lot of resources can 
be invested and the results can be minimal. (sub. DR115, p. 14) 
The Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy (sub. DR121) argued that 
the current regulatory approach to energy consumption resulted from the prior 
failures of  voluntary programs. The Victorian Government submitted that despite 
having already participated in voluntary programs, some firms were still able to 
identify opportunities with a three year payback as part of the Victorian 
Environment Protection Authority Greenhouse Program (sub. DR125).  
International experience with voluntary agreement programs shows that they have 
led to some improvements in the energy efficiency of firms, although it is generally     
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difficult to quantify those improvements. The World Energy Council (2004) 
concluded that many energy efficiency improvements that are attributed to 
voluntary agreement programs would have been undertaken by firms independently 
of government intervention. For example, it was found that the German voluntary 
agreement program resulted in relatively small improvements over the 
business-as-usual scenario. Nevertheless, studies of the Dutch program, which is 
considered to be one of the most successful industry voluntary agreement programs, 
showed that it drove participants to improve their energy efficiency. It was 
estimated that the program reduced energy intensity  in the industrial sector by 
0.8 per cent per annum between 1989 and 1999 (box 7.3), with improved energy 
efficiency being one of the major causes for this reduction. The program was 
deemed to have a number of effective features. These included:  
•  exploratory surveys to gauge the energy efficiency improvement potential of a 
participating sector prior to developing the agreement;  
•  annual monitoring of performance of participants; and  
•  government provision of general information to raise industry awareness of 
potential energy efficiency improvements. 
 
Box 7.3  Long-term voluntary agreements in the Netherlands 
The Dutch Voluntary Agreement Program ran between 1989 and 2000. The program 
involved energy intensive commercial and industrial subsectors entering into long-term 
agreements with the government to improve their energy efficiency by a specific 
percentage within an agreed period. The agreements included commitments by 
individual firms to adopt particular management practices, such as the preparation and 
implementation of energy conservation plans and annual monitoring of energy 
consumption. Subsector energy efficiency targets derived from initial government 
surveys of potential for improvement, underpinned the agreements.  
Over the period of 1989–99 participating subsectors achieved an average energy 
efficiency improvement of 20.4 per cent. A study by University of Utrecht researchers 
utilised a combination of expert opinion and company surveys to analyse the direct 
effect of the program on industrial energy efficiency improvement. It was estimated 
that, between 25 and 50 per cent of the energy efficiency improvement in the industrial 
sector occurring during the program’s operation was directly attributable to the 
voluntary agreements. Without the program, energy efficiency improvement in the 
industry would have been about 1 per cent per year instead of 1.8 per cent. 
While developing the agreements in itself was not a costly process for the government, 
the program was accompanied by substantial government expenditure on information 
provision and awareness-raising initiatives. In total, between 1989 and 2000, the 
program cost the Dutch Government €159 million to run.  
Source: World Energy Council (2004).   
     





The main advantage of voluntary agreements is that they give organisations the 
flexibility to self-select as well as choose the level and nature of their undertaking. 
There is, therefore, a lower risk of firms being forced into adopting practices that 
are not privately cost effective for them.  
However, the voluntary character of such programs is easily compromised. Some of 
the participation in the Challenge Plus and the ABGR programs may have been 
instigated by the presence in those programs of incentive or coercive elements. 
Participating may well be a precaution against the threat of other higher-cost policy 
measures being adopted by governments. Alternatively, participants may be 
motivated by government provision of technical support or the prospect of losing 
access to other government support (for example, participation in the Challenge 
Plus program is compulsory for recipients of fuel excise credits of over $3 million). 
To the extent that participation is not purely voluntary, there is a higher risk that 
firms would undertake projects that are not privately cost effective.  
Furthermore, it is likely that firms would package some of their business-as-usual 
actions into their agreements, thus making it easier to achieve agreed targets. This 
proposition was not tested in the evaluation of the Greenhouse Challenge Program. 
The risk is likely to be lower for programs in which substantial government effort 
has been directed at collecting information about the participant and their industry 
prior to entering into an agreement with them. However, this may add significantly 
to government costs. 
7.5  General information provision 
As discussed in section 7.2, some of the information gaps faced by firms could be 
attributed to the public good characteristics of information. General information 
provision programs seek to address this market failure. Governments currently 
provide firms with a wide range of energy efficiency information using a variety of 
delivery mechanisms (box 7.4).      
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Box 7.4  Examples of general information programs 
General information provision programs can take a number of forms. The following 
types of programs currently operate in Australia: 
Educating firms about general aspects of energy efficiency 
The ACT Ecobusiness program and the Western Australian Energy Smart Business 
program run workshops and seminars on general energy efficiency issues, in which 
small and medium sized firms are given information on various topics including lighting, 
air conditioning and energy audits.  
Publicising current industry practice and success stories 
Under the Australian Government’s Energy Efficiency Best Practice Program, energy 
use case studies and benchmarking reports were prepared for a number of commercial 
and industrial subsectors. The New South Wales Energy and Water Green Globe 
Award scheme identifies and publicises the practices of energy efficient firms.  
Providing information about products regulated for energy efficiency  
The Australian Government publishes some information collected as part of the testing 
of appliances and equipment that are regulated for energy efficiency in the electronic 
Switched On newsletter and the Motor Solutions Online website. 
Acting as a reference point for other sources of information   
The Western Australian Government maintains an Energy Smart Directory of suppliers 
of ‘sustainable’ energy products and services. In South Australia, annual Energy 
Efficiency Conferences and Trade Fairs provide a forum for manufacturers of 
energy-efficient products and the energy services industry to advertise their products.   
 
General information and education provision may address some of the information 
gaps faced by Australian firms. However, in some cases, the information will be 
available from the private sector. For example, the energy services industry can 
provide a wide range of advice including some of the information that is currently 
provided by governments through general information programs. Information gaps 
concerning the operation of the energy services industry can be addressed by 
industry associations like the Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
and AEPCA. This includes maintaining consolidated registers of consultants and 
providing information on the services offered by the energy services industry.  
In some cases, government provision of information may be warranted. Information 
provided by governments may be more credible than if it was supplied by private 
agents. If the information is relatively generic, a government agency may be able to 
provide it at a cost that is lower than that faced by individual firms due to     





economies of scale and scope. Government provision may also reduce search costs 
for users.  
A frequent criticism of general information provision programs is that they do not 
guarantee outcomes, particularly if there are barriers within an organisation to the 
processing or implementation of the information. However, non-action on the basis 
of received information may also reflect rational decision making by the firms.  
There is also usually a tradeoff between the generality of information and its 
relevance and usefulness to the recipient. Moreland Energy Foundation observed: 
Our experience indicates that firms prefer targeted information to general 
information … (sub. DR115, p. 14)  
A review of the Energy Efficiency Best Practice program run by the Australian 
Government Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR) found that its 
original approach of general information provision was relatively ineffective in 
changing energy user behaviour in the industrial sector. General information 
provision ‘… did not directly assist companies in improving their energy 
efficiency …’ (EnergyConsult 2002, p. E1). 
The Australasian Energy Performance Contractors Association commented that, 
compared to energy audits, general information provision programs: 
… provide information on the benefits of energy efficiency, … provide information on 
specific technologies, but don’t provide enough information for a consumer to actually 
exploit the opportunity. They may still not be certain how to specify a technology, how 
to be sure they are paying the right price for the technology. (trans., p. 359) 
This illustrates the fine line between public and private goods and the dilemmas 
facing governments in pursuing anything but the most basic information provision. 
If information is specific enough to the needs of a particular firm, there should be 
sufficient incentives for others (consultants, performance contractors and ESCOs) to 
provide it. Generally speaking, the information failures in the commercial and 
industrial sectors are less significant than in the residential sector, suggesting a 
commensurately smaller role for governments in information provision. 
7.6 Financial  incentives 
Financial incentives do not directly address the information barriers, split incentives 
and organisational barriers identified in section 7.2. Further, provision of financial 
incentives may simply improve the return on projects that are already privately cost 
effective. However, provision of financial incentives for actions that improve the 
energy efficiency of a firm increases the attractiveness of such actions to the firm,     
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and thus can have a direct bearing on whether these actions are undertaken. 
Government financial assistance might be justified if it reduced the negative 
externalities associated with energy use or helped promote positive spillovers 
associated with research and development (R&D) and better practices.  
This section examines the case for government provision of financial incentives to 
firms in the form of:  
•  subsidies for energy audits; 
•  assistance for research, development and innovation in energy efficiency; and 
•  subsidies for other energy efficiency related expenditure by firms.  
The section concludes with a discussion of hypothecated levies as a means of 
financing the subsidies. 
Subsidies for energy audits 
The most common type of financial incentive program in the commercial and 
industrial sector involves governments assisting firms in conducting energy audits. 
A number of state programs adopted this approach, including the Energy Smart 
Business Program in Victoria; the Cleaner Production Partnerships and the 
Greenhouse Industry Partnerships programs in Queensland; and the Business 
Energy Efficiency Opportunity Identification program in South Australia 
(appendix C). However, the largest energy audit assistance programs of recent years 
were the Enterprise Energy Audit and Energy Efficiency Best Practice programs run 
by the Australian Government. 
Enterprise Energy Audit and Energy Efficiency Best Practice programs 
The Enterprise Energy Audit Program (EEAP) was run by the Australian 
Government Department of Primary Industries and Energy between 1991 and 1997. 
Under the EEAP, firms were provided with subsidies of 50 per cent of the cost of an 
energy audit up to a maximum of $5000. Approximately 1200 firms took part in the 
EEAP.  
An evaluation by ABARE researchers (Harris, Anderson and Shafron 1998) 
concluded that the EEAP was very cost effective in generating cost savings for 
firms (box 7.5). However, the analysis showed that most of the improvements 
would have been initiated by firms in the absence of government subsidies. Harris, 
Anderson and Shafron (1998) argued that the role of government should be limited 
to promoting the private take-up of the EEAP auditing process by firms, but should     





not extend to providing firms with specific information or direct subsidies for 
audits. 
 
Box 7.5  Enterprise Energy Audit Program outcomes 
A survey of the EEAP participants conducted by ABARE researchers resulted in the 
following findings: 
•  The total net present value to firms of audit recommendations that were 
implemented was $189 million. The energy savings generated amounted to 
8 per cent of previous energy costs.  
•  Total costs of program administration were $1 million and the total cost of audits 
was $8.7 million, of which the Government funded half. 
•  The average implementation rate of audit recommendations was 81 per cent (the 
implementation rate was lower for larger firms). 
•  Participation in the EEAP led to increased awareness of energy efficiency within the 
firm and acted as a ‘springboard’ for further actions. 
Source: Harris, Anderson and Shafron (1998).   
 
The EEAP was superseded by the Energy Efficiency Best Practice Program (EEBP) 
run by DITR during 1998–2002. The objective of the program was to assist firms to 
overcome the barriers to the adoption of privately cost-effective energy efficient 
practices. The EEBP commenced in 1998 as a general information provision 
program with funding of $10.3 million allocated over five years. From 2000, EEBP 
evolved to targeting specific firms and directly assisting them in improving their 
energy efficiency (box 7.6). Two approaches were developed under the program — 
the Big Energy Projects and the Best Practice, People and Processes. The Big 
Energy Projects involved DITR facilitating and subsidising a series of workshops 
that brought together representatives from different industries and external 
consultants. The objective was to foster exchange of knowledge and generate 
innovative solutions that would otherwise not be detected within the firm or the 
industry. The Best Practice, People and Processes component of the EEBP aimed to 
build capacity within organisations to deal with energy-use issues. The EEBP 
assisted firms in forming internal energy management teams and trained those 
teams to measure and monitor energy use in their organisations.     
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Box 7.6  Examples of firms that participated in the Energy Efficiency 
Best Practice Program 
Amcor received approximately $25 000 from the Australian Government Department of 
Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR) to engage an energy consultant to work part 
time for four months at the Amcor Botany Mill. The resulting energy audit identified 
potential energy savings of $654  800 per year. These came from efficiency 
improvements at operations level (including equipment maintenance issues, process 
optimisation and staff training) and the more fundamental improvements in underlying 
energy efficiency through replacement of equipment and significant changes to 
processes. Subsequently, Amcor implemented projects that resulted in annual savings 
of $240 000. 
Carlton & United Beverages participated in the workshop organised by DITR as part of 
its Big Energy Project approach. Opportunities for optimisation of the refrigeration 
system at the company’s Abbotsford plant were identified and implemented, resulting 
in net savings of $300 000 per year. 
Sources: Amcor, pers. comm., 7 October 2004; DITR (2002).   
 
A review of the EEBP program estimated that the program resulted in identification 
of opportunities to cut energy costs within participant firms by up to $74 million by 
2010 (EnergyConsult 2002). By the end of 2002, savings of $21 million 
(cumulative to 2010) had been implemented (DITR 2003). These estimates, 
however, did not take any account of the impacts of the EEBP on other costs to the 
firm, including the capital and labour costs of achieving the savings. On the basis of 
available evidence it is, therefore, not possible to estimate the private cost 
effectiveness of the program, but, presumably, the firms only adopted measures that 
were privately cost effective.  
Should firms be subsidised to identify specific energy efficiency improvements that 
are privately cost effective? 
A policy of assisting firms to conduct energy audits is less likely to be justifiable on 
the grounds of correcting an information-related market failure than general 
information provision. Firms have an incentive to obtain and utilise information that 
would lead to cost savings, particularly where the net savings are as large as those 
identified in the EEAP and EEBP programs.  
Subsidising firms to perform privately cost-effective actions may also encourage 
rent-seeking behaviour from firms. Some firms may seek funding to pay for energy 
audits that they intended to conduct in the absence of any government subsidy. On 
the other hand, governments are likely to face significant information asymmetries 
in trying to identify such firms. A study of the German energy audit assistance     





program (Gruber and Brand 1991) found that 67 per cent of the participating firms 
would still have used a consultant without the grant.  
Although the Commission has reservations about subsidising firms to identify 
privately cost-effective opportunities, the long history of government involvement 
in audit programs appears to have led to considerable improvement in the programs’ 
effectiveness. Some of the features of the EEBP program appear to have increased 
the uptake of privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements. For example, 
many participants considered that the EEBP approach of sponsoring workshops, 
which combined internal staff with representatives from other industries and 
external consultants, helped to generate innovative ideas that would otherwise not 
be discovered by the firm. More generally, comments from EEBP participants 
published on the EEBP website (DITR 2004a) and made during private meetings 
with the Commission suggest that the program was successful at delivering actual 
energy efficiency gains in firms. 
Assisting firms to obtain specific information on privately cost-effective 
opportunities for reducing their energy consumption may also be warranted if it 
results in significant spillover benefits to third parties. One potential externality is a 
positive demonstration effect for other firms in the industry. For example, the EEBP 
program published a number of case studies of program participants. This approach 
could diffuse the specific information obtained with government assistance across 
and within industries. It could also promote the uptake of energy auditing without 
government assistance if the private cost effectiveness of doing so can be 
demonstrated in the case studies. An examination of the EEBP case studies reveals, 
however, that most of them have tended to be relatively nonspecific summaries of 
the projects, lacking concrete details about the cost-saving opportunities that were 
identified and implemented.  
The Australian Meat Processors Corporation argued that more could be done to 
diffuse the information generated by the EEBP program and provided an example 
of the UK Energy Efficiency Best Practice Program which: 
… had over 800 publications which covered energy consumption guides, best practice, 
good practice, future practice. The publications related to industry sectors and 
technologies, and were based on communicating actual case studies. (sub. DR95, p. 2) 
If the policy of assisting firms to obtain specific information is to be pursued, it is 
important to try and diffuse the information that has been generated as much as 
possible. In order to be useful for other firms, the information would need to be 
concrete and relevant, providing details of the opportunities identified and the 
associated costs and benefits of implementation. However, governments may be 
constrained in doing this by the firms’ unwillingness to disclose confidential 
information about their operations to their competitors.     
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Subsidies for research, development and innovation 
Australian governments currently operate a framework of general policies 
supporting R&D that include maintaining an intellectual property rights system, tax 
concessions, competitive grants and concessional loans for R&D (chapter 4). 
In addition, all jurisdictions operate a number of financial assistance programs 
aimed specifically at promoting research and innovation in energy use in the 
industrial and commercial sectors. Some programs take the form of a fund which 
distributes grants to research organisations and private firms (often on a competitive 
tender basis) to undertake research into energy efficiency technologies and 
practices. For example, the Sustainable Energy Research and Development Fund in 
New South Wales, the Sustainable Energy R e s e a r c h  G r a n t s  s c h e m e  i n  S o u t h  
Australia and the Queensland Sustainable Energy Innovation Fund operate in this 
manner.  
Other programs take a more applied approach, promoting the take-up by firms of 
existing new technologies and innovative solutions. Two examples are the 
Commercial Office Building Energy Innovation Initiative and the Business Energy 
Innovation Initiative schemes in Victoria (box 7.7). These programs are aimed at 
fostering the demonstration of new energy efficiency technologies in the 
commercial building and manufacturing sectors through subsidising the uptake of 
new technologies by individual firms. 
 
Box 7.7  Commercial Office Building Energy Innovation Initiative and 
Business Energy Innovation Initiative 
Commercial Office Building Energy Innovation Initiative 
The program commenced in 2003 and is still in operation. The program aims to 
demonstrate innovation in the design and application of sustainable energy in new and 
existing office buildings. Financial incentives are provided to ‘property industry leaders’ 
to support the development of projects that demonstrate high quality and energy 
efficiency in commercial property. The Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria (SEAV) 
estimates that, within 15 years, the demonstration projects will influence 30 per cent of 
office building activity.  
(Continued next page)   
     






Box 7.7  (continued) 
Business Energy Innovation Initiative 
The program provides support for projects that invest in new and innovative energy 
efficiency solutions, or in solutions that combine energy efficiency with sustainable 
industry practices. This can involve identifying and assessing new technology options; 
performing detailed technical and commercial appraisals; installing and commissioning 
new solutions and securing local and international expertise for energy efficiency 
initiatives. The focus is on productivity improvement through innovative demonstrations 
of sustainable energy supply, design and operation of state-of-the-art production 
facilities, and the development of new energy-efficient or renewable-energy products. 
The SEAV may contribute up to $150 000 matched dollar for dollar with the business 
partner. 
Source: Victorian Government response to PC request for information (unpublished). 
 
 
In addition, the Australian Government (2004) announced the establishment of the 
Low Emissions Technology Demonstration Fund, in 2006. The Fund will provide 
subsidies to firms for investment in new technologies that have significant 
greenhouse gas abatement potential, with the aim of demonstrating the commercial 
potential of those technologies to the wider industry. Among technologies listed as 
potentially eligible for subsidies are more energy-efficient manufacturing 
technologies. However, the Commission understands that such projects will account 
for only a small portion of the funds. The grants will be made on the basis of 
competitive funding rounds, with an eligibility prerequisite that the technology must 
have potential to reduce national energy-related emissions by at least two per cent. 
A total of $500 million has been allocated to the Fund for projects initiated between 
2006 and 2020. It is anticipated that government funding will drive private R&D 
investment of $1 billion. 
Should R&D into energy efficiency receive special treatment? 
The Commission considers that a fundamental question to be answered is whether 
R&D and innovation programs focusing specifically on energy efficiency are 
required in addition to general R&D assistance already in operation. 
In the EEWG consultation with stakeholders, one of the suggestions presented was 
that governments: 
Enhance levels of government support and partnerships with industry and research 
institutions to promote appropriate research, development and demonstration activities. 
(EEWG 2004, p. 32)      
142  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
Similarly, the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network argued that the considerable 
public benefits from energy efficiency R&D justified further government support:  
… there is a case for additional incentives to induce private sector expenditure in this 
area. Energy efficiency improvement may provide unusual public benefit, in terms of 
enhanced energy security, reduced greenhouse gas emissions, etc. (sub. 57, p. 11)  
Alan Pears made a similar point and added: 
… at present, research infrastructure for energy efficiency is sparse and   
fragmented: resources are needed to build it to a ‘critical mass’. (sub. DR113, p. 19) 
However, some inquiry participants doubted whether R&D into energy efficiency 
warranted special treatment compared to other forms of R&D. The Energy 
Retailers’ Association of Australia argued: 
Positive externalities are likely to exist where research and development (R&D) in 
energy efficiency technology is undertaken. However it is not clear … that the social 
rate of return for this type of R&D should differ markedly from other types of R&D. 
Unless this difference can be demonstrated, general R&D policy should apply equally 
to energy efficiency technology as it does to other types of R&D activity in the 
economy. (ERAA, sub. 26, p. 38) 
In outlining the principles of good R&D policy, the Industry Commission (1995) 
suggested (among other things):  
•  assistance levels should be broadly consistent  
•  contestability should have a major role in research funding. 
Having an assistance policy that favours some fields of R&D and innovation over 
others may generate a number of costs. The major one is that such policy would 
have a distorting effect by encouraging R&D investment in one field at the expense 
of other (potentially greater benefit-yielding) fields. To the extent that there are 
economies of scale in administering a uniform R&D policy regime, having an 
additional R&D policy framework for energy efficiency is also likely to increase 
government administrative costs. Having energy-specific R&D programs in 
addition to general R&D assistance also creates coordination issues in preventing 
firms from exploiting the opportunity for additional funding through ‘double 
dipping’. 
The Commission considers that there is no special case to promote R&D into 
energy efficiency at the expense of other R&D solely on the basis of diffusion of 
technology, but there may be a case on the grounds of reducing negative 
externalities. However, while energy efficiency research may result in public 
benefits, this does not of itself justify energy-specific R&D assistance. In the     





Commission’s view, there is no reason why these public benefits cannot be 
considered in assessing project applications in a general competitive grants scheme. 
The need for special energy efficiency research and development funds has not been 
substantiated. Sourcing funds from existing more general research and development 
programs enables contestability between proposals and selection of those yielding 
the greatest net benefit. 
Other financial incentives 
A number of participants suggested that governments need to provide direct 
financial incentives for firms to undertake energy efficiency improvements (Green 
Building Council of Australia, sub. DR137; Alan Pears, sub. DR113; Energy Users 
Association of Australia, sub. DR150).  
Moreland Energy Foundation (sub. 18) cited the results of a survey of small firm 
behaviour that it had commissioned, which found that 44 per cent of firms in the 
Moreland City area were interested in low or zero interest loans to finance energy 
efficiency improvements, while 58 per cent of firms would apply for grants if they 
were available.  
The Green Building Council of Australia (GBCA) argued: 
Fiscal incentives are likely to be the most effective way to facilitate refurbishment that 
addresses efficiency or green building initiatives … The GBCA recommends fiscal 
incentives for existing buildings refurbishment or retrofits should include accelerated 
depreciation, land tax abatement, utility rate abatement, local government abatement. 
(sub. 41, p. 12) 
The Aluminium Council of Australia (sub. 29) and the Energy Supply Association 
of Australia (sub. 68) suggested that incentives to hasten capital turnover, like 
accelerated depreciation, would improve energy efficiency.  
Origin Energy had some reservations about subsidies. It stated that it: 
… does not consider financial incentives, generally, to be the most appropriate policy 
tool available. The basic premise of cost-effective energy efficiency improvements is 
that there are private benefits from undertaking the investment. Policy tools that rectify 
pricing distortions and information problems, which may be inhibiting this investment 
and the realisation of net private benefits, are more likely to be effective and efficient. 
(sub. 25, p. 13) 
Direct subsidies to undertake energy efficiency improvements increase the 
attractiveness of such projects for firms. It is natural for firms and individuals to 
FINDING 7.2     
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respond to incentives. However, there is also a risk that subsidies may distort 
business decision making by diverting resources away from other potentially more 
important areas. Therefore, the Commission considers that provision of subsidies to 
support investment into energy efficiency improvements that are privately cost 
effective for individual firms is not justified on these grounds alone. 
However, while the Commission’s focus is on barriers to the uptake of privately 
cost-effective energy efficiency investment, it notes that environmental externalities 
could justify a subsidy program even when the energy efficiency improvements are 
not cost effective. Subsidising firms to improve the energy efficiency of their 
operations would need to be considered among all policy options for achieving 
environmental goals. 
The Commission does not support the provision of direct subsidies to firms to 
undertake energy efficiency improvements that would be privately cost effective for 
those firms. Subsidies may, however, have a role in encouraging the uptake of 
improvements that have important spillover effects. In such cases this policy 
mechanism should be evaluated against other policies pursuing the same objective. 
Hypothecated levies to fund subsidies 
The terms of reference for this inquiry require the Commission to consider the role 
of levies. Levies could be used to ensure that energy users bear more of the full cost 
to society of their energy use. Such a rationale underpins arguments for imposing a 
carbon tax on greenhouse gas emissions. However, the terms of reference focus this 
inquiry on actions that would be cost effective for individual consumers and 
producers. Therefore, the Commission has interpreted the mention of levies as 
referring to the possibility of using ‘hypothecated’ levies to finance subsidies for 
energy efficiency improvements that are privately cost effective. 
One example of a hypothecated levy is the Energy Savings Fund introduced in 
May  2005 in New South Wales through the Energy Administration Amendment 
(Water and Energy Savings) Act 2005. Under that scheme, DEUS will administer a 
$40 million annual fund over 5 years providing funding, primarily on a contestable 
basis, to support energy savings initiatives by large private sector users, government 
and the residential sector. The money will be raised from electricity distribution 
network service providers who have in turn been given a right to recover their 
contribution from retail customers. That is, the Energy Savings Fund will 
effectively be financed by taxing electricity consumers.  
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Hypothecated levies can be a useful revenue-raising tool when there is a close 
connection between the levy and services received. One example is the funding of 
road repairs and maintenance from the fuel excise paid by truck operators. A levy 
on fossil fuel use to finance subsidies for energy efficiency improvements also has 
some appeal on equity and environmental grounds, because all users of fossil fuels 
contribute to environmental externalities and would pay the levy in proportion to 
their environmental impact. 
Climate Action Network Australia (CANA) favoured the use of levies: 
CANA supports the principle of using levies and/or taxes on fossil fuel generated 
energy to: 
•  encourage a culture discouraging wasteful use of polluting energy forms; 
•  provide funds for reinvestment into demand management, through the creation of 
demand management funds; and 
•  ensure that the cost of pollution as a result of energy generation is reflected in the cost 
of electricity. (sub. 19, p. 6) 
Moreland Energy Foundation supported the use of levies to finance a demand 
management fund: 
… MEFL [Moreland Energy Foundation] supports the creation of a demand 
management fund or funds, through the application of a levy on energy consumers, 
linked to consumption levels but also making allowances for social equity. 
Hypothecating a fund in this way is positive as it: 
L  sends a signal to energy users that demand management in its broadest sense is a 
priority for the community; 
L  creates a source of income to undertake much needed demand management work; 
and 
L  is fair in that bigger energy consumers pay more than small energy consumers. 
It could also be possible to build in additional incentives for companies to act to reduce 
their energy consumption, by reducing the burden from those who have taken action 
under their own initiative. 
The demand management funds in the US are capable of undertaking very ambitious 
energy efficiency and demand-management work, because they have a real budget to 
work with. (sub. 18, pp. 36–37) 
However, some participants expressed concerns about levies: 
The AAC [Australian Aluminium Council] is opposed to the use of levies (tax) to drive 
energy-efficiency improvements or to raise funds for energy-efficiency improvements. 
A levy would increase the cost of energy to the consumer and would distort/change 
resource allocation and competitiveness away from those sectors who use more energy 
to those who use less energy. This suggests that this policy option is based on the 
assumption that energy is incorrectly priced in the market. Economic growth will be     
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reduced to the extent that the levy/tax and its subsequent redistribution results in a shift 
of resources away from more efficient or productive sectors of the economy. (sub. 29, 
p. 14) 
The Australian Industry Greenhouse network argued: 
… any uniform levy on all energy users would penalise both energy-efficient and 
energy-inefficient users, and that targeting only those deemed to be inefficient would 
be difficult, arbitrary and discriminatory. Levies and other nonrebatable penalties risk 
affecting the competitiveness of Australian industry adversely and, in consequence, the 
jobs and living standards of many Australians. (sub. 57, p. 12) 
The Commission considers that hypothecated levies have some major drawbacks. 
First, there is rarely, if ever, a nexus between the appropriate level of taxes and 
funding needs. The levy is therefore likely to raise too much or too little revenue. 
Second, existing broad-based taxes are likely to be less distortionary and have lower 
administration and compliance costs. 
The case for government subsidies to encourage energy efficiency improvements 
should be separated from the means of funding those subsidies, such as by 
hypothecated levies. 
7.7  Mandatory energy audits 
The policy of Mandatory Energy Efficiency Opportunities Assessment (EEOA) for 
large energy users was announced in the Australian Government’s Energy White 
Paper (Australian Government 2004) and is currently being developed by DITR. 
The regulation is expected to come into operation in 2006. 
The EEOA is a successor to the EEBP program that was discussed in the previous 
section, but is a much more coercive approach. This reflects a perception that large 
energy users are still overlooking privately cost-effective opportunities to improve 
their energy efficiency despite past and current information provision and financial 
incentive programs run by governments.  
The EEOA will operate by mandating that energy users whose annual consumption 
is greater than 0.5 petajoules (at the moment around 250 firms, representing 
two-thirds of total business energy use) must conduct energy efficiency assessments 
every five years. Firms would be required to identify all opportunities to reduce 
their energy use with a payback period of four years or less, and to disclose this 
information to the public.  
FINDING 7.4     





The EEOA seeks to address the perceived organisational failure by firms to focus 
on identifying and implementing privately cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements. The disclosure element of the scheme appears to be aimed at 
exerting external pressure on firms from shareholders and other members of the 
public.  
The EEOA approach appears similar to the policy introduced in New South Wales 
in May 2005 through the Energy Administration Amendment (Water and Energy 
Savings) Act  2005 (box 7.8). It is unclear how this policy will interact with the 
EEOA framework (chapter 12). 
 
Box 7.8  Energy audits in New South Wales 
In May 2005, the Energy Administration Amendment (Water and Energy Savings) Act  
2005 was passed in New South Wales.  
Under the Act, designated energy users (which include all government agencies and 
any other person or body that is designated by the Minister) are required to submit an 
energy savings action plan to the Minister every four years. The plan must include the 
following items: 
•  a description of the energy use of the reporting entity; 
•  a list of potential measures to reduce energy use, prioritised in terms of energy 
saved and private cost effectiveness, and  
•  a statement of the measures that the reporting entity proposes to implement in the 
next four years.  
The Act does not require implementation of the measures identified in energy savings 
plans. However, the Minister has been given the power to introduce regulations under 
the Act to mandate the implementation of such measures.   
 
The EEOA framework is still in development, and elements like the assessment, 
reporting and verification procedure have not been finalised. It is anticipated, 
however, that external consultants will play some role in assessing the energy 
efficiency opportunities of individual firms. One of the auxiliary elements of the 
framework involves capacity building in the energy services industry through 
training and accreditation.  
As part of the policy development process, extensive consultation with interested 
parties has been undertaken. The subsequent draft consultation report (DITR 2004b) 
outlines the potential benefits and problems associated with the EEOA policy as 
identified by interested parties. Some of the identified benefits include: 
•  focusing management’s attention on cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements;     
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•  overcoming the organisational communication barriers between technical staff 
and management; 
•  improved access to external capital sources through a credible assessment 
process; 
•  public recognition for energy-efficient firms;  
•  demonstration and information diffusion effects through industry benchmarks 
and sector case studies; and 
•  strengthening of the energy services industry. 
The potential problems identified by interested parties included: 
•  the small size of potential privately cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvement;  
•  difficulties in clearly specifying the boundaries and process of EEOA; 
•  difficulties of designing an EEOA process that reflected differences between 
firms; 
•  unsuitability of the four year payback as a benchmark for cost effectiveness; 
•  risk to corporate reputation of the firm from disclosing their energy using 
practices and the associated incentive to not conduct a thorough assessment; 
•  risk to corporate reputation if the firm did not implement the opportunities, even 
if the decision was taken for economically valid reasons; and 
•  disclosure of confidential information to the public. 
No regulatory impact statements or any other evaluations of potential costs and 
benefits of the EEOA program have been completed yet, so it is difficult to assess it. 
However, the Commission has strong in principle reservations about this program. 
A number of potential problems can be identified. 
First, the EEOA will apply to organisations on the basis of one criterion only — the 
amount of energy used (which appears to have been set at an arbitrary level). Under 
the EEOA scheme, companies are not targeted for their apparently 
energy-inefficient practices. Rather, they are targeted solely because they are large 
energy users. This conflicts with the implicit aim of improving the cost-effective 
take-up of energy efficiency improvements.  
If anything, the targeting criterion is counter-intuitive and counter-evidentiary. 
Energy-intensive users, many of whom are likely to be captured in the selection 
process, already have a strong incentive to use energy efficiently, as well as having     





greater resources to identify and implement cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements. In this regard, AGL noted: 
Many industrial and commercial energy customers already undertake energy efficiency 
audits. These audits are used to reduce energy costs because energy is often a higher 
proportion of their total structure. It is unclear why mandatory energy efficiency 
opportunity assessments are necessary given the commercial benefits from improving 
energy efficiency and the growing level of activity. (sub. DR119, p. 4) 
It could be argued that focusing the EEOA program on large energy users was 
justified on the grounds of cost-effectiveness for government. The Moreland Energy 
Foundation stated: 
In terms of cost effectiveness for Government, it makes sense to focus resources on the 
250 companies which use the lions share (60%) of business energy, rather than running 
diffuse programs. (sub. DR115, p. 14) 
Focusing resources on a small number of large energy users may well reduce 
government administration costs. However, the point remains that if large energy 
using firms are already searching for ways to identify and implement energy 
efficiency improvements, the cost-effectiveness of the EEOA for government would 
be undermined.  
Second, the EEOA is likely to create significant administrative costs and procedural 
difficulties. Several difficulties have already been identified in the consultation with 
interested parties (DITR 2004b). It is unclear how a uniform assessment and 
disclosure process could be designed to reflect the differences across and even 
within organisations. It would be difficult to set clear boundaries and standards for 
the assessment process. Origin Energy stated: 
… there is a concern about the technical focus of auditing standards currently used in 
Australia … They fail to provide decision-makers with practical solutions to achieve 
energy reductions in the context of their specific circumstances. Prior to the 
implementation of mandatory auditing by the Australian Government, auditing 
standards should be reviewed in consultation with industry to reflect a more holistic 
approach to identifying and assessing energy efficiency opportunities. (sub. DR129, 
pp. 12–13) 
Some participants in the EEOA consultation process have also criticised the 
definition of cost effective as actions having a four-year payback because it 
excludes considerations of risk and profitability of other competing projects within 
a firm. And, as noted in chapter 5, using payback as an investment criterion may 
prejudice projects that have longer payback periods but higher net present values. 
Verification of assessments is also likely to be problematic and costly. There would 
be information asymmetries between regulators and firms, and firms would have an     
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incentive to withhold assessment results that might damage their corporate 
reputation.  
However, the most significant weakness of the EEOA framework is the context in 
which it is to be applied. While the EEOA policy does not specify what barriers to 
energy efficiency it seeks to address, judging from the consultation report and the 
DITR presentation to stakeholders, it appears that the main issue is the perceived 
lack of managerial attention to energy efficiency matters.  
The Commission reiterates its strongly held view that organisational barriers alone 
cannot justify regulatory intervention. To the extent that firms feel compelled by the 
EEOA process to invest in projects that they would otherwise reject, the EEOA 
would distort investment decisions and adversely affect the private cost 
effectiveness of firms’ operations. Competitive pressures on firms give them strong 
incentives to maximise their efficiency. This is particularly true for industrial firms 
operating in export and import-competing markets, which make up a large 
proportion of the organisations targeted by the EEOA.  
As Origin Energy stated: 
Policy should be based on the presumption that businesses are in the best position to 
allocate capital efficiently. Government involvement would be second best, except in 
cases where clear market failure (and minimal scope for government failure) can be 
demonstrated. The claim that managements’ capital allocation decisions are ill 
informed with regard to energy efficiency investments is not sufficient, alone, to 
warrant government involvement. A sound approach to policy needs to ask why 
businesses and their shareholders would not seek and invest in information that 
maximises the long run value of the businesses’ assets (as they are presumed to be able 
to do effectively in relation to other aspects of their operations). (sub. 25, p. 12) 
The Australian Industry Greenhouse Network described organisational barriers to 
energy efficiency improvement as ‘symptoms of poor management’ and noted: 
Poor management might equally be responsible, of course, for over-investment in 
energy efficiency technologies and practices and this is a risk when governments 
intervene, especially with mandates. (sub. 57, p. 8) 
Nevertheless, the EEOA framework does have some positive elements. Modest 
benefits might be achieved through demonstration and information diffusion effects. 
These effects would arise out of public disclosure of energy efficiency opportunities 
by firms and the resultant development of industry benchmarks and case studies. 
However, this benefit would need to be balanced against the disclosure costs for 
firms, including the cost of releasing potentially confidential information. Engaging 
firms in demonstration and information diffusion on a voluntary basis through 
schemes specifically targeted at achieving this aim (for example, through a program 
similar to the old EEBP) might be a better alternative.      





A further benefit is that the scheme could enhance the development of the energy 
services industry. However, it would do so only at the expense of the participating 
firms and, as noted earlier, it is arguable whether these audits would be in their best 
interests. 
More generally, the benefits arising out of the EEOA program appear likely to be 
modest and more easily achievable through a voluntary program. On the other hand, 
the compliance costs of this type of policy approach could be significant. In view of 
this, the Commission does not consider that introducing the EEOA program can be 
justified on the grounds of private cost effectiveness for individual firms. 
The policy of mandating assessments of energy efficiency opportunities is not 
warranted on private cost-effectiveness grounds. The demonstration effects that 
might be achieved by this policy could be pursued more effectively and at less cost 
by voluntary programs.  
Mandating implementation of identified opportunities 
It could be argued that a policy of mandatory energy efficiency opportunities 
assessments will not deliver substantial improvements in energy efficiency unless it 
is accompanied by a requirement to implement the opportunities identified.  
Currently, there are no programs, at the State, Territory or Australian Government 
level which mandate implementation of energy efficiency improvements on the 
grounds of private cost-effectiveness, nor is the Commission aware of any 
international programs which adopt this approach. The Victorian Environment 
Protection Authority Greenhouse Program incorporates mandatory assessment and 
implementation of energy saving opportunities by large energy using firms.4 
However, the objective of that program is a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 
rather than achievement of cost-effective energy efficiency improvements.  
The Commission considers that the policy of requiring firms to undertake particular 
energy efficiency improvements could not be justified on private cost effectiveness 
grounds.  
                                              
4 Victorian Environment Protection Authority (EPA) licensees with an annual energy usage of 500 
gigajoules or more (currently around 500 firms) are required to conduct an energy audit and to 
implement all energy efficiency improvements that have payback periods of up to three years. 
The same requirements apply to firms seeking an EPA works approval or applying for a new 
EPA license. 
FINDING 7.5     
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The approach is likely to face similar administrative and procedural difficulties to 
those identified in the discussion of EEOA. However to the extent that a higher 
degree of prescription is imposed on firms, the problems would be more severe. In 
particular, the cost to firms of identifying opportunities that they would not have 
voluntarily implemented would be higher than under the EEOA. Firms would, 
therefore, have an even stronger incentive to exploit their information advantage 
over the regulators and produce flawed assessments. In that respect, introducing an 
implementation requirement would undermine the effectiveness of the policy of 
mandatory assessment and disclosure. 
More generally, forcing a firm to undertake energy efficiency improvements on the 
basis of external judge ments of what is in that firm’s self interest creates a high risk 
of outcomes that are detrimental to the firm. Firms rather than governments are in 
the best position to make operational decisions that are consistent with their self 
interest. 
Only if the broader environmental benefits of energy efficiency were included, 
might a case for mandating implementation of energy efficiency improvements by 
firms be considered. Even then, given the stated reservation about the potential 
effectiveness of this policy approach, it is imperative that the policy is evaluated 
against other means of achieving environmental objectives. 
Private cost effectiveness should not be a rationale for requiring firms to 
implement any recommendations arising from the Energy Efficiency 
Opportunities Assessments. 
RECOMMENDATION 7.1     




 8  Governments as energy users 
 
Key points 
•  Governments account for a small proportion of final energy consumption in Australia 
and energy consumption accounts for a small proportion of total government 
expenditure.  
•  Government agencies are different from private-sector organisations in that they: 
– have different incentives for energy efficiency because the profit motive and 
competition are either absent or muted; and 
–  consider the flow-on effects (for example, demonstration effects) that their energy 
use will have on the community at large. 
•  These differences may warrant government-specific energy efficiency policies, but 
these need to be consistent with other government activities. 
•  The Australian and most State and Territory Governments have programs that seek 
to improve the energy efficiency of their own operations. These typically include 
measures such as information provision, procurement policies and energy-use 
targets. 
•  To the extent that it is cost effective, governments should disseminate energy 
efficiency information to their own agencies. 
•  Procurement policies that encourage cost-effective energy efficiency could lead to a 
range of benefits to governments and the wider community. Moving beyond 
cost-effectiveness criteria for procurement may be warranted on environmental 
grounds, but evaluation is needed to avoid measures imposing high costs relative to 
environmental benefits.  
•  Energy-intensity targets have advantages over energy-use targets, but both risk 
placing undue emphasis on an input that only accounts for a small proportion of 
expenditure. The use of energy-intensity performance indicators can reduce this risk. 
•  Government agencies should be able to access capital for energy efficiency 
investments that can be demonstrated to be cost effective and are consistent with 
overall fiscal policy. This does not require governments to reserve part of their capital 
budget for energy efficiency projects.  
 
 
Some of the energy used in the commercial and transport sectors is by government 
agencies. The findings of chapters 7 and 11, which deal with these sectors, 
generally apply to both government and private operations. The particular     
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characteristics of government operations, however, may warrant and/or lend 
themselves to energy efficiency policy measures that specifically address 
governments as energy users. This chapter examines these characteristics and their 
implications for energy efficiency policy.   
8.1  Characteristics of government energy use 
Government agencies use energy in undertaking a range of activities, including 
administration, defence, service provision (for example, hospital services and 
school education) and more commercial activities (for example, water supply).1 The 
available data show that the majority of government energy use is in buildings and 
transport (table 8.1). Buildings contribute a higher proportion of greenhouse gas 
emissions than would be suggested by their energy use. For example, buildings 
accounted for 50 per cent of the greenhouse gas emissions by New South Wales 
Government agencies, but only 38 per cent of energy use, in 2001-02 (table 8.1). 
This is because electricity, generated using coal, has a higher greenhouse gas 
emission intensity than other primary fuels, such as natural gas and petrol. 
Table 8.1  Energy use and greenhouse gas emissions for some Australian 
governments, 2001-02 




Energy use (Petajoules)       
Buildings  9.0 2.4 0.7 3.9 
Transport  12.6 2.1 0.4 1.2 
Other  1.9 0.1 0.1 3.1 
Total  23.5 4.7 1.2 8.3 
Greenhouse gas emissions (megatonnes carbon dioxide equivalent)   
Buildings  1.7 0.5 0.1 0.9 
Transport 1.2  0.2  –  0.1 
Other  0.5 – –  0.6 
Total  3.4 0.7 0.2 1.6 
a  Includes general government sector agencies and public trading enterprises. b Excludes commercial public 
trading enterprises. c Data are for 2002-03. Includes almost all ACT departments and statutory authorities. 
d Includes defence establishments but not defence operations. – Nil or rounded to zero.  
Sources: AGO (2003b); Environment ACT (nd); NSW DEUS (2004c); SA Government (2003). 
Governments account for a small proportion of final energy consumption in 
Australia. New South Wales Government agencies, for example, used about 
                                              
1 This chapter does not cover government as a supplier of energy. Supply of energy is covered in 
chapter 14.     




2.3  per  cent of total energy consumed in New South Wales in 2001-02 
(NSW DEUS 2004c). Energy also accounts for a small proportion of government 
expenditure. For example, New South Wales Government agencies incurred energy 
costs of $416 million in 2001-02 (NSW DEUS 2004c). This compares to gross 
operating expenses for the New South Wales Government in the same year of 
$34 101 million (ABS 2003). On this basis, energy costs represented 1.2 per cent of 
gross operating expenses.  
Despite this, it is worth focusing on government as an energy user in circumstances 
where there is: 
•  a significant potential for improving energy efficiency; and/or 
•  scope to encourage improvements by other energy users through demonstration 
and leadership. 
8.2  Government-specific barriers and policy issues 
Chapters 2 and 4 provide a framework for assessing where government intervention 
to increase energy efficiency may be warranted. This framework generally applies 
to government energy use, although there are some additional barriers and policy 
issues that need to be considered. 
Government agencies are different from private-sector organisations in the 
following ways: 
•  the incentives for energy efficiency are different, and may be less pronounced; 
•  whole-of-government policy can be used to direct the energy-management 
practices of specific (or all) government agencies; and 
•  leadership, demonstration, market development and environmental objectives 
may be justified on the grounds of communitywide benefits. 
As argued in chapters 4 and 7, the Commission considers that organisational 
barriers to energy efficiency in the private sector do not of themselves warrant 
government intervention. For the most part, firms manage their own affairs. The 
profit motive provides an incentive for them to pursue cost-effective energy 
efficiency opportunities. In most industries, competition provides a further incentive 
to minimise organisational barriers to the uptake of worthwhile energy efficiency 
opportunities (and other economic-efficiency opportunities). 
For the public sector, however, the profit motive and competition are either absent 
or muted and so do not provide the same incentives, although there are pressures to 
minimise costs to meet output requirements within a constrained budget. Without     
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the driving force of market incentives, organisational barriers in government 
agencies may require a stronger and more direct response. In addition, the large size 
and complex nature of some government operations increases the likelihood of 
organisational failures and this may add to the need for central agency coordination. 
It is important to emphasise that this challenge is not confined to energy use — it 
applies more generally as governments seek to improve the overall efficiency and 
effectiveness of their operations. In response, a wide range of reforms have been 
undertaken, including: 
•  an increased focus on outputs and outcomes, rather than inputs and processes; 
•  increased decentralisation of decision making; 
•  a recognition that agencies are able to perform better if they are given objectives 
that are well defined, nonconflicting and few in number;  
•  the use of efficiency dividends and other cost-cutting initiatives to promote 
efficiency; 
•  improved accountability through performance reporting and other mechanisms; 
and 
•  government trading enterprises operating in an environment similar to the 
private sector, through corporatisation and the application of 
competitive-neutrality principles. 
Policies aimed at overcoming organisational barriers to cost-effective energy 
efficiency need to be consistent with these broader reforms of government 
activities, particularly in relation to the respective governance and accountability 
roles of central and operational agencies. 
8.3 Policy  options 
The Australian Government and all State and Territory Governments, with the 
exception of Tasmania, have programs which seek to improve the energy efficiency 
of their own operations. The Tasmanian Government is planning to introduce 
programs of this type, consistent with the National Framework for Energy 
Efficiency (NFEE) Stage One (box 8.1). In addition, the Australian, New South 
Wales, Victorian, Queensland and South Australian Governments run programs that 
aim to improve the energy efficiency of local government operations.     





Box 8.1  NFEE Stage One measures for government energy efficiency 
At its meeting on 27 August 2004, the Ministerial Council on Energy agreed to the 
implementation of nine policy packages constituting the first stage of NFEE. The 
measures relating to government energy efficiency are as follows. 
To demonstrate leadership to the business sector and wider community, governments 
will: 
•  develop nationally consistent standards for measuring and reporting on government 
energy efficiency programs; 
•  introduce public annual reporting by all jurisdictions on energy use and progress 
towards achieving targets set for government agencies; 
•  establish minimum energy performance standards for government buildings; and 
•  develop best practice models for government departments to implement energy 
efficiency programs. 
Ministers also agreed to develop a database of low standby power and high-efficiency 
appliances to guide government purchasing decisions. 
Source: MCE (2004c). 
 
 
The current programs generally have objectives that extend beyond improving the 
cost-effective energy efficiency of government operations. In this respect, some 
programs seek to demonstrate ‘good practice’ and thereby promote energy 
efficiency to firms and the wider community. Additional objectives of most 
programs are to reduce energy consumption and/or greenhouse gas emissions, and 
indeed, in some cases these are the primary goals. In its submission to this inquiry, 
the Australian Government Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH) 
stated: 
The objectives of energy efficiency initiatives in the government sector are to lead by 
example and illustrate to others the economic and environmental benefits of improved 
energy efficiency. (sub. 30, p. 19) 
Most inquiry participants that expressed views on government energy use felt that it 
was appropriate for governments to pursue a range of objectives through their 
energy management programs. The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) 
noted: 
Governments have a long yet mixed history of implementing energy management 
programs. These programs allow government to reduce its own energy consumption, 
associated costs and production of greenhouse gases, support a local sustainable energy 
services industry, and lead by example, thus both demonstrating the potential and 
providing valuable information on appropriate design and implementation of energy 
efficiency programs in the wider community. (sub. 24, p. 10)     
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Origin Energy stated: 
The government, as a significant user of energy and participant in the market for energy 
efficiency services, is well placed to affect cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements simply by adopting them internally. Additionally, government tenders 
could emphasise energy efficiency as a way of motivating higher standards more 
generally. This would directly improve energy efficiency outcomes in the public sector 
and serve as a demonstration vehicle (reducing the risk) for the private sector. (sub. 25, 
p. 15) 
The Commission’s view is that it is appropriate for governments to consider 
flow-on effects (for example, demonstration effects) that their energy use will have 
on the wider community. It does not necessarily follow, however, that this justifies 
energy efficiency measures that are not cost effective for government operations. 
Most governments combine a number of measures in a strategy or program, as has 
been done in the Queensland Government’s Government Energy Management 
Strategy and the New South Wales Government’s Energy Smart Government 
program. This section assesses the individual policy instruments (such as 
information provision, procurement policies and targets) that make up these 
programs. In doing so, impacts on the cost effectiveness of government operations 
and possible benefits to the wider community through demonstration and other 
means are considered. Other government policies that are not focused on energy 
efficiency but which may impact on it are also addressed. 
Information provision 
The provision of information on energy efficiency to government agencies forms 
part of some government programs. For example, energy awareness material is 
provided as part of the Northern Territory Government’s Energy Management 
Services program, and awareness raising activities and training form part of the 
Western Australian Government’s Energy Smart Government program. 
The Commission supports governments disseminating information on energy 
efficiency to their own agencies, including: 
•  awareness raising regarding the potential to improve cost-effective energy 
efficiency; 
•  analytical tools that assist with managing energy use (for example, spreadsheet 
applications that estimate the return on energy efficiency investments); 
•  information to assist agencies to make effective use of external energy efficiency 
expertise; and 
•  examples of good energy efficiency practice.     




This is analogous to large companies supplying information to their constituent 
parts. To the extent that it is cost effective, governments should be doing this as part 
of normal operations. 
Currently, most government agencies are also required to provide information on 
their energy use to allow for monitoring of targets and performance indicators, 
and/or for inclusion in annual reports. As part of the NFEE Stage One measures, it 
is intended that nationally-consistent standards for reporting on energy efficiency 
programs for government operations will be developed and this may alter these 
information requirements. While governments need to be able to evaluate their 
programs, there are costs associated with providing and analysing data and this 
should be taken into account when deciding on what, if any, energy-use information 
is required.  
Procurement policies and guidelines 
Jurisdictions have a range of procurement policies and guidelines that relate to the 
energy efficiency of appliances, equipment, motor vehicles and buildings. Examples 
include the following: 
•  the New South Wales Government’s procurement and purchasing guidelines, 
which aim to ensure that agencies achieve the objectives of the Government 
Energy Management Policy (NSW DPWS 1998);  
•  the ACT Government’s procurement guidelines, which have requirements for 
environmental performance in areas such as waste, water and energy 
(ACT GPB 2004);  
•  the requirement that Australian Government departments and agencies purchase 
office equipment that complies with the US EPA Energy Star standard, where it 
is available and fit for purpose (DISR 2000); 
•  the Australian Government’s Environmental Strategy for the Motor Vehicle 
Industry, which includes a target to increase the proportion of the Government’s 
general pool vehicles with scores in the top half of the Green Vehicle Guide 
from 18 to 28 per cent by December 2005; and 
•  the ACT Government’s policy of reaching a target number of fuel-efficient 
hybrid vehicles (powered by a combination of petrol and electric motors) in their 
fleet (Stanhope 2005).  
Some inquiry participants support strengthening government procurement policies. 
The ACF stated that ‘There is … a clear role for governments in pushing the 
frontier of efficiency in equipment through procurement strategies, and R&D 
[research and development] and demonstration support’ (sub. 24, p. 8). With respect     
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to passenger vehicles, Sara Gipton commented that ‘by its own procurement 
practices and actions it [the Australian Government] can lead industry and 
consumers alike in adopting more fuel efficient practices’ (sub. 34, p. 11). 
Procurement policies can address energy efficiency with one or more of the 
following objectives: 
•  promoting cost-effective energy efficiencies within government operations; 
•  demonstrating good practice, in order to bring about a greater uptake of energy 
efficiency opportunities by others; 
•  changing market conditions in a way that results in a greater uptake of energy 
efficiency opportunities by others; and 
•  achieving environmental objectives, such as a reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
Cost-effectiveness objective 
Making cost-effective energy efficiency an explicit objective of procurement 
policies can increase the likelihood that decision makers consider factors such as the 
relative importance of initial costs and operating costs. This can help to address 
some of the organisational barriers to energy efficiency technologies discussed in 
chapter 4. Provided there is flexibility to select less energy-efficient options when 
this is necessary to obtain other desirable features, such policies could improve 
energy efficiency, provide environmental benefits associated with reduced energy 
use and contribute marginally to the overall efficiency and effectiveness of 
government operations.  
Demonstration objective 
Procurement policies that seek to demonstrate good practice are only effective if 
they result in a greater uptake of energy efficiency opportunities by firms and the 
wider community. For this to occur it is important that the energy efficiency 
measures advocated are genuinely cost effective. Measures that are not cost 
effective are likely to be ignored (and if not, will lead to net costs for those that 
implement them). In addition, consideration needs to be given to whether 
governments are necessarily in the best position to demonstrate good practice. A 
small manufacturing firm that achieves high energy efficiency would have a more 
powerful demonstration effect on other small manufacturers, than would a 
government department. In this respect there may be a role for energy efficiency 
awards and other mechanisms to publicise good practice in energy efficiency 
(chapter 7).     




Objective to change market conditions 
Procurement policies may go beyond cost-effectiveness criteria in order to change 
market conditions to the benefit of firms and the wider community. Some inquiry 
participants supported the view that governments could change markets in this way. 
For example, Origin Energy argued: 
Demand for energy efficiency services from the public sector (including skills and 
other inputs) provides a base of support for further development of the energy 
efficiency sector. In particular, large volume purchases (orders) from governments can 
assist emerging manufacturers in acquiring economies of scale and lower costs. 
(sub. 25, pp. 15–16) 
However, Australia has little ability to influence global technological development, 
and Australian Governments, through their purchasing power, have even less 
influence. Accordingly, the Commission sees only limited potential for procurement 
policies to lower the costs of energy-efficient appliances, equipment and buildings. 
The potential that exists is likely to relate to importers and distributors achieving 
critical volumes.  
The market for energy efficiency services is somewhat different in that it relies 
more heavily on local skills and industry capability. There is some potential for 
procurement policies to influence the development of this industry, leading to new 
and more cost-effective services being available to private firms and the wider 
community. If this occurs as a byproduct of government purchasing, then this can 
produce gains for all. However, it is the Commission’s view that governments 
should not seek to promote development of any specific industry through purchases 
of services that are not cost effective. Nor is it immediately apparent that the 
performance of the energy services industry is so noticeably deficient that it is 
holding back the performance of the Australian economy to an extent that would 
warrant additional assistance. If governments determine that an industry requires 
assistance, for explicit reasons, then more direct policy options are available. 
Environmental objectives 
To achieve environmental objectives, procurement policies may mandate or 
encourage energy efficiency standards that are not cost effective for government 
operations. This may be socially beneficial if the resulting environmental benefits 
exceed the costs imposed on government operations. While a full assessment of this 
approach to procurement policy is beyond the scope of this inquiry, it is clear that 
measures that impose high costs relative to environmental benefits should be 
avoided. Box  8.2 provides an illustration of how costs and environmental 
considerations might influence a government’s choice of which cars to purchase.     
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Box 8.2  How much more should governments be prepared to pay for 
more fuel efficient cars? 
Governments could potentially increase the energy efficiency, and lower the 
environmental impacts, of their own operations by purchasing more fuel efficient cars. 
This box draws on the data below to analyse how purchase price, fuel costs and 
greenhouse gas emissions might influence a government’s car purchasing decisions. 
The analysis is illustrative only, as not all relevant factors could be taken into account. 
Of the four cars, the Corolla has the lowest total cost, based on purchase price and the 
net present value (NPV) of fuel costs over the life of each vehicle. Whether the Corolla 
would be the preferred car for governments also depends on other factors such as 
safety, maintenance costs and resale value. For example, Commodores might be 
preferred in some cases due to their larger size (and/or local manufacture). While the 
Peugeot 307 diesel and the Prius have lower fuel costs than the Corolla, these savings 
($4597 and $5606 respectively, in NPV terms) are less than the extra purchase cost 
($10 240 and $16 750 respectively). The Corolla remains the lowest-cost option even if 
a discount rate of zero is used to calculate the NPV of fuel savings. If a government 
considered the four cars to be equivalent in respects other than their purchase price 
and fuel costs, then the Corolla would be the most cost-effective choice. 
It could be argued that governments should consider carbon dioxide emissions in 
deciding which cars to purchase. Under the assumptions explained above, choosing a 
Peugeot 307 diesel over a Corolla would reduce emissions at a net cost of over 
$400 per tonne of carbon dioxide saved. Choosing a Prius over a Peugeot 307 diesel 
would have a net cost of over $1200 per tonne of carbon dioxide emissions saved. For 
comparison, a review of the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) found that 
the cost of abatement to the economy arising from the scheme is expected to be about 
$32 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent gases (AGO 2003e). The review panel 
considered that this made the MRET a relatively expensive abatement measure. 
Choosing a Prius over a Corolla (spending over $11 000 to save 1.2 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide emissions per year for 15 years) is an extraordinarily expensive strategy. 
  Purchase  NPV of fuel     Total  CO2 emissions 
Selected passenger carsa    cost ($)b    costs ($)c cost  ($)d   (tonnes/year)e 
Toyota Corolla Ascent (1.8 litre, petrol)  19 750  12 272  32 022  2.9 
Peugeot 307 XSR HDi (1.6 litre, diesel)  29 990    7 675  37 665  2.0 
Toyota Prius (1.5 litre, petrol/electric hybrid)  36 500    6 666  43 166  1.7 
Holden Commodore Executive (3.6 litre, petrol)  33 650  16 817  50 467  4.1 
a The cars were selected to provide a wide spectrum of fuel consumption levels. The Peugeot is a manual, the other 
cars are automatics. b Recommended retail price (RRP) as reported on manufacturers web sites in August 2005. Note 
that governments often obtain a discount on RRPs and the extent of discount varies between models. c  Calculated 
based on a travel distance of 15 000 kilometres per year, fuel consumption information sourced from the Green Vehicle 
Guide, a petrol price of $1.18 per litre and a diesel price of $1.22 per litre, a vehicle life of 15 years and a social discount 
rate of 8 per cent real. Note that actual fuel consumption will be influenced by road conditions, driver behaviour and the 
condition of the vehicle. d Purchase cost plus NPV of fuel costs (other costs, such as for maintenance, have not been 
included).  e CO2 = carbon dioxide. Calculated based on emissions data from the Green Vehicle Guide. Actual 
emissions will be influenced by similar factors that influence fuel consumption.  
Sources: AGO (2005b); GM Holden (nd); Peugeot Australia (2005); Toyota Motor Corporation Australia (nd). 
     




Specific types of procurement policies 
Different types of procurement policies are being used by governments to promote 
energy efficiency. The preceding discussion on objectives provides a framework for 
their consideration.  
Use of green leases 
The DEH and the Australian Government Solicitor are developing a suite of Green 
Lease Schedules that can be attached to the Australian Government lease documents 
for leased and owned office property: 
The Green Lease Schedule has various features that take the duties of the tenant and 
building owner from the traditional static position of agreeing an energy intensity level 
in office building design, to a dynamic management process of monitoring, reporting 
and being accountable for energy and environmental issues annually. 
(DEH, sub. DR146, p. 2) 
The development of green leases appears likely to be a relatively low-cost initiative 
that has the potential to improve the cost effectiveness of government operations. It 
may also have spillover benefits to the private sector. 
The DEH reported that ‘there is interest by the commercial property sector in 
actually picking up on green leases’ (trans., p. 651). If this were to occur it would be 
an instance of government procurement having a demonstration effect. The 
commercial property sector would be unlikely to use green leases unless they were 
expected to be cost effective. This illustrates the general point that positive 
demonstration effects are only likely to occur where measures are genuinely cost 
effective. 
Green leases may also change market conditions for the private sector by lowering 
transaction costs and thus helping to overcome the split incentives between 
landlords and tenants. There is a question, however, as to whether government 
development of these leases is likely to produce significant spillover benefits. Large 
firms that own or lease office space have an incentive to develop an efficient legal 
instrument for managing energy use under an office lease. The benefits of this can 
be shared between owner and tenant, so that each gains. While smaller firms may 
lack the capacity to do this, market intermediaries, such as legal and accounting 
firms can play a role in disseminating such instruments. 
Government involvement could result in wider dissemination, but the benefits of 
this may be small. This is particularly the case as green leases require ongoing 
monitoring and reporting on energy use and this may be less worthwhile for small 
firms that have relatively low energy use.     
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Minimum energy performance standards for buildings 
Consistent with NFEE Stage One, some governments have introduced, or plan to 
introduce, minimum energy performance standards for their office accommodation 
using the Australian Building Greenhouse Rating Scheme (ABGR) (DTF 2005; 
Exergy Australia, sub. 40). Under this scheme ‘base buildings’ and tenancies can be 
rated separately. More information about the scheme is included in chapter 7. 
From July 2006, the Western Australian Government will only consider proposals 
to accommodate an agency in premises that achieve a 3.5 star rating for the base 
building, although this requirement may be waived where market conditions make it 
infeasible. In addition, all new fitouts shall achieve a minimum 4.5 star tenancy 
rating, where cost effective to do so (DHW 2004). These policies appear to 
appropriately address cost-effective energy efficiency. They require that energy 
efficiency be considered and set desired standards, but allow the costs of achieving 
these standards to be taken into account. 
The Victorian Government introduced office accommodation guidelines in 
July 2005 that contain new minimum energy performance standards. The guidelines 
require that each new office leased or built by the Victorian Government has at least 
a 4.5 star energy rating for the base building and a 5 star rating for the tenancy. For 
existing offices, the requirements are similar, except that the stringency for base 
buildings is lower (4 stars) (DTF 2005). The guidelines also state that ‘All projects 
carried out under the guidelines must deliver a value-for-money result for 
government and the people of Victoria’ (DTF 2005, p. 8). The guidelines do not 
provide any assistance to agencies where achieving the energy efficiency standards 
is incompatible with the requirement for value-for-money. Unless the energy 
efficiency standards can be waived under these circumstances, the guidelines are 
likely to impose extra costs on government operations. The types of costs that could 
be incurred include: 
•  costs of occupying a building that, while more energy efficient, is otherwise less 
suitable than other buildings; 
•  relocation costs that exceed the net present value of the energy savings, where a 
move is required to meet the minimum standards; and 
•  higher construction or lease costs. 
Basing procurement guidelines on Energy Allstars 
Energy Allstars is a database and interactive website of the highest energy-efficient 
products available in Australia. It has been developed for all Australian 
governments, but will also be available for corporate purchasers and the public.     




When fully developed, Energy Allstars will include details of the most 
energy-efficient household appliances, commercial equipment, lighting, office 
equipment, consumer electronics and other equipment. The National Appliance and 
Energy Efficiency Committee reported: 
[The] Ministerial Council on Energy has endorsed the idea that all future government 
procurement should use the website as the basis of energy efficient product purchasing 
guidelines that give preference to the listed products. (NAEEEC 2005a, p. 11)  
Such guidelines are unlikely to be compatible with achieving cost effectiveness in 
government procurement because products are selected for listing based on energy 
efficiency and not cost effectiveness. A recent report found that the projected 
energy cost savings from government use of computers, office equipment and 
electronics listed on Energy Allstars (which were estimated to account for 
95 per cent of government expenditure on products to be covered by the database) 
would only justify a maximum increase in purchase cost of 1  per  cent. For all 
products the maximum increase in purchase cost justified by energy cost savings 
was 2.2 per cent (George Wilkenfeld and Associates 2005a). 
Even if purchase cost outcomes within these narrow bounds could be achieved, this 
may change over time. Suppliers could seek to benefit from the preferential 
treatment of listed products by introducing models that are both high priced and 
energy efficient (the high prices might result from the additional costs of achieving 
increased energy efficiency or, if competition was inadequate, from suppliers 
increasing their profit margins). In addition, listed products may not always have 
the product features desired by government agencies. Accordingly, basing 
purchasing decisions on the Energy Allstars database could only be justified on 
other grounds, such as greenhouse gas abatement, but again only where there are net 
social benefits from doing so. In this respect, whether procurement guidelines based 
on the database would be consistent with greenhouse objectives depends in part on 
the extent to which other criteria, such as purchase price and product features, are 
taken into account. These other criteria need to be considered to avoid purchases 
which impose high costs relative to greenhouse gas abatement benefits. 
Addressing cost-effective energy efficiency in procurement policies, provided there 
is sufficient flexibility, could lead to environmental benefits and a small increase in 
the overall efficiency and effectiveness of government operations. There may be 
some additional benefits through demonstration effects and market development, 
but these are unlikely to justify procurement decisions that are not cost effective for 
government operations. Moving beyond cost-effectiveness criteria may be justified 
on other grounds (such as greenhouse gas abatement), but this would require an 
evaluation that incorporated these broader considerations. 
FINDING 8.1     
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Targets and performance indicators 
The Australian Government and most State and Territory Governments have set 
targets to reduce energy consumption in government buildings. These targets vary 
with respect to: 
•  the percentage reduction in energy use required and the time period for its 
achievement (for example, one New South Wales Government target is a 
25 per cent reduction of the 1995-96 level by 2005-06 (NSW DEUS 2004c) and 
the Western Australian Government target is for a 12 per cent reduction from the 
2001-02 level by 2006-07 (appendix C)); 
•  whether they are expressed in terms of energy intensity, energy use or energy 
cost (for example, the Australian Government targets relate to energy intensity 
levels; New South Wales, Western Australian and South Australian Government 
targets are for reductions in the quantity of energy used; and the Queensland 
Government target is for a reduction in energy cost); and 
•  whether penalties are imposed on government agencies that do not meet their 
targets (for example, the Western Australian Government’s policy refers to 
penalties, while the New South Wales Government’s policy does not). 
The targets for individual agencies are often expressed in the same terms as the 
overall targets. For example, the Western Australian Government target of a 
12 per cent reduction in stationary energy consumption applies to each participating 
agency. In New South Wales, however, each agency sets its own target, which must 
be aligned with the overall target. Some agencies have set energy-intensity rather 
than energy-use targets. The New South Wales Department of Education and 
Training, for example, has a target level for energy use per student per annum in 
schools (NSW DET 2004). 
Progress toward meeting targets is mixed, as indicated below.  
The DEH stated: 
… the Australian Government has reported, since 1997-98, falls in energy consumption 
of 15.4  per  cent, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 12.7  per  cent and an 
estimated fall in annual energy costs of $30 million. (sub. 30, p. 19) 
In aggregate, the Australian Government has achieved some of its energy-intensity 
targets. For example, the target for energy use for tenant operations in office 
buildings was 10 000 megajoules per person per year by 2002-03 and the actual 
average use in that year was 8980 megajoules per person. The Department of 
Defence has not met its target for defence establishments (AGO 2003b). Being an 
Australian Government agency, the Commission also has an energy-intensity target, 
as discussed in box 8.3.      





Box 8.3  The Productivity Commission’s energy use 
The Commission uses energy to light and power its two offices and provide passenger 
vehicle transport for staff. In 2003-04, 3876 gigajoules of energy was used for these 
purposes (approximately 60  per  cent for offices and 40  per  cent for passenger 
vehicles) (AGO 2005b). This energy accounted for 0.5 per cent of the Commission’s 
total expenditure in 2003-04. In addition, energy is used for air conditioning offices and 
other central services provided by the building owners. Energy is also embedded in the 
various goods and services consumed by the Commission.  
The Commission has obligations under the Australian Government’s policy Measures 
for Improving Energy Efficiency in Commonwealth Operations. One of these is to report 
annually on its energy use, and this information is included in the Australian 
Greenhouse Office report Energy Use in the Australian Government’s Operations. The 
reports show that the Commission’s energy use per person declined by 15 per cent 
over the six years to 2003-04 (AGO 2003b; AGO 2005b). This was due to encouraging 
staff to better manage energy use (for example, turning off lights when they are not 
needed), purchase of more energy-efficient equipment and a range of other actions. 
However, for 2003-04 energy use was still above the target level of 10 000 megajoules 
per person. 
To improve its energy management further, and as part of its Environmental 
Management System, the Commission engaged a consultant to conduct an energy 
review and audit of its Melbourne office in 2003. The initiatives identified mainly 
concerned lighting type and controls and these were implemented in 2004 and early 
2005. While it is to too early to precisely evaluate the outcomes, based on electricity 
invoices to date it is estimated that energy use (excluding services provided by the 
building owner) has decreased by 18  per  cent. The total cost for the consultancy, 
installation of new equipment and associated staff time has been approximately 
$29 000. While some of the initiatives have caused minor inconvenience to staff, and 
lighting is noticeably dimmer than it was before (but still above recommended minima), 
there appears to have been no significant impact on productivity. On this basis, the 
internal rate of return of the investment in energy efficiency will be 22 per cent (in real 
terms) over the life of the Commission’s tenancy (assuming that electricity prices 
remain constant in real terms). This equates to a net present value of $11 200 (using a 
discount rate of 8 per cent real) and a payback period of 3.7 years. It is expected that 
once these initiatives — and similar measures being undertaken in the Canberra office 
— are fully reflected in annual energy use data, the Commission will be below the 
target level of 10 000 megajoules per person. 
While undertaking the review and implementing the initiatives appears to have been 
cost effective for the Commission, the estimated financial gain is relatively small. 
Whether the broader policy of setting a target for the Commission has been cost 
effective is another question. Determining this would require an analysis of the costs 
and benefits of all activities motivated by the target, including monitoring and reporting 
undertaken by the Australian Greenhouse Office. 
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Building energy use in New South Wales Government buildings is estimated to 
have fallen by 2.3 per cent between 1995-96 and 2001-02 (Passey, MacGill and 
Watt 2004). The target was for a 15 per cent reduction over this period. 
In relation to its energy management strategy, the Queensland Government 
reported: 
This Queensland Government initiative is aiming to achieve annual savings of 
$20 million by June 2008. The first target of $2 million is to be achieved by 30 June 
2005. Early indications are that initiatives are already well in hand to achieve 
reportable savings in excess of the first target in June 2005. (sub. 38, p. 12) 
The Western Australian Government target is for a 12 per cent reduction from the 
2001-02 level by 2006-07, with a milestone of a 6 per cent reduction by 2003-04. 
This milestone was not met at the aggregate level as the average reduction to 
2003-04 was 3.3 per cent. 
As indicated, government agencies may have energy-use or energy-intensity targets. 
While neither of these relate directly to cost-effective energy efficiency, intensity 
targets have the following advantages: 
•  they make allowance for changes in agency work load; and 
•  they can be set in a way that does not penalise agencies that are relatively energy 
efficient at the commencement of the assessment period (that is, set as a target 
level, rather than a percentage reduction, in energy intensity). 
Targets can increase the incentives to implement energy efficiency improvements, 
particularly where there are penalties for failing to meet them. They are, however, 
not directly focused on the objective of increasing cost-effective energy efficiency. 
Achieving a partial performance target, such as one for energy use, may result in the 
deterioration of the overall efficiency and effectiveness of government services. 
This may result from managers placing an undue emphasis on an input that accounts 
for as little as 1  to  2  per  cent of expenditure. For example, deciding against 
installing electronic-mail-sorting equipment may assist in meeting an energy target, 
but a large increase in output, an improvement in outcomes (better sorted mail) or a 
large saving on labour costs, may be forgone. It can also be difficult to set targets 
which adequately reflect each agency’s circumstances. 
In response to a finding on government targets in the Commission’s draft report, 
Alan Pears argued: 
The Commission’s concern that undue emphasis on energy efficiency may adversely 
affect overall productivity presumes that there is a potential conflict between the two 
objectives. In reality, such conflict is unlikely until very high standards of energy 
efficiency are achieved. (sub. DR113, p. 23)     




In the Commission’s view there are a range of circumstances that can result in a 
conflict between energy efficiency and overall efficiency, including where: 
•  an improvement in overall efficiency is available through increasing energy use 
and reducing other inputs (such as in the example given above); 
•  management resources are limited and can be used to greater effect on issues 
other than energy management; and 
•  the most energy-efficient office accommodation, appliance or equipment is 
otherwise less suitable than less energy-efficient options. 
These considerations are as important to the public sector as they are to the private 
sector. 
Performance indicators are preferable to targets because they provide less incentive 
to adopt measures that are not cost effective, but still assist in providing incentives 
for improved energy efficiency. Reporting on energy intensity as a performance 
indicator allows for comparisons within and between agencies that can be used to 
identify opportunities for improvement. An example of this was provided by the 
Western Australian Government:  
… early results from an energy efficiency program targeting government agencies have 
been positive. These suggest that there is considerable scope for improvement in some 
agencies indicated by a wide difference in energy intensity from the highest to the 
lowest case. (sub. 58, p. 5) 
In making such comparisons, care needs to be taken to distinguish between 
differences due to energy efficiency performance and those due to differences in 
functions and operating environment.  
Energy-intensity performance indicators, or targets, can help identify opportunities 
for cost-effective improvements in energy efficiency. Performance indicators are 
preferable because they provide less incentive to adopt measures that are not cost 
effective. 
Access to capital 
Access to capital has been cited as a barrier to government agencies improving their 
energy efficiency (EEWG 2004). There are various reasons why this might be the 
case. As described in chapter 4, different managers being responsible for capital and 
operating budgets can limit the uptake of energy efficiency improvements, if there 
is a lack of cooperation. Other organisational issues, such as a poor understanding 
of energy efficiency investments by those responsible for allocating capital, can also 
FINDING 8.2     
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hinder uptake. It is also possible that what is perceived as a barrier may, in some 
cases, be rational decision making. 
One way for governments to address this potential barrier is to allocate part of their 
capital budget specifically for energy efficiency projects, as has been done by the 
following State Governments. 
•  The Western Australian Government makes capital advances available to 
agencies to invest in energy-saving capital projects. The funding is in the form of 
an interest-free advance, with repayments based on the estimated annual cost 
savings from the project (SEDO nd). 
•  The New South Wales Treasury has, since 1998, provided a $20 million rolling 
fund from which government agencies can draw down to finance energy 
efficiency capital upgrades (ABCSE, sub. 50). To be eligible, projects must be 
expected to deliver an internal rate of return of 12 per cent or more. 
Governments determine their overall capital works programs according to various 
considerations including: the absolute merits of proposed projects; the relative 
merits of projects across sectors and policy areas, including energy efficiency; 
potential crowding out of the private sector in the capital market; and overall fiscal 
policy. Within this framework, it is desirable that agencies be able to access capital 
for any investments, including for energy efficiency, that can be demonstrated to be 
cost effective and are consistent with overall fiscal policy. This can be facilitated 
either through normal capital-approval processes or specific arrangements for 
energy efficiency investments.  
It might be argued that quarantining funds for energy efficiency investments is 
warranted because of the organisational issues discussed above. These issues, 
however, have the potential to occur in many areas of government investment and 
so normal capital-approval processes should be adapted to deal with them. Another 
possible argument is that the environmental benefits of energy efficiency 
investments mean that they deserve special consideration. Again, there are other 
types of government investment that can generate environmental benefits (for 
example, investment in waste treatment facilities). Consistent consideration of 
environmental benefits is likely to require mechanisms that recognise them within 
normal processes. Accordingly, the Commission is not persuaded of the justification 
or merits of having special hypothecated funds within governments for special 
‘worthy’ purposes outside of normal capital budget allocation processes.     




Other policies with energy efficiency impacts 
Many governments require the purchase of Australian-made vehicles for a 
significant part of their fleets. As the Australian industry predominantly produces 
medium to large vehicles these restrictions will tend to increase fuel consumption of 
the government fleet. Governments face tradeoffs in terms of the desired attributes 
of the vehicles they purchase — energy efficiency is one consideration, but others 
include safety, size, reliability, comfort and local manufacture. Purchasing practices 
must attempt to balance all of these attributes to achieve the most appropriate 
vehicle for each task and context. Box 8.2 illustrates some of the issues involved in 
achieving this balance.     
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  9  Appliance labels and standards 
 
Key points 
•  To reduce the energy used by appliances and thereby reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, governments have introduced mandatory energy-performance labels 
and minimum energy performance standards (MEPS). These requirements are 
often promoted as also being cost effective for individuals. 
•  Labels aim to provide useful information to consumers and producers. However, for 
some appliances, the information on the label may not reflect how individuals use 
the appliance and so could be misleading. 
–  Consumer research indicates that labels are not a primary determinant of which 
models are purchased, but they do influence individuals once they have short-listed 
a few models. Labels appear to be becoming more important over time. 
–  While the benefits of labelling may have been overstated in regulation impact 
assessments, it is likely to have produced net benefits for consumers and 
producers. 
•  MEPS ban the sale of certain appliances that have energy efficiency below a 
specified minimum. This has the potential to: 
–  remove products from the market that would be cost effective for some consumers 
and producers; 
–  force consumers and producers to forgo product features that they may value more 
highly than greater energy efficiency; and 
–   reduce  competition. 
•  Past regulation impact assessments of MEPS have not given sufficient 
consideration to the above disadvantages. The Commission therefore recommends 
that future regulation impact assessments of MEPS include a more comprehensive 
analysis of their disadvantages and whether other policies would be more cost 
effective. 
 
Various domestic and commercial appliances are subject to mandatory 
energy-performance labels and/or minimum energy performance standards (MEPS). 
These requirements are intended to reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, they are often promoted as also being cost effective for individuals 
(NAEEEC 2004c). This chapter examines that proposition.     
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9.1 Administrative  arrangements 
Mandatory labelling and minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) for 
electrical appliances are managed by the National Appliance and Equipment Energy 
Efficiency Committee (NAEEEC) (appendix E). This comprises officials from the 
Australian, State and Territory Governments, and is ultimately directed by the 
Ministerial Council on Energy (NAEEEC 2004c). 
Historically, the Australian Gas Association (AGA) has had responsibility for 
managing the certification labelling and minimum standards of gas appliances 
(SEAV  2003). Governments have made the labels and standards mandatory by 
requiring all mass-produced gas appliances offered for sale to be certified by the 
AGA (appendix E). This is an example of co-regulation. 
The administrative arrangements for the regulation of gas appliances are currently 
undergoing transition (AGO 2005f). This is in line with the National Framework for 
Energy Efficiency (NFEE) Stage One measures, which included a commitment to 
broaden the scope of the National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency 
Program (NAEEEP) for electrical products to include mandatory labelling and 
MEPS for gas products (MCE 2004e). Such an arrangement would allow for 
national uniformity for all appliances. To date, a Gas Appliance and Equipment 
Energy Efficiency Program (GAEEEP) has been established by NAEEEC and this 
will be the vehicle for implementing the future gas appliances regime (appendix E). 
State and Territory regulators monitor compliance with labelling requirements at 
retail outlets and have taken action where breaches were suspected (NAEEEC 
2004c). In addition, NAEEEC has a check-testing program to verify that the 
performance of appliances sold at retail outlets matches what is recorded on the 
label. These tests have identified cases where claimed performance does not match 
test results, and have led to product deregistration.  
Electrical appliances that are required to satisfy a MEPS or have an 
energy-performance label are listed in table 9.1. The requirements for gas 
appliances are listed in table 9.2.     











Household    
Air conditioners (single phase)  Mandatory  Mandatory 
Air conditioners (three phase)  Voluntary  Mandatory 
Clothes washers  Mandatory   
Clothes dryers  Mandatory   
Dishwashers Mandatory   
Electric water heaters  Voluntarya Mandatory 
Refrigerators and freezers  Mandatory  Mandatory 
Commercial and industrial    
Commercial refrigerators    Mandatory 
Distribution transformers    Mandatory 
Electric motors    Mandatory 
Lamp ballasts  Mandatoryb Mandatory 
Linear fluorescent lamps    Mandatory 
a Electric water heaters can have an energy rating label, provided it follows the Standardised Information 
Disclosure requirements developed by the National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency Committee. 
b Ballasts subject to MEPS must be marked with an energy efficiency index. 
Sources: Harrington and Holt (2002); AGO (2004a); AGO (2005d). 
Table 9.2  Gas appliances subject to labelling and/or standards 
 
Appliance/equipment typea  Certification label  Minimum standardsb
Gas cookers    Mandatory 
Gas water heaters  Mandatory  Mandatory 
Gas room heaters  Mandatory  Mandatory 
Gas ducted heaters  Mandatory  Mandatory 
a The above products as well as gas cooktops and industrial equipment are expected to be covered by 
GAEEEP in 2010. b  Gas appliances have to be certified as meeting minimum safety standards. This 
certification process has also  been used to enforce minimum energy performance requirements. 
Sources: NAEEEC (2005a); AGA (2004b). 
9.2  Appliance energy performance labels 
In addition to the product testing and other activities of consumer associations, 
energy-performance labelling schemes aim to help overcome the information 
barriers that individual consumers and producers sometimes face. By providing 
information on the energy performance of specific appliances in a readily accessible 
and easily understandable format, individuals are more likely to make 
well-informed decisions regarding energy efficiency. Labels could also provide a 
greater incentive for suppliers to sell products that use energy cost effectively.     
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Although many countries require household appliances to have an 
energy-performance label (Harrington and Damnics 2004; IEA  2000), it is most 
widespread in Australia, Canada and the United States (World Energy Council 
2004). 
Label design 
The label displayed on appliances subject to Australia’s mandatory requirements 
must use a specified design that includes information on: 
•  annual energy consumption (based on a standard laboratory test); and  
•  a star rating to indicate energy efficiency relative to competing appliances (on a 
scale of one to six stars, with more stars indicating higher energy efficiency). 
Sample labels for clothes washers and gas water heaters are shown in figure 9.1. 
Figure 9.1  Sample labels for clothes washers and gas water heaters 
      
Source: NAEEEC (2004b).     




To have a discernable impact on consumers’ choices and behaviour, a label needs to 
present information that is useful, and otherwise costly to obtain, to consumers in a 
format that can be readily understood. The first labelling scheme in the United 
States (Energy Guide) was ignored by many consumers because it had too much 
information and was difficult to interpret (World Energy Council  2004). 
Researchers also found that about a quarter of consumers thought the number most 
prominently displayed on the label meant savings rather than usage, suggesting that 
some consumers mistakenly used the label to search for the least efficient 
appliances (Meier 2003). 
The development of Australia’s energy-performance labels has included consumer 
research on the effectiveness of different label designs, update bulletins and a toll 
free phone inquiry service for manufacturers and retailers, educational material for 
sales floor staff, and shadow shop surveys to verify compliance at retail outlets 
(Energy Efficient Strategies 2004; NAEEEC 2002; Winton 2003). 
However, some participants were concerned about the effectiveness of the energy 
consumption figure on Australian labels. Philip Clark commented that labels 
‘should avoid wording which is functionally irrelevant for end-users, such as 
kilowatts’ and instead provide information on dollar impacts (sub. DR147, p. 4). 
Laurie Virr and Paul Hanley (trans., p. 677) noted that a label with an operating cost 
in dollars is a more effective way of communicating to individuals than kilowatt 
hours. 
In the United States, energy-performance labels provide an estimate of the annual 
operating cost of the appliance, based on a national average cost of electricity per 
kilowatt hour (Federal Trade Commission 2005). The labels warn purchasers that 
the actual operating cost may vary due to differences in local electricity prices and 
individual usage.  
While purchasers may find it easier to interpret a label that measures energy use in 
terms of dollars, such a label could be misleading for purchasers who do not face 
the assumed electricity or gas price. For example, in 2003-04, the average 
residential electricity price in South Australia was 65 per cent higher than in New 
South Wales (ESAA 2004). In Victoria, it was 42 per cent higher. Notwithstanding 
the large variation in prices, the inclusion of a dollar operating cost on labels may 
help purchasers compare different appliances.     
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Problems with measuring energy consumption 
The energy consumption reported on mandatory labels comes from a laboratory test 
required by NAEEEC or the AGA (appendix E). A review of Australia’s labelling 
programs for the Australian Greenhouse Office noted: 
… [the estimated annual energy consumption], derived from the laboratory tests, has 
been found to correspond reasonably well (within 10 per cent) to in-use energy 
consumption for refrigerators and freezers. The energy consumption for other 
appliances is highly dependent on whether actual frequency and duration of use by 
users corresponds to the values assumed for labelling. (Energy Efficient 
Strategies 2004, p. 7) 
There has been some attempt to account for actual usage patterns in the tests: 
… some star rating algorithms include assumptions about user behaviour. For example, 
a ‘field use factor’ applied to clothes dryers gives a 10 per cent penalty to timer dryers 
when compared with auto-sensing dryers, on the assumption that manual operation 
more often leads to overdrying and hence higher energy consumption in use. (Energy 
Efficient Strategies 2004, p. 7) 
However, the Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association 
(AEEMA) expressed concerns about the energy-performance tests for air 
conditioners not being representative of actual use: 
The task of an air conditioner is not easily defined for the purpose of a test method … 
Test methods are based on a high heat load condition in which the compressor and fans 
run continuously. In the real world, generally when air conditioners run they are subject 
to relatively low heat loads. Over the last 20 years, variable speed compressors with 
control systems to suit have been developed. Efficiencies of air conditioners with 
variable speed compressors are similar to those with fixed speed compressors at test 
conditions. Hence they have similar efficiency ratings. However, they are much more 
efficient at the lower load conditions at which they usually operate. This is not evident 
from the efficiency ratings on the labels, so the labels are misleading in this case. 
(sub. 85, p. 4) (emphasis added) 
Evasave (sub. DR100) had similar reservations about the energy-performance tests 
for refrigerators and air conditioners.  
AEEMA also raised five concerns about the energy-performance tests for washing 
machines, dishwashers and clothes dryers: 
1. Amount  of  use: Usage rates of these appliances … are based on a Pacific Power 
study conducted twelve years ago … This was a reliable measure at the time but may 
no longer be valid … 
2. What these appliances do: … Test standards … must be met on a program 
nominated by the supplier … Efficiency ratings are only pertinent when the appliance 
is used on the program specified by the supplier. If used on a different program, the     




appliance will use a different amount of energy and the rating will be irrelevant to 
energy efficiency in actual use.  
… Around half of all users of clothes washers usually wash with cold water. However, 
the standard test uses 35°C water …  
Many users of dishwashers want their dishes dried more effectively than on the rating 
program and choose a program that dries better. This uses higher temperature water for 
the final rinse and uses more energy than the rating program.  
The degree to which specified conditions match real conditions of use is important 
when estimating energy savings and economic benefits attributable to energy efficiency 
ratings … 
3. Reliability of results: Test methods in dryer and dishwasher standards are considered 
to be of adequate reliability for effective check testing, but AEEMA doubts the 
accuracy of the clothes washer test method.  
4. International considerations: Currently these tests are specific to Australia. However, 
Australian and IEC [international] test methods are progressively converging. Test 
reliability would be lost if Australia accepted IEC test methods as they stand at present. 
5. Effects on product design: Appliances are being designed to maximise ratings while 
meeting minimum product performance requirements … However the principal 
deficiency of energy ratings in current standards is that they do not provide any 
incentive for the manufacturer to improve any program other than the rating program. 
(sub. 85, pp. 5–6) (emphasis added) 
Two of these problems were highlighted recently by several Australian Consumers’ 
Association (ACA) studies of dishwashers (ACA 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2005). The 
ACA studies tested various dishwasher models against set criteria including the 
level of energy efficiency. The ACA selected what they thought was the ‘most 
commonly’ used program in conducting the tests. A comparison of the ACA results 
with the same models on NAEEEC’s energy rating website shows that the ranking 
of the products is quite different. Consumer Electronic Suppliers Association 
(CESA) and AEEMA stated that this difference may be due to the fact that the 
NAEEEC tests for energy performance were based on usage patterns that are 
derived from limited usage data collected prior to 1995 and therefore do not 
represent current usage patterns (trans., p. 624). It may also be due to the fact that 
energy performance tests relate to a selected cycle on the dishwasher (often the 
‘normal’ cycle with a set temperature) whereas the ACA study tested the program 
‘most commonly’ used by consumers, which is likely to differ. AEEMA noted that 
testing a selected cycle is becoming increasingly irrelevant as dishwasher programs 
are becoming more complex: 
A recent development that threatens to make energy efficiency ratings based upon 
current test methods irrelevant to real conditions of use is sensor based automatic 
programs for clothes washers and dishwashers. (sub. 85, p. 6) (emphasis added)     
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The extent to which actual usage of an appliance differs from the tested program 
varies from one appliance to another. The energy consumption of some labelled 
appliances — refrigerators and freezers — is unlikely to vary markedly between 
individuals. For these ‘set and forget’ type of appliances, laboratory tests are 
expected to correspond closely to the actual usage patterns, given that there is little 
user discretion.  
The use of other labelled appliances — air conditioners, clothes washers and dryers, 
and dishwashers — is likely to vary significantly among individuals, given that 
there is a large degree of user discretion. 
For appliances where energy efficiency depends significantly on user behaviour, 
laboratory test results can be misleading, notwithstanding the ‘field use factors’ 
built into the tests. The dishwasher example illustrated that this outcome could have 
implications for the effectiveness of labelling. If labels are not an accurate guide to 
the relative energy efficiency of different models of the same type of appliance, 
given the usage pattern of a particular individual, then they are less likely to help 
that individual to rank those models.  
Do appliance labels change consumer behaviour? 
Given that energy accounts for a small proportion of household expenditure 
(chapter 6), consumers are likely to place emphasis on other factors, such as price, 
performance, capacity and style. In this respect, the Department of the Environment 
and Heritage advised: 
There is evidence from overseas and Australian studies to suggest that many consumers 
use energy efficiency as a tool to differentiate between the final two or three products 
that meet their other selection criteria (eg. appearance, colour, size etc). (sub. 30, p. 13) 
Consumer research undertaken for the AGO noted that consumers tend to go 
through distinct steps in deciding to purchase a product, and that labelling has the 
greatest influence at the final step after particular models have been short-listed 
(Winton 2003). The research also found that the impact of labels differs between 
consumers, reflecting their different preferences and training (Winton 2003). 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates commented that labels have raised the 
importance of energy efficiency to consumers, based on an analysis of data 
published by the ABS (1999): 
… labelling has raised ‘energy running cost’ and ‘energy-efficiency’ factors from about 
tenth priority in appliance purchase before the program was introduced in 1986 to 
second by 1999, behind purchase price but ahead of factors such as brand name, 
appearance and reliability. (sub. DR96, p. 7)     




The most recent data from the ABS (2002) indicated that purchase cost and energy 
efficiency are the two main factors considered by households in purchasing white 
good appliances. The main consideration for choosing heaters was cost, as only 
4 per cent of the households surveyed considered environmental issues (ABS 2002).  
In summary, energy-performance labels are not a primary determinant of which 
models are purchased, but they do appear to influence individuals once they have 
short-listed a small number of models. In addition, recent survey data suggest that 
labels are becoming more important over time as consumer behaviour changes. 
Periodic upgrading of rating scales 
There is a tendency for the energy efficiency of appliances to progressively increase 
due to technological innovation and product development, regardless of regulation. 
This can eventually lead to most appliances clustering near the highest possible 
energy rating on a label. As a result, labels lose their effectiveness as a device for 
ranking different models. 
The SEAV (2003) noted this phenomenon for gas appliances. A similar situation 
applied to electrical appliances in the late 1990s (Energy Efficiency 
Strategies 2004).  
Regulators have responded to this issue by periodically making the rating criteria 
more stringent to give a greater spread in star ratings between appliances. However, 
this involves additional costs and can lead to consumer confusion until the new 
scale has become established. There is also a risk that recalibrating the rating scale 
will exaggerate minor differences between appliances, such that consumers perceive 
models with the highest energy efficiency as being vastly superior to those with 
only a slightly lower energy efficiency. 
Assessments of labelling 
A study for NAEEEC found that, from 1993 to 2001, there was a gradual trend of 
improving energy efficiency for a range of appliances sold in Australia: 
As energy consumption is not generally apparent to the general consumer without 
information programs like energy labelling, the credit for much of this improvement 
must be attributed to the National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency 
Program (NAEEEP). (Energy Efficient Strategies 2003, p. 7) 
For example, the introduction of labelling in New South Wales and Victoria in 1986 
was followed by a decline in the average energy consumption of new frost-free 
refrigerator-freezers (figure 9.2). While it is difficult to attribute this decrease (and     
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the increase in energy efficiency) to one explanatory variable, it appears that 
labelling of new frost free refrigerator-freezers has been influential. 
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a Average energy consumption is calculated as a weighted average with weights based on sales volume. The 
data for the period 1980–1985 are based on energy labelling tests conducted by Choice Magazine. The data 
for the period 1986–1992 are based on energy labelling registrations. The data for the period 2003–2006 are 
based on projected estimates and are not accurate sales-weighted estimates. The data relate to both 
top-mounted and bottom-mounted refrigerator-freezers. 
Data source: S. Holt (Department of the Environment and Heritage, pers. comm., 1 August 2005).  
Other possible reasons why appliance energy efficiency has increased include 
changes in energy prices, technological change that is not attributable to 
government policy, and increasingly stringent energy efficiency standards in other 
countries. It is plausible that some increase in appliance energy efficiency would 
have occurred in the absence of Australian energy-performance labels. 
After studying US appliance energy efficiency trends, Newell, Jaffe and 
Stavins (1999) found that a sizeable proportion of energy efficiency improvements 
for air conditioners and water heaters sold in the US were independent of changes in 
federal regulations. However, Nadel (2004) criticised this study because it did not 
account for state-based standards in California and elsewhere, and so did not 
conclusively prove that energy efficiency standards had little impact.     




In terms of the costs of labelling schemes, George Wilkenfeld and 
Associates identified: 
•  The costs to government of program development and administration. 
•  The costs to product suppliers of any additional product testing, registration, 
production and fixing of labels, and administration. 
•  The costs to consumers of any increases in average product price due to greater 
consumer preference for the more efficient models on the market. (George Wilkenfeld 
and Associates 2003a, pp. 5–6) 
Another potential cost is that labelling distorts the market for appliances. As noted 
previously, the energy performance tests for labelling may be misleading when 
actual usage patterns differ from the tested program. This could lead to 
unobservable costs being imposed on consumers who purchase user-sensitive 
appliances based on a misleading energy-performance label. There is also the 
potential for labelling to distort the market for appliances in such a way that 
suppliers withdraw models that are cost effective for some consumers. The 
Department of the Environment and Heritage observed: 
In the lead up to the implementation of energy labelling for refrigerators in 1986, 
suppliers removed the least efficient models from the market to avoid having to label 
them. (sub. 30, p. 13) 
Some of those refrigerators withdrawn from the market may have been cost 
effective for certain consumers, or could have characteristics that consumers value 
more highly than greater energy efficiency.  
In 1999, the impact of adopting the national labelling scheme for household 
appliances was estimated by George Wilkenfeld and Associates and Energy 
Efficient Strategies (1999) in a regulation impact assessment. In net present value 
terms, it was estimated that the labelling requirements would increase indirect 
appliance costs by $688 million and reduce energy costs by $1500 million (using a 
4 per cent discount rate). This indicated that, from a broad social perspective, 
labelling would produce considerable net benefits. However, as discussed in 
chapter 5, such engineering–accounting estimates are based on many assumptions, 
which means the results should be treated with some caution. For example, a more 
optimistic business-as-usual (BAU) scenario for improvements in appliance energy 
efficiency would decrease the benefits attributed to labelling. In addition, it could be 
argued that the 4 per cent discount rate applied to future benefits and costs was too 
low from either the private perspective of the ‘average’ individual or from a social 
perspective (appendix F).      
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Appliance energy-performance labels have some influence on consumers after they 
have short-listed products on the basis of characteristics such as price, 
performance, capacity and style. While the benefits of labelling may have been 
overstated in regulation impact assessments, it is likely to have produced net 
benefits for consumers. 
9.3  Appliance minimum energy performance standards 
In addition to the mandatory labelling scheme, mandatory minimum energy 
performance standards (MEPS) apply to various residential and commercial 
appliances. MEPS prohibit the sale of products that do not achieve a specified 
minimum level of energy efficiency.  
In Australia, MEPS apply to most, but not all, of the electrical appliances that are 
also subject to mandatory labelling (table 9.1) and are managed in conjunction with 
labelling requirements (appendix E). NAEEEC has responsibility for electrical 
appliance MEPS, and the AGA will continue to manage gas appliance standards 
until this role is transferred to NAEEEC (table 9.2).  
As part of the NFEE Stage One measures announced by the Ministerial Council on 
Energy (MCE 2004e), the Australian, State and Territory Governments have agreed 
to expand NAEEEP by introducing new or more stringent MEPS for residential and 
commercial appliances. 
The goal of MEPS is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from appliances when it 
would benefit society as a whole. However, NAEEEC has claimed that MEPS are 
also cost effective for individual producers and consumers (NAEEEC  2004c; 
Harrington and Holt 2003). 
NAEEEC currently sets MEPS at a level that will ‘lead the world if that option … 
[is] cost-effective … and … [has] widespread stakeholder support.’ (Department of 
the Environment and Heritage, sub. DR146, p. 2). If the option is not cost effective, 
then MEPS will be set to ‘match, for each appliance regulated, best practice levels 
imposed by Australia’s major trading partners’ (Department of the Environment and 
Heritage, sub. 30, p. 15). 
FINDING 9.1     




Benefits of MEPS 
The key potential benefit of MEPS for individuals is lower appliance operating 
costs. Other benefits that participants of this inquiry have identified include: 
economies of scale and the ability to sell to any market in the world; reduced search 
costs; and the environmental benefits associated with decreasing energy use. 
Energy cost savings 
All regulation impact assessments of MEPS have found that the proposed MEPS 
substantially lower operating costs for individuals (for example, George Wilkenfeld 
and Associates 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b; Syneca Consulting 2003a, 2003b, 
2004, 2005b). These cost savings depend on the efficiency improvements that 
would have otherwise occurred under the BAU scenario. In practice, it is very 
difficult to separate the effect of MEPS from other influences. To illustrate, 
consider the decrease in average energy consumption for new frost free 
refrigerator-freezers over the period 1985–2005 (figure 9.2). It appears that the 
announcement of MEPS in 1996 decreased average energy consumption in the ‘lead 
in’ time before the MEPS were mandated in 19991. However, it is not known how 
energy efficiency would have improved in the absence of MEPS. It is highly 
unlikely that the industry would have reached the same level of energy efficiency as 
quickly as that brought about by the MEPS. But it is plausible that the effect of 
MEPS was to bring forward energy efficiency improvements that would have 
otherwise occurred.  
Some improvements could have been brought about by, among other things, the 
impact of labelling, technological development in Australia and overseas, changes 
in energy prices and an increased level of consumer demand for energy-efficient 
appliances. In this regard, CESA and AEEMA noted that regulation impact 
assessments have tended to give insufficient recognition to improvements that 
would have been forthcoming under a BAU scenario. They commented that there is 
a tendency for the energy efficiency of appliances to increase over time regardless 
of regulation (trans., p. 632). As a result, they considered that the benefits attributed 
to MEPS have been overstated. 
                                              
1 The Department of the Environment and Heritage has projected a similar response over the 
period 2002–2006 from the announcement in 2002 of more stringent MEPS to apply from 2005 
(figure 9.2).     
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Benefits to Australian producers 
Some participants claimed that MEPS also lead to ‘economies of scale’ in the 
production of appliances, which is of direct benefit to individual producers 
(ABCSE, sub. DR121, p. 12). However, CESA and AEEMA noted that an increase 
in the level of MEPS does not initially lead to a lower cost of production for 
producers because ‘at that point you are not mass produced, and it is expensive’ 
(trans., p. 627). 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage claimed that another advantage of 
MEPS being based on ‘world’s best practice’ or ‘leading the world’ is that: 
… products made in Australia can be sold in any market in the world – they at least 
meet the minimum regulatory requirements. (sub. DR146, p. 3) 
However, while this might be true in a technical sense, manufacturers are likely to 
be primarily interested in supplying appliances that meet the needs of the market 
they are exporting to (in accord with minimising cost and maximising profit). The 
most cost-effective level of energy efficiency for that market may be less than what 
is required under Australian MEPS. Appliances that are configured for Australian 
MEPS would run the risk of being overengineered and therefore, less competitive in 
markets that have lower energy efficiency requirements. Further, Australia is a 
small consumer and producer of appliances by global standards and so is probably 
not in a position to influence supply and consumption decisions in other countries. 
Reduced search costs 
A further benefit of MEPS is that they, in effect, reduce the search (or transaction) 
costs associated with purchasing energy efficient appliances. As Jaffe, Newell and 
Stavins noted:  
… standards can in principle be beneficial by conserving on the need for every 
individual to undertake the information and assessment process inherent in trading off 
capital and energy operating costs. (2005, p. 172) 
Thus consumers are supposedly better off by having a regulator make decisions on 
their behalf at a lower total cost, including search costs. But this presumes that, in 
the absence of MEPS, consumers would come to the same conclusion as the 
regulator once they had collected and assessed the relevant information. In practice 
they are likely to purchase a range of products for different reasons. Any advantages 
in reducing search costs would therefore need to be weighed against the impact on 
product choice (see below).     





To the extent that MEPS reduce fossil fuel consumption and thereby greenhouse gas 
emissions, they would be achieving environmental benefits. But again, assumptions 
about BAU projections make it difficult to assess the incremental impact. 
Combined with the small proportion of emissions that are appliance-related, the 
Institute of Public Affairs questioned whether the environmental benefits of MEPS 
have been overstated: 
MEPS targets products that account for only 2 per cent of Australia’s total greenhouse 
gas emissions. The measures, once having reached maturity are estimated to reduce 
emissions by less than 0.2 per cent of the business-as-usual levels.  
Modest though they are, these estimated reductions exaggerate the effect of the 
regulations because they exclude energy efficiency improvements that are taking place 
without any regulation. (sub. 6, pp. 13–14) 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates (sub. DR96) noted that the benefits to energy 
users of increasingly higher MEPS are declining. Demonstrating that MEPS are 
beneficial for the wider community will therefore increasingly depend on the value 
assigned to emission abatement. The Department of the Environment and Heritage 
(sub.  DR131) also noted that including the value of environmental benefits in 
regulation impact assessments is desirable. While this approach is appropriate when 
assessing the net benefit of MEPS for society as a whole, it is not appropriate for 
assessing private cost effectiveness. If, as has been suggested, privately 
cost-effective MEPS are becoming increasingly difficult to find and implement, 
then future MEPS are likely to make more individuals worse off.  
Costs of MEPS 
The benefits of MEPS could be outweighed by the associated costs of: 
•  administering and complying with standards; 
•  mismeasurement of energy performance; 
•  removing products from the market that are more cost effective for some 
consumers; 
•  forcing individuals to forgo product features that they value more highly than 
greater energy efficiency;  
•  reduced competition;  
•  regressive distributional impacts; and 
•  an increase in embodied energy consumption.     
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Administration and compliance costs 
The administration costs that governments can incur from MEPS include public 
consultation prior to mandating a standard, the design of tests to measure energy 
performance, certification procedures, and a check testing program. The compliance 
costs for suppliers can include changing appliance designs to meet performance 
standards, testing products, and complying with registration procedures prior to 
offering appliances for sale. 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage stated that the administration 
costs of MEPS are substantially lower than for labelling, but the compliance costs 
can be higher: 
The administrative costs of MEPS are substantially lower, since there is no need for a 
physical label, for checking that the label is correctly fixed, or for publicising the 
label … 
MEPS can have a greater cost for suppliers than labelling, since suppliers must adjust 
their model ranges to meet the MEPS levels by the given date (which is why the lead 
times for MEPS implementation is often 2 to 3 years) … 
The costs to government of ensuring the quality of initial product tests and undertaking 
random check tests are the same for MEPS and energy labelling. (sub. 30, p. 16) 
The first regulation impact assessment of national labelling and MEPS requirements 
estimated that the administration costs for MEPS would be $3 million over the 
period 2000–15, compared to $39 million for labelling (in present value terms using 
a discount rate of 4 per cent) (George Wilkenfeld and Associates and Energy 
Efficient Strategies 1999). It was assumed that 84 per cent of administration costs 
were borne by appliance purchasers, with the remainder borne by governments. The 
assessment also estimated that MEPS would increase the cost of appliances by 
$266 million over 2000–15, compared to $688 million for labelling (the latter cost 
being due to consumers voluntarily purchasing more efficient appliances). 
AEEMA noted: 
The cost of developing standards and reliable test procedures is high. Whether the 
standards are national or international, product development costs and compliance 
testing costs are substantial both in terms of direct costs and opportunity costs when 
scarce skilled engineers and laboratory resources are diverted from other product 
improvement or cost reduction projects to meet energy efficiency targets. (sub. 85, p. 3) 
Compliance costs will be influenced by the ‘lead in’ time between the introduction 
of the regulatory proposal and the implementation of the MEPS. In the most recent 
regulation impact statement on air conditioners, several manufacturers noted that 
the ‘lead in’ time needs to be at least three years and another noted it needs to be at 
least five years (Syneca Consulting 2005b, pp. 41–43).     




When introducing or setting an increased level of MEPS, suppliers will need time to 
adjust. Where the new MEPS can be met with off-the-shelf technology, adjustment 
could be quite rapid. But where the new MEPS requires product development, more 
time will be required. Trying to accelerate the adjustment process could add to 
compliance costs.  
Compliance costs can be high if the MEPS require different materials or 
components to be used. In relation to lighting components, CESA and AEEMA 
noted: 
… there are substantial extra costs. For example, in lighting ballast you’re looking at 
high grade electrical steel as opposed to a lesser grade of electrical steel. You're also 
looking at electronic components as opposed to ferromagnetic components. 
(trans., p. 625) 
In relation to electric motors, initially there were substantial costs involved in 
making a product more energy efficient: 
High efficiency motors cost 10–25 per cent more than the common variety, although 
the price differential is shrinking in most cases. (Lamb 2005, p. 31) 
In contrast to the above industry advice, the Department of the Environment and 
Heritage (sub. DR131) argued that products with a higher level of energy efficiency 
are not necessarily more expensive to buy, and nor are they more costly to produce 
than those with a lower level of energy efficiency. 
Ultimately, the level and relative importance of administration and compliance costs 
will vary between different MEPS, depending on the prescriptiveness of the 
standard, how stringent it is, the lead in time to implementation, and the extent to 
which firms can spread fixed compliance costs across appliance sales. 
Mismeasurement of energy performance 
MEPS compliance is tested under laboratory conditions to ensure each model of an 
appliance satisfies a minimum level of energy performance. 
The previously mentioned problems that arise with tests for labelling also arise in 
relation to tests for MEPS. Primarily, these problems occur because MEPS are 
based on the same limited data on user behaviour (data collected prior to 1995) and 
it is difficult to take account of how appliances are used in practice.      
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Functional and/or technical attributes need to be specifically accounted for in the 
tests for MEPS. In relation to electric motors, for example: 
Efficiency depends on the load placed on a motor. They are most efficient when they’re 
at full load … sizing the right motor for the job is very important because over-sizing 
reduces efficiency … (Lamb 2005, p. 31) 
As with labelling, a distinction can be drawn between ‘set and forget’ appliances 
and user-sensitive appliances. For ‘set and forget’ appliances, test results probably 
correspond well to actual outcomes. That is, MEPS are better suited to products that 
have little user intervention, such as electric motors, electric water heaters, freezers 
and most lighting products. MEPS are ‘less suited’ to appliances where the energy 
performance is significantly affected by what the customer chooses to do with the 
product (CESA and AEEMA, trans., p. 633). For this reason, NAEEEC does not 
mandate MEPS on clothes washers, clothes dryers and dishwashers. 
Removing more cost-effective products from the market 
By definition, MEPS ban certain appliances from sale that have energy efficiency 
below a specified minimum. Therefore, appliances that might have been cost 
effective for some consumers are no longer available on the market. When MEPS 
are set to ‘lead the world’ or to ‘match world’s best practice’, these effects are even 
more pronounced. 
In an international review of energy policies, the World Energy Council found that 
the standards set for MEPS in other countries have led to a large proportion of 
models being forced out of the market: 
In Europe … 40 per cent of appliances on sale in 1996 did not comply with the 
standards to be introduced in 1999. In the United States, the standards were more 
ambitious in their goal: none of the refrigerators on the US market at the end of the 
1980s met the efficiency standards planned for 1993. (World Energy 
Council 2004, p. 45) 
Similar outcomes appear to have occurred, or are set to occur, in Australia. The 
regulation impact assessment for electric motors estimated that 70  per  cent of 
models in December 2003 would be excluded from the market under the proposed 
MEPS scheduled for 2006 (Syneca Consulting 2003b). The regulation impact 
assessment for Australia’s future air conditioner MEPS estimated that among the 
models registered in August 2004: 
•  92 per cent would not comply with an alternative MEPS based on the next best 
European benchmarks; and 
•  96 per cent would fail the MEPS scheduled for 2007 (Syneca Consulting 
2005b).     




In addition, the regulation impact assessment of MEPS for low pressure and heat 
exchanger water heaters estimated that models accounting for at least 90 per cent of 
existing sales would be removed from the market when the standard was introduced 
(Syneca Consulting 2004). 
In conclusion, the Commission notes that some MEPS have led to a significant 
proportion of models being removed from the Australian market. It is likely that the 
displaced models are cost effective for some individuals, such as those who do not 
use appliances intensively and so cannot justify the added cost of a more efficient 
product.  
Forcing individuals to forgo more highly valued product characteristics 
Given that energy costs account for only a small proportion of household 
expenditure (chapter 6) and a small proportion of total costs faced by the majority 
of firms (chapter 7), it is unlikely that energy efficiency is as highly valued by 
consumers and businesses as are some other appliance characteristics. Where those 
other appliance characteristics come at the cost of lower energy efficiency, 
well-informed individuals could be willing to accept the cost (lower energy 
efficiency) in return for the more highly valued benefit (the relevant appliance 
characteristics).  
For example, a consumer may want to buy a refrigerator with narrower side walls so 
they can fit a bigger capacity model (in terms of internal refrigerated area) into a 
confined space in her/his kitchen. Although a refrigerator with narrower side walls 
could involve less insulation and so require greater energy consumption to maintain 
a desired temperature, a consumer may place a higher value on the benefits (a larger 
refrigerated space) than the associated costs (greater energy use). 
MEPS have the potential to prevent well-informed consumers and producers from 
making such decisions. That is, MEPS could ban products that some consumers and 
producers want to buy, even when they are aware of the lower energy efficiency and 
higher running costs (Jaffe, Newell and Stavins 2005). 
The Victorian Government commented that MEPS ‘constrain consumer and 
producer sovereignty’ on the basis of broader environmental, social and economic 
criteria, including reduced greenhouse gas emissions (sub. DR125, p. 5). This may 
be appropriate, given the role of governments to consider the wellbeing of society 
as a whole. However, MEPS are often promoted by NAEEEC as also being cost 
effective for individuals (NAEEEC 2004c; Harrington and Holt 2003). 
CESA and AEEMA (trans., p. 626) noted that when industry is required to meet a 
new MEPS level, there could be a cost ‘in terms of features forgone’. Despite that,     
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CESA and AEEMA noted that not much has been given way in terms of loss of 
features so far. 
Different MEPS levels are used for three different types of refrigerators (those with 
a top-mounted freezer, a bottom-mounted freezer or a side-by-side configuration). 
This is because the inherent energy consumption of a refrigerator for a given 
capacity depends on its configuration (CESA and AEEMA, trans., pp. 639–640). 
Therefore, MEPS for refrigerators have been set so as to give individuals an 
opportunity to select the style of refrigerator that they want. If the MEPS level were 
applied uniformly across the three styles, there would be far less choice between 
styles of refrigerators. This illustrates that setting the level of MEPS is a complex 
task and, therefore, should be set so as to avoid adverse effects such as the loss of 
product features. In this way, MEPS can allow for consumer choice. However, it is 
important to account for the fact that such an approach will involve an increased 
amount of administration costs. 
Reduced competition 
Another possible cost of MEPS for consumers is that they have the potential to 
reduce competition in the marketplace. This could lead to higher prices than 
otherwise and cause consumers to delay the replacement of very energy inefficient 
appliances (Australian Industry Greenhouse Network, sub. 57; Institute of Public 
Affairs, sub. 6). 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage (sub. 30) acknowledged this 
possibility, but was unaware of any instance where a supplier had withdrawn from 
the Australian market because of MEPS.  
However, one manufacturer told the Commission that it had stopped supplying the 
Australian market with refrigerators in response to a more stringent MEPS 
introduced in January 2005. The manufacturer decided that it was not economic to 
design refrigerators specifically for Australia’s new MEPS. This was confirmed by 
CESA and AEEMA: 
Two were originally pulling out. One of them did pull out, and they were a very small 
player. The other one went back to Japan, modified their products, and, yes, it's still on 
the market. (trans., p. 636) 
Despite this withdrawal, AEEMA stated that there is still an ‘adequate’ level of 
competition: 
Generally, fewer models will be available in all size ranges of single door refrigerators, 
freezers and chest freezers. It is too soon to be sure, but there appears to be enough 
models in the market in each type and size range to maintain an adequate level of     




competition, even though the number of brands and models available will decrease. 
(sub. 85, p. 7) 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage noted that refrigerator MEPS are 
set at a level where an adequate level of competition is maintained: 
NAEEEC made a determined effort to consult with industry on the levels … Without 
that exemplary work, the limits might have been set too low or there might have been 
insufficient competition in several sectors of the market. (sub. DR131, p. 11) 
Notwithstanding this, the Commission considers that, to date, regulation impact 
assessments have not included a sufficiently thorough examination of how a 
proposed new or upgraded standard would affect competition. 
Distributional impacts 
The Institute of Public Affairs (sub. 6) noted that MEPS reduce the availability of 
cheaper products and/or some specialised products that fill particular niches or 
requirements. The Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
acknowledged that MEPS leads to the removal of some products, but claimed that it 
‘will only remove products that leave low-income earners worse off’ 
(sub. DR121, p. 12). 
In relation to air conditioners, MEPS tend to be beneficial for intensive users — 
such as retirees and families with young children — because the fall in operating 
costs more than compensates for the higher capital cost. However, the assessments 
of Australian air conditioner MEPS noted US research showing that cheaper, less 
efficient models are cost effective for less intensive users of air conditioners 
(Syneca Consulting 2003a, 2005b).  
The Department of the Environment and Heritage noted that the distributional 
effects of MEPS differ from those for labelling: 
In labelling, a high proportion of the costs and benefits are borne voluntarily by those 
consumers who use the label to select more efficient products. In MEPS, the costs of 
increased appliance prices are borne by all consumers, even those — usually very few 
— who do not stand to benefit (because their energy prices or energy usage is so low). 
Conversely, the benefits also flow to additional classes of consumers who would not 
benefit from labelling — those who do not purchase their own appliances (eg tenants) 
or who are not label-aware. (sub. 30, p. 16)     
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Sutherland  (2003) found that low-income households bear a disproportionately 
large share of the welfare loss from US minimum energy efficiency standards 
because the standards force cheaper appliances off the market. However, Nadel 
criticised Sutherland’s analysis on two grounds: 
First, the majority of low-income households rent, and hence it is often the landlords 
who purchase the appliances and not the tenants. Second, if low-income people buy 
appliances, they often buy on the used appliance market, where costs are reduced since 
equipment is partly depreciated. (2004, p. 1)  
Nadel’s first point refers to the widely held notion that landlords do not have an 
incentive to install energy efficient appliances that have a high upfront cost because 
the direct benefits accrue to the tenant and not themselves — the split incentive 
problem. The Commission accepts that this might indeed have some effect in such 
situations. 
With respect to Nadel’s second point, what seems to be in dispute is not so much 
that low-income earners do not incur some cost from MEPS, but that this cost will 
be diminished because they purchase second hand rather than new appliances 
(Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd, sub. DR115). 
Nadel (2004, p. 3) also criticised Sutherland for basing his distributional argument 
on the assumption that ‘low-income households have higher discount rates than 
higher-income households’. However, the Commission considers that it is 
reasonable to expect this to be the case, given that such households are more likely 
to be constrained in their access to capital, and their basic needs may not have been 
fully satisfied (appendix F).  
Australian regulation impact assessments typically assume that households do not 
face capital constraints. An energy efficiency investment is usually deemed to be 
cost effective if the additional capital cost is less than the present value of the fall in 
future operating costs. This implicitly assumes that householders do not face a 
constraint on their ability to finance a higher capital cost now in return for a stream 
of returns well into the future. In practice, such constraints do exist, especially for 
low-income households. 
If a household is capital-constrained, then it is rational for it to allocate its available 
capital to what it considers to be the most highly-valued uses of that capital. This 
could involve the purchase of cheaper and less efficient appliances because they 
have a lower capital cost. The Institute of Public Affairs noted that this was the case 
for first home buyers: 
… there are strong reasons why homes built for owner-occupation would incorporate 
fewer energy saving features – the home buyer, at least the first home buyer, is likely to 
be borrowing constrained and will seek to defer unnecessary outlays. (sub. 6, p. 4)     




George Wilkenfeld noted that regulation impact assessments would benefit from 
distributional analyses but this has been constrained by limited data: 
In the United States, there are excellent data accumulated over time on matching 
energy use to household structure and household income. That data set doesn’t yet exist 
in Australia, but we have recognised the value of developing this so we can actually 
better analyse distributional issues. (trans., pp. 545–546) 
In relation to regulation impact assessments, distributional analyses are a 
requirement under the COAG guidelines for regulation (COAG 2004). In addition, 
the Department of the Environment and Heritage (sub. DR131) stated that the 
analysis of distributional impacts will be recommended in a manual for preparing 
regulation impact statements for NAEEEC.  
Potential increase in embodied energy consumption 
In designing MEPS, the objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions is confined 
to the energy consumption of the appliance. However, energy embodied in the 
manufacturing materials may also be relevant when the energy used in the 
manufacturing process forms a significant part of the appliance’s whole-of-life 
energy consumption (assuming that higher energy efficiency will lead to a higher 
level of embodied energy). This may have an adverse impact on the private cost 
effectiveness of an energy efficiency measure if more embodied energy leads to a 
higher purchase cost. 
Net benefits of MEPS 
It is not possible to say that the benefits of MEPS always outweigh the costs, or 
vice-versa. Whether there is a net benefit has to be judged on a case-by-case basis, 
and requires quantification of the various benefits and costs. This quantification is 
important because ‘MEPS is a relatively interventionist form of regulation and as 
such it is important that any standards are supported by clear and unambiguous 
benefits’ (Origin Energy, sub. DR129, p. 10). 
Regulation impact assessments of Australia’s household appliance, and commercial 
and industrial appliance MEPS have predicted that the benefits substantially 
outweigh the costs (table 5.6). Examples are summarised in boxes 9.1 and 9.2. In a 
recent assessment of all labels and MEPS administered by NAEEEC, George 
Wilkenfeld and Associates (2005b) projected a net benefit of $4.8 billion in present 
value terms during 2005–20 (using a 10 per cent discount rate).      
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Box 9.1  Predicted impacts of MEPS for residential appliances 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates and Energy Efficient Strategies (1999) estimated 
the combined impact of: 
•  imposing MEPS for refrigerators, freezers and electric hot water heaters; and 
•  introducing model regulations in each State and Territory that extended the use of 
mandatory energy labelling requirements to Tasmania and the ACT, and slightly 
increased the scope of NSW labelling requirements. 
It was estimated that, over the period 1999 to 2015, consumers would incur an 
additional cost in buying appliances of $954 million in present value terms (using a 
discount rate of 4 per cent). The present value of the associated fall in energy costs 
was valued at $2287 million. Thus, the proposed package of regulations was found to 
generate a significant net benefit for householders. It was estimated that the proposed 
MEPS would generate significant net benefits for householders even if labelling 
regulations were not changed. 
More recently, George Wilkenfeld and Associates (2005b) projected the impact of 
MEPS and labelling over the period 2005–20. The study estimated an overall net 
benefit from labelling and MEPS of $4.8 billion and a benefit–cost ratio of 1.7 (using a 
10 per cent discount rate). The study also estimated the additional (unvalued) benefits 
from the anticipated reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to be 204 megatonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent. 
Syneca Consulting (2003a) evaluated the impact of lowering the maximum permitted 
heat loss for low pressure and heat exchanger water heaters by 30 per cent. It argued 
that individuals generally fail to recognise that standing losses from electric water 
heaters — energy lost directly to the atmosphere from the storage tank — typically cost 
more over the life of the heater than its installation cost. Accordingly, it estimated that 
the proposed standard for low pressure and heat exchanger water heaters would 
generate a $19.4 million benefit for users that was more than double its cost of 
$9.3  million (in present value terms using a 5 per cent discount rate). Syneca 
Consulting (2003a) also estimated that the introduction of MEPS for single phase air-
conditioners would generate benefits for users of $102 million and costs of $34 million 
(in present value terms using a 5 per cent discount rate). 
The most recent regulation impact assessment of MEPS for air conditioners estimated 
the impacts of increasing MEPS to an intermediate level (based on European 
benchmarks) and to the South Korean world’s best practice level (Syneca Consulting 
2005b). The net benefit for users was estimated to be $12.5 million for the intermediate 
level and $82 million for the world’s best practice level (in present value terms using a 
10 per cent discount rate). 
 
     




Box 9.2  Predicted impacts of MEPS for commercial and industrial 
appliances 
Electric motors are responsible for the majority of electricity consumption in the 
industrial sector. Electric motors are estimated to account for about 30 per cent of total 
electricity consumption in Australia. The MEPS for electric motors with a power rating 
of 0.73 kilowatts – 185 kilowatts was introduced in 2001 and will remain in force until 
2006. A regulation impact assessment prepared for the current MEPS estimated that 
the policy would result in benefits which are 80 per cent greater than the costs (Syneca 
Consulting 2003b). A new standard which will operate in 2006–12 has already been 
developed. A regulation impact assessment assessed the benefits of the proposed 
MEPS to be between two and five times greater than the costs (Syneca 
Consulting 2003b). 
Fluorescent lamp ballasts are components used in linear fluorescent lighting which is 
the most common form of lighting in commercial buildings in Australia. Ballasts provide 
suitable conditions for lamp start up and limit the electrical current during normal lamp 
operation. The MEPS for fluorescent lamp ballasts were introduced in 2003. The 
regulation impact assessment estimated that the MEPS provided a net benefit of 
$471  million such that benefits outweighed the costs by 20  per cent (George 
Wilkenfeld and Associates 2001a). 
 
 
However, these assessments give little if any attention to a range of issues that could 
substantially influence the net benefits of MEPS. These issues include the potential 
for MEPS to remove appliances from the market that are more cost effective for 
some individuals, force consumers to forgo product characteristics that they value 
more highly than energy efficiency, and reduce competition. An assessment of the 
net benefits of MEPS also requires that adequate attention be given to the discount 
rate that individuals use in assessing private cost effectiveness. 
One of the most crucial issues when assessing the net benefits of MEPS is the 
estimation of the BAU scenario. As noted previously, some improvement in energy 
efficiency could be expected in the absence of MEPS, so it is very difficult to 
isolate the MEPS effect. This is because once a MEPS is implemented, ‘the BAU 
scenario disappears’ (George Wilkenfeld 2001b, p. 4).  
The BAU scenario for any MEPS should make provision for the impact of labelling 
(figure 9.2), technological developments in Australia and overseas, changes in 
energy prices and an increase in consumer demand for energy-efficient appliances. 
An increase in demand for energy efficiency might be expected as the community 
becomes more conscious of energy efficiency in response to labelling and rising 
environmental awareness (for example, through media coverage on climate change).     
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Most assessments of MEPS to date have tended to assume that a new level of MEPS 
will lead to a step change in energy efficiency that will be maintained over the life 
of the MEPS — that is, the two competing scenarios (BAU versus the new MEPS) 
never converge (figure 9.3a). However, if MEPS bring forward some of the 
efficiency improvements that would have otherwise occurred, a more plausible 
situation would be that the BAU scenario ‘catches up’ to the MEPS scenario at 
some stage in the future (figure 9.3b). Such a scenario would allow for overseas 
market developments and the influence of MEPS adopted by Australia’s trading 
partners.  




The net benefit of a new (or tightened) MEPS will also depend on the discount 
rate(s) used in calculating the present value of the benefits and costs (appendix F). 
Assessing a policy from a social perspective requires the use of a social discount 
rate, whilst assessing the policy from a private perspective requires the use of a 
potentially different private discount rate(s) (appendix F). Yet it appears that most 
regulation impact assessments assumed that the average private discount rate is 
equal to the estimated social discount rate (chapter 5). In practice, private discount 
rates probably vary across individuals and, on average, do not equal the estimated 
social discount rate. 
While overall community wellbeing should be the test by which any regulatory 
proposal is assessed, private cost effectiveness has also been used as a justification 
for MEPS (NAEEEC 2004c). If this is to continue to be the case, greater attention 
time  time 
kWh/year  kWh/year 
BAU scenario MEPS scenario 
a  b     




needs to be given to using discount rates that will allow a more accurate assessment 
from the private perspective of the consumers affected.  
Given the above considerations, the net benefits of MEPS to individual consumers 
and producers estimated in regulation impact assessments are probably overstated. 
The problems associated with BAU scenarios and discount rates means that a more 
rigorous assessment of MEPS is required. 
9.4  Are other market interventions better? 
Policy makers need to consider whether policies other than MEPS would be more 
cost effective. There are four possible options:  
•  voluntary MEPS  
•  voluntary energy-performance labels 
•  mandatory energy-performance labels 
•  mandatory disendorsement labels.  
These options are not necessarily mutually exclusive and, in some instances, it may 
be appropriate to use more than one measure. 
Voluntary MEPS 
A view expressed by some policy makers and their advisers is that MEPS cannot be 
effective unless they are mandatory. For instance, the Department of the 
Environment and Heritage claimed that there is little incentive for firms to 
unilaterally volunteer to adopt MEPS: 
The reasons why no individual firm would unilaterally introduce MEPS are the same as 
for labelling but more so. The costs to the producer are higher than for labelling, since 
not only do product designs have to change physically, but the only conceivable 
competitive advantage to the supplier is from publicising its actions and convincing 
buyers that it is a reason to prefer its products — i.e. the same costs as for a ‘private’ 
labelling regime. On the other hand the risks of ‘private’ MEPS are also higher, since 
the first mover places itself at a product price disadvantage. (sub. 30, p. 18) 
The regulation impact assessment of MEPS for refrigerators, freezers and electric 
water heaters assumed that voluntary standards would not be effective because it ‘is 
unlikely to be commercially advantageous for suppliers’ and ‘there would always be 
a risk that competitors would not comply’ (George Wilkenfeld and Associates and 
Energy Efficient Strategies 1999, p. 3). However, an international review of energy 
policies by the World Energy Council (2004) concluded that voluntary agreements     
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between manufacturers and governments can be an effective alternative to MEPS, 
provided they are accompanied by a credible threat of regulation. 
The key issue seems to be that voluntary and mandatory standards do different 
things. Mandatory standards remove the least efficient models from the market. 
Voluntary standards tend to be used by suppliers to market more efficient models. 
This can be done in conjunction with a voluntary (endorsement) label. An example 
is the voluntary Energy Star label, which suppliers of office equipment and home 
electronics can use if they adopt the Energy Star standards (appendix E). 
The case for mandatory standards appears to be strongest when split incentives 
typically cause individuals to use products that are very cost ineffective. In such 
cases, appliance suppliers have little incentive to adopt a voluntary standard to raise 
energy efficiency, and energy-performance labels may have little impact on 
purchase decisions. A possible example is water heaters in new houses, which 
builders may select on the basis of capital cost, rather than the running costs borne 
by consumers (Syneca Consulting 2004). However, this example needs to be kept in 
perspective. If higher energy efficiency is important to a home buyer, they would be 
willing to pay an extra upfront cost to their builder for ongoing energy savings.  
Voluntary energy-performance labels 
A voluntary scheme would allow different varieties of appliances to circulate in the 
market — those conforming with a standard could be labelled and those not 
conforming with it do not require a label, but could still be sold (WTO 2005).  
NAEEEC already administers variations on this approach: 
•  Electric water heaters can have a voluntary energy rating label, provided the 
label follows the Standardised Information Disclosure requirements developed 
by NAEEEC. These requirements apply to products that do not have to be 
labelled, but must still undergo an energy-performance test to satisfy a minimum 
energy performance standard. Thus, this combines a mandatory minimum 
energy performance standard with voluntary labelling. 
•  Appliances that receive the Top Energy Saver Award can use a special award 
label specified by NAEEEC (appendix E). This is an endorsement label designed 
to enable consumers to identify the most energy-efficient electrical and gas 
appliances on the market (figure 9.4). Alternatively, suppliers of electrical 
appliances can note the award in a green bar at the bottom of the standard energy 
rating label.     




Figure 9.4  Sample endorsement label for the Top Energy Saver Award 
 
Source: NAEEEC (2004b). 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates (2003a) noted that Australia’s voluntary water 
efficiency labelling scheme has been used by few suppliers, and those that have 
used it tend to only label their better performing products. This voluntary labelling 
scheme will be fully replaced by a mandatory labelling scheme next year.2 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage stated that voluntary labelling 
should be seen as a supplement, rather than a substitute to a mandatory scheme 
(sub. 30, p. 18).  
Voluntary labels tend to be more useful for endorsing the most efficient models, 
rather than helping consumers to rank the cost effectiveness of different models. 
Without compulsion, suppliers are unlikely to label less efficient models.  
Mandatory energy-performance labels as a substitute for MEPS 
In Australia, MEPS are often applied to appliances that are also required to have an 
energy-performance label (table 9.1). This raises the question of why it is necessary 
                                              
2 From 1 July 2006, the Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards (WELS) scheme will require 
mandatory labelling for various products including clothes washers and dishwashers. Currently, 
products can be registered and labelled under the WELS scheme on a voluntary basis.     
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to restrict consumer choice if the less interventionist (and hence probably less 
costly) approach of labelling is as effective as a stand-alone policy. 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage observed that MEPS can be more 
effective than labelling because: 
… MEPS … do not rely on the mechanisms of consumer awareness and choice and 
supplier response to consumer preference, which are all highly variable. (sub. 30, p. 16) 
Similarly, the Energy Retailers’ Association of Australia noted: 
Placing liability on product manufacturers to ensure that products comply with 
minimum efficiency standards … is an efficient way of realising energy efficiency 
gains without the need to rely on consumer behavioural change. (sub. 26, p. 40) 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates and Energy Efficient Strategies (1999) claimed 
that labelling is unlikely to be effective if: 
•  purchasers rarely inspect appliances in a showroom where they can compare 
energy performance across different models; or 
•  the purchaser is not the ultimate user, and so has little interest in operating costs 
(split incentives). 
These conditions often apply for water heaters. As a result, NAEEEC has made 
MEPS mandatory for electric water heaters and labelling voluntary. However, it is 
less likely that other appliances subject to mandatory MEPS (air conditioners, 
refrigerators and freezers) would satisfy these conditions for mandatory labelling to 
be ineffective. Hence, for those appliances, there is a stronger case for using 
mandatory labelling. Nevertheless, NAEEEC and the AGA have imposed both 
mandatory MEPS/minimum safety standards and labelling requirements for those 
appliances.  
Disendorsement labels 
Another option is the use of disendorsement (warning/negative) labels for 
appliances that would otherwise be prohibited by MEPS. Such a label would have 
to be mandatory because no supplier would volunteer to use a label that discouraged 
customers from buying its products.  
Consumer research commissioned by the AGO suggests that a disendorsement label 
warning consumers that an appliance is very inefficient could be effective: 
Many different ways of informing consumers about ... inefficient appliances were 
tested during the current study, including a series of mock-up labels. The general 
message ... is that consumers will react positively to a label which informs them that a 
particular ... appliance is inefficient. (Winton 2003, p. 71)     




Many participants in that consumer research considered the tested warning labels to 
be extreme, and questioned why such appliances would be allowed to be sold 
(Winton 2003). This suggests that disendorsement labels would discourage most 
consumers from buying the least energy-efficient appliances, and so have a similar 
effect to a mandatory standard that removed those appliances from the market. 
However, a key difference is that disendorsement labels would not prevent a 
consumer from buying a less efficient appliance when that is the most cost-effective 
option for them, or they have a strong preference to buy such an appliance. 
Therefore, disendorsement labels are less likely to force individuals to forgo 
product features they value more highly than energy efficiency, remove products 
from the market that are more cost effective for some individuals, and to have 
regressive distributional impacts. 
AEEMA (sub. DR118) preferred MEPS to disendorsement labels because 
disendorsement labels do not deal with the problem of split incentives. However, it 
noted that disendorsement labels may be appropriate for products that have a niche 
market. 
Australian, State and Territory Governments have already agreed to introduce 
mandatory disendorsement labels for water-consuming products, such as shower 
heads that have a flow rate above a certain level (George Wilkenfeld and Associates 
2003a). High-flow shower heads have not been banned, given that water efficient 
models are unsuitable for homes with low hot water pressure. The water 
disendorsement label shows that the product is ‘zero star rated’, which indicates that 
the product does not comply with the minimum standard (figure 9.5). 
The Ministerial Council on Energy has previously agreed to use disendorsement 
labels for electrical appliances, if such labels are found to be an effective way to 
reduce standby power consumption. However, this option has not been pursued by 
NAEEEC.  
Disendorsement labels were also considered as part of the MEPS arrangements for 
electric water heaters. The suppliers had proposed a tradeoff in which small electric 
water heaters not satisfying the MEPS could remain on the market if they had a 
disendorsement label — and in return, other heaters manufactured by those 
suppliers would be more efficient than required by the MEPS. The rationale for the 
proposal was that small inefficient water heaters were required in situations where a 
more efficient (and necessarily larger) unit would not fit. Ultimately, suppliers 
decided not to pursue the proposal.     
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Figure 9.5  Sample disendorsement label for the Water Efficiency Labelling 
and Standards Scheme 
 
Source: Department of the Environment and Heritage.  
 
Future regulation impact assessments of appliance minimum energy performance 
standards (MEPS) should include a more comprehensive analysis of: 
•  whether MEPS reduce competition and how this affects prices and service 
quality; 
•  why individuals — with guidance from an energy-performance label — are 
not best placed to judge what is in their best interests;  
•  whether a disendorsement label and/or voluntary standard would be a more 
cost-effective policy; and 
•  the distributional impacts, including the extent to which MEPS are regressive 
and prevent consumers from buying products that are more cost effective for 
them. 
The extent to which individuals are forced to forgo product features they value 
more highly than energy efficiency should also be reported in regulation impact 
assessments if MEPS are to continue to be promoted as privately cost effective. 
RECOMMENDATION 9.1     




 10  Building ratings and standards 
 
Key points 
•  Mandatory ratings and standards for building energy efficiency have been adopted, 
or are planned to be introduced, across Australia.  
•  While the objective of these policies is to raise the wellbeing of society as a whole, 
governments often promote them as also being privately cost effective. 
•  It is unclear whether mandatory ratings for existing buildings deliver a net benefit to 
individuals. To date, building ratings have only been mandated for dwellings in the 
ACT, and that scheme has not been subject to an ex post evaluation. However, 
preliminary evidence suggests that the ACT scheme has been ineffective and 
costly. The Commission supports the Australian Government’s plans to evaluate the 
ACT scheme before building ratings are mandated elsewhere. 
•  Mandatory energy efficiency standards for new buildings currently apply across 
Australia, with the precise requirements often varying between jurisdictions. There is 
considerable uncertainty about how effective these standards have been in reducing 
energy consumption, and whether they have been cost effective for individuals: 
–  current standards have not been subject to ex post evaluation; 
–  many questionable assumptions were used in regulation impact assessments to 
predict energy savings and financial impacts; 
–  numerous problems have become evident in implementing the standards;  
–  various recent surveys show that compliance costs are much higher than predicted 
in regulation impact assessments; and 
–  important issues, such as the consequences of heterogeneity among individuals 
and buildings, the loss of building features that individuals value more than energy 
efficiency, and the potential discouragement of innovation and productivity growth, 
have been largely overlooked by policy makers. 
•  To aid better-informed policy making, the Commission recommends that the 
Australian Building Codes Board should, as a matter of urgency, commission an 
independent ex post evaluation of energy efficiency standards for new buildings to 
determine: 
–   how effective the standards have been in reducing energy consumption; and 
–   whether the financial benefits to individuals outweigh the associated costs. 
•  This evaluation should include the standards for residential buildings in New South 
Wales (BASIX), Victoria (5 star) and the ACT (ACTHERS), as well as the national 
standards in the Building Code of Australia. 
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Mandatory building energy efficiency ratings and standards have been adopted, or 
are planned to be introduced, across Australia. While the objective of these policies 
is to raise the wellbeing of society as a whole, governments often promote them as 
also being beneficial for individuals (for example, Victorian Government nd).  
This chapter considers whether building ratings and standards are indeed cost 
effective for individual producers and consumers. 
10.1  Do individuals overlook cost-effective building 
improvements? 
As noted in earlier chapters, imperfect information and split incentives may cause 
individuals to overlook energy efficiency improvements that are cost effective for 
them. Both of these barriers could exist in the building market.  
Imperfect information could be a barrier if a buyer does not have sufficient 
technical expertise to determine a building’s energy efficiency. Split incentives are 
most often associated with residential buildings — particularly rental 
accommodation — and a recent ABS  (2005a) survey of energy use appears to 
support this view (chapter 6).  
An additional constraint on the adoption of energy efficiency improvements is the 
relatively small size of potential cost savings. As noted in earlier chapters, energy 
use accounts for a small proportion of expenditure by most producers and 
consumers. Thus, in many cases, what appears to be rewarding in monetary terms 
may not be cost effective after individuals take account of the time and effort 
required. 
Many inquiry participants observed that it is technically feasible to increase the 
energy efficiency of buildings above their current levels. However, only a limited 
number of participants provided evidence to support the assertion that individual 
producers and consumers typically fail to adopt building energy efficiency 
improvements when it would be cost effective for them to do so. 
The Australian Glass and Glazing Association (AGGA) submitted estimates of the 
impacts of more energy-efficient glazing for two different project homes offered by 
Simonds in Victoria: 
… two homes were drawn from the Simonds range of designs, the first being a medium 
sized home, rating 3.5 stars with ordinary glazing or 5 stars with energy-efficient 
glazing. The second example was a larger sized residence rating 3 stars with ordinary 
glazing and 5 stars with energy-efficient glazing …     




The two homes were … simulated on the basis that heating as well as cooling was 
electric … Under this scenario, reduction in energy usage for the medium sized home 
amounted to 2180  kWh when energy-efficient glazing was used and generated 
greenhouse gas emissions savings of 2921 kg. For the larger house, annual energy 
savings were 8178 kWh and reduction in greenhouse gas emissions was 10 960 kg. 
(sub. 16, pp. 1–2) 
The Association estimated that the additional cost of the more energy-efficient 
windows could be recouped by energy cost savings within five years (table 10.1). 
Table 10.1  Cost effectiveness of energy-efficient windows for particular 
project homes 
  Units Glenwood  2201a Toscana  4001b 
Additional cost of windowsc  $ 1620  5400 
Annual energy cost savingd $/year  327  1226 
Payback periode years  5.0  4.4 
a The Glenwood 2001 is a single storey dwelling with a floor area of 21 squares. b The Toscana 4001 is a 
double storey dwelling with a floor area of 30 squares. c For the Glenwood 2201, windows are upgraded from 
a 3.5 to 5 star rating. For the Toscana 4001, windows are upgraded from 3 to 5 stars. d Energy cost savings 
for homes with electric heating and cooling. e Number of years it takes for cumulative savings in running costs 
to compensate for the increase in capital costs, assuming that the benefit from having a dollar today is the 
same as having a dollar in the future. 
Source: Australian Glass and Glazing Association. 
Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd (sub. 18, pp. 6–8) noted its involvement in two 
household energy efficiency programs that had been successful in achieving higher 
energy efficiency and lower greenhouse gas emissions. In terms of cost 
effectiveness for householders, a survey of participants in one of the programs 
revealed that almost all participants saw cost as the key barrier to implementing 
energy efficiency improvements. The Foundation did, however, provide examples 
of cost-effective energy efficiency improvements, which are summarised in 
table 10.2. 
In conclusion, there is evidence to suggest that individual producers and consumers 
have not implemented the full range of building energy efficiency improvements 
that appear to be cost effective for them. This could be due to information barriers, 
split incentives, or the small size of the cost savings in monetary terms.     
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Table 10.2  Cost effectiveness of selected energy efficiency improvements 
  Additional 
capital cost   




 $  $  years 
Lighting     
Compact fluorescent lampb  5 18  0.3 
Ceramic metal halide lampc 11 9  1.2 
     
Showerheadsd     
A 5  90  0.1 
AAA 35  135  0.3 
     
R3.5 ceiling insulation     
Currently has no insulation  1026  198 – 384  5.1 – 2.6 
Currently has R2 insulatione  571  124 – 240  4.6 – 2.3 
     
Solar hot water system     
Electric-boosted solarf 2874  339  8.4 
Gas-boosted solarg 3880  238  16.3 
a Number of years it takes for cumulative savings in running costs to compensate for the increase in capital 
costs, assuming that the benefit from having a dollar today is the same as having a dollar in the future. 
b Compared to an incandescent lamp. c  Compared to a halogen lamp. d  Compared to a standard 
showerhead. Fall in running cost does not include reduction in water bills. e Assuming existing insulation can 
be ‘topped up’ to achieve a higher standard. f Compared to an off-peak electric storage heater. g Compared to 
a 2 star gas heater.  
Source: Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd (sub. DR115, attachment 1). 
10.2  Energy efficiency ratings for existing buildings 
The Australian, State and Territory Governments have announced their intention to 
make it mandatory in all jurisdictions to disclose a building’s energy efficiency at 
the time of sale or lease (MCE 2004c). This was a Stage One measure of the 
National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE) and it applies to both residential 
and nonresidential buildings. 
Mandating energy ratings for existing buildings is seen as a way to overcome the 
difficulty that purchasers and tenants face in determining the energy efficiency of a 
building. By making purchasers and tenants better informed, it is thought that they 
will be willing to pay for energy efficiency features. This will in turn encourage 
building owners to invest in such measures. 
The Australian Conservation Foundation (sub. 24) and the Insulation Council of 
Australia and New Zealand (ICANZ, sub. 14) supported mandatory energy ratings 
at the time of sale and lease of residential buildings. The ACT already has such a     




requirement. Since 1999, anyone wishing to sell an existing dwelling in the ACT 
has had to obtain an energy efficiency rating assessment (appendix D). The energy 
efficiency rating has to be disclosed in all advertisements and the contract of sale. 
The Housing Industry Association (sub. 27) considered that not enough evidence 
was available to assess whether the ACT energy-rating scheme had been 
worthwhile. In contrast, ICANZ (sub.  14) viewed the ACT scheme favourably 
because houses with a higher star rating were observed to be more expensive to 
purchase. But this correlation between energy ratings and prices does not prove that 
higher energy efficiency causes home buyers to pay higher prices. There are many 
other possible explanations. To determine whether energy ratings have an impact, it 
is necessary to undertake an econometric analysis that isolates the effects of energy 
ratings from the many other factors that can determine house prices. To the 
Commission’s knowledge, no such analysis has been undertaken yet.  
A government-sponsored study of the ACT home energy-rating scheme was 
conducted in 2001 (George Wilkenfeld and Associates, Artcraft Research and 
Energy Partners 2001). The study concluded that it was not possible at that time to 
establish whether the scheme had been effective in increasing residential energy 
efficiency. The study did, however, find some major problems: 
•  about a quarter of homes were advertised without an energy rating;  
•  only 39 per cent of surveyed home buyers received an energy-rating report prior 
to exchanging contracts (20  per  cent received the report on the same day as 
contracts were exchanged, 13 per cent received the report after the exchange of 
contracts, and 28 per cent said they did not receive a rating report); 
•  52 per cent of surveyed home buyers and 39 per cent of surveyed sellers did not 
find the energy-rating report useful; 
•  about half of the ratings were made by an assessor who had not visited the 
property;  
•  there were instances where sellers had deliberately inflated their rating by giving 
false or exaggerated data to the assessor; and 
•  some people were confused about home energy ratings, incorrectly thinking that 
they covered the energy efficiency of heating and cooling appliances. 
The Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy (ABCSE, sub. DR121) 
commented that the ACT scheme was a good idea, but there had been problems in 
practice because the scheme had not been adequately promoted, did not include the 
efficiency of fixed equipment, and ratings were difficult to interpret in real estate 
advertisements.     
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The Department of the Environment and Heritage (sub. DR131) advised that an ex 
post evaluation of the ACT home energy-rating scheme will be undertaken before 
implementing the Ministerial Council on Energy decision to mandate building 
energy ratings across Australia. The Commission supports this approach.  
It is not clear that energy-rating schemes for existing dwellings would deliver a net 
benefit (see, for example, the modest gains found by Gilmer (1989) for US house 
energy labelling). They impose administrative and compliance costs that inevitably 
get passed on, at least to some extent, to tenants and home buyers. Furthermore, it is 
questionable whether energy ratings are effective in increasing the adoption of 
energy efficiency measures. As noted in chapter 6, energy costs account for a very 
small part of expenditure by most households. Therefore, the decision to rent or 
purchase a dwelling is likely to be driven more by other considerations, such as the 
general amenity of the property and its proximity to schools, shops and workplaces.  
The effectiveness of home energy ratings is also questionable because it is 
debatable whether energy performance can be measured accurately. George 
Wilkenfeld and Associates (2003a) noted some of the constraints on developing 
useful energy-performance ratings for homes: 
•  … The use of ratings as a guide to the purchase of existing dwellings … is limited by 
the fact that almost every dwelling is unique in its location, quality, affordability and 
suitability for the buyer. 
•  Unlike appliance ratings, house ratings cannot directly indicate probable resource 
consumption, running cost or environmental impacts. Those will depend on whether 
there is any heating or cooling equipment installed at all, its energy type and efficiency, 
and the patterns of use … 
•  Unlike appliance rating claims, which can be tested in the laboratory, house rating 
claims cannot be directly tested, even after a house is built. (It is even difficult to 
establish that a house has been built fully in accordance with the approved design). 
(George Wilkenfeld and Associates 2003a, pp. 34–5) 
An alternative to mandating energy-performance ratings for existing dwellings, 
which may be more cost effective, is a voluntary rating scheme. The Australian 
Window Association (sub. 59) advised that it had developed a voluntary Window 
Energy Rating Scheme with assistance from the Australian Greenhouse Office 
(AGO) (appendix D). The scheme uses star ratings to indicate a window’s energy 
efficiency. Voluntary rating schemes also exist for commercial and industrial 
buildings (chapter 7). 
A voluntary rating scheme has the disadvantage that there is little incentive for 
building owners to use it unless their building is likely to get a favourable rating. In 
contrast, mandatory ratings could enable building purchasers and tenants to 
compare the energy efficiency of any prospective building against that of any other     




building offered for sale or lease. Whether this advantage outweighs the increased 
costs of a mandatory approach relative to a voluntary rating scheme is difficult to 
judge.  
To further inform policy makers about the merits of mandatory ratings, the 
Commission therefore supports an evaluation of the existing ACT scheme, 
particularly to determine: 
•  the accuracy of home energy ratings in predicting the relative energy efficiency 
of different dwellings for a given home buyer or tenant; and 
•  the costs, benefits and effectiveness of the scheme, taking account of the diverse 
preferences and financial circumstances of individual home buyers. 
The Australian Greenhouse Office plans to commission an ex post evaluation of the 
ACT home energy-rating scheme on behalf of all Australian governments. The 
results should inform the Ministerial Council on Energy decision to mandate 
building energy ratings across Australia. 
10.3  Minimum energy efficiency standards for new 
buildings 
Mandatory energy efficiency standards are applied to new residential and 
commercial buildings, with the precise requirements often varying between 
jurisdictions. As part of the NFEE Stage One measures announced by the 
Ministerial Council on Energy  (MCE 2004c), Australian, State and Territory 
Governments have indicated their intention to make such standards nationally 
consistent. This section describes current and proposed energy efficiency standards 
for buildings. 
Building Code of Australia 
At the national level, building energy efficiency standards are specified in the 
Building Code of Australia (detailed in appendix D). The Building Code currently 
includes mandatory energy efficiency standards for single dwellings (class 1); other 
residential buildings, such as apartment buildings, hotels and motels (class 2–4); 
and related structures, such as garages (class 10). Energy efficiency standards for 
other (class 5–9) buildings — including offices, shops, warehouses, factories and 
public health buildings —  will be included in the Building Code in 2006. 
FINDING 10.1     
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The Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB), which is responsible for 
maintaining the Building Code, stated that energy efficiency standards help to 
overcome the information and split incentive problems that people face when 
buying a dwelling (sub. 7). However, the objective of the Building Code’s energy 
efficiency standards is to ‘reduce greenhouse gas emissions by efficiently using 
energy’ (Building Code of Australia 2004 (volume 2), s.O2.6). This could be used 
to justify increases in energy efficiency that are not cost effective for individual 
producers or consumers. 
Prescriptive and performance-based compliance methods 
Compliance with the Building Code’s energy efficiency standards can be 
demonstrated by using prescriptive ‘deemed-to-satisfy’ construction methods and 
materials detailed in the Building Code. The ABCB (sub. 7) noted that most 
building designers use the deemed-to-satisfy approach.  
Alternatively, compliance can be demonstrated by using a performance-based 
verification method to show that a building’s annual heating and/or cooling load 
will not exceed a specified level. An annual heating/cooling load is the quantity of 
energy that has to be delivered/removed from a space over a year in order to 
maintain a desired temperature.  
For houses, there are three performance-based verification approaches that can be 
used instead of the deemed-to-satisfy provisions: 
1.  Demonstrate that the predicted annual heating and/or cooling load (requirements 
vary between climate zones) does not exceed that of a ‘reference building’ in the 
same location. The Building Code details the characteristics of the relevant 
reference building. 
2.  In northern climate zones, demonstrate that the predicted annual energy load 
(combined heating and cooling load) does not exceed the maximum permitted 
load for the relevant location (specified in table V2.6.1 (volume 2) of the 
Building Code of Australia 2004). 
3.  Show that the building achieves an energy (star) rating that is no lower than a 
specified minimum, based on its predicted annual energy load. The rating has to 
be determined in accordance with the ABCB (2005d) Protocol for House Energy 
Rating Software. This requires an algorithm that takes account of climate and 
how specific design features affect energy performance. 
In essence, new houses built in northern climate zones are required to achieve a 
3.5 star rating, while houses in southern climate zones are required to achieve a 
4  star rating. A lower rating is permitted in northern climate zones because the     




rating algorithms available when the standards were formulated did not adequately 
account for the benefits of natural ventilation in hot climates. The ABCB (2004d) 
noted that work is being undertaken to address this issue. 
The current minimum 3.5 star standard for houses in the Building Code was chosen 
because some jurisdictions already had a requirement that residential developments 
achieve a 3.5 star rating. It was considered: 
… unreasonable to consider options that are weaker than those already implemented in 
some jurisdictions, given the policy direction from Government, which is to ‘improve 
energy efficiency’. (ABCB 2002, p. vi) 
This suggests that the level of the building energy efficiency standards has not been 
based on a consideration of what is most cost effective among all possible 
standards. The regulation impact statement for the current standards acknowledged 
that no attempt had been made to select the minimum required star rating that would 
lead to the greatest net benefit (ABCB 2002). This was seen as being impractical 
because of: 
… the lack of available information about the intensity of heating and cooling demand 
in specific climate zones. It is not enough to know how many households use space 
conditioners; it is also necessary to know how intensively that equipment is used. 
(ABCB 2002, p. vi). 
This raises questions about whether the energy efficiency standards in the Building 
Code are based on sound evidence. 
Upgrading of Building Code standards 
Since the energy efficiency standards for houses were adopted in January 2003, 
some jurisdictions have announced that they will require a higher minimum star 
rating than required under the Building Code. The ABCB (2004d) responded by 
initiating a review of the stringency of the Building Code’s energy efficiency 
standards. It has now proposed that the minimum required energy rating for houses 
in all climate zones be raised to 5 stars in the May 2006 edition of the Building 
Code. This proposal is currently subject to a regulation impact assessment 
(ABCB 2005b). 
In light of this, it appears that the stringency of the Building Code’s housing 
requirements has again been driven largely by a desire to catch up to the most 
stringent State or Territory standard. 
The ABCB (2005a) has indicated that standards for class 5–9 buildings will also be 
increased in stages, and this will be done in light of experience with the initial 
measures and after industry has adapted to those changes.     
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State and Territory standards for residential buildings 
In essence, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania and the 
Northern Territory have adopted the national energy efficiency standards in the 
Building Code.1 The exceptions are New South Wales, Victoria and the ACT, 
which have implemented their own energy efficiency requirements for residential 
buildings. 
In New South Wales, all new single and dual occupancy dwellings must be certified 
under the Building Sustainability Index (BASIX) scheme. From 1 October 2005, the 
BASIX scheme will also cover new multi-unit residential developments, and from 
1 July 2006, all residential alterations and additions. 
In order for a building to be certified under BASIX, thermal comfort and energy 
indices have to be calculated, and the value of these indices must be within 
prescribed bounds.  
The BASIX thermal comfort index measures the thermal performance of a 
building’s fabric. It is derived by either using simulation software to estimate a 
building’s heating and cooling loads, or by demonstrating compliance with 
prescriptive ‘deemed-to-comply’ building materials and methods. Designers also 
have access to an ‘expert opinion’ compliance route if a building’s heating and 
cooling loads cannot be simulated by software. At the time of writing this report, 
the deemed-to-comply method was only available for basic single storey dwellings. 
The NSW Government intends to eventually make the deemed-to-comply approach 
available to a wider range of building types.  
The BASIX energy index is used as an indicator of actual energy use and emissions. 
It is derived by taking account of factors such as installed appliances and floor area, 
as well as the thermal performance of a building’s fabric. This is a key difference 
from the building energy efficiency standards applied in other jurisdictions, which 
focus on the thermal performance of a building’s fabric. 
In Victoria, most new houses are required to achieve a 5 star rating for building 
fabric, and have either a solar hot water heater system or a rain water tank 
connected to all sanitary flushing systems (Victorian Building Commission 2005). 
The exceptions are houses of timber floor or earthwall construction, which until 
30 April 2006 can be constructed to achieve either a 5 star rating for building fabric, 
or a 4 star rating and have either a solar water heater system or a rain water tank 
connected to all sanitary flushing systems. For class 2 buildings (those containing 
                                              
1 The Queensland Government (2004a) has proposed additional energy efficiency requirements for 
residential buildings.     




two or more separate dwellings), an average 5 star rating is required for the whole 
building, and each sole occupancy dwelling within the building must not achieve a 
rating of less than 3 stars. 
In most cases, a software package is used to demonstrate compliance with Victorian 
housing standards. The exception is the interim 4 star option for houses of timber 
floor or earthwall construction, which can be satisfied by following the deemed-to-
satisfy provisions of the Building Code. Two software packages have been 
approved for use in Victoria (FirstRate and NatHERS). The rating scores generated 
by FirstRate are based on the energy loads predicted by NatHERS (Nationwide 
House Energy Rating Scheme), and so the two packages are closely related.  
In the ACT, new residential buildings are required to achieve at least a 4 star rating 
under the ACT House Energy Rating Scheme (ACTHERS). Star ratings are 
calculated by using the FirstRate computer simulation package (ACT Land and 
Planning Authority 2004). 
Environmental impact of the standards 
Current standards for building energy efficiency target a relatively small proportion 
of Australia’s energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. For example, residential 
building standards are designed to moderate home heating and cooling demand, 
which accounts for about 5 per cent of Australia’s final (end use) energy 
consumption (Department of the Environment and Heritage, sub. DR86; Dr Terry 
Williamson, sub. 78) and, in 1999, was responsible for 2 per cent of Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions (George Wilkenfeld and Associates and Energy 
Strategies 2002; ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE, sub. DR144). 
Building standards are therefore expected to make a minor contribution to emission 
abatement. The AGO has projected that, in 2020, 0.8 per cent  of  Australia’s 
abatement of greenhouse gas emissions (relative to business-as-usual) will come 
from the Building Code’s mandatory energy efficiency standards for residential 
buildings. A further 1.7 per cent is projected to come from the Building Code’s 
standards for commercial buildings.2 
                                              
2 In 2020, the Building Code’s residential building standards are expected to reduce Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions by 1 megatonne carbon dioxide-equivalent, and the commercial 
building standards are expected to reduce emissions by 2 megatonnes (relative to business-as-
usual) (AGO 2004l, pp. 31–2). All emission-reducing measures across the economy are projected 
to reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions by 121 megatonnes carbon dioxide-equivalent in 
2020 (AGO 2004o, p. 14).     
216  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
Despite the modest contribution to Australia’s annual emission reductions, ICANZ, 
AGGA and ABCSE (sub.  DR144) argued that the current policy emphasis on 
buildings is warranted because they have a much longer life span than other 
energy-consuming products. However, the current policy emphasis would only be 
justified if the marginal cost of abating greenhouse gas emissions is much lower for 
buildings than for other emission sources. There is no evidence that this is the case. 
An additional concern is that current standards do not target many building-related 
emissions, such as those from manufacturing building components, and from 
constructing and demolishing buildings. As a result, the standards may not be as 
effective in reducing emissions as anticipated, particularly if they encourage the use 
of components that require more energy to manufacture.  
Ideally, a life cycle approach should be adopted that takes account of all energy and 
emissions associated with a building from its inception until its eventual demolition 
and disposal, including the energy embodied in building materials. Such an 
approach was supported by various participants (including the Building Products 
Innovation Council, sub. 44; and Green Building Council of Australia, sub. 41). 
The Timber Promotion Council (sub. DR141) noted that current standards fail to 
recognise the lower embodied energy and emissions of a suspended timber floor 
compared to a concrete slab. The Australian Wood Panels Association (sub. DR91) 
observed that the standards favour the use of high mass materials with high 
embodied energy. AMCER (sub. DR105) was concerned that the standards fail to 
fully recognise the lower embodied energy of earth wall construction. 
The precise magnitude of energy and emissions overlooked by current building 
standards is difficult to determine from currently available data, but it appears that 
the embodied energy in buildings is significant (box 10.1). A report commissioned 
by the AGO noted the policy implications: 
Embodied energy and its resultant greenhouse gas emissions form a significant 
proportion of the life cycle energy of a residential building. Any measures designed to 
abate greenhouse gas emissions could not be considered to be comprehensive if they 
did not address this issue. (Energy Efficient Strategies 1999, p. 104) 
Similarly, a home design manual on the AGO website advises that it is unacceptable 
to ignore embodied energy: 
True low energy building design will consider this important aspect [embodied energy] 
and take a broader life cycle approach to energy assessment. Merely looking at the 
energy used to operate the building is not really acceptable. (Milne and Reardon 2001, 
p. 1)     




In addition, the relative importance of embodied energy increases over time if 
building standards are successful in constraining the amount of energy used for 
heating and cooling.  
 
Box 10.1  Relative importance of a building’s embodied energy 
There are limited data on the embodied energy in buildings. However, the available 
estimates indicate that it is significant. For example, the CSIRO  (nd, p.  1) has 
concluded: 
The embodied energy of a building is a significant multiple of the annual operating energy 
consumed, ranging from around 10 for typical dwellings to over 30 for office buildings. 
Making buildings such as dwellings more energy efficient usually requires more embodied 
energy thus increasing the ratio even further. 
The importance of embodied energy is also evident in two case studies undertaken for 
the AGO. The first case study compared concrete versus timber floors for a given 
house design. The study found that a concrete floor would reduce emissions from 
occupants’ operational energy use, but it would take 62 years for this benefit to 
outweigh the higher embodied emissions of a concrete floor: 
… the use of a concrete floor as a means of reducing operational energy consumption as 
compared to a timber floor is effective in the very long term and would result in a total 
operational primary energy saving of approximately 208 GJ over a 100 year building life 
span in the Western Sydney climate type. At this rate, the added embodied energy in the 
concrete floor as compared to the timber floor would be paid back in approximately 47 years 
… In terms of greenhouse gas emissions, this return period is higher at 62 years … making 
this strategy marginal in terms of improving the building’s life cycle greenhouse gas 
emissions. (Energy Efficient Strategies 1999, p. 103) 
The second case study compared the use of single versus double glazed windows, 
and reached a more favourable conclusion: 
… the use of a double glazing is an effective means of reducing operational energy 
consumption compared to single glazing and would result in a total operational primary 
energy saving of approximately 430 GJ over a 100 year building life in the Western Sydney 
climate type. At this rate the added embodied energy in the double glazed as compared to 
the single glazed house would be paid back in approximately 9 years … In terms of 
greenhouse gas emissions this payback period is approximately 12 years … making this 
strategy effective in terms of improving the building’s life cycle greenhouse gas emissions. 
(Energy Efficient Strategies 1999, p. 104) 
Dr Terry Williamson (sub. 78) estimated that 145 petajoules of primary energy and 
8.2  megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions are embodied in the new 
houses built in Australia each year. In comparison, he noted that the energy consumed 
in heating and cooling all dwellings (not just new ones) was around 180 petajoules of 
primary energy in 2001-02, and the associated emissions were 8.7 megatonnes of 
carbon dioxide equivalent. 
 
 
Energy Efficient Strategies (1999) suggested that an adjustment factor could be 
applied to residential building ratings to account for embodied energy. For example,     
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it noted that a four star house (based on heating and cooling loads) using low 
embodied energy materials could be rated as equivalent to a five star house using 
higher embodied energy materials. A similar approach has already been adopted by 
the Green Building Council of Australia in its ‘Green Star’ rating scheme for office 
buildings. The Council noted that its rating methodology takes account of embodied 
energy by awarding credits for the use of recycled steel and for replacing cement 
with less energy-intensive materials (sub. 41, p. 3). 
However, attempts to incorporate embodied energy into a building rating scheme 
would be very imprecise. There are limited data available on embodied energy and 
the accuracy of the data is questionable (Energy Efficient Strategies 1999; Milne 
and Reardon 2001; Drogemuller et al. 1999). Such data would have to be 
generalised across a wide range of circumstances in order to make a rating scheme 
operational. In addition, it would be difficult to maintain the timeliness of embodied 
energy data, given that the processes used to manufacture building materials change 
over time. 
In conclusion, the Commission considers that the current approach of ignoring 
many building-related emissions has undermined the effectiveness of building 
standards in reducing Australia’s energy use and emissions. A more comprehensive 
life cycle approach could address this problem, but it would be difficult to 
implement. 
10.4  Are building standards cost effective for 
individuals? 
While the goal of building energy efficiency standards is to raise the wellbeing of 
society as a whole, governments often promote the standards as also being 
beneficial for individuals. For example, in a promotional brochure for Victoria’s 
5 star housing standards, the Minister for Planning claimed: 
… it is clear that the environment is not the only beneficiary of the new 5 star standard. 
Consumers will reap many benefits from the standard as well.  
5 star will deliver higher quality and more comfortable homes with lower running 
costs, at the same time as reducing greenhouse pollution and stimulating economic and 
employment growth for Victoria. (Victorian Government nd, p. 3) 
More specifically, the Victorian Government’s promotional material advises 
individuals that the 5 star standard will generally be cost effective for them: 
Industry experts experienced in 5 star energy efficiency rating have reported that the 
average house may cost less than $1000 extra to build to the 5 star standard. However, 
for some designs there may be no cost difference. Generally the ongoing savings in     




energy bills for heating and cooling, and lower water bills will more than compensate 
for any increase in building costs. (Victorian Government nd, p. 5) 
Whether building energy efficiency standards are indeed cost effective for an 
individual producer or consumer will depend on: 
•  how effective the standards are in reducing the individual’s energy use 
•  whether the resulting benefits to the individual outweigh the associated costs. 
Analysis in the following sections indicates that there is considerable uncertainty 
about these two issues, and as a result there is an urgent need for an ex post 
evaluation of building energy efficiency standards. 
How effective are the standards in reducing energy consumption? 
The effectiveness of current building energy efficiency standards in reducing energy 
consumption has not been tested comprehensively.3 Instead, policy makers have 
assumed that the energy savings predicted in regulation impact assessments and 
supporting research have been realised in practice. This is unlikely because the 
predictions are based on many questionable assumptions, and they ignore numerous 
practical problems in implementing the standards. 
Assumptions used to predict energy savings 
Predicting the energy savings that result from a building standard is difficult 
because it depends on numerous factors, many of which are not well understood. 
An important example is the behaviour of a building’s occupants. This is likely to 
be a major determinant of how much energy is saved with a building standard, but 
there is remarkably little data available about the behaviour of building occupants. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that occupant behaviour varies markedly across the 
population and this will lead to considerable diversity in the energy saved by 
individuals. 
Another important determinant of energy savings will be the type of heating and 
cooling appliances an occupant uses, and how efficient those appliances are. Again, 
this is likely to vary considerably across the population, but limited data are 
available on this issue. 
                                              
3  Energy Efficient Strategies (2000) examined the impact of Victoria’s mandatory insulation 
requirements (introduced in 1991), but it simulated (rather than measured) energy savings for 
individual dwellings (using FirstRate software) and relied on many questionable assumptions due 
to the limited availability of data on issues such as appliance efficiency and user behaviour.     
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A further consideration is the engineering relationship between a building’s 
physical properties and its energy use for given occupant behaviour and appliances. 
Attempts to model this relationship for housing have been underway in Australia for 
some years, with the models being continually updated as researchers endeavour to 
fix known deficiencies. A recent focus has been on improved modelling of the 
benefits of ventilation in tropical climates. Such amendments are likely to be 
ongoing for the foreseeable future because the complex relationship between energy 
use and a building’s physical characteristics is far from fully understood (discussed 
further below). 
Given the above, any prediction of energy savings can only be based on a limited 
understanding of important determinants of building energy use. Examples of the 
many questionable assumptions used to predict energy savings from current 
standards are given in box 10.2. The ABCB (sub. 7, p. 9) acknowledged that ‘in 
developing the BCA [Building Code of Australia] energy efficiency measures, some 
technical and policy decisions have had to be made on limited or anecdotal evidence 
due to the lack of energy data’.  
ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE (sub. DR144) and Tony Isaacs (trans., p. 751) noted 
that the uncertainty created by a lack of data on occupant behaviour has been 
compensated for in regulation impact assessments by using conservative 
assumptions. However, whether the assumptions have been conservative cannot be 
demonstrated objectively, given the limited available data and incomplete scientific 
knowledge about building energy use.  
Another important assumption that is open to question is the business-as-usual 
projection of energy consumption. This is important because predicted energy 
savings are derived by calculating the difference between expected energy use 
under a standard and that expected under business-as-usual. As noted in chapter 5, 
the development of a business-as-usual projection (even one that assumes no 
change) involves judgements about many aspects of the future that are highly 
uncertain, such as future changes in the cost of energy saving technologies, relative 
prices, and the rate of capital turnover. 
ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE (sub. DR144, p. 30) claimed that the business-as-usual 
projections used to assess energy efficiency standards for buildings are sound 
because they ‘are based on immediate past trends [and so] any natural increase in 
efficiency [that is, not caused by the standards] should be captured’. However, past 
trends are not necessarily reliable indicators of future events, and so business-as-
usual projections of energy use will always have an element of uncertainty.     





Box 10.2  Assumptions used to predict building energy savings 
Many questionable assumptions are used in regulation impact assessments to predict 
energy savings from building standards. Some of these are mentioned below. 
Residential buildings 
Assumptions about how householders use heating and cooling appliances are largely 
based on a survey conducted about 20 years ago by the ABS (1986). To reflect 
changes in usage patterns since the 1980s, ad hoc adjustments are made to these 
historical data.  
Assessments are typically based on a small number of building designs. For example, 
the current Building Code standards were assessed by examining only two house 
designs — a small 1 storey house and a large 2 storey house. The proposed upgrade 
of the Building Code standards was assessed on the basis of four house designs. 
It is usually assumed that improved building energy efficiency will cause smaller (and 
hence less costly) heating and cooling appliances to be used, with the extent of this 
downsizing based on judgments by the analyst. Assumptions are also made about the 
energy efficiency of appliances on the basis of limited evidence. For the Victorian 5 star 
standard, it was assumed that the average efficiency of appliances would remain 
unchanged over the 40 year assessment period. 
Simulation models, such as NatHERS and FirstRate, are used to predict energy 
savings. For the proposed upgrade of the Building Code standard, arbitrary 
adjustments were made to the simulated energy savings in order to compensate for 
inadequacies in the modelling. For example, the simulated energy saving for cooling 
was adjusted upwards by 150  per  cent in climate zone 5 (Sydney). It was also 
assumed that only 25  per  cent of total approvals will use the deemed-to-satisfy 
compliance method. 
Nonresidential buildings 
Simulated energy savings from deemed-to-satisfy compliance are assumed to 
eventuate, despite evidence that building construction, commissioning and 
maintenance could significantly weaken any relationship between simulated and actual 
energy use. The ABCB (2005a, p. 46) acknowledged it was possible that ‘the required 
design improvements will not deliver on their full potential in the absence of other 
complementary measures’.  
For class 5–9 buildings, the business-as-usual scenario assumed a basic building with 
minimal attention to energy use. The Property Council of Australia criticised this as 
being contrary to current industry practice. There was also limited consideration of the 
variability of energy use within each building class. While buildings were allocated to 
one of three occupancy profiles (office, retail or school), this would not reflect the 
diversity of energy requirements between, for example, a restaurant and a jeweller.  
Sources: ABCB (2002, 2005a, 2005b); Energy Efficient Strategies (2002); Property Council of 
Australia (2005). 
 
     
222  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
Practical problems overlooked when predicting energy savings 
The predicted energy savings overlook real-world problems that are encountered in 
implementing building standards. These implementation problems lead to 
uncertainty about what energy savings are achieved in practice. This section focuses 
on four sources of uncertainty: 
•  standards can be difficult to enforce; 
•  there is more than one compliance method, they lead to different energy savings, 
and the proportion that will use each compliance method is uncertain; 
•  deemed-to-satisfy requirements allow few tradeoffs between design features, 
making it unlikely that energy savings will be consistent from one building to 
the next; and 
•  energy savings using a performance-based compliance method are uncertain 
because the required performance is not specified in terms of energy 
consumption, and there are doubts about the accuracy of the performance 
measurement techniques. 
Standards can be difficult to enforce 
It can be difficult (and costly) to ensure compliance with building energy efficiency 
standards, especially when detecting non-compliance requires thorough on-site 
inspections of all new buildings. Laurie Virr (trans., pp. 676–7) noted that there is a 
degree of non-compliance with roof insulation requirements, despite building 
certifiers supposedly having a responsibility to check this. The ABCSE  (2005) 
commented that there has been little effort by the Victorian Government to ensure 
that the quality of installations and the products used meet standards. ICANZ, 
AGGA and ABCSE (sub. DR144) urged more regulation in order to ensure that 
expected energy savings for commercial buildings are not undermined by poor 
commissioning and maintenance of systems. The extent of compliance problems is 
uncertain and, as a result, the extent of energy savings will also be uncertain. 
Different compliance methods deliver different energy savings  
The actual energy saving achieved by a particular individual will vary according to 
which compliance method is used (ABCB 2005b; Energy Efficient Strategies 2002; 
Master Builders Queensland, sub. DR90). This is because performance-based 
methods allow tradeoffs to be made between different design features in order to 
achieve a target level of energy efficiency, whereas deemed-to-satisfy methods 
allow few such tradeoffs. Divergent outcomes could also occur because several 
different performance-based methods are allowed.      




This issue is most relevant when the national Building Code applies. It is less 
relevant for residential buildings in New South Wales and Victoria, because they 
are subject to state-based requirements that provide limited scope to use anything 
other than a single performance-based compliance method (appendix D). 
It is uncertain how actual energy savings vary between different compliance 
methods, and what proportion of builders use each of those methods. Thus, the 
extent to which building standards have reduced individuals’ energy consumption is 
also uncertain. 
Uncertainty about deemed-to-satisfy outcomes 
The limited scope to make tradeoffs under the deemed-to-satisfy method means that 
outcomes will be distributed around a particular level of energy efficiency, rather 
than meeting that level in most cases. Very little is known about the distribution of 
outcomes under the deemed-to-satisfy method, including how widely dispersed 
actual outcomes are, and what proportion of buildings end up below the intended 
level of energy efficiency. This, in turn, leads to uncertainty about the actual energy 
savings that particular individuals will achieve under a deemed-to-satisfy method. 
Uncertainty about performance-based outcomes 
The distribution of outcomes with performance-based compliance methods may 
also be uncertain because: 
•  the performance requirement is not specified in terms of energy consumption 
•  there are doubts about the accuracy of performance measurement techniques. 
Performance requirement not specified in terms of energy consumption 
The performance-based requirements in the Building Code are specified in terms of 
heating and cooling loads (collectively termed an energy load), which have the 
following meanings: 
Cooling load means the calculated amount of energy removed from the cooled spaces 
of the building annually by artificial means to maintain the desired temperatures in 
those spaces. 
Heating load means the calculated amount of energy delivered to the heated spaces of 
the building annually by artificial means to maintain the desired temperatures in those 
spaces. (Building Code of Australia 2004 (volume 2), s.V2.6, p. 88)     
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Heating and cooling loads that maintain desired temperatures do not measure actual 
energy consumption because: 
•  they ignore the energy lost by appliances in converting one form of energy into 
another (or gained in the case of a heat pump); 
•  not all buildings have the assumed heating and/or cooling appliances; 
•  many occupants allow indoor temperatures to fluctuate to some extent with 
changes in external conditions, rather than maintain the assumed temperatures; 
•  dwellings are often unoccupied for a large part of the day and for some weeks of 
the year, and this can differ markedly from the assumed occupancy pattern;  
•  heating and cooling is often restricted to certain parts of a dwelling, which can 
be very different from the assumed behaviour; and 
•  climate variation over a year can differ from the assumed weather pattern. 
In essence, policy makers have sought to isolate the impact of a building’s design 
from the many other factors that affect its energy consumption, such as occupant 
behaviour, appliance efficiency, whether heating and cooling equipment are 
installed, and inter-year variability in climate. As a result, the performance-based 
requirements target few of the determinants of a building’s actual energy 
consumption. 
If, for a given building and occupants, energy load and actual energy consumption 
are highly correlated, then the performance-based standards are more likely to be 
effective. But it cannot be assumed that such a strong correlation exists.4 Both the 
Department of the Environment and Heritage (sub. 69) and Dr Terry Williamson 
(sub. 78) noted that the behaviour of a given householder may not be independent of 
a building’s characteristics. In some cases, the interaction between householder 
behaviour and building characteristics could be counter intuitive. For example, the 
Department of the Environment and Heritage commented: 
Early field studies into the effect of insulation showed that savings attributed to 
insulation were found to be less in the field than would be predicted by thermal 
performance simulation.  
One possible theory developed to explain the difference between observed and 
simulated energy savings is the hypothesis known as ‘comfort creep’. In an uninsulated 
house, it is suggested that the thermal performance of the house is so poor that it is 
difficult to maintain reasonable levels of comfort at an affordable cost, if at all. In 
houses which have installed insulation it is suggested that some of the improved 
                                              
4 The ABCSE (sub. DR121) submitted a review of Australian studies that have linked building 
fabric efficiency with energy consumption. However, most of the studies were quite dated (going 
back as far as the early 1980s) and none evaluated the effectiveness of the current simulation 
algorithms used for performance-based building standards.     




performance is used to improve comfort i.e. heat larger areas and/or heat to higher 
temperatures. Consequently the actual energy savings are significantly less than the 
theoretical energy savings. 
It should be noted that this is not the only possible explanation, and other theories may 
explain this phenomenon. (sub. 69, p. 18) 
Master Builders Australia (sub. DR122) argued that a better approach would be to 
include the energy efficiency of appliances in a building’s energy rating, so 
tradeoffs could be made between appliance efficiency and building fabric. Moreland 
Energy Foundation Ltd (sub.  DR115) also favoured the inclusion of installed 
appliances in building standards. As noted previously, the BASIX requirements in 
New South Wales already take account of a building’s appliances and other factors 
that can influence actual energy use and emissions (appendix D).  
In contrast, Dr Angelo Delsante (sub. DR 126) commented that it is inappropriate to 
take account of the energy efficiency of appliances because they have a shorter life 
span than the buildings they are installed in. 
Doubts about the accuracy of performance measurement techniques 
In many cases, builders have the option of using a computer simulation program to 
demonstrate compliance with a performance-based standard. Such programs predict 
a building’s energy load based on key variables, such as floor area, window sizes 
and building fabric. In New South Wales and Victoria, the use of simulation 
software is essentially compulsory for most residential buildings. 
An underlying assumption of the performance-based standards, and the use of 
simulation software in particular, is that the relationship between particular building 
features and energy efficiency is well understood. Dr Terry Williamson questioned 
this: 
Improving dwelling energy efficiency, rather than being a straightforward matter as 
implied in the existing regulations and rating schemes, is far from understood. The 
evidence submitted here based on data from surveys and case studies reveals that: 
•  results are often counter intuitive (effects seem opposite to computer model 
predictions); 
•  results are often confounding … ; and 
•  results are often inconclusive (small sample sizes, incomplete data of existing studies). 
(sub. 28, pp. 2–3)     
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Dr Williamson submitted case study results for six houses that had won awards 
from the Royal Australian Institute of Architects. The houses had below-average 
energy consumption, but achieved only a 0 or 1 star rating using approved 
simulation software: 
Each house was rated using NatHERS and/or FirstRate software and results compared 
with actual consumption and AGO projected average house consumption for the 
areas  ...  The houses in each case were built prior to the introduction of mandatory 
energy efficiency regulations. Despite each of these houses having energy consumption 
results well below the ‘average’ house in the location, based on the star rating results, 
none could now be built because they do not achieve the required rating criteria. 
(sub. 28, p. 25) 
In the draft report for this inquiry, the Commission noted that Dr Williamson’s case 
studies raised doubts about the effectiveness of building standards in reducing 
individuals’ energy consumption. Many advocates of the standards responded with 
a critique of the case studies and asserted that an appropriate reinterpretation of the 
results actually supported the argument in favour of standards (Tony Isaacs, 
trans.,  pp.  736–41; ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE sub. DR144; Clive Blanchard, 
sub. DR108 and DR135; Dr Angelo Delsante, sub. DR126). ICANZ, AGGA and 
ABCSE (sub. DR144) noted that occupants of the case study houses had conserved 
energy by allowing temperatures to move outside accepted comfort standards. 
Dr Williamson  (sub. DR133)  disagreed with the criticisms and repeated his 
concerns about the current performance-based approach to regulating building 
energy efficiency. Many other parties also questioned the current approach (for 
example, Timber Promotion Council, sub. DR141; Master Builders Australia, 
sub.  DR122; Master Builders Queensland, sub.  DR90; Housing Industry 
Association, sub.  DR130; Laurie Virr and Paul Hanley, sub.  DR99; Australian 
Wood Panels Association, sub. DR91; AMCER, sub. DR105; Royal Australian 
Institute of Architects, sub. DR124; Green Building Council, sub. DR137; Property 
Council of Australia 2005). 
The Commission therefore notes that there is considerable disagreement among 
technical experts and other interested parties about the effectiveness of the 
performance-based standards. It is also evident that the debate has largely been 
taking place in an ‘information vacuum’. The Commission is particularly concerned 
that the advocates of building energy efficiency standards have focused on 
criticising a handful of case studies submitted by Dr  Williamson, rather than 
producing more detailed and comprehensive evidence on the effectiveness of 
current performance-based standards. Dr Williamson  (sub. DR133,  p. 1)  stressed 
that his ‘intention was not to present conclusive data, rather to demonstrate the 
paucity and inconsistency of existing evidence’. The onus of proof should rest with     




those advocating standards, given that the standards are mandatory and have the 
potential to impose sizeable costs on many Australians. 
It should also be noted that there has been an ongoing history of deficiencies being 
identified in the simulation packages that have subsequently led to amendments. For 
example, the FirstRate package was modified after it became apparent that there 
were errors in how interactive effects between solar gains and uncarpeted floors and 
internal masonry walls were modelled. Similarly, NatHERS was recently revised, 
and relabelled as AccuRate, to recognise the benefits of ventilation in tropical 
climates (Department of the Environment and Heritage, sub. DR69; Tony Isaacs, 
p.  14, attachment to ICANZ, sub. DR94). The Timber Promotion Council 
(sub. DR141) noted that the revisions are also expected to address a bias NatHERS 
had against the use of suspended timber floors. The AccuRate software is currently 
undergoing trials (Department of the Environment and Heritage, sub. DR131). 
Amendments have also been made to simulation algorithms to remove a previous 
bias in favour of larger homes (ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE, sub. DR144). 
This process of ongoing changes in how performance is measured is likely to 
continue, given the complex scientific relationship between a building’s physical 
features and its energy efficiency. For example, Dr Angelo Delsante noted a 
deficiency in the current approach that he considered required further changes: 
… the current way in which heating and cooling energy loads are used to derive a 
rating or target is not satisfactory, because they are simply added together. Doing so is 
physically incorrect: if heating and cooling loads are to be added, then appliance 
efficiency must be taken into account before doing so. But this then leads to 
complications … Thus this submission suggests that … separate ratings … be given for 
heating and cooling ... (sub. DR126, pp. 4–5) 
For nonresidential buildings, Exergy Australia (sub. 40) mentioned a survey of 66 
commercial buildings in Sydney that showed there was virtually no connection 
between design features and actual energy performance. A number of potential 
factors (most of them not related to tenant behaviour) could explain the weak 
relationship between design and actual energy use. These include poor 
commissioning of the building, poor workmanship, issues with the control of the 
hardware that determines energy use within a building, and design details not being 
captured in computer simulations. 
Do the financial benefits of standards outweigh the associated costs? 
Most of the publicly available information on the cost effectiveness of current 
building energy efficiency standards is in regulation impact assessments and 
supporting research. While regulation impact assessments are only required to     
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assess whether society as a whole would be better off with a proposed regulation, 
assessments of building energy efficiency standards also examine the impact on 
individuals. 
 
Box 10.3  Predicted private cost effectiveness of building standards 
Regulation impact assessments typically predict that individuals will benefit financially 
from complying with a building energy efficiency standard. 
Current housing standards (Building Code) 
For an ‘average house’ (floor area of 200 square metres), the current requirements in 
the Building Code were predicted to deliver a net benefit of $712 in present value 
terms. This was based on an expected increase in construction costs of $1147, a 
reduction in appliance capital costs of $170, and a fall in energy costs of $1689 over 
30 years (using a discount rate of 5 per cent).  
Proposed upgrade of housing standards (Building Code) 
For a ‘representative’ house, the proposed upgrade of Building Code standards was 
predicted to deliver a net benefit ranging from $205 to $1207, depending on climate 
zone (excluding a ‘synthetic alpine zone’ meant to represent the small minority of 
populated areas that have snow during winter). The predicted increase in construction 
costs ranged from $432 to $1332, the expected fall in appliance costs was $0–$131, 
and the reduction in lifetime energy costs was $510–$2490 (using a discount rate of 
6 per cent) (excluding the alpine zone). 
Victorian 5 star housing standards 
For the average household, Victoria’s 5 star standard was predicted to deliver a net 
benefit of $861 in present value terms. This was based on an expected increase in 
construction costs of $3280 and a fall in energy costs of $4141 over 40 years (using a 
discount rate of 4 per cent). 
Class 5–9 buildings (Building Code) 
Across all capital cities, the net benefit was predicted to be $41–$115 per square 
metre for a typical three storey office building, $37–$145 per square metre for a large 
single storey shopping centre, and $40–$100 per square metre for a medium-sized 
school building. For most building types and locations, the increased construction cost 
was assumed to be offset by cost savings from smaller plant and equipment. For 
example, the increase in construction costs for a three storey office building in 
Melbourne was predicted to be $15 per square metre, which was outweighed by a 
reduction in plant and equipment costs of $28 per square metre. 
Sources: ABCB (2002, 2005a, 2005b); Energy Efficient Strategies (2002). 
 
 
The regulation impact assessments for current building energy efficiency standards 
predict that the standards are cost effective for individuals (box 10.3). However, the     




net financial benefits for housing are small compared to the cost of a dwelling. The 
predicted net benefits for nonresidential buildings are generally larger. For example, 
the ABCB (2005a) predicted that the net benefit would be 2–7  per  cent of 
construction costs for a typical three-storey office building. 
There has not been an ex post evaluation of whether individuals have in practice 
received the predicted net financial benefits of current standards. The Commission 
considers that there is an urgent need for such evaluation because the predictions are 
unlikely to be robust. Concerns about the benefit and cost predictions are outlined 
below. 
Predicted financial benefits 
A key benefit to individuals is that they spend less on energy than otherwise. 
However, as noted previously, there is considerable doubt about the accuracy of the 
predicted energy savings. In addition, converting these questionable energy savings 
into financial terms requires assumptions about what fuels are used and what tariffs 
the building occupant faces for those fuels. 
An additional problem in valuing benefits is that they typically occur in small 
increments for many years into the future, whereas the cost of meeting standards is 
borne upfront. Regulation impact assessments typically use a net present value 
decision rule to address this issue. This involves applying a discount rate to future 
financial benefits to convert them into their present values (appendix F). 
These regulation impact assessments typically assessed private cost effectiveness on 
the assumption that individuals use the estimated social opportunity cost of capital 
as their discount rate. As noted in chapter 5 and appendix F, the Commission 
considers this to be questionable. The average private discount rate is likely to be 
higher than the estimated social discount rate used in regulation impact assessments, 
and so the benefits to individuals could be less than those predicted. In any case, if 
private cost effectiveness is being assessed, then the private opportunity cost of 
capital for the relevant individual should be used.  
Building energy efficiency standards may not be privately cost effective if a higher 
discount rate is used. The Queensland Government (2004a) found that every one 
percentage point increase in the discount rate reduced the net benefit of its proposed 
regulations by 20 per cent. In its assessment of the proposed upgrade to housing 
standards in the Building Code, the ABCB (2005b) found that the net benefit fell 
from $194 million to $44 million when the discount rate was increased from 
6 per cent (the base case) to 9 per cent. It could be argued that, on the basis of 
observed behaviour, even a 9 per cent discount rate is too low to assess private cost     
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effectiveness, particularly for less affluent individuals (Train 1985; 
Sutherland 2003). 
Predicted financial costs 
It is also evident that ex post verification of predicted financial costs is required. 
Like the predictions for energy savings and financial benefits, many questionable 
assumptions have been used to predict costs.  
For example, Master Builders Australia (sub. DR122) questioned the cost of the 
proposed upgrade of housing requirements in the Building Code. It noted that the 
ABCB (2005b) had based its predicted cost on a 2002 study for Victoria’s 5 star 
housing standard. Master Builders Australia (sub.  DR122, p.  4) claimed that the 
study ‘grossly underestimated’ building costs in 2002, and would now be even more 
inaccurate because building costs have increased by about 20 per cent since 2002. 
Master Builders Queensland (sub DR90) questioned the relevance of a Victorian 
study to other areas of Australia. 
The limited available evidence on outcomes under current standards suggests that 
actual costs have been very different from those predicted.  
ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE (sub. DR144) noted that a large building company had 
been able to satisfy the Victorian 5 star housing standard for less than half the 
average cost predicted by the Victorian Government.  
However, more comprehensive evidence gathered by the Victorian Building 
Commission indicates that, in many cases, cost increases have been much higher 
than predicted. The Building Commission had predicted that the cost of a new 
house would rise by 0.7–1.9 per cent due to the 5 star standard (Victorian Building 
Commission  2002). In contrast, a survey of 600 builders undertaken in 
February  2005 for the Building Commission (with assistance from the Housing 
Industry Association) found that actual cost increases have often been far higher: 
The data suggest that residential building costs have increased as a result of builders 
achieving standards in this area, with the median estimate of such a cost increase in the 
range of 3 to 5 per cent … Excluding those that answered ‘don’t know’, the mean 
additional cost incurred was 6.04 per cent. (Chant Link and Associates 2005, pp. 9 
and 50) 
Other surveys have also found that the costs of Victoria’s 5 star housing standard 
have been much higher than predicted:  
•  A survey by Master Builders Australia (sub. DR122) of its members revealed 
that the cost of a three-bedroom brick-veneer dwelling had increased by between     




$13 000  and  $18 000,  depending on design and location. In comparison, the 
Victorian Government had predicted that the average increase in the cost of a 
house would be $3300 (Victorian Building Commission 2002). 
•  The Timber Promotion Council (sub.  DR141) found that the average cost 
increase in climate zone 6 (Melbourne) has been $28 per square metre, whereas 
the ABCB (2005b) had predicted a weighted average increase of less than $4 per 
square metre. 
•  The Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission  (2005) found that 
Victoria’s 5 star housing standard had increased the cost of an ‘average house’ 
by 2.5–6.0 per cent, with the exception of one builder who thought the cost 
increase was negligible. 
Master Builders Association Queensland (sub. DR90) submitted a detailed costing 
for the proposed upgrade of deemed-to-satisfy housing provisions in the Building 
Code. It showed that the cost increase for a sample four-bedroom house in Cairns 
would be at least $9359 (7.3 per cent). In comparison, the draft regulation impact 
statement (ABCB 2005b) predicted an average cost increase of only $478 for 
Australia’s northern climate zone. 
Net financial benefit to individuals 
Given the above-mentioned uncertainty about the financial benefit and cost 
estimates, the Commission considers that the predicted net benefits of building 
energy efficiency standards are not robust.  
Whether the standards are beneficial for individuals (or indeed society as a whole) 
can only be adequately resolved by governments undertaking comprehensive ex 
post evaluations. While this may be costly, it should nevertheless be a priority 
because the standards are mandatory and have the potential to impose considerable 
costs on many Australians. 
The experience of other countries confirms the urgent need for ex post evaluations. 
In the few cases where countries have undertaken such evaluations, they have found 
that building standards are far less effective in reducing energy consumption than 
policy makers had predicted (World Energy Council 2004). 
The ABCB acknowledged that the net benefit could be marginal for its proposed 
upgrade of housing standards (class 1 and 10 buildings): 
The benefit–cost ratio is relatively low and, under alternative assumptions in regard to 
the amount of energy saved or the value of energy, the proposal would be seen as more 
marginal. Certainly there are some areas of Australia, such as Brisbane and areas with     
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similarly mild climates, where the use of heating and cooling systems is minimal and it 
seems likely that the benefits will be about equal to the costs. (ABCB 2005b, p. iii) 
For residential buildings other than houses (class 2–4), the ABCB (2004a) predicted 
a net benefit of only $13 million (excluding an $8 million valuation for reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions). The use of different plausible assumptions could lead to 
a net cost. For example, the ABCB found that its net benefit prediction was very 
sensitive to what discount rate was used. An increase in the discount rate from 
5 per cent (the default assumption) to 7 per cent nearly halved the net benefit. As 
noted in chapter 5, firms frequently require much higher returns for an investment 
to be seen as being cost effective (one survey found that firms used a discount rate 
of 12–15 per cent). 
In contrast, the ABCB (2005a) predicted a large net benefit ($2647 million) for the 
proposed class 5–9 building standards. However, this probably significantly 
overstates what will be achieved in practice, because the business-as-usual scenario 
was ‘a basic building with minimal attention to energy efficiency’ (ABCB 2005a, 
p. 46). The Property Council was critical of this approach: 
No attempt has been made to investigate the current state of the market, nor has there 
been any recognition that the market has come a long way in the last six years. This 
means that the overall savings … are … overstated. (Property Council 2005, p.39) 
The Property Council of Australia (2005) and Master Builders   
Australia (sub.  DR122) also claimed that the predictions for nonresidential 
buildings failed to fully account for implementation costs. 
There is considerable uncertainty about the extent to which building standards have 
reduced energy consumption and emissions. In addition, it is doubtful that the net 
financial benefits predicted in regulation impact assessments have been achieved in 
practice. The limited available evidence suggests that the costs of current standards 
have been much higher than were predicted. 
10.5  Areas for improvement in the assessment of 
standards 
In its review of building regulation, the Commission found that the ABCB had a 
good record of compliance with the requirements for regulation impact statements, 
but there was nevertheless scope for improvement (PC 2004a). On the basis of this 
inquiry, the Commission now considers that improved assessment procedures could 
also be adopted for state-based standards.  
FINDING 10.2     




If claims of private cost effectiveness are to be robust, then future regulation impact 
assessments and ex post evaluations of building energy efficiency standards need to 
include a more thorough consideration of the following: 
•  comparison with options other than mandatory standards 
•  consequences of heterogeneity among individuals and buildings  
•  tradeoff between compliance cost and effectiveness 
•  loss of building features that individuals value more than energy efficiency 
•  potential discouragement of innovation and productivity growth 
•  potential adverse health effects on building occupants 
•  relevance of the decision rule to the affected individuals. 
Comparison with options other than mandatory standards 
Regulation impact assessments rarely compare mandatory building energy 
efficiency standards with other options, such as changing occupant behaviour 
through the widespread installation of ‘smart’ electricity meters, or publicity 
campaigns to raise awareness about cost-effective building designs. This is of 
concern because mandatory building energy efficiency standards are not necessarily 
superior to other approaches. 
The ABCB (2005b) justifies its non-examination of other options on the grounds 
that the Australian, State and Territory Governments have agreed to include 
mandatory energy efficiency requirements in the Building Code, and this has the 
support of industry. In addition, the ABCB’s ability to consider other options is 
probably constrained because it has been established primarily to develop nationally 
consistent building regulation through the Building Code. This constraint may 
require changes in policy making arrangements. 
Consequences of heterogeneity among individuals and buildings 
There is considerable heterogeneity among buildings and their occupants. This is 
likely to lead to a very wide distribution of outcomes from building standards, 
including possibly a large group of individuals who are made worse off. For 
example, many Queensland homes north of Brisbane do not have heating or cooling 
equipment (ABCB 2005b; Master Builders Queensland, trans., pp. 526–7). Thus, 
there will be few financial benefits in that region to outweigh the costs of building 
energy efficiency standards.     
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Regulation impact assessments have tended to overlook the consequences of 
heterogeneity by assessing impacts for a very limited number of building designs 
and usage patterns (box 10.2).5 It is therefore doubtful that predicted outcomes are 
close to the average or median of the distribution. In any case, there needs to be 
more detailed analysis and reporting of how benefits and costs are distributed across 
the population of buildings and their occupants. 
Of particular concern to governments will be the distribution of benefits and costs 
across socioeconomic groups. Building standards could be regressive if the 
proportionate increase in capital costs tends to be greatest for cheaper homes, and 
such homes are typically bought by less affluent people. ICANZ, AGGA and 
ABCSE (sub. DR144) commented that there is no evidence to suggest this is the 
case. However, Master Builders Queensland (sub. DR90) submitted a detailed 
costing for a sample house in Cairns that it considered illustrated the potential for 
regressive impacts.  
The Victorian Building Commission (2002) observed that householders who spend 
a lot of time at home are the ones who benefit most from building standards because 
they have the greatest demand for heating and cooling in their homes. Conversely, 
many people who occupy a dwelling for shorter periods, such as those in full-time 
employment and those who own a holiday home, could be made worse off by 
building energy efficiency standards. 
ICANZ, AGGA and ABCSE (sub. DR144) noted that it is rare for low heating and 
cooling demand to continue over the life of a house or household, because of factors 
such as the birth of children and retirement from employment. The implication is 
that standards will eventually generate net financial benefits for most households. 
Greater examination of this issue in regulation impact assessments would be useful. 
In some cases, the benefits may be so distant in the future that, after application of 
an appropriate discount rate, the financial benefits are still lower than the upfront 
capital cost. In addition, demographic changes, such as a falling number of children 
per family and the growing significance of single person households, could reduce 
the number of households for whom the building standards are privately cost 
effective. 
                                              
5 An exception was the study by Energy Efficient Strategies (2002) for the Victorian 5 star housing 
standard, which simulated impacts for 240 houses and 112 flats, using 8 orientations and 2 floor 
types across 5 climate zones.     




Tradeoff between compliance cost and effectiveness 
The ABCB (2004a) has described the Building Code as being performance-based 
and concluded that this leads to lower compliance costs. But in a submission to this 
inquiry, the ABCB (sub. 7) noted that most building designers use the prescriptive 
deemed-to-satisfy provisions rather than the performance-based provisions of the 
Building Code. Thus, it appears that many practitioners view the performance-based 
options in the Building Code as more costly than following the deemed-to-satisfy 
provisions. This could be the right decision in many cases, particularly for smaller 
operators who do not have the resources to investigate innovative new building 
approaches (Master Builders Australia, trans., p. 608). Thus, the Commission is not 
urging the removal of deemed-to-satisfy provisions. 
However, from a policy-maker’s perspective, the effectiveness of a 
deemed-to-satisfy provision in raising energy efficiency could be less certain than 
for a performance-based standard. This is because the deemed-to-satisfy approach 
generalises the energy performance of particular construction materials and methods 
to all buildings, and allows few tradeoffs. 
The 5 star standard for houses in Victoria avoids this problem by not providing a 
deemed-to-satisfy option. The Victorian Building Commission (2002) argued in 
favour of this approach because the thermal performance of buildings is too 
complex to define effectively using prescriptive standards. It also noted that 
prescriptive standards must be conservative to ensure that even worst-case designs 
achieve a minimum standard, and this inflexibility contributes to uneconomic 
outcomes for average designs. Master Builders Australia (trans., p. 607) claimed 
that such a problem is evident with the deemed-to-satisfy provisions in the proposed 
upgrade of Building Code housing standards. 
In its regulatory proposal to upgrade housing energy efficiency standards in the 
Building Code, the ABCB (2004d) indicated a preference for a purely performance-
based approach. But the ABCB noted that most jurisdictions are unwilling to move 
to purely performance-based standards because the deemed-to-satisfy method 
provides a straightforward compliance path for building practitioners. 
The Commission considers that future assessments of the net financial benefits to 
individuals should give greater attention to differences in the effectiveness and 
compliance costs of deemed-to-satisfy versus performance-based standards. There 
should also be a more detailed examination of what proportion of builders use 
particular compliance options and why.      
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Loss of building features that individuals value more than energy 
efficiency 
Some home buyers may prefer to have a less energy-efficient home if that is what is 
required to obtain certain highly-valued characteristics. Building energy efficiency 
standards have the potential to prevent well-informed consumers from making such 
decisions. Similarly, well-informed purchasers of nonresidential buildings may 
want to forgo the energy savings from a building standard because the standard 
causes more highly valued characteristics to be lost. That is, building energy 
efficiency standards could ban products that some producers and consumers want to 
buy, even when they are aware of the lower energy efficiency and potentially higher 
running costs. In such cases, the standard is not cost effective for the individual. 
Potential to discourage innovation and productivity growth 
Standards distort the building market in favour of designs that use prescribed 
building materials and methods (in the case of deemed-to-satisfy compliance 
options) or satisfy particular performance measurement algorithms (in the case of 
performance-based compliance). This has the potential to cause more cost-effective 
improvements in energy efficiency to be overlooked, particularly in the longer term 
(Laurie Virr and Paul Hanley, sub.  DR99). Innovation could be stifled in 
energy-efficient designs that do not fit within the paradigms used for deemed-to-
satisfy provisions or simulation software. While there is some scope to demonstrate 
compliance on a case-by-case basis by ‘expert judgement’, this approach is 
probably more costly and so is unlikely to be used for many buildings. It could also 
add to uncertainty because it depends on the chosen expert. 
Adverse effects on building occupants 
The Royal Australian Institute of Architects and Archicentre Limited (2005) noted 
that sealing a home to satisfy building energy efficiency standards can lead to 
microclimates that cause illness. A similar concern was expressed by the Green 
Building Council of Australia (sub. 41). The Council also noted that standards can 
lead to a reduction in the size of windows, which in turn causes increased reliance 
on artificial lighting that is likely to have a detrimental effect on the health of 
building occupants (sub. DR137).     




Criteria used by individuals to assess cost effectiveness 
The current approach to assessing cost effectiveness assumes that individuals are 
able to finance the upfront capital cost of meeting a standard, and the estimated 
social opportunity cost of capital is the discount rate used by individuals. 
In practice, individuals do not have unlimited access to capital and so they will tend 
to invest in what they expect to be the most rewarding opportunities. Thus, the 
return on energy efficiency investments must be considered in the context of other 
investment opportunities. For firms, it may be more rewarding to invest their 
limited capital in core activities (such as investing in new products) rather than in 
increased energy efficiency. For less affluent households, the returns on meeting 
today’s basic needs (such as for food and clothing) may far outweigh those from 
investing in energy efficiency improvements that only deliver benefits in small 
increments into the distant future. If building standards are to continue to be 
promoted as being privately cost effective, then future assessments will need to 
provide greater justification for the criterion and parameters used. 
The Australian Building Codes Board should, as a matter of urgency, 
commission an independent ex post evaluation of building energy efficiency 
standards to determine: 
•  how effective the standards have been in reducing actual (not simulated) 
energy consumption; and 
•  whether the financial benefits to individual producers and consumers have 
outweighed the associated costs. 
This evaluation should include the standards for residential buildings in New 
South Wales (BASIX), Victoria (5 star) and the ACT (ACTHERS), as well as the 
national standards in the Building Code of Australia.  
RECOMMENDATION 10.1     
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  11 Energy efficiency in transport  
 
Key points 
•  There appears to be only limited scope for further privately cost-effective 
improvements in energy efficiency in the transport sector. However, if oil prices 
remain at their current (or higher) levels, more actions that would improve transport 
sector energy efficiency would become privately cost effective. 
•  Many potential improvements in energy efficiency in transport that would be 
privately cost effective result from policies designed mainly to obtain other efficiency 
benefits (for example, congestion pricing and improved efficiency of rail freight).  
•  The compulsory fuel consumption label and voluntary national average fuel 
consumption target for motor vehicles are likely to generate small improvements in 
the fuel efficiency of the new motor vehicle fleet. 
•  The TravelSmart information program to encourage less motor vehicle use has 
reduced energy use and increased energy efficiency in transport.  
•  Energy efficiency improvements arising from schemes that do not compel 
consumers and producers to move to more energy-efficient vehicles or travel 
modes, should, in general, be privately cost effective. 
•  The introduction of efficient congestion-pricing schemes in the larger capital cities 
could generate energy efficiency improvements that are cost effective (even 
excluding environmental benefits) for the community as a whole, although not for all 
travellers. 
•  Further regulatory reform in road and rail freight would be likely to engender some 
privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements in each sector. 
 
 
This chapter considers the potential for achieving energy efficiency improvements 
that are cost effective for individual producers and consumers in passenger transport 
(section 11.2) and freight transport (section 11.3). The terms of reference direct the 
Commission to examine the potential for energy efficiency improvements in 
vehicles and fuels resulting from improved energy efficiency information, minimum 
energy efficiency standards, and new and improved technologies and equipment. 
They also require the Commission to consider policy options for improvements in 
transport-related areas — including from urban planning, congestion pricing, 
intelligent transport systems, travel-demand management and increased efficiencies     
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in the business and freight sectors — which may have implications for energy 
efficiency.  
Unlike some other sectors of the economy, potential energy efficiency gains in 
transport are often associated with policies that offer significant other efficiency 
benefits — energy efficiency tends to be a useful byproduct of achieving other 
worthwhile gains such as reducing inefficient levels of road congestion, improving 
the efficiency of the provision of rail services or reducing air pollution. Particularly 
in such cases, the sole pursuit of energy efficiency should not determine policy 
settings. Conversely, in some instances, policies adopted to meet other objectives — 
for example, obtaining cleaner exhaust emissions from trucks and restricting or 
slowing traffic in suburban streets — can lower fuel efficiency. Hence, in the 
transport sector, perhaps even m o r e  s o  t h a n  i n  other sectors, it is essential to 
consider energy efficiency in a broader economic, social and environmental context. 
11.1 Introduction 
As noted in chapter  3, transport is a significant user of energy. In 2001-02, 
37 per cent of final energy consumption in Australia was consumed in the transport 
sector. The Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (BTRE) projected 2010 
greenhouse gas emissions from the transport sector to be more than 40 per  cent 
higher than their 1990 levels, increasing to nearly 70  per  cent higher by 2020 
(BTRE 2002c). As in many other countries, energy use (and resultant greenhouse 
gas emissions) in Australian transport is growing faster than in other sectors, despite 
the fact that motor vehicles, and transport systems generally, have continually 
become more energy efficient. Increases in energy use from growth in motor 
vehicle numbers and usage, reflecting economic and population growth, have 
outweighed decreases from energy efficiency gains.  
Because Australia is a large, sparsely populated continent, the transport task of 
moving people and freight is commensurately greater than in many other countries. 
The availability of relatively cheap land and Australians’ preferences for larger 
residential blocks, has also meant that major cities have generally expanded in a 
sprawling low-density fashion. While largely reflecting individuals’ preferences, 
this style of development has added to the urban transport task for firms and private 
purposes.  
In addition to providing significant benefits of mobility and lifestyle options, 
transport also creates important negative environmental externalities. Motor 
vehicles cause localised air pollution and noise in larger urban areas, particularly at 
peak hours, while public transport also creates some degree of noise and air     




pollution. In addition, motor vehicles and, to a much lesser extent (particularly on a 
per traveller basis), public transport, contribute significantly to greenhouse gas 
emissions either directly or indirectly.  In 2000, direct transport energy use 
accounted for around 14 per cent of Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions, of which 
road transport made up close to 90 per cent.1 By 2020, the level of greenhouse gas 
emissions from transport is forecast to grow by around 60 per cent from its 1990 
level (AGO 2004o). 
A given transport service usually provides users with multiple outputs. As well as 
moving between two points, factors such as comfort, flexibility, reliability and time 
taken are all important attributes — in some cases travellers enjoy the trip itself. For 
producers, convenience, reliability, time taken and absence of damage to goods are 
all important. Hence, in some cases, there can be a degree of difficulty in defining 
and measuring the total output of a transport service, and therefore, some 
uncertainty in determining if an observed fuel-efficiency improvement resulting 
from government policy intervention is privately cost effective. 
11.2 Passenger  transport 
This section considers a range of current and potential programs that might result in 
privately cost-effective improvements in the energy efficiency of road and rail 
passenger transport. Road-based passenger transport is the major user of energy in 
the transport sector, and hence, has been a particular focus of energy efficiency 
programs for transport under the National Greenhouse Strategy and the 
Environmental Strategy for the Motor Vehicle Industry. There may be potential for 
cost-effective improvements to energy efficiency of road transport by more 
efficiently managing traffic flows by using road pricing and intelligent transport 
systems. Planning policies have also been suggested as a longer-run tool that could 
increase energy efficiency by facilitating greater use of public transport.  
Passenger motor vehicle fuel efficiency 
There are several existing programs aimed at improving the fuel efficiency of 
passenger-transport activities (particularly of the motor vehicle fleet), usually with a 
focus on achieving communitywide benefits (reduced air pollution and greenhouse 
gas emissions) rather than providing direct benefits for the individuals directly 
affected. In these programs, achieving privately cost effective energy efficiency 
improvements has been incidental to achieving environmental objectives. Hence, an 
                                              
1 This excludes indirect emissions resulting from the use of energy in the transport sector which is 
generated in other sectors (for example, electricity).     
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examination of any private benefits of these policies should not be viewed as a 
complete assessment of their performance. Indeed, many are best considered as 
greenhouse and pollution abatement schemes with low net cost (after allowing for 
any private benefits and both private and government costs). Whether they fulfil 
these criteria is beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
Whether reducing fuel consumption through greater fuel efficiency is privately cost 
effective will depend on the savings from lower fuel consumption compared to any 
capital cost of improving fuel consumption and the value to consumers of any other 
loss in amenity required to achieve those savings. The absence of any clear market 
failures impeding vehicle buyers from making privately cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements suggests that opportunities for such improvements are 
limited. 
Fuel consumption labelling scheme 
Since 2001, all new passenger cars and all off-road vehicles and light commercial 
vehicles powered by petrol, up to 2.7 tonnes in gross mass, have been required to 
display (at the point of sale) fuel consumption labels (showing litres used per 
100 kilometres).2 A standard laboratory test procedure is applied to all vehicles (for 
both city and highway cycles) and hence, the resultant fuel consumption figures are 
comparable between models. Actual fuel consumption will vary from the test results 
due to different driving conditions, driver behaviour and vehicle condition.  
From July 2003, the label has also indicated the grams of carbon dioxide the model 
would emit (under standard test conditions) per kilometre travelled. In addition, all 
new vehicles weighing up to 3.5 tonnes (regardless of fuel source) are now required 
to display the label, bringing some larger off-road vehicles under the scheme. Many 
other countries (for example, the United States, Canada and Japan) have similar 
compulsory labelling requirements providing fuel efficiency and/or greenhouse gas 
emissions information while others (for example, the United Kingdom) have 
voluntary arrangements adhered to by all producers. 
The fuel consumption labelling requirement is supported by the Fuel Consumption 
Guide (published by the Australian Government since 1980) and the Green Vehicle 
Guide. The Fuel Consumption Guide contains data on the fuel consumption of 
vehicles (passenger motor vehicles, four wheel drives and light commercial 
vehicles) manufactured between 1986 and 2003, for both city and highway 
conditions. The Green Vehicle Guide provides information on the environmental 
                                              
2 The labels are mandated under the Motor Vehicles Standards Act 1989 (Australian Design 
Rule 81/01).     




performance and fuel consumption of new vehicles sold in Australia since 2004, 
using the fuel consumption label data. The Australian Government will spend 
$1.5 million over four years promoting the guide. These sources allow consumers to 
readily compare information on the fuel consumption of different vehicles.  
As discussed in chapter 9 with regard to home appliances, it could be argued that 
the market does not necessarily provide consumers with sufficient information 
regarding the energy efficiency of alternative products. With regard to motor 
vehicles, the Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics (BTCE) 
commented: 
In making informed purchasing decisions, buyers generally have to rely on the claims 
of competing manufacturers. Because of uncertainty on the part of buyers, genuinely 
more fuel-efficient products may attract prices below their optimal value. A vehicle 
labelling scheme supervised by the government has the potential to reduce the 
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. (BTCE 1996b, p. 154) 
Nonetheless, energy is a much more significant and visible cost for motor vehicle 
use than for most home appliances. Hence, consumers would be expected to be 
reasonably aware of fuel efficiency differences, even if other factors are more 
influential in their final purchase decision. For example, the RACV (2004) indicates 
that for most new passenger motor vehicles, fuel costs make up around 15 to 
20 per cent of the total cost of running a motor vehicle and over one-third of the 
non-capital costs. A wide variety of market sources — car magazines, newspapers, 
motoring organisations and motor vehicle retailers and producers — provide 
consumers with information on fuel consumption. Any small deficiencies in this 
market-provided information may not justify the expense to government, the 
industry and consumers of government intervention. There may be many areas of 
motor vehicle performance about which consumers have less than perfect 
knowledge.  
However, the fuel consumption labelling scheme is part of the broader 
environmental strategy for the motor vehicle industry. In this regard, the new 
requirement that fuel efficiency labels include information on greenhouse gas 
emissions — something markets would underprovide from a social perspective — 
better focuses on the program’s primary objectives, namely to lower emissions and 
reduce urban air pollution. In particular, the environmental performance of vehicles 
powered by fuels or fuel combinations producing lower greenhouse gas emissions 
will now be better brought to consumers’ attention.  
The Ford Motor Company of Australia (sub.  76) noted the potential for greater 
in-use fuel efficiency, such as that achieved in some European eco-driving 
programs, by changing motorists’ driving behaviour. Such programs have the     
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advantage of influencing the fuel consumption of all vehicles, not just the new 
vehicles covered by the fuel labelling scheme. 
As the fuel labelling scheme provides comparative information to consumers to 
assist in making informed decisions, rather than restricts or directs their purchasing 
decision, any resultant improvement in the energy efficiency of the motor vehicle 
fleet should be privately cost effective. However, analysis by the Bureau of 
Transport and Regional Economics (BTRE  2002a) indicates that actual fuel 
consumption is consistently above the test results by an average of 20 per cent, with 
underestimation greatest for the highway cycle. This may distort the vehicle choices 
of some consumers, possibly towards less fuel-efficient vehicles, as the absolute 
size of the underestimation of fuel consumption will be greater for vehicles with 
higher fuel consumption.  
Overseas studies of the impact of fuel-labelling schemes on consumer behaviour 
indicated that many consumers were aware of fuel consumption labels. European 
studies suggested that only modest reductions in average fuel consumption of the 
new vehicle fleet, in the order of one to four per cent, were likely to have been 
attributable to the schemes (BTRE  2002b and BTCE  1996b). However, greater 
gains might be expected as awareness of environmental impacts of motor vehicle 
use increases. A 1993 survey of two Australian car showrooms indicated a 
15  per  cent reduction in fuel consumption due to consumers changing their 
preferred vehicle on the basis of fuel consumption labels (Wallis 1993). In assessing 
the likely impact of an Australian fuel consumption label, the BTCE (1996b) 
assumed an average (over time) 1 litre per 100  kilometre (around 12  per  cent) 
reduction in fuel consumption of the new vehicle purchases of private buyers in 
response to a label. On this basis, the fuel-saving benefits of the scheme were found 
to make it a privately cost-effective measure. 
The labelling scheme appears relatively low cost to administer and comply with, 
particularly given that manufacturers have to meet similar requirements in many 
overseas markets. The BTCE (1996b) suggested a cost of between $2 and $15 per 
new car sold. These costs have been further reduced, particularly for imported 
vehicles and export models, by bringing the test procedure into line with 
internationally-recognised standards.  
Markets provide extensive information to consumers regarding fuel consumption of 
motor vehicles. Nonetheless, the Australian Government’s Fuel Consumption 
Labelling Scheme and Green Vehicle Guide provide relatively low cost, accessible 
and comparable information to consumers, and may be justified as part of the more 
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fundamental objective of encouraging consumers to reduce the adverse 
environmental impacts of motor vehicle use. 
National average fuel consumption target 
A voluntary industrywide average fuel consumption target for new (petrol-powered) 
passenger motor vehicles was first negotiated between the Australian Government 
and the automobile industry association (Federal Chamber of Automotive 
Industries – FCAI) in 1978. It aimed for a 15 per cent improvement in fleetwide 
fuel efficiency (to 9.5 litres per 100 km) by 1983 and a 20 per cent improvement by 
1987 (9 litres per 100 km). A further voluntary target of 8.2 litres per 100 km by 
2000 (12 per cent below the actual 1990 levels) was agreed to in 1996. Outcomes 
have been slightly above the targets but no penalties applied as the schemes were 
voluntary.  
The current average fuel consumption target, established under an industry 
voluntary code of practice in 2003, is 6.8 litres per 100 km by 2010 — a reduction 
in average new vehicle fuel consumption of 18 per cent below the actual 2001 level 
of 8.3 litres per 100 km. This compares with the United States corporate-specific 
target for new passenger vehicles of around 8.6 litres per 100 km (box 11.1). In 
assessing possible fuel efficiency targets, ACIL (1999) argued that a figure of 
6.7 litres per 100 km by 2010 would be a challenging but realistic lower limit. Sharp 
increases in fuel prices in recent years should increase consumers’ interest in fuel 
efficiency, making it more likely that the target will be achieved. The FCAI (2005a) 
suggested 6.3 litres per 100 km as a feasible objective for 2015.  
In addition, a separate national average carbon dioxide emissions target covering 
cars, vans, four wheel drives and light commercial vehicles up to 3.5 tonnes is being 
negotiated with the industry. The existing fuel-efficiency target will also be 
converted to a carbon dioxide (grams per kilometre) target. Achievement of the fleet 
fuel efficiency target is estimated to represent a reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions from motor vehicles of up to a total of two million tonnes per annum 
(around 4 per cent) by 2010 compared to that which would have occurred under 
base level fuel consumption (Kemp and Macfarlane 2003).      
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Box 11.1  Overseas fuel efficiency targets 
Many countries have implemented mandatory or voluntary motor vehicle fuel-efficiency 
targets, sometimes supported by other fiscal or regulatory policies aimed at reducing 
petrol consumption (for example, the US tax on vehicles with high fuel consumption). 
United States  
Since 1978, the United States has had compulsory Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) standards for each automotive manufacturer’s sales (segregated between their 
imported and domestically produced vehicles) in the US market. These standards were 
introduced because of concerns about energy security after the 1970s oil price shocks. 
The initial CAFE for passenger motor vehicles was 18 mpg (13.1 litres/100 km) rising 
to 27.5 mpg (8.6 litres/100 km) by 1985, where, after a brief reduction to 26.5 mpg, it 
has remained. Light trucks, SUVs and minivans are required to average at least 20.7 
mpg. Penalties exist for companies that fail to meet the target. Overseas producers 
(mostly European importers of larger cars such as BMW and Mercedes-Benz) have 
paid over $US 500 million in penalties since the scheme’s inception.  
Average actual fuel economy for new passenger cars had fallen from 16.1 mpg in 1955 
to 13 mpg in 1973. The first oil price shock saw fuel economy increase to 15.9 mpg in 
1975 and 19.9 mpg in 1978, gradually rising to 28.8 mpg in 1988. Since then it has 
varied between 28 mpg and 29 mpg, but has risen above 29 mpg in the last two years. 
European Union 
In 1998, the European Commission negotiated a voluntary agreement with European 
manufacturers for a fleetwide target for carbon dioxide emissions from new passenger 
vehicles of 140 grams per kilometre (equivalent to fuel consumption of around 
5.7 litres/100 km) by 2008. This represents around a 33 per cent reduction from 1995 
average fuel consumption (and a 25  per  cent reduction in average emissions). 
Japanese and Korean manufacturers have also agreed to meet this target for their 
exports to the European Union by 2009. The focus on emission levels means that the 
target can also be met by increasing the share of vehicles using less-polluting fuels as 
well as by improving fuel efficiency. 
Japan 
In 1999, Japan established fuel-efficiency targets for new passenger cars and light 
trucks (up to 2.5 tonnes) based on vehicle weight classes and fuel type. For most 
vehicles, the targets are to be met by each vehicle maker for each vehicle weight class 
by 2010. The targets represent fleetwide new vehicle fuel consumption of around 
6.7  litres/100 km for petrol passenger cars (23  per  cent lower than the average for 
1995). Small penalties apply if the targets are not met. The targets are based on the 
most fuel-efficient vehicle in each weight class in 1997, adjusted for likely feasible 
future fuel-saving technologies and factors adversely affecting fuel efficiency (for 
example, tighter regulation for pollution, noise and safety). Because the Japanese 
testing procedure is weighted more to lower fuel-efficiency driving cycles, vehicles 
would achieve lower fuel-efficiency ratings under the Japanese regime than the 
European and US testing procedures.  
 
     




The impact of these various targets on observed fuel consumption is likely to be 
limited by the high import share in the new motor vehicle market. Around 
70 per cent of new vehicles are imported and the fuel efficiency or emission levels 
of these vehicles will be significantly affected by the preferences of overseas 
consumers and by government fuel-efficiency regulations in those countries. A 
good deal of the technology used in Australian-made vehicles is also developed 
overseas or developed in Australia to meet overseas fuel-efficiency standards for 
models exported. In this regard, such voluntary and mandatory fuel-efficiency 
targets implemented overseas (box 11.1) may have served to further encourage 
innovation for greater fuel efficiency by putting the motor vehicle industry in those 
countries on notice that fuel efficiency is an important government priority.  
The rate at which Australian producers and importers incorporate overseas 
developments in fuel saving technologies which consumers are willing to pay for, 
might be influenced somewhat by the voluntary fuel-efficiency target. The 
possibility of mandatory targets could also affect industry behaviour. 
FCAI commented: 
… the industry has sought to cooperate with successive Australian governments to 
adopt voluntary targets to achieve improvements in the energy efficiency and 
environmental performance of vehicles, thereby avoiding unnecessary resort to more 
draconian mandatory regulation which would otherwise increase compliance costs and 
undermine the competitiveness of the Australian industry. (sub. 77, p. 1) 
Achieving the targets will also depend on the preferences of Australian consumers 
for fuel-saving technology and other features which might affect fuel efficiency, as 
well as by the mix of vehicles sold (weight and engine size). The Department of the 
Environment and Heritage (DEH) (sub. 30, p. 22) noted that, with regard to motor 
vehicle fuel consumption, ‘over time, weight specific efficiency has improved, but 
increasing vehicle weight has worked against overall efficiency improvement’.  
In this regard, the BTRE (2002a) indicated that estimated national average fuel 
consumption of new passenger motor vehicles had fallen by around 15 per cent 
between 1979 and 2001. Engine technologies had improved substantially, reducing 
fuel consumption per unit of maximum engine power output of around 45 per cent. 
However, the impact of this improvement on fuel consumption had been largely 
offset, particularly during the 1990s, by consumers’ preferences (on average) for 
larger more powerful vehicles with more accessories that have increased fuel 
consumption. Recent sharp rises in petrol prices should increase the importance 
consumers place on vehicle fuel efficiency.  
The voluntary code of practice (FCAI 2003) acknowledges that external influences 
(such as consumer preferences) may affect the achievement of the target. In such     
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instances, the industry will discuss changes to the target with the Australian 
Government. 
Unlike many industrial and commercial firms where energy is a relatively small 
cost, the importance of fuel in vehicle operating costs should make motor vehicle 
producers particularly cognisant of consumers’ interest in fuel efficiency. The 
highly competitive nature of the Australian motor vehicle market should mean that 
producers provide the vehicle features sought by consumers, of which energy 
efficiency is one. The Ford Motor Company of Australia observed that significant 
reductions in industry protection in Australia had contributed to the development of 
a highly competitive automotive market and argued: 
In such a congested marketplace, a manufacturer’s success will inevitably be dependent 
on sought-after and high value product (sub. 76, p. 2) 
Fleetwide fuel-efficiency targets that go much beyond what the market would 
deliver are likely to suffer from a number of drawbacks. To the extent that such 
targets distorted producer and consumer behaviour, the resultant energy efficiency 
gains would not be privately cost effective — consumers would value improved 
fuel efficiency less than the associated costs and additional constraints on vehicle 
choice. In addition, with over 50 producers supplying around 350 models of motor 
vehicles to the Australian market, the temptation to free ride on any efforts of others 
in meeting a marketwide target would be strong. 
As with other sectors of the economy, increased motor vehicle energy efficiency 
will also have some ‘rebound effect’ — in this case by encouraging greater use of 
motor vehicles or the purchase of vehicles with more energy consuming features. 
This would partly offset the environmental benefits from the initial fuel saving. 
Greene et al. (1999) estimate that for US households, a 10  per  cent increase in 
vehicle fuel efficiency leads directly to a 2 per cent increase in distance travelled. 
Fleetwide fuel consumption targets for new motor vehicles sold in Australia are 
likely to have had only a limited impact on the fuel efficiency of the new vehicle 
fleet. Significantly tightening such targets and making them compulsory would be 
likely to impose additional costs on consumers. 
Composition of the motor vehicle fleet 
A number of participants (for example, Sara Gipton, sub. 34; Sustainable Transport 
Coalition, sub. 70 and Alan Pears, sub. DR113) observed that the fuel efficiency of 
the motor vehicle fleet would increase if the proportion of vehicles with relatively 
poor fuel economy (in particular, four wheel drives used in large cities) were 
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reduced. Fuel consumption of large four wheel drive vehicles and larger sedans is 
significantly higher than smaller engine capacity sedans.3  
The share of larger vehicles and Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs) in new car sales has 
increased in recent years, mirroring trends in a number of large developed countries 
such as the United States and Canada. This trend may partly reflect the relatively 
low petrol prices experienced during much of the 1990s, along with growing real 
incomes. However, the recent significant increases in world oil prices, if expected to 
continue, should discourage some consumers from purchasing vehicles with lower 
fuel efficiency. 4 The FCAI, in noting the increase in the share of light and small 
vehicles in total passenger and SUV sales from 34.7  per cent in 2004 to 
38.4 per cent in the first half of 2005, commented: 
The small car segment is booming this year, … suggesting that fuel economy has risen 
on the list of priorities for many buyers. (FCAI 2005b) 
Given the extent of competition in the motor vehicle industry, it would be expected 
that the attributes of different vehicles would be well communicated to consumers.5 
Hence, consumers’ current purchasing patterns should adequately represent their 
view of the most cost-effective vehicles for their needs, given the level of factors 
such as income, motor vehicle prices and current and anticipated fuel prices. Any 
policy measures to mandate or subsidise a switch to a less energy-intensive car fleet 
are unlikely to provide privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements. 
Whether they would be cost effective in achieving broader policy objectives is not 
clear.  
In the past, four wheel drives have faced much lower tariffs than passenger motor 
vehicles, thereby distorting demand towards them and, as a consequence, lowering 
the energy efficiency of the motor vehicle fleet. With the progressive lowering of 
passenger motor vehicle tariffs, only a small tariff preference remains (5 per cent 
compared to the 10 per cent for passenger motor vehicles). Because Australian 
tariffs are only applied to the price of a vehicle when it leaves its country of origin 
                                              
3 The Green Vehicle Guide (AGO 2005c) shows that many small 4 cylinder manual vehicles 
average petrol consumption of around 6 to 9 litres of petrol per 100 kilometres (under the 
assumed driving cycles and testing conditions used) while larger sedans and four wheel drives 
predominantly range from 12 to 17 litres per 100 kilometres. 
4 A number of participants (for example, Matt Mushalik, sub. 4 and 75, Alan Parker sub. 35 and 
DR112 and Phillip Laird sub. DR127) have argued that world oil production will soon reach its 
peak and hence petroleum product prices could be expected to remain high in the long term. 
BTRE (2005a) provided a review of the debate concerning future oil supplies and noted that 
international energy agencies expect oil supply to broadly keep pace with demand over the next 
30 years at prices around $US30 per barrel (in year 2000 dollars). 
5 This is particularly so since the reduction of the very high levels of assistance to the domestic 
motor vehicle industry, commencing in 1989, has significantly increased competition.      
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(hence they are not levied on shipping costs and wholesaler and retailer margins in 
Australia) the lower tariff for four wheel drives will only reduce their final retail 
prices by a little over 3 per cent. The tariff differential will be removed in 2010 
when passenger motor vehicle tariffs are scheduled to fall to 5 per cent. 
The composition and fuel efficiency of the government motor vehicle fleet were 
discussed in chapter 8. 
New vehicle and fuel technology 
Technological developments (related to vehicle engines, chassis, tyres and 
transmissions) have been critical in delivering improvements in the energy 
efficiency performance of the Australian motor vehicle fleet. At the same time, 
consumer demands for more comfortable motoring and improved vehicle 
performance have seen a greater provision of accessories (for example, air 
conditioning) and larger cars with higher fuel consumption although providing other 
services of value to consumers. The wide variety of automotive market niches 
suggests that consumers’ varied preferences for fuel efficiency and other vehicle 
attributes should be well provided for. 
Currently available and potential new technologies that would significantly improve 
the fuel efficiency of new vehicles include improvements in aerodynamics, 
automated manual transmissions (SwRI  2004), direct injection engines, cylinder 
deactivation and on-board diagnostic systems. As well as market availability and 
consumer preferences, the rate at which more fuel-efficient technology of this type 
is introduced to the motor vehicle fleet depends on the level of new car sales and the 
rate at which old vehicles are scrapped. In this regard, the price reductions and 
quality improvements which have accompanied the very large reductions in 
protection to the local motor vehicle industry in the last 15 years should have 
significantly stimulated demand for new vehicles.  
Average fuel efficiency of new vehicles in Australia was over 11 litres per 100 km 
in the 1970s, improving to around 9 litres per 100 km by 1990. This compares to 
current levels of close to 8 litres per 100 km. Hence, in the immediate future, the 
rate of replacement of the existing fleet is likely to make a more significant impact 
on total fleet fuel economy (depending as it does on previous improvements in new 
vehicle fuel efficiency) than foreseeable future improvements. The fall in passenger 
motor vehicle tariffs to 10  per  cent in 2005 and the scheduled reduction to 
5  per  cent in 2010 should further stimulate the modernisation of the fleet. 
Prohibitive tariffs on second-hand vehicles ($12 000 plus the normal vehicle tariff) 
preclude relatively new overseas used cars as a privately cost-effective source of 
improving the fuel efficiency of the Australian car fleet.     




Sara Gipton noted that, in some cases, fuel-efficient motor vehicle technology may 
require increased energy use in other parts of the production process: 
… energy saving in one step of production or operation may in fact cause an increase in 
energy use in a different part of the process. For example, to reduce fuel consumed per 
distance travelled by the substitution of more energy-intensive materials such as 
aluminium to reduce the weight of a vehicle. The net impact of energy consumption 
over the life of a vehicle should therefore be taken into account. (sub. 34, p. 5) 
To the extent that motor vehicle energy efficiency programs are targeting 
greenhouse gas abatement, they should consider the full impact of alternative 
technologies on energy use. 
Improved fuel quality is a prerequisite to the efficient introduction of certain more 
fuel-efficient engine technologies. The FCAI noted the importance of adopting new 
fuel standards if the current voluntary fuel consumption targets are to be achieved: 
The achievement of these targets is dependent on a range of factors including more 
widespread uptake of higher octane (95  RON) petrol and introduction of very low 
sulphur petrol to facilitate the introduction of a range of advanced engine and emission 
control technologies. (FCAI 2005a) 
Some technological improvements in fuel would also offer the potential to improve 
the energy efficiency of the whole motor vehicle fleet rather than just new vehicles. 
The BTRE (2002a) noted that about half of new passenger vehicles sold in any year 
are still on the road 20 years later.  
Several participants (for example, the Queensland Government, sub.  38 and 
Electricity Markets Research Institute, sub.  DR110) have noted that the use of 
non-petroleum based automotive fuels, such as ethanol and fuel cells, can offer 
better conversion of energy inputs to energy output or provide considerable 
environmental benefits. However, comparisons of relative energy outputs and 
greenhouse gas emissions from alternative fuel sources are beyond the scope of this 
inquiry. Such comparisons do not directly relate to the privately cost-effective 
energy efficiency of different fuels. In any event, there do not appear to be market 
failures which prevent individuals from making privately cost-effective choices 
between alternative fuels. 
Congestion pricing 
Beyond a certain level of traffic, every vehicle entering a road space imposes 
congestion costs on all other vehicles using that road. As road usage approaches the 
capacity of a road, additional vehicles slow traffic significantly and fuel     
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consumption is around twice that under free-flow conditions (BTE 2000).6 
However, for individual drivers (and their passengers) the congestion costs they 
impose on others are externalities and do not enter the decision to make the trip by 
road at that time on that route. Because these congestion costs are largely ‘external’ 
to the individual driver’s decision making, the level of traffic on a congested road 
will be inefficiently high.  
One approach to dealing with this externality is to require road users to directly 
meet a significant cost of their travel choice through user charges, thereby 
improving overall economic efficiency. The Bureau of Transport Economics 
(BTE 1999) estimated that the social costs of congestion on capital city roads was 
around $12.8 billion in 1995, nearly half of which was in Sydney, and a further 
20 per cent in each of Melbourne and Brisbane. It predicted that due to urban traffic 
growth exceeding increases in road capacity, annual congestion costs in the six 
capitals could increase to around $30 billion by 2015.  
However, even under optimal pricing, only some of this congestion would be 
alleviated and there would also be initial and ongoing costs involved in 
implementing such charges and losses for those ‘tolled-off’ the road at congested 
times. The BTCE (1996a) estimated that accurately-calibrated peak-period 
congestion pricing in the five largest Australian state capitals would provide net 
benefits of around $1.1 billion per year (only including time savings benefits).7 The 
BTRE (2002b) reported that the fuel savings resulting from optimal congestion 
pricing would be around 30 per cent, with consequent reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions of 5  million tonnes per annum  (about  one per cent  of  Australian 
emissions from all sources). At current fuel prices, the value of these fuel savings to 
motorists will have increased significantly. 
As far back as the 1960s, the UK Ministry of Transport (1964) concluded that direct 
road pricing in the United Kingdom would yield net benefits of between ₤100 and 
₤150 million (1964 prices). Hau (1990) reported annual net benefits (in 1985 prices) 
of introducing road pricing in Hong Kong of over $US150 million. MVA (1995) 
estimated the net benefits from road pricing in London at ₤225 million per annum. 
Prud’homme estimated annual net benefits for Paris at 2.5 billion francs (reported in 
Nash and Sansom 1999). Schrank and Lomax (2004) estimated that in 2002, the 
                                              
6  The BTE (2000) noted that ‘free-flow’ conditions are an unrealisable hypothetical situation 
which provide a benchmark to indicate the size of the congestion problem, but which could not 
be attained in practice. 
7 The BTCE (1996a) stressed that, particularly given that data for different cities was for different 
years and did not take account of recent changes in the road system, their estimates were to be 
treated as ‘indicative and exploratory’.     




cost of congestion to US travellers in 85 major metropolitan areas at peak times was 
$US63 billion. 
Despite the significant potential benefits, congestion pricing has been applied 
internationally in only a few quite localised cases of particularly severe traffic 
problems, such as in Singapore and London (box 11.2). Although toll roads have 
become more prevalent in a number of countries, they are not examples of 
congestion pricing as such — prices do not vary between times of higher and lower 
congestion. Express transit lanes (for vehicles with two or more occupants) have 
been one non-price strategy aimed at reducing congestion by encouraging car 
pooling. However, these lanes tend to be underutilised and result in increased 
congestion in the remaining lanes (BTRE 2002b). Congestion (or peak) pricing is 
widespread in other services where it is designed to spread demand for fixed 
infrastructure more evenly over time. Higher long-distance telecommunications 
prices during weekdays, lower train fares during certain off-peak periods, lower 
overnight electricity charges, cheaper cinema tickets for particular days and times, 
and higher accommodation charges during peak seasons are all examples of 
congestion pricing. Often these differentials are expressed as off-peak discounts —
in the case of congestion-priced roads, such discounts might be no charge at 
non-congested times. 
Whether switches of some journeys from congested roads to (often subsidised) 
public transport provide net community benefits will also depend on the costs and 
benefits in the public transport sector as a result of making this transition. For 
example, if greater peaks in public transport were to result, this might require more 
capital and labour resources which are idle for much of the day and at weekends. 
Alternatively, the public transport system may become more congested at peak 
times, imposing costs of additional discomfort and delays on commuters. If these 
costs are not adequately reflected in fares, the choice between private and public 
transport (or between any other options facing the traveller) will be distorted.  
Congestion pricing does not result in energy efficiency improvements that are cost 
effective for those drivers priced off the road — they are shifted to other options 
which they value less than travelling on (congested) roads at a particular time. If 
congestion tolls are set appropriately, these costs will be more than made up for by 
the efficiency gains (time saving and lower vehicle operating costs) accruing to 
those still using (and now directly paying for) the less congested road system. The 
size of the net efficiency benefits will then depend on the costs of administration 
and compliance. However, remaining road users will also be paying tolls — a 
transfer payment to government that does not have negative efficiency implications 
because it involves taxing a negative externality. These charges will, on average, 
exceed the efficiency benefits received by this group (BTCE 1996a) and hence, in a     
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financial sense, they are also worse off. Those travellers who place a high value on 
time will be better off but those with lower valuations of time savings will be worse 
off after paying the congestion charge. The latter group still make the journey 
because the value of the trip to them is greater than all of the costs involved, 
including vehicle operating costs, travel time and the congestion toll. 
The Industry Commission (IC 1994b) recommended the incremental introduction of 
areawide electronic road pricing, starting with new or upgraded urban arterial roads 
in Sydney and Melbourne. The AATSE (1997) inquiry into urban air pollution also 
recommended that congestion pricing be introduced as part of a range of 
demand-management measures to enable consumers to make informed travel 
choices. Governments have not acted on these recommendations.  
However, since then, further advances in charging technology and the extension of 
the use of (non-congestion) toll roads to finance expansion of the road capacity, 
together with increasing congestion on certain urban roads, have increased the 
technical (and political) feasibility of introducing congestion pricing.  
The Ministerial Inquiry into Sustainable Transport in New South Wales 
(Parry  2003) recommended that the New South Wales Government consider 
implementing electronic road pricing within the next five to ten years in order to 
effectively signal the costs (including congestion) of road use. 
Efficient road congestion pricing would lead to communitywide, cost effective 
increases in energy efficiency. However, these gains will not be privately cost 
effective for all road users. Reductions in fuel consumption and cleaner burning of 
fuel would also provide significant local environmental benefits and reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
While congestion pricing can offer significant efficiency benefits, it needs to be 
implemented in an effective manner if maximum benefits are to be obtained. In 
particular, congestion levies would need to be variable over time depending on the 
level of congestion and implemented in an areawide context to minimise inefficient 
diversion of traffic to minor roads. Given the extent of interstate road travel, 
particularly by freight vehicles, coordination of charging technology between 
jurisdictions would lower costs of implementing congestion pricing. 
FINDING 11.3     





Box 11.2  Congestion pricing schemes 
While there are numerous instances where tolls have been used to finance road 
construction, there are only a few cases where road-user charging has been totally or 
partially focused on reducing inefficient levels of road congestion. These include: 
Singapore 
Singapore, in 1975, introduced a requirement for a prepaid area license for a vehicle to 
enter a restricted zone encompassing the most congested parts of the city. Initially the 
charge was only for the morning peak but was later extended to between 7:30 am and 
7:00 pm on weekdays and 7:30 am and 2:00 pm on Saturday. The entry charge varied 
between vehicle types and was greater for entry during the morning and evening 
peaks. While achieving only a portion of the potential benefits from congestion pricing, 
the scheme’s administration costs were relatively low. Car parks were set up around 
the restricted zone to facilitate the use of public transport into the city. During the 1990s 
a similar scheme was progressively introduced along congested sections of a number 
of expressways between 7:30 am and 9:30 pm on weekdays. While manually enforced 
and fairly rudimentary as a congestion control technique, the scheme did serve to 
reduce traffic congestion towards more efficient levels. In 1998, Singapore switched to 
electronic tolling and enforcement methods, facilitating the better targeting of the level 
of charges to address congestion. 
London 
In 2003, a daily charge of ₤5 was introduced for all vehicles (with certain exemptions 
and also discounts for residents) driving or parking in a 21 square kilometre zone of 
central London between 7:00 am to 6:30 pm on Mondays to Fridays. In periods when 
congestion is not considered a serious problem there is no charge. The scheme is a 
paper-based charge enforced by a series of over 200 camera sites. It is now proposed 
to extend the charging zone to include adjacent congested areas of central London. 
The charge has been accompanied by a 30  per  cent reduction in the level of 
congestion in the charging zone, an 18 per cent decline in motor vehicles entering the 
zone and a 12 per cent fall in vehicle emissions. Public transport usage increased by 
around 40 per cent of which about half was attributed to the congestion charge. 
California 
Since 1995, a ten mile section of a four-lane tollway (located on the median strip of the 
existing congested eight-lane public freeway) in Orange County, has had tolls which 
vary according to the time of day, week and year. Motorists have a direct choice 
between priced and unpriced (on the parallel freeway) travel. Tolls currently vary from 
$US  1.05 to $US  6.25. Tolls are reviewed every six months to recognise changing 
congestion levels to more efficiently ration tollway use. In 1998, the first ‘dynamic 
congestion pricing’ scheme was introduced in San Diego by converting two existing 
underutilised 13 kilometre high-occupancy vehicle lanes on the ten lane I-15 into 
reversible high-occupancy toll lanes. Tolls are continuously varied according to the 
level of congestion, normally ranging from $US  0.75 to $US  4.00 but potentially 
increasing to up to $US 8.00 if congestion is very high. 
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In both the short and long term, congestion pricing is only one of a number of 
complementary policies for improving the efficiency of investment, in and use of, 
transport infrastructure. In the short term, traffic control measures and 
improvements in access to public transport may be efficient means of reducing road 
congestion. In the longer term, efficient investment in both roads and public 
transport infrastructure together with effective urban planning will also play a part 
in efficiently addressing road congestion. 
There are a number of other issues regarding charging for road use, some of which 
may indirectly have implications for energy efficiency. A number of participants 
(for example, the Sustainable Transport Coalition, sub.  70, the South Australian 
Government, sub. 79 and Urban Ecology Australia, sub. DR132) have argued that 
there are efficiency and equity reasons for changing some currently fixed road user 
charges into variable charges (for example, by incorporating them into petrol 
excise). By increasing the cost of road journeys, higher variable charges for road 
use would result in both energy conservation (by reducing the amount of travel) and 
some increase in transport energy efficiency (by, for example, transferring some 
journeys to public transport or encouraging more energy-efficient private transport). 
In addition, certain external costs of road use such as local air and noise pollution as 
well as greenhouse gas emissions are not directly accounted for in current taxation 
of road users. Several participants (for example, Philip Laird, sub. 1, the Railway 
Technical Society of Australasia, sub. 45 and Environment Victoria, sub. 67) noted 
the significant health costs attributed to motor vehicle emissions. The BTRE has 
estimated that the economic cost of health impacts from motor vehicle emissions in 
2000 was $2.7 billion (central estimate) (BTRE 2005b).8 Governments have used 
vehicle emission controls and fuel standards, rather than taxation, as the main 
means to reduce motor vehicle pollution. However, the impact of these technologies 
on vehicle and fuel prices will also have reduced motor vehicle use to some extent 
(even in locations and times at which emissions are not a problem) but may also 
have reduced vehicle fuel efficiency. Hence, their net impact on the fuel efficiency 
of the transport task is uncertain. 
The possibility of varying the basis of road taxation (including congestion pricing) 
is part of the National Action Plan of the Australian Transport Council, which gives 
the Standing Committee on Transport the responsibility to: 
Develop an approach to move travel costs from predominantly fixed to predominantly 
variable costs in the areas of registration pricing; the cost of fuel; insurance charges; 
parking policies and congestion pricing.  
                                              
8 This cost estimate relates solely to the impact of outdoor ambient air pollution and BTRE note 
that it will vary substantially with changes to key assumptions such as the extent of observed 
pollution levels that are due to motor vehicle use.     




The Commission’s Review of National Competition (NCP) Policy Reforms 
(PC 2005) has recommended a national review of the passenger transport sector. 
Such a review could encompass issues of congestion pricing and other road pricing 
issues including the treatment of environmental externalities.  
Australian governments should investigate the feasibility of introducing 
congestion pricing where it is likely to improve the economic efficiency of road 
use (including greater energy efficiency). It may be appropriate for such a study 
to be incorporated in a wider examination of efficient road pricing or in a review 
of passenger transport reform as a whole.  
Intelligent transport systems (ITS) 
ITS  Australia  (2003, p. 4)  defines  intelligent transport systems as ‘… the 
application of computing, information and communications technologies to the 
vehicles and networks that move people and goods’. Generally ITS are a range of 
relatively small projects which cumulatively could provide useful economic 
benefits, including privately profitable gains in energy efficiency and possibly 
environmental benefits. The BTRE noted: 
There is a wide range of ITS developments with equally varied impacts. ITS should 
result in more efficient use of the transport network through better informed decision 
making and low cost communication for the transport community. 
(BTRE 2002b, p. xvi) 
Examples of ITS include managing and coordinating traffic signals, provision of 
transport information and optimising train, bus and truck fleet operations. The 
feasibility and potential benefits of congestion pricing have also been significantly 
enhanced by advances in ITS.  
Austroads argued that the National Strategy for Intelligent Transport Systems 
offered significant benefits from further implementation of ITS: 
This Strategy will harness ITS to meet Australia’s transport challenges. Estimates 
suggest an overall reduction in the total costs of road accidents, congestion and vehicle 
emissions by at least 12 per cent by 2012 from using ITS, is achievable, and indeed 
should be a minimum expectation of the total gains from using ITS. 
(Austroads 1999, p. 8) 
The private benefits of improved traffic flow and efficiency in the use of transport 
vehicles may justify the public (and sometimes private) expenditure in certain ITS 
involved in achieving such improvements. However, the resultant energy efficiency 
and environmental benefits may not be as great as expected. Reduced congestion 
RECOMMENDATION 11.1     
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caused by more efficient traffic control (rather than by congestion tolls), while 
worth pursuing, may encourage more road use which may eventually partly or 
wholly offset the initial reduction in fuel consumption and emissions — effectively 
a ‘rebound effect’. 
Much of the investment in ITS likely to deliver energy efficiency improvements is 
undertaken by government. The key to such investment being cost effective for the 
community is the rigorous benefit–cost analysis of projects implemented within an 
efficiently operated, regulated and priced transport system. With regard to the latter, 
implementation of remaining regulatory reform in transport, reform of the rail 
sector and introduction of efficient congestion pricing are all necessary to enable 
accurate assessment of the benefits of further developments in ITS. Indeed, use of 
ITS would play an important part in achieving greater benefits from any 
introduction of congestion pricing. 
In some cases, government budgetary restrictions can prevent or delay efficient 
capital investments. However, the Commission has not received any indications of 
any budgetary, regulatory or other impediments to the implementation of efficient 
ITS investments that would have improved energy efficiency.  
Urban planning and energy efficiency in transport 
The terms of reference direct the Commission to consider the role that urban 
planning policies might play in achieving privately cost-effective energy efficiency 
improvements in transport. The availability and cost of the various transport options 
for individuals and firms can be significantly influenced by urban and transport 
planning decisions of state and local authorities. In turn, this can affect actual 
transport choices with associated energy efficiency implications. Planning also 
impacts on the amount of energy used in transport activities by influencing both the 
need to make journeys and their length.9 This energy-use effect is not the focus of 
this inquiry, but particular government programs often focus on both improved 
energy efficiency and reduced energy use simultaneously. 
Urban planning involves a complex interaction of multiple objectives and multiple 
policy instruments to influence the way cities develop. Once made, the impacts of 
planning decisions are often effectively irreversible for long periods. Also, the 
extent of externalities — the actions of one person or firm impacting on others — 
                                              
9  For example, planning which facilitates residential, shopping, leisure and industrial and 
commercial zones in a local area can reduce the number and extent of energy-using transport 
journeys.     




means that urban planning has to deal with the sometimes conflicting interests of 
individuals and firms in their roles as producers, employees and consumers. 
The Planning Institute of Australia’s (PIA) view of planning was that: 
Planners guide and manage the way suburbs, cities and regions develop, making sure 
that they are good places in which to live, work and play. Planners are involved in 
making decisions about land use proposals and other types of developments whilst 
balancing the needs of communities and the environment. (PIA 2005) 
With regard to transport issues, the National Charter of Integrated Land Use and 
Transport Planning10 (developed by the National Transport Secretariat for the 
Australian Transport Council) states: 
Land use and transport planning has a key role to play in delivering social, economic, 
and environmental sustainability. Roads will continue to dominate as the means of 
movement for the majority of people and freight in Australia in the foreseeable future. 
However, by shaping the pattern of development and influencing the location, scale, 
density, design and mix of land uses, planning can help to facilitate an efficient 
transport and land use system … (DoTARS 2003, p. 1) 
The Australian Transport Council (ATC) has developed national guidelines for 
transport infrastructure planning: 
They adopt a total system approach to transport planning and investment. A 
multi-modal approach, providing for integrated infrastructure, travel demand 
management strategies (including land use planning), travel behaviour and Intelligent 
Transport Systems (ITS)/traffic operations is taken. (ATC 2004) 
A number of parties have argued that urban planning needs to place greater 
emphasis on both reducing the need for travel and facilitating passenger journeys 
other than by private vehicle, thereby reducing energy use and increasing energy 
efficiency in transport. The Public Transport Users Association commented: 
It makes no sense to continue to build suburbs that have street layouts that are 
unsuitable for anything but the private car. Instead new subdivisions should provide 
sensible street layouts for efficient direct bus routes, and have permeable easily crossed 
local grid streets so residents can walk or cycle to neighbourhood facilities. 
(sub. 63, p. 7) 
                                              
10  DoTARS (2003) notes that the Charter originated as an action in the Integrated National 
Strategy and Action Plan for Lowering Emissions from Urban Traffic which had been 
developed by the National Transport Secretariat following a request from the Australian 
Transport Council to improve the environmental performance of the transport sector. The 
Charter also incorporates the intent of the strategic responses prepared for the National 
Greenhouse Strategy measure 5.3 on land use and transport planning.     
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The National Charter of Integrated Land Use and Transport Planning place a focus 
on: 
… developing an urban and regional form that concentrates the provision of goods and 
services at hubs, and provides effective transport linkage between those hubs. 
(DoTARS 2003, p. 3) 
Similarly, the PIA considered that transport considerations should play an integral 
role in urban planning: 
Australian cities should pursue urban development policies that strengthen the 
multi-modal city by increasing density and diversifying uses in activity centres linked 
to public transport, and by promoting integrated residential and employment precincts 
at the urban fringe and in larger infill development. (PIA 2003, p. 58) 
In some cases, the underlying objective is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Environment Victoria argued: 
Energy efficiency and reductions in greenhouse emissions should be planned for in 
land-use and transport planning and where new Commonwealth funded development is 
proposed; as such development design affects energy use for generations. (sub. 67, p. 1) 
In the National Charter of Integrated Land Use and Transport Planning it is noted 
that improved environmental performance of the transport sector (involving both 
less travel and improved energy efficiency of those journeys undertaken) is one of 
many outcomes resulting from best practice in integrated land-use and transport 
planning. 
However, the BTRE cautioned that an excessive focus on transport outcomes could 
lead to inefficient planning decisions: 
While there are many lessons to be learnt from past development practices, these alone 
do not justify a radical change in direction. The uncritical pursuit of policies to increase 
the density of cities to achieve better utilisation of public transport may not be in the 
public interest. A prerequisite for sound land use would be to ensure that development 
costs are not distorted by subsidies (such as partial recovery of infrastructure costs): In 
other words, that the price signals that determine settlement patterns accurately reflect 
the benefits and costs facing society. (BTRE 2002b, p. 56) 
The Industry Commission report on the impacts of financial policy on urban 
settlement noted the potentially high cost of mandating shifts in travel mode: 
It is not practical or cost effective to attempt to control urban land use such that no 
pollution or other adverse environmental impacts occur. Simple solutions are scarce: 
for example, mandated reduction in use of private motor vehicles is often advocated to 
remedy air pollution and congestion but this would imply an extreme judgement about 
alternative means of achieving those objectives, and neglect the considerable range of 
benefits to households and firms of the mobility enabled by private vehicles. 
(IC 1993, p. 8)     




The energy efficiency of transport is only one relatively small and rather indirect 
consequence out of numerous outcomes influenced by the planning process. For the 
impacts of planning on transport energy efficiency to be privately cost effective, the 
other costs and benefits to individuals flowing from planning decisions will need to 
have been appropriately incorporated into the planning process. In particular, if 
outcomes are to be privately cost effective, the shares of motor vehicle and public 
transport use will be determined by individuals’ and firms’ responses to an efficient 
planning framework. The setting of target shares by governments is unlikely to 
result in privately cost effective transport outcomes nor in minimum-cost 
greenhouse gas abatement. 
Given the complexity and longevity of the impacts of the planning process and the 
limited role of pricing signals, the costs and benefits of planning decisions can be 
difficult to determine. However, any focus of planning on improving transport 
energy efficiency and reducing energy use must be balanced against other 
objectives of individuals, firms and the economy and society more generally. Urban 
planning involves many competing social, economic and environmental priorities. 
No single consideration, such as energy usage or energy efficiency, should be given 
undue weight. 
Other passenger transport issues 
Corporate and leased vehicles  
There can be tax advantages for individuals in using a vehicle leased for them by 
their employer rather than purchasing a vehicle out of their after-tax income. This 
will tend to increase employees’ expenditure on motor vehicles. Some employers 
also pay for the cost of fuel which may (depending on the details of the salary 
package) lower the incentive for employees to select more fuel-efficient vehicles 
and to drive them economically. Further, some employers, particularly 
governments, require that leased vehicles be produced in Australia. As only medium 
and large vehicles are now produced in Australia, such requirements will tend to 
lead to lower energy efficiency of the overall vehicle fleet.  
A motor vehicle provided by an employer which is available for an employee’s 
private use is subject to fringe benefits tax (FBT) payable by the employer. Under 
the predominant method for calculating the tax liability (the statutory formula 
method) the tax liability reduces as kilometres travelled increase through various 
thresholds. If a company-provided vehicle is driven less than 15 000 kilometres in a 
year, its taxable value for that year is 26 per cent of its purchase price, whereas 
travelling over 40 000 kilometres reduces this to 7 per cent. The presumption is that,     
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as a ‘rule of thumb’, the greater the kilometres travelled, the lower the proportion of 
private travel. 
The FBT methodology provides an incentive to use a company-provided vehicle 
more, either by substituting for other modes of travel or for other family vehicles, or 
by increasing the amount of travel undertaken. To the extent that any substitution is 
away from more fuel-efficient means of travel, the energy efficiency of passenger 
transport will be reduced.11 Several participants argued that the FBT statutory 
formula method should be amended to remove this encouragement to increased car 
travel (Public Transport Users Association, sub.  63; Sustainable Transport 
Coalition, sub. 70).  
Many factors determine the choice of particular taxation rules — for example, 
efficiency, equity and, particularly, it would appear in this case, administrative 
simplicity. While the rules for calculating FBT liability will encourage somewhat 
greater vehicle ownership and greater use of the vehicles concerned, the impact on 
the energy efficiency of the transport sector appears likely to be relatively small and 
may not justify amendments to rules which have been developed to meet other 
objectives. 
Changing transport modes 
Public transport is, in most cases, a more energy-efficient means of transporting 
passengers than private motor vehicles. However, as many factors other than energy 
efficiency are considered when making travel-mode decisions, the vast majority of 
passenger trips are undertaken using private transport.  
TravelSmart is a travel behaviour change program that aims to reduce the reliance 
on cars for private travel by providing information to transport users on the benefits 
of alternative means of travel, and the environmental costs imposed by car travel. 
State, Territory and local governments implement a wide range of projects under the 
TravelSmart banner and TravelSmart Australia brings together many government 
and community programs aimed at reducing the use of cars and increasing the 
energy efficiency of the transport task. 
The objectives of TravelSmart are local and global environmental improvements 
together with improving individual’s health. TravelSmart Australia commented: 
TravelSmart is essentially a voluntary program that aims to inform and motivate people 
for changing their travelling behaviour through personal choice. It does not involve any 
                                              
11  A greater quantum of travel, while increasing negative externalities associated with motor 
vehicle use, is outside the energy efficiency focus of this inquiry.     




form of regulations, fees or taxes directed at compelling changes in travel behaviour. 
(TravelSmart Australia 2004). 
The Conservation Council of Western Australia argued that the public needs to be 
educated about travel choices because: 
Lack of awareness of travel alternatives or misconceptions about the relative 
performance of different modes or preference for driving is a major factor behind car 
use in our cities — behavioural programs should be run to capitalise on system 
improvements. (sub. 54, p. 12) 
The Queensland Government commented favourably on the program, observing: 
TravelSmart enables each participant to review and adjust their own travel behaviour to 
achieve reductions in vehicle travel within the context of their lifestyle and transport 
needs. The initiative does not compromise an individual’s mobility needs. 
(sub. 38, p. 15) 
TravelSmart initiatives aim to reduce the energy requirements of the passenger 
transport task by providing information aimed at encouraging a voluntary switch 
from motor vehicle travel (particularly involving a single occupant) to other less 
energy-intensive methods of transport. Hence, aggregate reductions in transport 
energy intensity resulting from the campaign should be beneficial for the private 
individuals affected, but will involve government expenditure. Whether 
TravelSmart is an effective means of achieving these private benefits will depend 
on the costs of the campaign and the value of any environmental and health benefits 
flowing from it. It is also important to consider if the program is the most 
cost-effective means of achieving these benefits. 
The Victorian Government has evaluated a TravelSmart trial in suburban Alamein 
and found that there had been reduced car trips (10 per cent) and increased public 
transport, cycling and walking trips, compared to a control group not covered by the 
project. The South Australian Government (sub. 80) indicated benefit–cost ratios 
ranging from 4:1 to 44:1 from TravelSmart programs, with significant shifts 
observed from motor vehicles to public transport. 
Even if the whole journey is not changed from motor vehicle to public transport, 
there are opportunities for part of the journey to be substituted. There are many 
possibilities for passenger transport (particularly in urban areas) to involve several 
modes. For example, in 2003 the Victorian Government developed a park and ride 
facility with 400 car spaces, bike lockers and a fast ‘drop-off’ zone to link with a 
freeway bus service to the city. If such facilities meet appropriate benefit–cost 
criteria they can generate both private and economywide, cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements.     
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As noted above, cost-effective opportunities for greater use of multiple transport 
modes would be efficiently enhanced if congestion pricing were introduced on 
urban roads in conjunction with planning to efficiently satisfy the resultant 
increased demand for public transport. 
FINDING 11.4 
The TravelSmart program improves the energy efficiency of transport by providing 
consumers with information regarding less fuel-intensive travel options and means 
to reduce the need to travel. TravelSmart simultaneously addresses several policy 
issues — greenhouse gases, air pollution, and personal health and fitness — in a 
way that allows consumers to choose which options are most cost effective for them. 
11.3 Freight  transport 
A large proportion of freight transport within Australia is undertaken using either 
road or rail. In many (although not all) cases, rail freight will be a more 
energy-efficient means of transport than road, particularly for heavy loads over long 
distances. For example, Apelbaum Consulting (2004) estimated that, on average, in 
2001-02 rail freight used 0.31 megajoules of energy per tonne kilometre of freight 
carried compared to 0.96 megajoules for articulated trucks (the main competitor 
with rail freight). However, technical energy efficiency will be only one 
consideration among the range of costs and services that determine the choice of 
freight mode. Because of its overall advantages in other cost and service areas, road 
freight is used for the majority of non-bulk freight transport tasks where both modes 
are practicable. However, if current petroleum prices are maintained or increase 
further, the energy efficiency advantage of rail will assume greater importance in 
freight transport decisions. 
Voluntary shifts by producers towards using rail (on the basis that it was more cost 
effective than road transport) would usually result in cost-effective increases in the 
average energy efficiency of the transport sector. A number of possible 
impediments or barriers to using rail freight may direct customers’ choices away 
from rail — some are rational and efficient reasons while some reflect market or 
regulatory failures. In line with the inquiry’s terms of reference, the focus here is on 
the private costs and benefits of alternative freight transport options. In particular, 
environmental costs and benefits are only noted insofar as they are the outcome of 
privately cost-effective freight transport choices. A full evaluation of policies for 
freight transport would also need to include environmental and social costs and 
benefits.     




Significant amounts of freight traffic are effectively non-contestable between road 
and rail in that one or the other mode has a clear cost/service advantage. Domestic 
carriage of bulky low value freight such as coal and iron ore is largely the province 
of rail (and, to a lesser extent, sea) transport, while short distance freight traffic is 
largely the province of road. Phillip Laird (sub. 56) estimated that at least 8 per cent 
of the 2002-03 road freight task might be potentially transferred to rail if road 
freight input costs (for example, diesel and road user charges) increase and more 
rail investment is undertaken. The BTRE considered that ‘… generally, only a small 
proportion of total freight carried by road is contestable’ (BTRE 2002b, pp 58–59).   
Efficiency of rail freight 
If the costs of rail transport services are inefficiently high, or service quality is too 
low, firms (and passengers) will, in the absence of subsidies, tend to use less rail 
transport (and more of other forms of transport) than is potentially desirable for 
economic efficiency. For example, Pacific National considered that: 
The NSW interstate track operates at significantly above efficient levels in terms of its 
continuing operating and maintenance costs. (Pacific National 2004b, p. 2) 
Generally, this will also have adverse energy efficiency implications for the freight 
transport task by lowering rails share of freight carried. 
The reform process in road transport proceeded ahead of that in rail and did so on 
an integrated national basis via the National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) 
which was established by COAG in 1992. As a result, inter- and intra-state road 
reform is well advanced and the already strong competitiveness of road freight has 
improved further.  
While producing highly beneficial economic efficiency gains in road freight 
transport and the economy, the success of these reforms, in conjunction with a 
slower rate of rail reform, is likely to have encouraged some substitution of 
long-distance freight from rail to road. The National Transport Commission (NTC) 
(replacing the NRTC in 2004) was established principally to progress 
nationally-consistent regulatory and operational reform in road, rail and intermodal 
transport. While recognising the recent increased pace of rail reform, the NTC 
argued: 
Further reform, however, is required to enable rail to meet its full potential — 
especially if it is to carry a much larger proportion of the nation’s rapidly growing 
non-bulk freight task. (NTC 2003, p. 1) 
Improving the competitiveness of the rail sector offers the potential for 
cost-effective gains in energy efficiency through freight being shifted from road to     
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rail transport. In addition, there are also likely to be opportunities for improved fuel 
efficiency of rail freight (and passenger) services through greater competitive 
pressure, improved regulation and better incentives for rail operators.  
The Commission’s examination of NCP reforms (PC 2005) has recommended a 
national review into the requirements for an efficient and sustainable national 
freight transport system. It recommended that such a review should include 
consideration of impediments to competition and efficiency in individual modes, 
including rail freight. The Australian Government (Costello 2005) has announced 
that the recommendations from the Commission’s NCP report will be considered as 
part of the COAG review of NCP arrangements now due to be completed by the end 
of 2005. 
Heavy vehicle charges 
There has been considerable debate over many years regarding the appropriate level 
of road-user charges that heavy vehicles should pay. Interest has focused on equity 
and efficiency between different classes of road users and on competitive neutrality 
between road and rail.  
The NTC is responsible for recommending the level of road charges to be levied on 
heavy vehicles. It has established a nationally-uniform set of charges (registration 
fee and fuel excise) that aims to recover the share of current road construction and 
maintenance costs attributable to heavy vehicles as a group and, at least to some 
degree, for sub-classes of heavy vehicles. The charges do not contain any allowance 
for environmental costs (such as noise and pollution), road safety costs or the costs 
of enforcing heavy vehicle regulation. 
The former NRTC produced two heavy-vehicle charging determinations in 1992 
(implemented in 1995 and 1996) and 2000. The NTC is currently undertaking a 
third pricing determination and has produced a discussion paper for public comment 
(NTC 2005a). New heavy vehicle charges (to be approved by the Australian 
Transport Council) will apply from July 2006. 
There has been considerable argument that heavy vehicles are undercharged for 
their use of road infrastructure. For example, Pacific National considered: 
Road access pricing policy provides a significant subsidy for heavy vehicle owners, 
which not only inflates charges for passenger car owners, but also severely impacts on 
the competitive position of rail. (Pacific National 2004a, p. 4) 
In particular, Pacific National (2004a) argued that both the averaging processes 
involved in determining fixed charges for particular vehicle classes and the use of     




fuel excise as a proxy for recovering variable road-use costs, resulted in 
undercharging of the large heavy vehicles which typically competed with rail for 
long-distance freight. It argued that a charging regime which was more closely 
correlated with mass carried and distance travelled would more accurately reflect 
the costs imposed by heavy vehicles. This, in turn, would enhance the competitive 
position of rail freight. It also noted that external costs of road freight, such as 
congestion, accidents and environmental costs, were not incorporated into road 
charges. 
Conversely, the Australian Trucking Association (ATA) was concerned about 
subsidies to rail freight, arguing that the road freight industry: 
… more than pays for its attributed share of road costs. The same does not apply to rail 
freight, which pays for part of its infrastructure costs but benefits from government 
grants towards some of its infrastructure upgrading. (ATA 2004, p. 14) 
The BTRE (2000b) noted that while road charging mechanisms had tended to 
under-recover costs for long distance freight vehicles, non-bulk rail freight often did 
not fully recover the costs of the infrastructure it used. 
The Commission (PC 1999) has noted that the averaging process used to determine 
charges by vehicle class masks significant within-class differences in the road costs 
attributable to individual vehicles. It concluded that, at the time, heavy vehicles 
travelling longer distances — those most likely to be competing with rail — were 
being undercharged but noted that it was unclear whether changes in heavy vehicle 
charges proposed by the (then) NRTC would be sufficient to correct this 
undercharging.  
The NRTC implemented a second charging determination in 2000, which 
significantly increased charges (which had not changed from the cost base used to 
establish the 1992 charges determination) for heavy vehicles and introduced an 
adjustment process to annually update the registration component of the charges 
between formal determinations. The second determination increased charges 
differentially between categories of trucks in order to better recognise average 
differences in factors such as distances travelled, utilisation of load capacity and 
fuel efficiency. 
In preparation for the third heavy vehicle determination, the NTC (2004b) noted 
that some important issues in determining efficient charges still needed to be 
resolved. It has now released a discussion paper presenting indicative cost 
calculations for various types of heavy vehicles, to form the basis of its draft 
charges determination later in 2005 (NTC 2005a). While preliminary, these costings 
suggest a close to doubling of the registration charges component for B-double and 
Road Train vehicles.      
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The NTC estimated that such an increase would take registration charges to around 
5  per cent of the total annual cost of providing and operating a B-double 
(NTC 2005b). It considered that the impact on rail’s freight market share would be 
‘relatively small’ (NTC 2005b, p. 69). The ATA indicated that an increase in road 
transport costs of between 5 and 8 per cent is likely from the proposed excise and 
registration fee increases (ATA 2005). These estimates suggest that relatively 
modest increases in freight charges would result if the NTC draft proposals were 
implemented and the NTC considers that only a small modal shift in freight would 
occur (NTC 2005b). In addition, the large trucks competing with rail are often the 
most fuel efficient.12 Hence, the impact on energy efficiency of freight transport of 
the NTC charges proposals is likely to be very small. 
Further refinements to the level and method of charging heavy vehicles offer 
important economic efficiency benefits. However, the extent of further appropriate 
increases in charges for heavy vehicles and the extent to which these would lead to 
energy efficiency improvements from switches in freight from road to rail is 
unclear. With regard to competitive neutrality between road and rail, the NTC 
argued: 
… the impacts of road pricing, within the scope of NTC’s current sphere of influence, 
are likely to produce only marginal changes in the overall pricing of transport services. 
(NTC 2004b, p. 8) 
The process for determining heavy vehicle charges is detailed and transparent, 
involving substantial industry consultation and an opportunity for public 
involvement. The charging methodology has evolved over time in order to more 
closely approximate the costs attributable to different classes of road users. 
Nonetheless, the charges necessarily involve many approximations and are averages 
of attributed costs across each of the various heavy-vehicle charging categories 
rather than the marginal costs imposed by individual vehicles.  
Competitive neutrality between competing transport modes is an important 
objective of the NTC in undertaking this process. However, administrative 
simplicity and cost are also significant factors that are likely to continue to restrict 
the precision with which charges can be set to reflect the road costs attributable to 
individual vehicles or narrow vehicle groups. Equity and efficiency benefits from 
introducing a more sophisticated charging system would need to clearly outweigh 
the additional costs of implementing it. While increases in heavy-vehicle charges 
would encourage substitution of rail for road freight, any resultant energy efficiency 
improvements would only be cost effective if the charges were set appropriately. 
The achievement of competitive neutrality across all transport modes is a proposed 
                                              
12 BTRE (2002b) estimated that the intercapital routes that competed directly with rail made up 
12 per cent of the trucking task but accounted for 3.5 per cent of truck fuel use.     




objective of the national review of the freight transport system recommended by the 
Commission (PC 2005).  
The NTC process does not currently include an allowance for external costs of road 
freight. Some of these such as safety, urban air pollution and noise are being partly 
handled by regulatory approaches rather than pricing mechanisms. However, the 
ATC approved pricing principles underlying the NTC’s considerations do allow for 
externality charges relating to noise and air emissions in certain circumstances 
(NTC 2005a). Addressing the broader greenhouse gas issue may justify higher 
prices for carbon-based fuels used by both road and rail. However, such increases in 
fuel prices may be best dealt with in an economywide (or indeed worldwide) 
context, rather than introduced on a sector-by-sector basis via, for example, 
increased heavy-vehicle charges. 
Energy efficiency of road freight 
Because fuel represents a significant proportion of the costs of road freight, 
providers would be expected to place considerable emphasis on energy efficiency.  
The ATA noted: 
Because fuel consumption comprises some 25 to 30 per cent of the operating costs in 
line-haul trucking, in hire and reward trucking, then the trucking industry is well 
apprised of the need to control its consumption for business as well as environmental 
reasons … (trans. p. 253) 
Energy efficiency of road freight movements has been further enhanced by 
regulatory reforms overseen by the NTC, such as greater opportunities for the use of 
B-doubles where appropriate. The BTRE (2003) indicated that, over the 1990s, fuel 
efficiency in terms of litres per net tonne kilometre travelled had improved by 
around 3 per cent for rigid trucks and 17 per cent for articulated trucks. Given that, 
on average, the fuel efficiency per tonne kilometre of articulated trucks is nearly 
three times greater than that of rigid trucks (BTRE 2003), the 10 per cent increase 
over the 1990s in the share of tonne kilometres carried by articulated vehicles has 
further increased the average fuel efficiency of the road freight transport task. 
However, further reform opportunities remain, some of which would deliver 
additional privately cost-effective fuel-efficiency gains — for example, the ATA 
observed (trans. pp. 258–59) the potential for a number of jurisdictions to further 
increase regulatory mass limits for trucks with ‘road friendly’ suspensions without 
causing more road damage than under previous limits. Reviews of mass limits 
which identify justified increases (with higher heavy-vehicle charges if appropriate)     
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would tend to generate privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements 
within the road freight industry.  
There remains some scope for additional regulatory reform within both the road 
and rail sectors, that would improve overall efficiency and is likely to lead to some 
increase in energy efficiency within each sector. Some individual reforms may alter 
the competitive position of road freight compared to rail. This may change the 
energy efficiency of the overall freight task, in some cases reducing energy 
efficiency overall. However, this would not be an appropriate reason for delaying 
such reforms.  
Intermodal transport 
Many longer-distance transport tasks offer potential for the use of a combination of 
several types of transport to complete the task — intermodal transport. For most 
freight (other than some bulk commodities), at least some road element is usually 
needed. The opportunities for more energy-efficient transport modes to also be 
involved will be influenced by the cost or efficiency of intermodal transfers. In 
particular, concerns have sometimes been raised that barriers or impediments to 
intermodal operations have limited the share of rail and, to a lesser extent, sea in 
domestic freight transport. One of the objectives of the Inter-Governmental 
Agreement for Regulatory and Operational Reform in Road Rail and Intermodal 
Transport, which established the NTC, involves: 
Facilitating effective intermodal transport arrangements by addressing regulatory and 
operational issues. (ATC 2003, p. 1)   
Reforms to remove inefficient impediments to intermodal transport could generally 
improve both economic and energy efficiency. However, an NTC discussion paper 
into impediments to improving efficiency in intermodal transport concluded: 
… there are no obvious gaps and/or shortcomings of regulation that has influence on 
interaction of operations between modes. (NTC 2004a, p. 63) 
Similarly, this inquiry has received no submissions arguing that regulatory 
impediments to intermodal transport are inhibiting energy efficiency in freight 
transport. Nonetheless, concerns have been raised (for example, ACEA 2004) about 
the need for a more integrated approach to investment (some of it by government) 
in transport infrastructure. The Minerals Council of Australia (2004) argued that 
significant future growth in container throughput at ports would place pressure on 
the linked-land transport infrastructure.  
FINDING 11.5     




In this regard, the Australian Government appointed a taskforce to identify physical 
or regulatory bottlenecks in the operation of Australia’s infrastructure that may 
impede the realisation of export opportunities (Howard 2005a). The Exports and 
Infrastructure Taskforce made a number of recommendations with direct relevance 
to intermodal transport (EIT  2005). It argued that the Auslink transport 
infrastructure investment program should be extended to include ports of national 
significance and that Auslink should be used to expedite joint planning processes, 
especially with respect to the port/rail/road interface. The Taskforce also noted the 
success of road-rail-port logistics chains in the coal and meat industries. It 
recommended that, to the extent that it was consistent with competition law, the 
Australian Government should assist in the formation and operation of groups for 
the coordination of logistics chains of national importance.  
In response, COAG has agreed in principle to: 
•  extend Auslink planning and coordination to ports and associated shipping 
channels; 
•  reinvigorate the agenda for harmonising road and rail regulation; 
•  the Commonwealth facilitating the establishment of groups to coordinate 
logistics chains of national importance (COAG 2005). 
The NTC also noted that there appeared to be strong support for its existing road 
and rail reform program. It observed: 
Improved efficiency of modes (rail in particular) and flexibility of mode regulation 
(road in particular) is needed to improve attractiveness of potential intermodal transport 
chains. (NTC 2004a, p. 64) 
Reliability and timeliness are critical elements of freight transport in today’s 
‘just-in-time’ world. Switching from one transport mode to another may increase 
both the duration of a transport task and the risks of missing deadlines. As well as 
coordination between modes, minimising these costs also requires efficient 
operation within all of the transport modes involved. Regulatory issues impacting 
on within-mode efficiency were discussed above. 
Sea transport has played only a very small role in intermodal freight within 
Australia. It has been limited by the relatively high cost and limited availability of 
Australian coastal shipping, together with the restrictions on the use of international  
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vessels — cabotage.13 Although the number of single voyage permits granted has 
increased substantially since the late 1980s, the considerable uncertainty created by 
the need to obtain permits has inhibited any long-term relationship between 
overseas shipping lines and current or potential users of the coastal trade. The use of 
international vessels already travelling between Australian ports offers the potential 
for lower-cost freight transport which might also increase transport energy 
efficiency to the extent that it displaced road freight. The scheduled review of 
cabotage under the NCP is yet to occur. The ASA (2004) argued that there was a 
number of regulatory restrictions which impeded the Australian shipping industry’s 
ability to compete for coastal trade.   
The Commission (PC 2005) has argued that identifying barriers to efficient 
intermodal transport and developing appropriate policy responses, as well as 
examining impediments to better outcomes in coastal shipping, should be part of a 
proposed review into the requirements for an efficient and sustainable national 
freight transport system. 
Overall, there appear to be limited opportunities for privately cost-effective 
increases in energy efficiency in freight transport. Improvements to the regulatory 
environment and efficiency of the rail sector could increase rail’s share of the 
long-distance freight market and lead to cost-effective increases in energy 
efficiency in that sector. Road freight operators have significant incentives to be 
efficient in their use of fuel, although some further efficient regulatory reforms 
allowing greater use of large trucks would enable road freight transport to be 
somewhat more energy efficient. Possible large increases in registration charges for 
the largest trucks in 2006 (NTC 2005) would make rail freight more price 
competitive and could, thereby, lead to improved energy efficiency in long distance 
freight. As with passenger transport, an appropriate congestion pricing regime in 
large capital cities would provide a cost-effective increase in energy efficiency of 




                                              
13 Cabotage refers to the practice of restricting access of international (essentially foreign-flagged) 
vessels to the Australian coastal trade. Vessels participating in the coastal trade must be 
licensed. A licence is only granted if the crew is paid at least Australian wage rates. 
Alternatively, a single voyage or a continuing voyage permit may be granted if licensed ships 
able to adequately provide the shipping task are not available.      





  12 Coordinating government programs 
 
Key points 
•  Improving the coordination of energy efficiency policies would reduce compliance 
costs for firms that operate nationally. 
•  Levels of coordination across jurisdictions range from strict uniformity at one end, to 
consistency between similar programs at the other. The benefits and costs of 
different levels of coordination need to be compared on a case-by-case basis. 
•  National uniformity has been achieved in the regulation of energy labelling and 
minimum energy performance standards for electrical appliances. A lack of 
uniformity would be likely to increase business costs and inconvenience consumers. 
•  Despite efforts to achieve minimum energy efficiency standards for new houses that 
are nationally uniform (within climate zones), there are some State and 
Territory-based variations. These increase business costs and the case for 
continuing with them appears weak. Also, some local governments effectively 
override these standards. Ways to prevent this from occurring should be examined. 
•  For a range of other energy efficiency measures (such as information provision) 
national uniformity would not necessarily be beneficial. However, the inclusion of 
common elements (such as measurement systems) is desirable. Consistency with 
other policies is always appropriate. 
•  There is scope to improve the coordination of energy efficiency policies with other 
greenhouse gas abatement policies and economic efficiency objectives.  
•  The Ministerial Council on Energy has made some progress in improving the 
coordination of energy efficiency programs. Elements of the National Framework for 
Energy Efficiency (NFEE) Stage One could result in further improvement. However, 
there is need for: 
–  greater clarity on the objectives of government intervention 
–  more emphasis on priority setting 
–  rigorous evaluation of past policies and programs 
–  greater commitment of governments to the more rigorous framework.  
•  Stage One proposals of the NFEE that expand the scope of existing programs (to 
new jurisdictions or products) should only proceed after the net social benefits of 
those programs has been established. 
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There are around ninety Australian, State and Territory Government programs 
directed, at least in part, at improving energy efficiency (appendix C). Energy 
efficiency is also affected by many government activities that do not have an 
explicit energy efficiency focus (such as public housing policies). Programs aimed 
at improving energy efficiency can in turn affect other government policies, such as 
those aimed at stimulating economic growth. The interaction of all of these 
government initiatives raises a range of coordination issues. 
The terms of reference direct the Commission to consider the level of coordination 
between Australian, State and Territory Government energy efficiency programs. 
This chapter examines: 
•  the coordination of energy efficiency policies and programs; 
•  coordination between energy efficiency policies and other policies; and 
•  institutional frameworks for achieving coordination and the role of the National 
Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE). 
Appendix B provides detailed background on the existing institutional arrangements 
for coordinating government policies in regard to increasing energy efficiency. 
12.1  Coordination of energy efficiency policies 
This section examines participants’ views on the coordination of energy efficiency 
policies and general principles of coordination. The insights gained are then used in 
assessing the desirable approach to coordination for individual energy efficiency 
policy measures. 
Participants’ views 
A common theme expressed by many inquiry participants is that the coordination of 
government energy efficiency policies — both within and between jurisdictions — 
needs to be improved (box 12.1).     






Box 12.1  Selected inquiry participants’ views on policy coordination 
Origin Energy: 
Poor coordination between current jurisdictional energy efficiency policies and related 
programs reduces the potential for cost-effective energy efficiency improvement across the 
economy. (sub. 25, p. 9) 
Building Products Innovation Council: 
… there are a number of different approaches to energy efficiency in Australia and the 
eastern states are certainly leading the way. Unfortunately they are each leading their own 
way and we have a need to understand and implement different energy solutions for the 
same building requirement, varying based on the state in which it is constructed. (sub. 44, 
p. 3) 
Housing Industry Association (HIA) 
HIA is concerned that conflicting State, Territory and local government regulations are 
damaging the capacity of the industry to deliver compliant homes. The competitiveness of 
local manufacturing is being damaged by regulations which fragment the Australian market 
into small niche markets. Australian manufacturing cannot achieve economies of scale if it 
has to tailor production to comply with different regulatory regimes nor does this represent 
an environment in which it can pursue innovative solutions. (sub. DR130, p. 9) 
Government of Western Australia: 
A lack of government coordination has meant that organisations operating across 
jurisdictions often face different regulations, reporting requirements and formats in relation to 
energy programs. (sub. 58, p. 8) 
Sustainable Projects:  
There are over four energy rating programs around Australia, each of which costs over 
$3000 to buy and train one person, not counting the additional costs of buying updates and 
training. So if your business operates in Queensland, NSW and other states (as mine does) I 
may have to buy over four programs to do the same job to comply with different state rules 
and prejudices (NatHERS, BERS, FirstRate). (sub. 3, p. 8) 
GridX: 
GridX has found it difficult to access and comply with the regulatory landscape which is 
different in each state. It is an extremely costly process to obtain approval and licences for 
our projects within the various states of Australia and it would be better to have one 
framework. (sub. 5, p. 1) 
Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association: 
Policies and programmes remain unfocused and uncoordinated, even to the extent that 
there is no consistent method to measure greenhouse gas emissions, or the implications for 
this of energy efficiency or energy consumption. (sub. 49, pp. 5–6) 
Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd (MEFL): 
One feedback MEFL receives from schools is their confusion at the number of different 
approaches and initiatives underway which relate to sustainability. While innovation is good 
and different approaches are needed for different situations, it would be much easier for 
schools if all the sustainability initiatives came under one Government umbrella, linked to a 
State level strategy and policy. (sub. 18, p. 22) 
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Several inquiry participants supported national coordination as a means of 
overcoming current deficiencies. The precise form of coordination favoured, 
however, is sometimes unclear, given the use of different, undefined terms (such as 
coordination, harmonisation, consistency and uniformity). Some examples of 
support for a national approach, however expressed, are included below. 
AGA [Australian Gas Association] believes that national consistency is required in any 
energy efficiency framework for it to be workable for industry and at least cost to the 
community. (sub. 2, p. 2) 
Friends of the Earth … recommend … tough MEPS [minimum energy performance 
standards] and building standards in a timely manner, coordinated nationally as 
imperative measures in energy efficiency … (sub. 20, p. 15) 
The AAC [Australian Aluminium Council] supports the coordination of energy 
efficiency programs at the national level. While recognising the need for variations to 
accommodate differing climatic conditions across Australia and hence the need to be 
flexible around any notion of national uniformity in some areas, such as building 
standards, national coordination can have benefits, such as economies of scale in the 
development of programs and reduced costs of compliance for national businesses. 
(sub. 29, p. 11) 
From the BPIC [Building Products Innovation Council] perspective a nationally 
coordinated approach is essential to ensure the most efficient operation of the materials 
suppliers. (sub. 44, p. 5) 
AIGN [Australian Industry Greenhouse Network] is utterly convinced that national 
coordination and national uniformity of these [energy efficiency] programs … is an 
imperative for the efficient governance of the economy. (sub. 57, p. 8) 
The Australasian Energy Performance Contracting Association (and the Australian 
Business Council for Sustainable Energy) had a different view, arguing that 
attempts to achieve national coordination can result in delays or failure: 
While coordination of energy efficiency policy and programs potentially reduces the 
costs and time spent in delivery and enhances compliance, the reality is often far from 
this. However history shows very long delays or complete failures in the delivery of 
such energy efficiency programs when attempts have been made to coordinate 
programs nationally. (sub. 47, p. 17) 
In summary, coordination is often perceived as being inadequate where there are 
different regulations in each jurisdiction, resulting in increased compliance costs. 
This mainly affects firms which operate nationally. Another problem that can result 
from poor coordination is confusion for those targeted by different information 
programs or subject to conflicting reporting requirements. National coordination is 
supported by many inquiry participants as a means of overcoming these problems. 
The main arguments presented against national coordination are that it can take too 
long and there may be failure to agree on a common approach.      





Many of the concerns raised have the potential to be addressed through the 
Ministerial Council on Energy’s (MCE’s) NFEE. The role of the NFEE is 
considered in section 12.3. 
General principles of coordination 
Greater coordination at the national level can reduce duplication of effort, improve 
program effectiveness and reduce costs to firms and the wider community. It is not 
always the case, however, that more coordination is better. 
Decentralised government action can generate the following benefits: 
•  Development of more effective policies — different approaches in different 
jurisdictions can allow for greater innovation and opportunities for learning from 
the experiences of others. 
•  Reduced information asymmetries — it may be easier for local agencies to 
obtain accurate information about the firms and communities who are to be 
regulated or provided with programs.  
•  Closer matching with community needs — regional variations in community 
needs may justify differences in government objectives and policies.  
•  Greater responsiveness — local agencies may be able to respond more quickly 
to community needs.  
Of relevance to these benefits is the principle of subsidiarity, which recognises that 
decisions whose impact is restricted to a local area should be made at the local 
level. The European Community makes use of this principle to require that actions 
be left to member states unless ‘by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, [it] be better achieved by the Community’ (van den Bergh 1996, p. 363). A 
Productivity Commission report into National Competition Policy (NCP) applied 
the principle of subsidiarity to the coordination of ongoing reform, arguing: 
For some areas … reform will best be pursued on a jurisdictional basis. This would be 
the case, for example, where an activity is not of national significance and where the 
impacts of policy decisions taken by individual jurisdictions are largely confined within 
those jurisdictions. (PC 2005, p. 323) 
On the other hand, some policy problems transcend regional boundaries and may 
require a more coordinated approach that involves a higher level of government or a 
combination of jurisdictions (local, state, national, international). The three broad 
approaches to coordination are: 
•  uniformity — the same across all jurisdictions;     
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•  harmonisation — agreement on common elements, such as definitions, 
measurement systems and rating systems; and 
•  consistency — not contradicting broader policy settings. 
Each approach has its own strengths and limitations and these determine the 
circumstances in which they are likely to be appropriate (box 12.2). The remainder 
of this section considers these strengths and limitations in assessing the desirable 
approach to coordination for individual energy efficiency policy measures.  
 
Box 12.2  Approaches to coordination 
Uniformity 
Uniformity can have the following benefits: 
•  Scale economies for government — costs of policy development and 
implementation may be lower when undertaken centrally or collectively. 
•  Scale economies for firms — costs may be lower because one product or service 
can be supplied across Australia, rather than having variations to meet local 
regulatory requirements. 
•  Reduced transaction costs — firms’ costs may be lower where there is no 
requirement to provide different information, or follow different administrative 
procedures, when operating in different jurisdictions. 
•  Enhanced competition — uniform regulation may encourage Australian firms to 
expand their operations across jurisdictions and encourage international 
manufacturers to supply the Australian market. 
•  More effective treatment of externalities — where government action is required to 
address externalities (such as greenhouse gas emissions), it may be more effective 
when taken at a level that can ‘internalise’ the effects of the externality. 
Uniformity has benefits where governments impose mandatory standards, where 
different standards in different areas (for example, in different industry sectors or 
across jurisdictions) could increase costs and have anticompetitive effects. Different 
mandatory standards for substitutable goods (for example, cars and four-wheel-drive 
vehicles) could distort consumer choices. Different standards in different jurisdictions 
will affect national companies and cross-border trading. 
Uniformity is also important where governments establish regulatory schemes where 
trading is possible, such as emissions trading schemes. The larger the potential trading 
pool, the greater the potential gains from trading. Schemes that allow interjurisdictional 
trading (between States and, potentially, internationally) create scope for achieving 
given outcomes at least cost. 
 (Continued on next page) 
 
     






Box 12.2   (Continued) 
Where the Australian Government does not have responsibility, national uniformity 
requires the agreement of all States and Territories. Such agreement can be brought 
into effect by enacting model or template legislation across all jurisdictions. 
Harmonisation 
Harmonisation can be used to achieve the minimum effective resolution of coordination 
issues in circumstances in which uniformity is not appropriate. For some policies, 
uniformity may not be necessary, or even desirable. For example, it might be beneficial 
to tailor educational and awareness programs to specific circumstances. Similarly, 
different approaches to incentive programs (such as subsidies on energy-efficient 
products) are not likely to cause significant compliance problems, and might enable 
best-practice approaches to evolve more quickly than under a uniform national 
approach. Even in these circumstances, however, having uniformity in the definition 
and measurement of energy efficiency improvements can allow the effectiveness and 
efficiency of different programs to be compared, and can facilitate the assessment of 
each program’s contribution to national or international objectives. 
Consistency 
Consistency of government policies within a jurisdiction reduces the risk that the 
pursuit of the specific objective will come at the expense of other, perhaps more 
important, objectives. 
Government energy efficiency policies may interact with broader government 
objectives of economic efficiency, equity and community wellbeing. Energy efficiency 
policies that are consistent with related policies (or at least not inconsistent), including 
those addressing climate change, will be more effective at achieving the government’s 
overall objectives.  
Governments employ several mechanisms to promote consistency in their programs, 
including Cabinet, central agencies (including Premier’s Departments and Treasuries) 
and rules and procedures for policy decision making. Governments have established 
policy development and evaluation mechanisms, such as regulation impact statement 
guidelines and environmental impact assessment guidelines, to assess the effect of 
specified activities on priority areas of government interest. 
Consistency of policies and programs across jurisdictions is, however, often the only 
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Appliance labelling and standards 
Schemes for energy labelling and minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) 
for electrical appliances were developed by the MCE and the Energy Efficiency 
Working Group (EEWG). The schemes are coordinated by the National Appliance 
and Equipment Energy Efficiency Committee (NAEEEC). Further information on 
the these bodies and the schemes themselves was provided in appendix B and 
chapter 9 respectively. 
Regulations for these schemes are included in State and Territory Government 
legislation and are administered by State and Territory regulatory agencies. The 
legislation, however, is based on a nationally endorsed ‘model regulation’ and is 
intended to be administered in a uniform manner. The aim is to achieve ‘consistent 
outcomes for all affected products irrespective of the product or jurisdictional 
location’ (NAEEEC 2004a, p. 5). 
Historically, the Australian Gas Association (AGA) has had responsibility for 
managing energy labelling and MEPS for gas appliances (SEAV 2003). Consistent 
with NFEE Stage One, NAEEEC has established a Gas Appliance and Equipment 
Energy Efficiency Program (GAEEEP) to take over these functions. It is intended 
that: 
A nationally consistent legislative framework, including penalties for noncompliance, 
will [be] put in place before the formal commencement of the GAEEEP. This will be 
based on legislation and model regulations developed by Victoria, which will be 
replicated in all jurisdictions from an agreed date to ensure national consistency. 
(AGO 2005f, p. 7) 
The coordination of energy labelling and MEPS for electrical appliances is designed 
to achieve uniform outcomes across jurisdictions. If these schemes are to continue, 
it is appropriate that they be coordinated in this way, given that a lack of uniformity 
would be likely to increase business costs, for what are internationally traded goods. 
In the case of labelling, such uniformity also assists consumers who purchase 
appliances in different jurisdictions. It is planned that the GAEEEP will achieve a 
similar level of coordination for gas appliances. 
National uniformity has been achieved in the regulation of energy labelling and 
minimum energy performance standards for electrical appliances and the same is 
planned for gas appliances. To the extent that appliance regulation is justifiable, 
national uniformity is appropriate. 
FINDING 12.1     





Minimum energy efficiency standards for new buildings 
The Building Code of Australia (the Building Code) is intended to form the basis of 
building regulation across Australia. The Building Code was amended in 2003 to 
include standards to ensure a minimum level of energy efficiency in new houses and 
additions to existing houses.1 Most jurisdictions have adopted these standards in 
full but some have not. The exceptions are Victoria — where state-based standards 
take precedence over some of the energy efficiency requirements in the Building 
Code — and New South Wales and the ACT — which have adopted their own 
energy efficiency standards for residential buildings (appendix D). In addition, 
some local governments, through the planning approval process, have imposed 
building requirements related to energy efficiency that are beyond the scope of the 
Building Code (PC 2004a).  
Energy efficiency standards for other residential buildings (class 2–4) were adopted 
in May 2005 and standards for offices, shops, warehouses, factories and public 
health buildings (class  5–9) are scheduled to be introduced in 2006. While 
coordination of these standards is not considered here, many of the same issues 
apply. 
Research report into the reform of building regulation 
In 2004, the Australian Government requested the Productivity Commission to 
examine the reform of building regulation. In its report, published in November 
2004, the Commission found that: 
•  some progress had been made in reducing differences in mandatory technical 
requirements across jurisdictions; 
•  further reductions in variations across jurisdictions should be pursued; 
•  ways to reduce the erosion of a national approach to building regulation caused 
by actions of local governments should be examined; and 
•  a new intergovernmental agreement should be negotiated to, amongst other 
things, strengthen the commitment to national consistency (PC 2004a). 
                                              
1 The desirability of including minimum energy efficiency standards in building regulations is 
discussed in chapter 10 and further information on the Building Code and its administration is 
included in appendix D.     
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The Commission noted that business and industry were frustrated by the multiple 
regulatory environments of the States and Territories, which limit interstate and 
international trade, and result in lower growth (PC 2004a). The research report 
concluded:  
Any variations to the BCA [the Building Code] need to be justified. Sometimes, 
differences are intrinsic to a locality and require particular, tailor-made regulations. 
Sometimes, they reflect the aspirations of the inhabitants of a community. In almost all 
cases, where a particular jurisdiction wants to set a different standard from the national 
one, the case for the variation should be put under scrutiny. Important questions to ask 
include what is the difference worth and how much would it cost to maintain it (for 
example, in terms of greater costs of compliance and decreased competition)? 
(PC 2004a, p. 38) 
Following the release of the report, the Australian Minister for Industry announced 
that in-principle agreement had been reached on a new intergovernmental 
agreement that will result in greater consistency in building regulation across 
Australia. He stated: 
… [the new intergovernmental agreement is] a key step towards a truly nationally 
consistent building code based on minimum industry upset through regulation. 
I am also pleased that my State and Territory counterparts will begin implementing 
measures to ensure local governments do not undermine these principles through their 
planning approval processes … (Macfarlane 2005) 
Are state and territory-based variations of minimum energy efficiency standards 
warranted? 
State and Territory Governments may see a benefit in departing from uniform 
standards because their constituents have views on energy efficiency that differ 
from those that underpin the national standards. Where governments propose 
standards that are higher than those in the national code, however, the importance of 
this reason is weakened. This is because home owners who are strongly in favour of 
energy efficiency are free to go beyond the minimum standards required for their 
own homes. Variation in climate has been suggested as another possible reason for 
variations in standards. However, as the Building Code currently has energy 
efficiency standards that vary by climatic zone, there is no necessity for 
jurisdiction-based variations on these grounds. 
A benefit of uniform standards is the reduction of costs to the building and building 
products industries. While there is only limited interstate trade in houses (for 
example, mobile and prefabricated houses), house designs and building products are 
actively traded, and some builders operate in multiple jurisdictions. Variations in 
standards tend to increase costs for this cross-border activity. Several inquiry     





participants provided information on the effects of variations in standards on their 
businesses (box 12.1). As stated by the Australian Glass and Glazing Association: 
It is very inefficient, difficult and costly, for a manufacturing industry to deal with 
fundamentally different state based approaches to energy efficiency, or any other 
regulation. (sub. 16, p. 3) 
An alternative way that firms could deal with variations in standards was suggested 
by Alan Pears: 
Complaints about the cost of compliance with different requirements can also be 
addressed by developing higher standards that are sufficient to achieve all performance 
standards. For example, major building company Australand has developed internal 
environmental standards that allow it to comply with all existing measures. This 
minimises their compliance cost. (sub. DR113, p. 24) 
While adopting uniformly high standards reduces compliance costs associated with 
variations in standards (such as administrative costs and loss of economies of scale), 
it tends to increase other costs (such as the materials and labour costs required to 
meet higher standards). Firms would need to weigh up these costs, and the possible 
marketing advantage of supplying products of a higher standard, in deciding 
whether this strategy is viable for them. 
The benefits of national uniformity (for each climate zone) can not be considered in 
isolation from what those standards are. Common adoption of the most stringent 
standards could result in the benefits of uniformity being outweighed by a reduction 
in the cost effectiveness of the regulations in those states whose stringency must 
increase to comply with uniformity.2 An analysis of the cost effectiveness of 
minimum energy efficiency standards for new houses, including the influence of 
stringencies, is included in chapter 10. 
The fact that some firms may be able to effectively work around variations in 
standards, does not mean that there are not benefits in moving to national 
uniformity at an appropriate standard. 
The current State and Territory-based variations in energy efficiency standards for 
new houses increase costs for the building and building products industries. The 
case for such variations appears to be weak. 
                                              
2  A discussed in chapter 10, recent efforts to achieve national uniformity, while being only 
partially successful, involved this sort of ‘ratcheting up’ to the most stringent existing standard. 
FINDING 12.2     
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Are local government-based variations of minimum energy efficiency standards 
warranted? 
In a national survey of Master Builders Australia members, 42  per  cent of 
respondents indicated that, in their last residential contract, the local council had 
imposed extra energy rating requirements (sub. DR122). Local government energy 
efficiency requirements can be set out explicitly in regulations or be raised in 
negotiations. The Queensland Master Builders Association reported that some local 
governments have influenced land developers to impose covenants on the sale of 
land that deal with energy matters. They cited an example where the covenant on 
the sale of land in a housing estate requires that only solar, instantaneous gas or 
heat-pump water heaters can be used (sub. DR92). 
Several inquiry participants opposed local government energy efficiency 
requirements that contradict, override or disregard the performance requirements of 
the Building Code. For example, Master Builders Australia stated: 
The level of additional documentation, plans and specialist reports required to be 
lodged with local government for planning approval is adding significant costs and 
delays to the assessment and approval processes by Councils. Many of these local 
government regulations are often designed in isolation and do not consider how they 
should fit with other statutory legislation, ie BCA [Building Code of Australia] and 
Australian Standards. They are developed without a regulatory impact statement and 
the costs are not calculated or balanced against the benefits. The increasing incidence 
of local government energy measures makes it extremely difficult for designers and 
builders to keep up-to-date with the rate of change as variations range from Council to 
Council. (sub. DR122, p. 2) 
Some local government requirements relate to the appliances installed in new 
buildings. The Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association 
(AEEMA) opposed such requirements: 
… it’s crucial local government does not erode the uniformity of minimum energy 
efficiency standards for new homes. That is a real worry for us. We’re finding already 
some local councils [saying]: ‘Sorry, if you want my signature on the development 
application, you can have four-star clothes dryers’ [for] example. (AEEMA, trans., 
p. 638) 
There was some support for local government variations in building standards, with 
Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd arguing that they could foster policy innovation: 
… some leading local governments in Victoria are implementing approaches which 
provide builders with an impetus to integrate a range of sustainability measures in 
building projects. Once local governments have made this work, the State Government 
will no doubt respond by adopting some of the practices which have been trialled at a 
local level. This is an important process in working towards best practice in our built 
environment. (sub. DR115, pp. 16–17)     





The Commission’s view is that the case for local decision making is generally 
strongest where the greatest knowledge and the greatest impact of the changes is at 
a local level. Determining effective energy efficiency requirements for houses 
requires specialist knowledge that is more likely to be available to national bodies 
than to local governments. The effects of such requirements are predominately 
experienced outside of the local government area. The impacts on suppliers of 
building products and appliances, and the building industry are often statewide or 
national. The possible environmental impacts associated with residential energy 
regulation are predominately global in nature. In addition, the costs associated with 
local government area based variations in energy efficiency standards are 
potentially higher than for State and Territory-based ones. This is because they can 
cause a higher degree of regulatory fragmentation and uncertainty. 
The Commission recommended in its final report on building regulation: 
The future work agenda for the ABCB [Australian Building Codes Board] should 
include an examination of ways to reduce the scope for the inappropriate erosion of 
national consistency of building regulation by local governments through their planning 
approval processes. (PC 2004a, p. 184) 
A number of avenues for doing this were also given in the report. This 
recommendation allows for the possibility of there being building regulation issues 
that could be appropriately dealt with by local governments. It is the Commission’s 
view that energy efficiency standards are not in this category and the aim should be 
to remove local government involvement altogether. It is acknowledged that some 
progress has been made already. For example, in New South Wales the Building 
Sustainability Index scheme is enacted through legislation that prevails over any 
other environmental planning instrument (appendix D). The proposed new 
intergovernmental agreement, discussed earlier, may also help to improve the 
consistency of building regulation. 
Australian, State and Territory Governments and the Australian Building Codes 
Board should examine ways to prevent local governments creating variations in 
minimum energy efficiency standards for buildings. 
Other (less significant) coordination issues concerning the administration of the 
Building Code are covered in appendix D.  
Reporting requirements 
Firms are required to provide information on their energy use and greenhouse gas 
emissions to a range of Australian and State and Territory Government agencies. 
RECOMMENDATION 12.1     
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This can result in significant compliance costs for firms, particularly where the 
information is required in different formats or where different data definitions 
apply. An example of this was provided by the Plastics and Chemicals Industries 
Association: 
This program [Victorian Protocol for Environmental Management] involves different 
reporting requirements to that of the Greenhouse Challenge, and a different and 
separate demand on those companies that would also be involved in the proposed 
MEEOA [Mandatory Energy Efficiency Opportunity Assessments], and the different 
reporting requirements are in themselves a significant cost and diversion for industry. 
(sub. 49, p. 6) 
The Energy Administration Amendment (Water and Energy Savings) Bill that was 
passed by the NSW Parliament in May 2005 has the potential to add to the 
complexity of reporting requirements for firms in New South Wales. Under this 
Bill, some firms are required to report on their current energy usage and develop an 
action plan for making energy savings (chapter 7). 
The Australian Government is looking to streamline the provision of information on 
energy use and emissions, using the Greenhouse Challenge program (now called 
Challenge Plus) as a single point of entry (Australian Government 2004). The 
Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd objected to this initiative, on the grounds that it 
would not cover all firms: 
While signatories to the Challenge should be reporting to the AGO [Australian 
Greenhouse Office] on what they have achieved in meeting their targets, this program 
is a voluntary one and so should not be relied upon as the means by which industry and 
business reports on emissions and energy use. (sub. DR115, p. 17) 
The Commission sees value in better administrative coordination of reporting 
requirements, irrespective of what role the Challenge Plus program plays, provided 
that the information collected serves a valuable purpose.  
A review of the requirements on firms to report on their energy use and greenhouse 
gas emissions has the potential to reduce compliance costs. The review should 
consider whether the information currently collected serves a useful purpose as well 
as examining opportunities to harmonise reporting formats and data definitions.  
Other energy efficiency policies 
Coordination issues relating to information provision, incentives and government 
energy management are considered below. The focus is on whether national 
uniformity is necessary or desirable. Harmonisation of programs, which includes 
FINDING 12.3     





uniformity of some elements (such as defining and measuring energy efficiency 
improvements), may be desirable where this allows the effectiveness and efficiency 
of programs to be compared. Policy consistency is desirable in all cases. 
Information provision 
There are many government programs that provide households and firms with 
information about energy efficiency. With the exception of appliance labelling (see 
previous discussion), information programs do not need to be nationally uniform. 
Local programs may more closely match local needs, foster innovation and allow 
governments to learn from successful programs in other jurisdictions. Different 
information programs in different jurisdictions would not result in any particular 
disadvantages for firms or affect competition. There may be some scale economies 
for governments in developing information programs that are implemented 
nationally. Provided governments are able to learn from one another, however, 
duplication of effort is unlikely to be a significant disadvantage of local programs. 
Incentives 
The benefits of uniformity do not apply in any significant way to programs that 
provide financial and other incentives for the uptake of specific energy efficiency 
opportunities. By contrast, a benefit of allowing regional variation is that programs 
can respond to particular local circumstances. For example, the Remote Area 
Energy Efficiency Rebates Scheme (now discontinued) provided rebates on 
compact fluorescent lamps and insulation to households and businesses in off-grid 
communities in regional and remote South Australia. One objective of this scheme 
was to reduce government expenditure on electricity subsidies that are provided to 
these communities. While the Commission has not evaluated the program itself, 
clearly this objective is not relevant to other areas, where subsidies are not paid.  
Government energy management 
Managing the energy use of government agencies is an operational issue for each 
government. It would not be appropriate, therefore, to have a uniform approach to 
government energy management programs. It would be beneficial, however, to be 
able to compare the effectiveness of these programs and so a uniform approach to 
matters such as measurement of energy use would be a significant advantage. The 
NFEE Stage One measure to develop nationally consistent standards for measuring 
and reporting on programs that deal with government energy efficiency has the 
potential to improve policy coordination in this regard.     
288  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
12.2  Coordination with other policies 
Energy efficiency policies do not operate in isolation. They affect, and are affected 
by, a variety of other policies. This section distinguishes three situations which lead 
to different coordination issues, as follows:  
•  The consistency of energy efficiency policies with other policies for greenhouse 
gas abatement. 
•  The integration of energy efficiency into the broader energy and economic 
efficiency policy frameworks. 
•  The pursuit of policies that do not have an explicit energy focus (such as public 
housing policies) which nevertheless affect energy efficiency. 
Greenhouse gas abatement policies 
This is not an inquiry into Australia’s response to climate change (see terms of 
reference and chapter 1). However, the Commission recognises that many energy 
efficiency policies are embedded within broader policies designed to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
An important policy principle is the alignment of policy objectives and policy 
instruments. This inquiry is focused primarily on the policy objective of addressing 
barriers and impediments to the adoption of energy efficiency improvements that 
are cost effective for individual producers and consumers. The main objective of 
climate change policies is to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, including those 
that result from the production and consumption of energy from fossil fuels. 
Energy efficiency policies are consistent with climate change policies when they 
result in energy efficiency improvements with net private benefits that exceed the 
cost of the government programs. More marginal energy efficiency improvements 
may still be consistent with greenhouse policies if they result in a reduction in 
emissions with no net financial gain, or even a small loss. Inconsistency arises 
where energy efficiency measures are pursued in favour of other abatement options 
that have a lower cost (per unit of carbon dioxide equivalent gases abated). 
The Commission is concerned that some current government programs to improve 
energy efficiency may produce a net private loss. Such programs could have a 
higher cost than abatement options that are not being pursued. Rigorous evaluation 
of programs is necessary to determine whether this is the case.     





The Commission’s review of National Competition Policy recommended: 
The Australian Government, in consultation with State and Territory Governments, 
should as a matter of urgency develop a more effective process for achieving a national 
approach to greenhouse gas abatement. (PC 2005, p. 349) 
Following a meeting on 3 June 2005, the Council of Australian Governments 
announced that it had: 
… agreed to set up a Senior Officials’ group to examine the scope for national 
cooperation on climate change policy, focusing on areas of common ground between 
jurisdictions where practical progress can be made. This would include consideration of 
the scope to improve investment certainty for business, encourage renewable energy 
(including ethanol) and enhance cooperation in areas such as technology development, 
energy efficiency and adaptation. (COAG 2005, p. 7) 
There are some lower-order coordination issues between energy efficiency policy 
and greenhouse gas abatement policy that concern the relative emphasis given to the 
financial and environmental benefits of increasing energy efficiency. Appliance 
labelling is an example, where there is a choice between providing information on 
end-point energy use, energy costs, greenhouse gas emissions, or some combination 
of these. For appliances that have both gas and electric models available, this choice 
potentially makes a significant difference to rankings. Resolution of these issues 
relies on coordination between policy makers involved in both policy areas. 
The broader energy and economic efficiency policy frameworks 
The Australian Government’s 2004 White Paper, Securing Australia’s Energy 
Future announced its commitment to ‘energy prosperity, security and 
sustainability’: 
Improving Australia’s energy efficiency performance is a key part of the government’s 
plans to deliver prosperity and sustainability from energy. Increasing the uptake of 
commercially attractive energy efficiency opportunities would deliver substantial 
economic and environmental benefits. (Australian Government 2004, p. 17)  
Energy efficiency is only one aspect of an integrated energy policy. As noted by the 
International Energy Agency: 
Energy policy must achieve a balance between energy security, economic growth and 
environmental protection. (IEA 2004c, p. 1) 
Whether policies to improve energy efficiency are consistent with government 
policies and objectives to improve economic efficiency depends on the extent to 
which they result in increased use of other inputs (such as labour and capital), and 
the cost of government programs. Policies that result in net private benefits that     
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exceed their costs to governments are consistent with economic efficiency 
objectives. 
The price of energy is a key factor that influences the balance between 
environmental protection and economic growth. High prices encourage greater 
energy conservation and energy efficiency, which may have environmental and 
energy security benefits. High energy prices, however, tend to reduce economic 
growth. It would appear that developers of energy efficiency policy in Australia 
have generally been cognisant of this balance, and have sought to avoid measures 
that increase domestic energy prices.3 However, a more comprehensive view of 
government objectives relating to economic efficiency and economic growth would 
appreciate how energy efficiency policies may decrease economic efficiency 
through means such as restricting the choices available to households and firms.4 
Examples of where the Commission considers that energy efficiency programs are 
likely to be inconsistent with economic efficiency objectives are discussed 
elsewhere in this report. 
Other policies 
Many government policies outside the energy field nevertheless affect energy 
efficiency. Urban planning policies can affect the energy efficiency of residential 
and commercial developments. Policies affecting traffic congestion or public 
transport can affect the observed average energy efficiency of transport. In most 
cases, energy efficiency is not the driving force or main objective behind the policy, 
although the benefits of improved energy efficiency would be an input into any 
benefit–cost analysis of the policy (chapter 11). 
To improve policy consistency, governments already employ mechanisms of good 
regulatory practice. All Australian jurisdictions, with the exception of Western 
Australia, use regulation impact statements (RISs) to formalise and document the 
steps taken in developing good regulation (PC 2004b). RIS requirements applied in 
Australia are integrated with, and reinforce, other regulatory quality control 
systems, including regulatory performance indicators and regulatory plans, and the 
requirements of National Competition Policy (PC 2004b). These mechanisms can 
contribute to the coordination of the overall policy platform, including consideration 
of energy efficiency. 
                                              
3 One of the major consequences of microeconomic reform in the 1990s was a fall in real prices of 
energy, especially electricity and gas. 
4 A wider ranging and more detailed discussion of energy pricing issues is included in chapter 14.     






Provision of public housing is another example of where government policy affects 
energy efficiency without being its main objective. Governments provide various 
forms of housing assistance, including public housing, for people that face problems 
in accessing suitable private accommodation due to cost or other reasons. State and 
Territory Governments are responsible for providing public housing, and in 2004 
there were around 336  000 occupied public housing dwellings in Australia 
(SCRGSP 2005). 
Public housing policy and energy efficiency policy should both be consistent with 
reliable evidence on what constitutes privately cost-effective energy efficiency in 
housing. On the one hand, public housing policy should seek to avoid imposing 
high energy costs (or high levels of discomfort) on tenants through the provision of 
housing that is energy inefficient. This is necessary to ensure that government 
housing assistance is provided in a cost-effective manner. On the other hand, energy 
efficiency policy should be informed by the practical experience gained by public 
housing authorities on the tradeoffs between the energy efficiency and capital cost 
of housing. Failure to do this could result in governments imposing, or encouraging 
the adoption of, measures that they find not to be appropriate for their own housing 
stock.  
Energy efficiency policies for the residential sector are premised on there being a 
significant gap between actual and the most privately cost-effective level of energy 
efficiency. As discussed in chapter 4, information deficiencies, split incentives and 
other barriers and impediments may be responsible for this gap. In providing public 
housing, governments are able to overcome many of these barriers and 
impediments. For example, while some private-sector landlords may seek to reduce 
outlays and increase profits by providing accommodation that is energy inefficient, 
it would be contrary to the objectives of providing public housing for governments 
to do this. Also, governments have access to information that would enable them to 
provide housing that — in the building fabric, fittings and installed appliances — 
provides a cost-effective level of energy efficiency. Another reason for State and 
Territory Governments to ensure that public housing is energy efficient is their 
objective of improving the affordability of energy services to people on low 
incomes (chapter 6). 
Some inquiry participants provided anecdotal information that some public housing 
was energy inefficient. The Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd reported: 
A significant proportion of low income and disadvantaged householders reside in 
public housing supplied by the Department of Housing or Aboriginal Housing Board in 
each State. According to participants [in householder workshops], this housing is often 
poorly designed from the perspective of energy efficiency (especially heating and     
292  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
cooling requirements), stocked with inefficient appliances and lacking in insulation, 
including window and door seals and drapes. (sub. 18. p. XIX) 
The Energy and Water Ombudsman NSW (EWON) stated: 
… EWON was contacted by a worker from a community agency who advised that the 
majority of their clients live in public housing and seem to have very high energy bills 
on a regular basis. They believe that much of the housing stock is not energy efficient, 
and generally properties are not insulated. This often means that their clients incur large 
energy accounts that are a significant financial burden. (sub. 48, p. 2) 
More systematic information is provided by an Australian Bureau of Statistics 
survey that found that 39 per cent of renters with a government housing authority in 
South Australia used electric heaters (most commonly portable ones) as their main 
type of heater in 2004. This compares to 27  per  cent for other renters and 
13  per  cent for owner-occupied households in South Australia (ABS 2005a). 
Electric heaters, while often being the cheapest to buy, are generally more 
expensive to operate than either gas heaters or reverse cycle air conditioners — 
which were the most common heater types overall (SEAV 2004c).  
The South Australian Government reported that the energy efficiency of their public 
housing has improved: 
For example, over the past five years, the South Australian Government has installed 
approximately 2200 efficient heaters in Housing Trust homes within the colder, wetter 
parts of the State … 
… the Housing Trust builds houses that exceed the mandatory 4 star house energy 
rating, with the majority achieving a 5 star house energy rating. (sub. DR153, pp. 1–2) 
On the basis of the evidence available, the Commission has not been able to come 
to any firm conclusions regarding the energy efficiency of public housing across 
Australia. While there appear to be deficiencies, it is acknowledged that some 
governments have programs aimed at improving the energy efficiency of their 
public housing stock (appendix C).  
12.3  Institutional framework and the National 
Framework for Energy Efficiency 
The institutional framework for coordinating energy efficiency programs needs to 
be able to address coordination across jurisdictions, between programs and with 
other policies. As argued in this chapter, coordination needs to take the form of 
uniformity, harmonisation or consistency, depending on the circumstance.     





The current institutional framework includes the MCE and its committees — the 
EEWG and NAEEEC. These national bodies make recommendations and decisions 
that generally require agreement by the government in each jurisdiction, before they 
come into effect. The ABCB also has a role in relation to coordinating building 
regulations. Further information on the institutional framework is included in 
appendix B. 
The institutional framework for coordinating energy efficiency policy appears to be 
appropriate for achieving coordination across jurisdictions and between programs. 
Appliance labelling and MEPS is an example of where the MCE has achieved an 
appropriate level of coordination. The MCE is also well placed to coordinate energy 
efficiency policy with other energy policies. 
There are, however, aspects of coordinating energy efficiency policy with other 
government objectives, such as those for climate change and economic growth, that 
are likely to require a broader perspective. The current arrangements allow this to 
occur as individual Australian, State and Territory Governments make the final 
decisions, and it is at this level that energy efficiency policy can be considered in 
the context of broader government objectives. Nonetheless, throughout this report 
there are examples of where the Commission’s assessment is that energy efficiency 
programs (including regulatory programs) are likely to be inconsistent with other 
government objectives — in particular those relating to economic efficiency.  
A factor that may have contributed to this apparent inconsistency is inadequate 
consideration of nonregulatory alternatives during the policy-development process. 
RISs require alternative approaches to be considered. However, where RISs are 
conducted late in the process this may not be done effectively. 
In many cases, the RIS is prepared too late in the policy development process to be of 
any real assistance to decision makers. In those circumstances, it effectively becomes 
little more than an ex post justification for a policy decision already taken, subverting 
its role. 
When this happens, the telltale signs in the RIS tend to be inadequate consideration of 
alternative options, and lack of consultation, both of which are critical to good 
decision-making. (Banks 2005, p. 10) 
For some energy efficiency measures, the problem of RISs being done late in the 
process is exacerbated by them being done by entities that do not have the ability to 
implement nonregulatory measures. An example of this relates to the introduction 
of mandatory energy efficiency measures in the Building Code. The ABCB 
reported: 
… the Australian Government announced in July 2000 that agreement had been 
reached with State and Territory Governments to introduce mandatory energy 
efficiency measures in the BCA [Building Code of Australia] … (sub. 7, p. 5)     
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A subsequent RIS for such measures, undertaken by the ABCB in 2002, included a 
section on the identification of alternatives, that stated: 
The ABCB has no responsibility for providing advice, education and information, 
except in relation to the BCA [Building Code of Australia]. This consideration of 
alternatives is therefore limited to regulatory measures that can be implemented 
through the BCA. (ABCB 2002, p. 6) 
While the ABCB did consult with stakeholders during the development of the RIS, 
it is not apparent that nonregulatory options were adequately considered at any 
stage during the policy-development process.  
In general, conducting RISs earlier in the policy-development process could help to 
achieve more comprehensive consideration of all policy options. If the ABCB 
continues to be involved in preparing RISs for building energy efficiency 
regulations, a measure suggested in a Commission report on building regulation 
might also assist (PC 2004a). This report noted that there is no Ministerial Council 
overseeing the operation of the ABCB. The Commission found that establishing 
such a Council may not be justified, but: 
An annual meeting of Ministers (with appropriate whole-of-government backing) may 
be a useful mechanism to demonstrate ongoing commitment to a nationally consistent 
approach to reform of building regulation. Ministers could also set broad strategic 
direction and priorities. (PC 2004a, p. 339) 
Such an arrangement could provide a forum for the consideration of nonregulatory 
options for achieving greenhouse objectives in the building sector.  
National Framework for Energy Efficiency 
The MCE has overseen the development of the NFEE. In August 2004, Energy 
Ministers committed to implementing a package of measures as Stage One of the 
NFEE. The MCE has stated that ‘[t]he package will assist improved coordination 
amongst jurisdictions in delivering energy efficiency programs’ (MCE 2004c, p. 2). 
Many inquiry participants were supportive of the NFEE. For example: 
The AIGN [Australian Industry Greenhouse Network] applauds the agreement within 
the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) to proceed with energy efficiency 
improvement initiatives on a national basis through the NFEE framework. If the NFEE 
delivers in coordinating and delivering uniform national programs in this area, it will be 
a success. (sub. 57, p. 9) 
MEFL [Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd] is aware that the MCE has signed off on a 
package of measures as part of the NFEE. We support the policy package as a 
significant positive step towards overcoming the barriers to energy efficiency and 
unlocking the potential benefits. (sub. 18, p. 4)     





Some participants were qualified in their support for the NFEE, arguing that there 
were deficiencies. Origin Energy noted:  
Development of the National Framework on Energy Efficiency (NFEE), although 
clearly valuable in many respects, has not focused sufficiently on the underlying 
rationale for government policy intervention in the area of energy efficiency. A poor 
understanding and specification of the policy problem being addressed potentially leads 
to misguided and ineffective policy prescriptions which risk imposing unnecessary 
costs on the economy and the community more generally. (sub. 25, p. 1) 
There is a range of conclusions reached in this report that are relevant to particular 
NFEE Stage One proposals. These are summarised in table 12.1. Considering the 
NFEE more generally, the Commission’s view is that it will improve national 
coordination and help guide the development of energy efficiency programs. There 
are, however, four main areas that could be improved: 
•  clarity on the rationale for, and objectives of, government intervention; 
•  emphasis on priority setting;  
•  use of ex post policy and program evaluations; and 
•  commitment of governments to the revised framework. 
Clarity of objectives 
The NFEE would benefit from a clear statement of the rationale for, and objectives 
of, energy efficiency policy. Some possible objectives of energy efficiency policy 
suggested by inquiry participants are to: 
•  enable producers and consumers to obtain energy services more cost effectively; 
•  compensate for people’s failure to take environmental externalities (such as 
greenhouse gas emissions) into account when making energy consumption 
decisions; 
•  compensate for distortion in energy prices; 
•  reduce the need for investment in energy supply infrastructure; and 
•  improve energy security. 
Energy efficiency policy is the most direct means of meeting only the first of these 
objectives. Energy efficiency policy can legitimately be used to pursue other 
objectives, but only where (or to the extent that) it is preferred to more direct policy 
responses. For example, using energy efficiency regulation (such as MEPS for air 
conditioners) as a means to reduce peaks in demand for electricity should only be 
considered if it has been decided that this is preferable to allowing electricity prices 
to become more cost reflective or implementing other demand management     
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strategies such as interruptible supply contracts or direct load control (chapter 14). 
Deliberate choices need to be made and the objectives of energy efficiency policy 
clearly articulated. A risk in not doing this is that improving energy efficiency may 
be taken to be the sole objective, and government intervention seen to be warranted 
wherever there are perceived barriers to this occurring. As argued in this report, 
such an approach is likely to reduce economic efficiency. 
Priority setting 
It would be useful for the NFEE to identify the areas with greatest potential for 
generating net benefits, so that policy priorities can be set. The assessment of 
potential should consider both the amount of energy used, and the degree and type 
of market failure in the various sectors. Reference to specific policy measures could 
then be confined to those instances where national uniformity or harmonisation are 
warranted. Such a framework could improve national coordination, without being 
overly prescriptive. It would also assist individual governments to develop energy 
efficiency programs that deliver the greatest net benefits.  
Ex post program evaluation 
The Commission’s view that there is a need for more rigorous evaluation of energy 
efficiency policies and programs is evident from the conclusions presented in 
table  12.1. In general, there appears to have been little ex post evaluation of 
progress by any jurisdiction. In conducting this inquiry the Commission asked all 
jurisdictions to supply it with copies of any public evaluations of existing and recent 
programs that they had undertaken. The jurisdictions provided the Commission with 
several RIS assessments undertaken before programs commenced, but very few 
ex post evaluations. In some cases, presumably, internal assessments of programs 
were undertaken. 
Lack of rigorous evaluation is of particular concern where the NFEE foreshadows 
the expansion of the scope of programs. For example, one NFEE Stage One 
measure is for elements of the ACT House Energy Rating Scheme to be extended to 
all other jurisdictions. This was announced without having established that this 
scheme was efficient and effective. In response to the Commission’s draft report for 
this inquiry, the Department of the Environment and Heritage reported that a 
number of evaluations are being undertaken, including: 
The ACT Government mandatory disclosure of building energy performance scheme is 
being evaluated as a necessary first step to implement the national mandatory building 
energy performance disclosure measure as announced in the Prime Minister’s Energy 
Statement and NFEE Stage One policy packages … (sub. DR131, p. 2)     





This move to undertake more program evaluations is a positive one. Formal, 
independent evaluation of key programs would help establish the knowledge base 
needed for future policy and program development. These should all be made 
publicly available. To achieve the widest possible benefits, future evaluations could 
be overseen by the MCE, or by relevant Auditor-Generals’ offices. 
Government commitment to the framework 
One potential benefit in having a national framework is that the types of 
government energy efficiency interventions that can be expected in the future is 
made clear to stakeholders. This benefit is lost if governments introduce new energy 
efficiency policies that do not conform to the framework.  
NFEE Stage One makes clear that the Australian Government will act to require 
large energy users to undertake mandatory energy assessments and report on energy 
efficiency opportunities. The Energy Administration Amendment (Water and 
Energy Savings) Bill introduced in New South Wales potentially cuts across this by 
requiring that large energy users in that State prepare energy savings action plans. 
The National Framework for Energy Efficiency will improve national coordination 
and guide the development of energy efficiency programs. It would be further 
enhanced by greater clarity on the rationale for, and the objectives of, government 
intervention and by more rigorous evaluation of existing policies and programs.  
Stage One proposals of the National Framework for Energy Efficiency that 
expand the scope of existing programs (to new jurisdictions or products) should 
only proceed after the net social benefits of those programs has been established 
and a convincing case can be made for their expansion. Evaluations should also 
consider the impact on private cost effectiveness. 
FINDING 12.4 
RECOMMENDATION 12.2     
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Commission conclusions relevant to NFEE Stage One measures 
The Commission’s conclusions that are relevant to particular NFEE Stage One 
proposals are summarised in table 12.1. The table indicates where in the report the 
full conclusion (and supporting argument) can be found. 
Table 12.1  Summary of conclusions that are relevant to the NFEE Stage 
One measures 
NFEE Stage One measurea  Most relevant report conclusions (summarised) 
Residential buildings   
  Nationally consistent minimum energy 
efficiency design standards for new homes, 
units and apartments 
• The ABCB should, as a matter of urgency, 
commission an independent ex post 
evaluation of building energy efficiency 
standards (see recommendation 10.1). 
• The case for State and Territory-based 
variations in standards for new houses 
appears to be weak (see finding 12.2). 
• Ways to prevent local governments creating 
variations in standards for new houses should 
be examined (see recommendation 12.1). 
  Minimum energy efficiency design 
standards for major renovations 
• As above. 
  Mandatory disclosure of the energy 
performance of homes, units and 
apartments at the time of sale or lease 
• The results of a planned ex post evaluation of 
the ACT home energy-rating scheme should 
inform the implementation of this measure 
(see finding 10.1). 
  
Commercial buildings   
  Introduce nationally consistent minimum 
energy efficiency design standards for new 
and refurbished buildings 
• Measures that expand the scope of existing 
programs (to new jurisdictions or products) 
should only proceed after the net social 
benefits of those programs has been 
established and a convincing case can be 
made for their expansion. Evaluations should 
consider the impact on private and social cost 
effectiveness (see recommendation 12.2). 
  Introduce mandatory disclosure of building 
energy performance at time of sale or lease 
• As above. 
  
Commercial/industrial energy efficiency   
  The requirement for large energy 
consumers to undertake mandatory energy 
assessments and report on the energy 
efficiency opportunities that these identify, 
as announced in the Australian 
Government’s Energy White Paper 
• The policy of mandating assessments of 
energy efficiency opportunities is not 
warranted on private cost-effectiveness 
grounds. The demonstration effects that might 
be achieved by this policy could be pursued 
more effectively and at less cost by voluntary 
programs (see finding 7.5). 
(Continued next page)     





Table 12.1  (continued) 
NFEE Stage One measurea  Most relevant report conclusions (summarised) 
  Nationally coordinated training and 
accreditation for energy auditors and energy 
performance contractors in conjunction with 
programs and protocols already in place 
• Government should not become involved in 
accreditation of energy consultants and 
energy service companies because this 
function can be adequately performed by 
others (see finding 7.1). 
 
Government energy efficiency   
  Develop nationally consistent standards for 
measuring and reporting on government 
energy efficiency programs 
• This measure has the potential to improve 
policy coordination (see section 12.1). 
  Introduce public annual reporting by all 
jurisdictions on energy use and progress 
towards achieving the targets set for 
government agencies 
• Energy-intensity performance indicators, or 
targets, can help identify opportunities for 
cost-effective improvements in energy 
efficiency. Performance indicators are 
preferable because they provide less 
incentive to adopt measures that are not cost 
effective (see finding 8.2). 
• The costs of providing and analysing data 
should be considered when deciding what, if 
any, energy-use information government 
agencies are required to report (see 
section 8.3). 
  Establish minimum energy performance 
standards for government buildings 
• Addressing cost-effective energy efficiency in 
procurement policies (including those relating 
to government buildings), provided there is 
sufficient flexibility, could lead to net benefits. 
Possible demonstration effects and market 
development benefits are unlikely to justify 
procurement decisions that are not cost 
effective for government operations 
(see finding 8.1) (see also section 8.3). 
  Develop best practice models for 
government departments to implement 
energy efficiency programs 
• To the extent that it is cost effective, 
governments should be supplying energy 
efficiency information to their constituent parts 
as part of normal operations (see section 8.3). 
 
Appliance and equipment energy efficiency   
  The National Appliance and Equipment 
Energy Efficiency Program (NAEEEP) for 
electrical products will be broadened in 
scope to include MEPS and labelling for gas 
products 
• Future regulation impact assessments of 
appliance MEPS should include more 
comprehensive analysis of a range of issues 
(see recommendation 9.1).  
• National uniformity has been achieved in the 
regulation of energy labelling and MEPS for 
electrical appliances and the same is planned 
for gas appliances. To the extent that 
appliance regulation is justifiable, national 
uniformity is appropriate (see finding 12.1). 
(Continued next page)     
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Table 12.1  (continued) 
NFEE Stage One measurea  Most relevant report conclusions (summarised) 
  The NAEEEP for electrical products will be 
expanded through the introduction of new or 
more stringent MEPS for residential, 
commercial and industrial products, with a 
key focus on increasing the number of 
commercial and industrial products 
regulated 
• As above. 
• See also recommendation 12.2. 
 
Trade and professional training and accreditation 
  Undertake a nationally coordinated effort to 
integrate energy efficiency concepts into the 
courses for the key trades and professions 
that influence energy efficiency outcomes 
• Not covered. 
  Develop training and accreditation courses 
for practising tradespersons 
• Not covered. 
 
Commercial/industrial sector capacity building 
  Develop a nationally coordinated program to 
generate highly visible examples of 
energy-efficient equipment or processes in 
key industrial sectors and new or 
refurbished commercial buildings 
• In some cases, government provision of 
information (which could include publicising 
industry best practice) may be warranted 
(see section 7.5). 
• Information failures are generally less 
significant in the commercial and industrial 
sectors than in the householder sector, 
suggesting a commensurately smaller role for 
governments (see section 7.5). 
  Establish nationally coordinated energy 
efficiency best practice networks 
• As above. 
  Link industry and government to key centres 
for leading edge energy efficiency research 
and development 
• Not covered. 
 
General consumer awareness   
  Require energy retailers to provide 
benchmark data on energy bills 
• Not covered. 
  Development of a nationally coordinated 
network to facilitate easy and timely access 
to high quality and relevant information 
• Government advisory services can be justified 
on public good, credibility and accessibility 
grounds. Private providers can also supply 
useful information. The case for government 
provision is strongest for general advice 
(see section 6.3). 
  Targeted promotional campaigns for specific 
energy efficiency issues 
• As above. 
 Integration  of  energy efficiency concepts 
into the school curriculum 
• Not covered. 
 
Finance sector awareness  • Not covered. 
a  Adapted from MCE (2004c).     




 13  National energy efficiency target 
 
Key points  
•  A possible national energy efficiency target (NEET) has been canvassed during the 
development of the National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE).  
•  In Europe, there is considerable interest in energy efficiency target schemes as part 
of climate change policy. 
•  There are various options for how a NEET could operate. The Commission’s 
assessment focuses on schemes in which: 
–  major energy users or energy retailers would be required to achieve target levels of 
efficiency-related energy savings; and  
–  trading in eligible energy savings would be permitted via the use of certificates 
(known as white certificates).  
•  Modelling for the NFEE suggests that a NEET would have substantial economywide 
benefits. The Commission’s view is that it would not be possible to design a NEET 
scheme that would have the effects assumed by the modelling. 
•  A NEET is not supported because it: 
–  would not directly address the market failures that cause the energy efficiency gap; 
–  would require measurement and verification of efficiency-related energy savings from 
business-as-usual baselines, which would be very difficult and costly; 
–  would alter investment patterns and encourage energy efficiency investments that 
are not necessarily cost effective; and 
–  would not be a well-targeted measure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.   
 
 
Although there is no formal proposal for how a national energy efficiency target 
(NEET) would operate in Australia, the idea of adopting a NEET has been 
canvassed by the Energy Efficiency Working Group (EEWG 2004) during the 
development of the National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE). A NEET 
has parallels with the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) and the New 
South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (NGAS), both currently operating 
in Australia. There are also emerging experiences in European countries with 
implementing energy efficiency targets as part of climate change policy.  
Proponents of a NEET generally argue that it would encourage investment in 
energy efficiency improvements — and that if efficiency-related energy savings     
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could be traded between participants, the overall target could be met in a 
lowest-cost manner. However, as discussed in this chapter, there are a number of 
reasons why the efficiency-related energy savings would not necessarily be 
achieved in an economically-efficient way.  
The terms of reference require the Commission to consider a NEET including, but 
not limited to, the establishment of an annual requirement for major users of 
stationary energy to generate, or otherwise acquire, a target level of 
efficiency-related energy savings. This chapter examines this approach to a NEET, 
and also canvasses other options that involve placing obligations on energy retailers 
and that allow for trading in efficiency-related energy savings. The analysis is 
structured as follows: 
•  broad options for introducing a NEET (section 13.1); 
•  emerging experiences with energy efficiency targets, or related schemes, in 
Australia and internationally (section 13.2); 
•  assessment of a NEET on the grounds of private cost-effectiveness 
(section 13.3); and 
•  discussion on whether energy efficiency targets could help to achieve other 
policy objectives, particularly greenhouse gas abatement (section 13.4). 
13.1  Broad options for introducing a NEET 
There is a range of options for introducing a NEET. At its simplest, a NEET could 
be no more or less than what it implies — an aspirational target. It could be 
expressed as a broad objective of energy policy, for example that energy intensity in 
the economy be lowered by a given amount. The intention could be to meet this 
aspirational target through a range of energy efficiency policy measures. However, 
as the Australian Conservation Foundation noted, broad aspirational targets 
‘provide little information about the effectiveness of actual policy measures’ 
(sub. 30, p. 9). 
A NEET is usually viewed as a policy mechanism to drive improvements in energy 
efficiency. For example, the Energy Efficiency Working Group (through consulting 
with stakeholders on the development of a NFEE) identified the introduction of ‘a 
national energy efficiency target scheme to provide sufficient market drivers to 
increase energy efficiency’ as a potential policy option (EEWG 2004, p. 33).  
The targets could be set and applied in two ways. The national target could be set 
first, with targets for individual firms set so as to aggregate to the national level.     




Alternatively, the national target could be the aggregate of the energy savings 
targets for each firm. 
Voluntary or mandatory participation 
A NEET that involved setting targets for individual participants could operate with 
or without penalties for noncompliance. 
In the case of a NEET without sanctions for noncompliance, individual firms would 
volunteer to participate in the scheme, and could be involved in setting and 
measuring progress towards their own targets. Essentially, this form of a NEET 
could be implemented through voluntary partnerships with industry, such as   
Greenhouse Challenge Plus. As voluntary programs are discussed in chapter 7, 
voluntary participation in a NEET is not analysed further in this chapter. 
Energy efficiency targets and related schemes implemented in Australia and 
internationally generally impose mandatory requirements on individual firms. For a 
market in tradeable energy savings to operate, it would also be necessary to impose 
penalties for noncompliance on participants. 
Participants 
The group of participants required to meet energy efficiency targets could be all 
major energy users or — as is the case for the MRET — energy retailers.  
If major energy users were regulated, each would presumably be required to achieve 
target levels of efficiency-related energy savings on an annual basis. A regulator 
would set targets relative to a business-as-usual (BAU) case for each user and 
annually verify the energy savings claimed. Firms would face a penalty if they 
failed to meet their target. 
If energy retailers were regulated, targets could be set for reductions in energy sales 
relative to a BAU scenario, to be achieved through efficiency-related energy 
savings. To avoid penalties, the retailers could devise ways of rewarding their 
customers for achieving eligible energy savings. This would require negotiations 
with customers and annual verification of energy savings. 
Trading in efficiency-related energy savings 
Trading could be included in a NEET scheme if obligations to meet targets were 
regulated. A market could be established by allowing regulated firms to purchase     
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the right to claim efficiency-related energy savings made by other firms. A 
regulated firm could then meet its target by making energy savings itself, or 
purchasing the rights to savings made by others, or a combination of the two.  
Energy efficiency certificates (usually referred to as ‘white certificates’) could be 
issued for the purpose of trading. A trading scheme could allow efficiency-related 
energy savings made by both regulated and unregulated firms to count towards the 
national target, provided they could be verified. In such a scheme, regulated firms 
would be required to meet their targets and could act as either buyers or sellers of 
white certificates, whereas unregulated firms could act as sellers only. The penalties 
for noncompliance would establish the maximum value of white certificates, 
although their market value could be less depending on the supply of eligible energy 
savings. Trade in certificates would theoretically result in the lowest-cost 
compliance with the national target. 
13.2  Emerging experiences with energy efficiency 
targets and related schemes 
There is considerable interest in energy efficiency targets and related schemes in 
Europe and Australia. The key policy driver for these schemes is usually climate 
change.  
European experiences 
In Europe, several countries have introduced schemes that set mandatory energy 
efficiency targets. Some of these schemes involve tradeable white certificates, and 
the general intention in most schemes is that opportunities for trade will be 
introduced or further developed (box 13.1). Research is also being undertaken by 
the International Energy Agency on market-based policies for accelerating energy 
efficiency programs in five of its member countries (France, Italy, Norway, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom). 
In the European Union, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union have proposed that member states adopt a six-year indicative target for 
energy savings that is at least 1 per cent of energy consumed during an earlier 
reference period. Once reporting on this target has commenced, consideration will 
be given to whether a white certificates scheme should be introduced (CEU 2005).     





Box 13.1  Energy efficiency targets: examples from European countries 
United Kingdom 
The Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) scheme requires gas and electricity 
suppliers to save a total of 62 terawatt hours (TWh) over the three years to 2005 
(compared to 2002) (Langniss and Praetorius 2004). There are current proposals to 
extend the scheme to 2011 (DEFRA 2004b). The objectives of the scheme are to: 
•  contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in line with the United 
Kingdom’s Kyoto Protocol obligation; 
•  help electricity and gas consumers to use less energy and reduce their fuel costs, or 
to enjoy greater comfort; and 
•  give particular help to lower income consumers (DEFRA 2001). 
The EEC only covers the energy supply to households. There is a requirement that half 
of the savings come from lower income households (which includes approximately 
one-third of all households). The regulator has defined standard energy efficiency 
measures that are acceptable for filling obligations. Other measures can be accepted, 
but require independent verification. 
Energy suppliers have the option of trading energy savings and obligations. However, 
each trade needs to be approved by the regulator. In the first year of the scheme, there 
was no trading activity (OFGEM 2003), although an increase in the scope for trading 
within the scheme has been proposed (DEFRA 2004a). 
France 
The French Government has proposed the introduction of a white certificates scheme 
to help reduce energy intensity (final energy consumption per unit of GDP) 
(MEFI 2003). Under the scheme, major suppliers of electricity, gas, fuel oil and motor 
fuels would be required to achieve a level of energy savings based on the amount of 
energy they supply. These targets could be achieved through their own operations 
and/or the purchase of white certificates. The scheme is expected to begin in 2005, 
with a total energy savings target of 54.5 TWh over the first three years (IEA 2004d). 
These savings are equivalent to 2.7 per cent of French total final consumption of 
energy in 2001. 
Italy 
In 2001, targets were set for reducing the consumption of electricity by 18.6 TWh per 
year and of gas by 15.1 TWh per year against a business-as-usual scenario for the 
period 2002 to 2006 (Langniss and Praetorius 2004). The national targets are 
apportioned to electricity and gas suppliers with more than 100 000 customers.  
A white certificates scheme to support energy savings targets is still being designed. It 
is envisaged that this scheme will credit energy efficiency measures that reduce 
consumption of electricity, gas and other fuels, such as heating oil (IEA 2004d). 
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Related schemes in Australia 
A NEET has parallels with the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme 
(box 13.2) and the MRET (box 13.3) that currently operate in Australia. Under the 
New South Wales scheme, credit toward meeting greenhouse gas abatement targets 
can be gained by implementing energy efficiency measures. Both schemes involve 
tradeable certificates. 
 
Box 13.2  NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme 
The NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme commenced on 1 January 2003 and 
will remain in force until 2012. The purpose of the scheme is to reduce the emissions of 
greenhouse gases associated with electricity consumption. To accomplish this, the 
scheme sets benchmarks for per capita emissions of carbon dioxide equivalent gases. 
The statewide benchmark is to reduce per capita emissions to 5 per cent below the 
1989-90 levels by 2007 and to maintain this level through to 2012. 
The scheme covers all electricity retailers operating in New South Wales, as well as 
some large electricity consumers who have voluntarily elected to manage their own 
greenhouse gas emissions benchmarks, thereby avoiding having the compliance costs 
of the scheme being passed on to them by energy retailers. Energy retailers do not 
manage a benchmark for the load supplied to these consumers. Nine large consumers 
were voluntary members of the scheme in 2003, joining the 22 compulsory 
participants. Each of these benchmark participants is responsible for meeting a share 
of the statewide emission reduction target that is based on the proportion of electricity 
that they sell or use. Penalties are imposed on firms who fail to meet their targets 
(currently $10.50 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent gases). 
Under the scheme, benchmark participants must meet their targets by surrendering the 
required quantity of NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement Certificates (NGACs). These 
certificates can be traded. 
NGACs can be earned by: 
•  using low or zero emission technology to generate electricity; 
•  demand-side abatement through energy efficiency and/or fuel switching; and 
•  carbon sequestration. 
In 2003, electricity-generation measures accounted for 95 per cent, and demand-side 
abatement accounted for 5 per cent, of NGACs surrendered. 
Source: Adapted from IPART (2004c). 
     





Box 13.3  Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) 
The Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 (Cwlth) (the Act) originated as part of the 
Prime Minister’s ‘Safeguarding the Future: Australia’s Response to Climate Change’ 
announced in November 1997. The Act is supported by the Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) (Charge) Act 2000 (Cwlth) and the Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Regulations 2001 (Cwlth).  
The effect of the legislation, known as the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
(MRET), is to place a legal liability on wholesale purchasers of electricity to 
proportionately contribute towards the generation of an additional 9500 gigawatt hours 
of renewable energy annually by 2010. This level of generation is equivalent to more 
than twice the annual output of the Snowy Mountains Scheme.  
The legislation is administered by an Australian Government statutory authority, the 
Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator (ORER). Tradeable Renewable Energy 
Certificates (RECs) are created on the basis of eligible renewable energy generation. 
Each REC is equivalent to one megawatt hour of renewable energy generation. A 
range of energy sources and technologies is eligible including hydro, wind, solar and 
various biomass sources, with provision for emerging technologies not yet 
commercialised in Australia, such as wave, tidal and geothermal energy. 
Accredited generators that commenced operating on or after 1 January 1997 can earn 
RECs for all eligible electricity generated following accreditation. Pre-existing 
generators can only earn RECs for an increase in output above baselines determined 
by the ORER. Achievement of the 9500 gigawatt hours target and interim targets prior 
to 2010 is underpinned by a $40 per megawatt hour shortfall charge. 
Source: AGO (2003e). 
 
 
13.3  Could a NEET be justified on the grounds of 
privately cost-effective energy efficiency? 
It might be presumed that the objective of a NEET is the adoption of cost-effective 
energy efficiency opportunities. For example, the Government of Western Australia 
suggested that ‘… a NEET would have the effect of ultimately saving individuals 
and businesses money as well as improving the performance of the economy …’ 
(sub. 58, p. 15). 
As discussed in section 13.1, there are a variety of options for a NEET. However, 
the assessment presented here focuses on NEET schemes that include: 
•  a regulator that sets efficiency-related energy-savings targets for designated 
participants (who could be energy retailers or all major energy users); 
•  financial penalties for those who fail to meet their targets;      
308  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
•  trading in eligible energy savings that is open to all via the use of white 
certificates; and 
•  the eligibility of energy-savings measures and verification of claimed energy 
savings being determined by the regulator. 
While the idea of a NEET seemingly draws on well-established principles for 
creating tradeable permits, the Commission considers that the proposal has 
significant flaws — including its failure to address the policy-relevant market 
failures preventing the uptake of privately cost-effective energy efficiency. 
Furthermore, as discussed later in this section, difficulties with measuring and 
verifying efficiency-related energy savings would result in property rights being 
poorly defined. Consequently, markets in white certificates would not operate 
efficiently and so would not result in the most cost-effective energy efficiency 
investments being made. 
Participants’ views on the benefits of a NEET 
Several inquiry participants suggested that a NEET could drive improvements in 
energy efficiency. For example: 
A market mechanism like a NEET could deliver measurable energy savings through the 
uptake of eligible energy efficiency activities and would be independent of the level of 
economic activity. (Department of the Environment and Heritage, sub. 30, p. 10) 
The Green Building Council of Australia supports the conclusions of the National 
Framework for Energy Efficiency… Introduce national energy efficiency target scheme 
and provide market drivers to assist the transition to increased energy efficiency. 
(sub. 41, p. 7)  
AEPCA … recommends that broad-based market signals be introduced to drive new 
investment in energy efficiency. Two major types of signal can be used, preferably in 
combination … A greenhouse market signal … An energy efficiency certificate trading 
scheme. (The Australian Energy Performance Contracting Association, sub. 47, p. 19) 
There is … an opportunity we think for altering incentive structures through some 
mechanism; NEET, the National Energy Target, is one that’s been put forward. 
(Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy, trans., p. 770) 
Some participants who supported further investigation into the idea of a NEET 
referred to modelling undertaken as part of the NFEE process (for example, 
Department of the Environment and Heritage, sub. 30, p. 10; South Australian 
Government, sub. 80, p. 4). The modelling suggested that the benefits of achieving 
a NEET are substantial (box 13.4). However, the Commission would be concerned 
if this modelling was to be used to justify the desirability of introducing a NEET 
scheme (and indeed no claim of this type is made in Allen Consulting     




Group  (2004b) or MMA (2004), by the consulting firms that undertook the 
modelling). The Commission’s concerns focus particularly on the assumptions 
needed to incorporate energy efficiency and a NEET into general equilibrium and 
other models.  
In estimating the benefits of achieving certain targets, the modelling did not 
examine whether a NEET would be effective in encouraging firms to invest in 
privately cost-effective energy efficiency improvements. In effect, the modelling 
assumed that many privately cost-effective energy efficiency investment 
opportunities exist but have not yet been taken up, and that targets would be 
successfully met solely through the widespread uptake of these investments. As 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter, the Commission’s assessment is that this 
would not occur. 
 
Box 13.4  NFEE modelling of a NEET 
The Allen Consulting Group was engaged by the Sustainable Energy Authority of 
Victoria (SEAV) to undertake analysis of the impacts of reaching targeted annual 
reductions in end-use energy consumption, as part of the National Framework for 
Energy Efficiency (NFEE) process (Allen Consulting Group 2004b). This work involved 
general equilibrium modelling to assess economywide impacts. The results suggest 
that the benefits of achieving a NEET are substantial. 
The Department of the Environment and Heritage referred to the results for one version 
of the model: 
Analysis done for the NFEE showed that a 1 per cent NEET (annual energy savings of 
1  per  cent beyond business-as-usual) would deliver an increase in [real private] 
consumption of approximately 0.18  per  cent by 2014, while reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions by 16.5 megatonnes carbon dioxide equivalent and reducing electricity prices to 
end users. The total net present value of increased consumption over the life of the 
investments initiated by a 1 per cent NEET is $8.4 billion. (sub. 30, p. 9) 
A version of the model that seeks to simulate the effects of trade in energy efficiency 
certificates shows a lower, although still strongly positive, net present value of 
$6.4 billion (Allen Consulting Group 2004b). 
McLennan Magasanik Associates was engaged by the SEAV to estimate any 
additional benefits that might flow from achieving targeted reductions in energy 
consumption. They estimated benefits with a net present value of $2.4–$6.6  billion 
(depending on the NEET scenario) from: 
•  deferral of new electricity and gas plants 
•  higher levels and longer periods of mothballing of plants 
•  plants operating at reduced capacity (MMA 2004). 
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What kind of incentives would a NEET create? 
Retailers or energy users participating in a NEET would incur costs directly 
associated with meeting targets. For example, if a NEET involved setting targets for 
retailers: 
•  Some retailers would aim to meet these targets by purchasing white certificates 
and/or by encouraging customers to undertake energy efficiency improvements 
(for example, through subsidising purchases of energy-efficient appliances). 
•  Other retailers might find it profitable to overcomply with their targets, and sell 
white certificates on the market. Such retailers would gain revenue from trading 
on the market, but costs would be incurred through encouraging their customers 
to undertake energy efficiency improvements. 
The retailers would seek to pass the costs of meeting energy efficiency targets to 
their customers (through increased retail energy prices) and to energy suppliers 
(through decreased wholesale energy prices). In this situation, a NEET would be 
equivalent to a tax on energy that is imposed on retailers, the proceeds of which are 
used to subsidise energy efficiency improvements. Like the tax and subsidy policy 
combination, a NEET could encourage energy efficiency improvements — but 
these investments will not necessarily be privately cost effective. 
A NEET would not address market failures 
Regardless of what target levels are set, a NEET would not directly address the 
underlying market failures, such as imperfect information, that may limit the uptake 
of privately cost-effective energy efficiency opportunities (chapter  4). If cost 
effectiveness is the objective, policy instruments that target these failures directly 
would be more appropriate. The Energy Supply Association of Australia referred to 
this issue: 
… since the target would not address the underlying barriers to the uptake of energy 
efficiency improvement opportunities … it would be unlikely to drive significant 
energy efficiency gains. (sub. 68, p. 12) 
The Energy Retailers Association of Australia (ERAA) also questioned the rationale 
for a NEET: 
A national energy efficiency target, considered by some participants an appropriate 
policy response, is not in the interests of the community because it fails to address an 
underlying market failure. (sub. 26, p. 3)      




Defining property rights for the market 
In order for a market to work efficiently, property rights must be clearly defined, 
allow exclusive use of the property in question, be readily transferable, and be 
enforceable by law (Murtough, Aretino and Matysek 2002; PC 2002).  A  NEET 
would appear to have major shortcomings in this regard, largely because the 
attendant property rights can not be readily defined.  
For a NEET to work effectively, property rights need to be assigned to parties that 
undertake energy efficiency measures that result in energy savings that are 
additional to that which would have occurred without a NEET. This requires: 
•  determining what would have happened without a NEET (by establishing BAU 
baselines); 
•  measuring energy savings resulting from energy efficiency measures; and 
•  verifying that eligible energy savings have occurred. 
A NEET is described as a ‘baseline-and-credit’ scheme because it involves 
establishing baselines and issuing credits for efficiency-related energy savings 
measured from that baseline.  (See box 13.5 for examples from New South Wales 
and the United Kingdom that illustrate some of the potential difficulties with 
determining additionality in baseline-and-credit schemes.)  
Establishing business-as-usual baselines 
While it is relatively easy to measure how much energy is being produced or 
consumed, it is very difficult to measure how much energy is being saved due to 
efficiency measures as a result of a policy, because it relies on estimating 
hypothetical BAU baselines.  
As discussed in chapter 5, it is highly debatable what BAU energy use might be. To 
estimate BAU baselines in a way that considered the individual circumstances of 
each entity would be impractical, necessitating the use of indiscriminate rules. A 
balance would need to be struck between issuing certificates for activities that 
would have occurred anyway and disallowing activities genuinely motivated by a 
NEET.  
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Box 13.5  Additionality of measures in baseline-and-credit schemes 
A key test of the effectiveness of an energy efficiency target is whether the energy 
savings credited under the scheme are additional to those that would have occurred in 
the absence of the target. Experiences from schemes in New South Wales and the 
United Kingdom demonstrate the potential difficulties with ensuring additionality in 
baseline-and-credit schemes. 
New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (NGAS) 
One way that participants in this scheme can earn certificates is through a range of 
energy efficiency activities. Certificate entitlements from these demand-side abatement 
activities can be calculated using one of three methods: 
1. Project impact assessment method — engineering assessments of activities are 
conducted against baselines that are based on current energy consumption (for 
existing installations) or the most energy-efficient equivalent installation that exists 
in New South Wales, or otherwise in Australia (for new installations). 
2.  The metered baseline method — baselines are calculated by measuring 
consumption over a period before demand-side abatement occurs. 
3. Default abatement factors method — each item on a list of commonly installed 
equipment (such as domestic appliances and electric motors) is allocated a default 
abatement value, based on National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency 
Program energy star ratings (chapter 9). 
Activities credited under this scheme are not necessarily additional to what would have 
occurred anyway, because the assessment methods fail to take into account several 
factors (such as other policy measures) that could influence energy efficiency 
investment decisions. Energy reductions credited under the NGAS may have occurred 
for reasons unrelated to the scheme.  
United Kingdom Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) 
Domestic energy suppliers under the EEC scheme are obliged to meet their energy 
efficiency targets by encouraging householders to install energy-saving measures.  
It is acknowledged that some eligible energy efficiency measures would have occurred 
in the absence of the EEC. However, the scheme does not adjust the overall target or 
suppliers’ individual targets to account for such installations. Although suppliers are 
obliged to demonstrate additionality to the regulator, it is assumed that they will meet 
the cost of subsidising households that would have otherwise implemented the 
measure — referred to as ‘deadweight’.  
The stated rationale behind setting targets that represent total, rather than additional, 
energy efficiency installations, is that ‘this avoids the otherwise intractable problem of 
allocating deadweight to individual schemes when determining the energy savings’ 
(DEFRA 2004b, p. 22). 
Sources: MacGill and Outhred (2003); DEFRA (2004b). 
 
     




In schemes that require the establishment of baselines, certification of activities that 
would have occurred anyway is likely to be prevalent, because participants would 
have a strong incentive to seek credit for these zero-cost opportunities (Langniss 
and Praetorius 2004, OECD 2000). For example, MacGill et al (2005) observed that 
95 per cent of the certificates registered under the NSW Greenhouse Gas Abatement 
Scheme in 2003 appeared to have been earned from installations that were built or 
planned prior to the commencement of the scheme. In the majority of these cases, 
firms were not required to undertake operational changes. 
There is also the potential that firms which are already energy efficient could be the 
most disadvantaged by the introduction of a NEET. The Australian Industry 
Greenhouse Network argued that: 
… any target that might have reference to a contemporary or recent benchmark or 
baseline risks penalizing those businesses which have already achieved a high level of 
energy efficiency, and face much higher marginal costs to improve further. (sub. 57, 
p. 13) 
Consequently, there is a risk that once the scheme was announced firms would try 
to game the system by artificially inflating BAU projections and delaying energy 
efficiency improvements that they already had in the pipeline (OECD 2000). In this 
respect, the Energy Supply Association of Australia noted that: 
Major energy users would have an incentive to understate their energy efficiency prior 
to the commencement of the scheme in order to gain credit for business-as-usual 
(BAU) activities. (sub. 68, p. 13) 
Measuring and verifying eligible energy savings 
Changes in energy use over time can be measured relatively easily. However, 
isolating energy savings resulting from energy efficiency measures from other 
influences on energy use is much more difficult. This is because energy efficiency 
is difficult to define and distinguish from variations in energy use due to other 
factors, such as changes in the output of firms, lifestyles, and the weather.  
If energy savings resulting from energy efficiency measures could not be isolated 
accurately, as is likely, a NEET might discourage energy consumption per se. This 
would be distortionary by discouraging energy-intensive but economically-efficient 
activities.  
A NEET would require a verification system that balanced the competing objectives 
of minimising transaction costs and maintaining the integrity of the scheme. For 
large industrial energy users, this would involve detailed scrutiny of individual 
energy efficiency projects. For savings made by households, it would be necessary     
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to determine that energy savings had occurred from consumer actions, such as the 
purchase of an energy-efficient appliance or the installation of insulation.  
Due to the ill-defined nature of the property rights, and the potentially large number 
of suppliers of energy-savings credits, the task of verifying white certificates would 
be extremely difficult and time consuming. The likely result is that verification 
would fail to maintain a high level of integrity.  
Effect on investment 
Rather than addressing market failures, a NEET would increase the incentives to 
invest in energy efficiency improvements. Consequently, it would alter investment 
patterns and encourage investment in energy efficiency projects that are not 
privately cost-effective under current expectations about energy prices. As 
discussed above, difficulties in defining property rights could also lead to a bias 
against energy-intensive but economically-efficient activities. The effect of these 
distortions would be to cause a reduction in economic efficiency and economic 
growth. 
Several inquiry participants were of the view that a NEET would distort investment. 
For example: 
The Australian Aluminium Council is strongly opposed to any form of a national 
energy efficiency target (NEET). A NEET would cause economic inefficiency due to 
the enforcement of a particular outcome irrespective of the cost imposed on the 
economy and individual enterprises to achieve the specific target. (sub. 29, p. 14) 
Is the objective to drive EEI [energy efficiency improvements] across the economy or 
to reduce energy consumption? … a NEET would be more likely to force firms to 
allocate capital away from other more productive uses towards energy conservation 
projects in an attempt to achieve their target. (Energy Supply Association of Australia, 
sub. 68, p. 12) 
Liable entities would be collecting an energy efficiency tax from energy consumers and 
forced to spend the proceeds on energy efficiency investments to meet some arbitrary 
target at the expense of other capital projects. Energy efficiency performance in the 
economy may improve as a result but the allocation of capital would deteriorate. 
(Energy Retailers Association of Australia, sub. 26, pp. 39–40) 
Choice of designated participants 
Regardless of the initial distribution of obligations, trading under a NEET would 
fail to allocate the obligations to improve energy efficiency in the most 
cost-effective way. The choice of designated participants (between energy retailers     




or major energy users) could further influence efficiency outcomes — as well as 
having equity implications. 
As discussed previously, energy retailers participating in a NEET would incur costs 
associated with purchasing white certificates or encouraging customers to improve 
energy efficiency — and would seek to pass on these costs through increasing the 
price of energy. The costs could therefore be spread over a large group of domestic, 
commercial and industrial customers. The effect of higher energy prices might be 
regressive if the retailers’ lower-income households spent a higher proportion of 
their income on energy than did other customers. However, the overall 
distributional consequences of a NEET would also depend on the effects of energy 
price increases on retailers’ commercial and industrial customers. 
In comparison, large energy users — particularly those which are price takers and 
export-oriented — might have limited scope to pass on the costs imposed by a 
NEET to their customers. Firms which use energy intensively are likely to be the 
most affected, and thus investment and production would be distorted in an 
economically-inefficient way. The distributional consequences of targeting large 
energy users will also be different than targeting energy retailers. 
Administration costs 
The administration costs faced by regulators of, and participants in, a NEET could 
be significant. The Australian Aluminium Council noted: 
The administration and compliance costs of a NEET scheme would be very significant 
given the individual circumstances of firms even within the same industry. Establishing 
benchmarks for each business, accounting for ‘business-as-usual’ improvements, 
setting uniform industry or individual targets for each business, avoiding the danger of 
penalising those who have achieved a high level of energy efficiency make such a 
policy almost unworkable, very costly and counter-productive to achieving economic 
efficiency. (sub. 29, p. 15) 
The task of regulating a NEET would involve setting targets, determining the 
eligibility of energy-savings measures, verifying energy savings and administering 
the issue and surrender of certificates. Verification would likely be the most costly 
component. The verification task has been described earlier — to maintain even a 
moderate level of system integrity would require considerable resources and 
expense. The costs associated with performing the other tasks would also be 
significant.  
In addition to the costs of purchasing white certificates, paying penalties, 
undertaking energy efficiency improvements and the opportunity cost of forgoing 
more profitable uses of capital, a NEET would impose a range of administrative     
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costs on designated participants. These costs would be associated with 
demonstrating compliance with targets, such as the administrative costs involved 
with obtaining and trading certificates. 
Consistency of a NEET with other energy efficiency policies 
A NEET might be viewed as being complementary to existing energy efficiency 
programs and the NFEE Stage One measures. This is because it would encourage 
the uptake of energy efficiency investments by regulated firms or those producing 
white certificates. To some extent, it might be thought that it would even obviate the 
need for some of these programs. However, the distorting impacts of a NEET would 
also encourage the uptake of energy efficiency investments that are not cost 
effective. And since the NEET does not directly address the underlying market 
failures preventing the uptake of cost-effective energy efficiency improvements, it 
will tend to cut across, rather than complement, programs that do.  
A national energy efficiency target, based on an annual requirement for major users 
of stationary energy (or energy retailers) to generate or otherwise acquire a target 
level of energy efficiency related savings, can not be justified on the grounds of 
privately cost-effective energy efficiency. It may help to drive investment in energy 
efficiency, but this would be at the expense of economic efficiency. It would also be 
very difficult and costly to implement effectively.   
13.4   Could a NEET be justified as a means of meeting 
broader objectives? 
As discussed in the previous section, a NEET has significant flaws as a policy to 
address privately cost-effective energy efficiency. This section examines whether it 
might be justified because of the social benefits from increased investments in 
energy efficiency — in particular, the benefits associated with greenhouse gas 
abatement.  
Schemes that incorporate energy efficiency targets usually aim to meet broad 
objectives (section 13.2): 
•  In the United Kingdom, improving energy efficiency is seen as a cost-effective 
way of meeting multiple policy goals including reducing carbon emissions, 
ensuring security of energy supply and tackling ‘fuel poverty’. In particular, the 
Energy Efficiency Commitment addresses ‘fuel poverty’ by targeting poorer 
households (DEFRA 2004a). 
FINDING 13.1     




•  In France, the objective of the proposed system of tradeable energy efficiency 
certificates is to decrease energy consumption, in order to stabilise energy 
consumption to 2003 levels by 2015. This energy-consumption target appears to 
reflect policy goals including reducing carbon emissions and reducing 
dependency on imported fuels (IEA 2004). 
A greenhouse gas abatement objective could potentially be met by subsidising 
energy efficiency investments — such as those that could, in effect, be provided by 
energy retailers to energy users under a NEET. However, several inquiry 
participants argued that a NEET is not the best way to achieve a greenhouse gas 
abatement objective. For example: 
If the primary objective is to drive a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, ESAA 
believes that this would be better achieved through a coordinated, national approach, 
rather than adding an energy efficiency target to the existing mix of state and federal 
measures. (Energy Supply Association of Australia, sub. 68, pp. 12–13) 
Why implement an energy efficiency target to address a greenhouse 
gas abatement objective? 
In chapter 2, the Commission set out some important principles for good policy 
design. In particular, the objective of the policy needs to be identified clearly and 
policy measures chosen that target that objective as directly as possible. As the 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network observed: 
Energy efficiency improvement is not an end in itself. It can benefit profits, consumer 
welfare and energy security and the mitigation of climate change. Policy makers would 
do better to address and improve markets more directly related to those benefits than to 
a partial objective like energy efficiency improvement. (sub. 57, p. 13) 
As a policy to address greenhouse gas abatement, a NEET would target energy 
efficiency improvements rather than emissions themselves. It would not be the most 
directly-targeted instrument and is therefore unlikely to be the most efficient or 
cost-effective option.  
For example, in a ‘cap-and-trade’ emissions trading scheme, regulators set a cap on 
total carbon emissions and distribute allowances to the emissions amongst the 
participants. Participants could then trade in emissions allowances. Some 
participants may find it profitable to undertake a range of activities, including but 
not limited to energy efficiency improvements, which reduce their emissions and 
enable them to sell excess allowances. This type of cap-and-trade scheme, which 
operates entirely on traded allowances (and does not provide offset credits for 
emissions reductions based on BAU projections) is likely to have several 
advantages over a baseline-and-credit NEET. These advantages include:     
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•  More comprehensive inclusion of greenhouse gas abatement options — a NEET 
that restricted abatement options to energy efficiency improvements would result 
in a higher total cost of abatement compared with emissions trading. 
•  Better functioning markets, due to more easily defined property rights 
(AGO 1999b) — defining property rights for a baseline-and-credit scheme, such 
as a NEET, would be difficult and costly due to reasons outlined in section 13.2. 
•  Potentially lower administration costs — a baseline-and-credit scheme such as a 
NEET would require ongoing, costly monitoring and verification of energy 
savings, and is likely to result in higher administration costs than emissions 
trading (AGO 1999b). 
•  Greater certainty of meeting a greenhouse gas abatement objective — due to the 
difficulties with establishing baselines and measuring and verifying activities, 
there is a greater risk that a baseline-and-credit scheme, such as a NEET, would 
not result in the desired level of abatement (Dewees 2001). 
If a NEET was introduced in addition to an emissions trading scheme, it would not 
necessarily create emissions reductions additional to what would be achieved with 
emissions trading alone. If a cap-and-trade scheme can be adequately enforced and 
compliance levels are high, then it is likely that total emissions from participants 
will be less than or equal to the aggregate cap. If both schemes are in place, 
activities that are implemented to earn energy efficiency certificates could also 
reduce total emissions. These emissions allowances, which have been ‘freed up’ by 
energy efficiency activities, would then be banked for subsequent use or sold to 
other emissions trading participants to cover equivalent increases in emissions. 
(Sorrell 2003).  
There is also doubt as to whether a NEET can be integrated with an emissions 
trading scheme without threatening the credibility of the latter (box  13.6). The 
issues are similar to those identified by various organisations when assessing the 
problems associated with linking project-based mechanisms with domestic 
greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes (for example, Bygrave and Bosi (2004)). 
These problems would arise through grafting a baseline-and-credit NEET onto the 
‘cap-and-trade’ architecture of an emissions trading scheme, which does not rely on 
BAU assumptions.     





Box 13.6  Integrating a NEET with an emissions trading scheme 
The issues involved in integrating a NEET with an emissions trading scheme depend in 
part on the type of emissions trading envisaged.  
Integrating a NEET with baseline-and-credit emissions trading 
It is possible, with some assumptions, to convert energy savings under a NEET to 
emissions reductions (MacGill and Outhred 2003). This allows for a NEET to be 
integrated with other systems that trade in emission reductions from a 
business-as-usual (BAU) baseline. This could involve having a NEET for emissions 
reduction from energy efficiency, and similar schemes for emissions reductions from 
low-emission fuels and carbon sequestration. An alternative would be to subsume 
efficiency-related energy savings within an economywide scheme for trading in 
emissions reduction. No target would be set for energy efficiency, as the amount of 
emissions reductions from each type of abatement activity would be left to the market. 
The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme is an example of such an 
approach. 
Integrating a NEET with cap-and-trade emissions trading 
The generally preferred option, however, is for trading in emissions, not reductions in 
emissions. This is consistent with the Kyoto Protocol, that sets emissions caps for 
developed countries, rather than targets for reductions from a BAU baseline.  
There are substantial difficulties in integrating a NEET (which trades in intangible 
energy savings) with a ‘cap-and-trade’ emissions trading scheme (which trades in 
tangible emissions). While work is being done on ways to overcome the difficulties, 
some commentators believe that the inclusion of intangible energy savings would 
threaten the credibility of emissions trading schemes, because there is a high level of 
uncertainty about whether credited energy savings correspond to actual reductions in 
emissions (MacGill and Outhred 2003; Sorrell 2003). This mainly arises because of the 
uncertainty involved in setting baselines and difficulties in monitoring and verification. 
For example, in the case of the United Kingdom Energy Efficiency Commitment 
investments, the energy savings are estimated rather than monitored and the accuracy 
of these estimates will depend on the models used and assumptions taken.  
Another possible consequence of coexisting NEET and emissions trading schemes is 
that emissions reductions might be ‘double counted’ under both schemes 
(Sorrell 2003, AGO 1999b). Emissions reductions will be attributed to activities earning 
credits under a NEET, but these activities will also ‘free up’ some emissions 
allowances under an emissions trading scheme. For example, if an energy retailer 
participating in a NEET scheme subsidises a household to install energy-efficient 
appliances, the retailer will earn credits under the NEET — which will be accounted for 
as emissions reductions. However, if the household reduces electricity consumption as 
a result of the installation, then additional carbon allowances will also become available 
in the emissions trading market. 
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Could a NEET be justified on the basis of wider coverage? 
Some proponents of a NEET regard it as being able to operate effectively in 
combination with a greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme and an MRET 
scheme. As discussed in section 13.2, the implementation of all three measures is 
being considered in some European countries. One common argument is that a 
NEET would complement emissions trading because it would enable wider 
coverage of emissions reduction opportunities. For example: 
•  The AGO (1999b) suggested that if larger emitters participated in emissions 
trading, then there could also be a role for a baseline-crediting arrangement to 
include small emitters that would otherwise be difficult to bring within the scope 
of a cap-and-trade scheme. 
•  In the United Kingdom’s White Paper on energy policy, DTI (2003) suggested 
that, although the European Union emissions trading (which will cover direct 
emissions from large emitters) will play a central role in reducing emissions, the 
EEC would enable greater coverage of the household sector. 
However, if markets are functioning efficiently, in theory the price signal reflecting 
the cost of greenhouse gas emissions would be incorporated into the price of energy 
faced by other sectors not directly involved in emissions trading.  
As Sorrell (2003, p. 696) observed, once emissions trading is in place, it is unlikely 
that an energy efficiency target such as the EEC could be justified on the grounds of 
greenhouse gas abatement: 
… the justification for retaining those instruments must rely more heavily on their 
contribution to, first, policy objectives other than efficiency; and second, overcoming 
market failures other than carbon externalities. 
Because the EEC scheme requires retailers to achieve 50 per cent of energy savings 
from lower-income households, it could be viewed as a measure to address an 
equity objective of United Kingdom energy policy — which is ‘to ensure that every 
home is adequately and affordably heated’ (DTI 2003, p. 11). However, if the 
intention is for a NEET to address policy objectives other than efficiency, these 
objectives must be clearly outlined (chapter 2). A NEET should be evaluated 
against other policy options that could achieve the stated objective — for example, 
in the case of the affordability of household heating, direct subsidies or concessions 
to lower-income households.     




Another proposition in support of a NEET seems to be that an emissions trading 
scheme will not overcome all of the barriers to energy efficiency (MacGill and 
Outhred 2003). For example, in the United Kingdom, DEFRA (2004a, p. 65) 
suggested that: 
Due to the low elasticity of demand for electricity, price signals from the generators 
alone will not reduce demand in line with our emission reduction goals … We will 
continue to explore other ways in which trading-based approaches could be used … for 
demand-side energy saving, both in households and in other sectors that do not fall 
under the ETS [emissions trading scheme]. Options include … developing a separate 
market in accredited energy savings — so-called “White Certificates” … 
To some extent, emissions trading schemes may not achieve emissions targets at 
lowest cost if failures in the market for energy efficiency technologies that warrant 
government intervention — such as those caused by asymmetric information — 
prevent the adoption of some low-cost options. If this is the case, however, policy 
measures that address these barriers directly are required — and as discussed above, 
a NEET would not do this.  
As a measure to address greenhouse gas abatement, a national energy efficiency 
target has serious disadvantages compared to other more directly-targeted policy 
options. It is unlikely to complement those options, and could reduce the overall 
economic efficiency with which a greenhouse gas abatement objective is met. 
A national energy efficiency target, based on an annual requirement for major 
users of stationary energy (or energy retailers) to generate or otherwise acquire a 
target level of energy efficiency related savings, should not be implemented.  
FINDING 13.2 
RECOMMENDATION 13.1     
322  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
     








•  The price of energy does not always reflect the costs of its production and 
consumption. This is particularly the case with electricity. Making electricity prices 
more cost reflective will improve economic efficiency. 
•  Regulatory arrangements governing the transmission, distribution and retail price of 
electricity insulate consumers from variations in the costs of delivering electricity to 
them and dampen demand-side responses.  
– Retail price caps should be removed as soon as effective competition is 
established. 
–  Network regulation could be improved to provide better incentives to invest in 
demand side management. 
–  The introduction of more cost-reflective pricing (including time-of-use pricing) will 
require the roll out of smart metering and billing systems but this should be subject 
to a comprehensive benefit–cost analysis.  
–  More cost reflective pricing might improve energy efficiency in peak load periods. 
•  Environmental externalities associated with the use of energy, such as greenhouse 
gas emissions, add to the cost of producing and consuming energy. Recognising 
these costs, either explicitly or implicitly, would encourage a greater uptake of 
energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies. 
•  Improving competition among electricity generators will lower pool prices, which will 
tend to decrease incentives for end users to invest in greater energy efficiency. 
 
 
The scope for energy market reforms to improve energy efficiency is discussed in 
this chapter. The terms of reference direct the Commission to consider the scope for 
further energy market reform (including, but not limited to, more efficient 
cost-reflective pricing) to improve the management of the demand and supply of 
energy. 
Many participants in this inquiry have argued that energy prices do not precisely 
reflect the costs of supplying and using energy, and that this is leading to inefficient 
and/or overuse of energy. They have also argued that by making energy prices more     
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cost reflective, suppliers and users will improve their management of energy in a 
way that increases energy efficiency.  
Other chapters presented in this report are concerned with the policy implications of 
barriers and impediments to the adoption of cost-effective investments in energy 
efficiency. Those chapters examine the effect of barriers and impediments from the 
perspective of current energy prices — that is, current expectations about the energy 
prices likely to be experienced over the relevant investment time frame. In contrast, 
this chapter is mainly concerned with how reforms to energy markets, by 
influencing energy prices, can improve demand- and supply-side responses in 
energy markets and bring about energy efficiency improvements. 
The costs of energy vary significantly over time and between locations of energy 
use (section 14.1). Although microeconomic reform since the early 1990s has made 
energy prices more cost reflective, some distortions are still present. These include: 
•  the regulation of retail prices and network tariffs faced by residential and small 
business customers (section 14.2); 
•  insufficient levels of competition in electricity generation (section 14.3); and 
•  unaccounted environmental externalities, such as those arising from greenhouse 
gas emissions (section 14.4).  
These factors prevent the prices for energy from fully reflecting the economic costs 
of its production and consumption, leading to a misallocation of resources. Though 
improved competition might reduce energy efficiency, other measures that would 
make prices more cost reflective (including addressing the unaccounted 
externalities) have the potential to raise energy efficiency. Before addressing these 
issues the chapter gives a brief account of some of the influences on electricity costs 
and prices. 
14.1  Energy pricing and costs 
One means of encouraging demand- and supply-side responses in an energy market, 
and thereby promoting economic efficiency, is to ensure that the price of energy 
reflects the economic cost of its supply and use. 
Economic efficiency does not imply that energy use must be minimised. In some 
circumstances, using high levels of energy might minimise the total costs of 
production (including the costs of capital and other inputs) as energy is used or 
consumed in preference to other inputs (chapter 2).     





Electricity markets are dynamic. Demand and supply are constantly changing 
throughout the day, week, season and year, and these changes vary between 
different locations in the market. In the case of electricity, there is considerable 
volatility in both the volume of electricity generated and price for which electricity 
is traded in the spot market (figure 14.1). 
The reasons for the volatility in spot prices and volumes are well understood 
(Sayers and Shields 2001; Salerian 1991). Electricity cannot be easily stored in 
large volumes, and instead it must be generated when it is required. This means that 
small imbalances in supply and demand can have large effects on wholesale prices. 
As demand increases during the day, so does the cost of supplying additional 
energy, as incrementally more expensive capacity is required to be brought 
on-stream. Coal-fired generators have the lowest operating costs and provide base 
load electricity, while gas-fired generators have higher operating costs and supply 
the market’s intermediate and peak demands.  
Electricity costs can also vary over time because of congestion in transmission and 
distribution networks. Networks can become congested as a result of peak demand 
or through regional development such as the construction of a new housing or 
industrial estate, which creates local bottlenecks.  
In recent years, peak wholesale prices in some regional markets of the National 
Electricity Market (NEM) have been highest in summer. Peak loads have only been 
occurring for a few hours and days of the year. Summer peaking appears to be 
primarily driven by the increasing adoption of air conditioners by residential 
customers. The Energy Supply Association of Australia (ESAA) attributed the 
increased uptake of space cooling equipment to: 
•  the impact of hot summer temperatures on discretionary purchases of space cooling 
equipment; 
•  improved marketing penetration and technological advances in space cooling 
equipment; 
•  the coincident increase in construction activity in both the commercial and residential 
sectors. The increase in townhouse and apartment construction for residential dwellings 
is a key factor, as these buildings are particularly suited to reverse cycle units; and 
•  the continued ageing of the population and the associated expansion in retirement 
villages for senior persons. (sub. 68, p. 3)     
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Figure 14.1  New South Wales regional electricity prices and loads, daily 
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Data source: NEMMCO (nd). 
The costs of supplying electricity will also differ according to the location of the 
user. Costs will vary according to how much transmission and distribution 
infrastructure is needed to service each customer and because of line losses. 
Line losses are, on average, a relatively small proportion of the overall amount of 
electricity transported. For example, the Queensland Department of Energy 
estimated that average line losses were about 4.2 per cent and 6.2 per cent across its 
transmission and distribution networks respectively (Queensland Department of 
Energy 2005). In Tasmania, distribution line losses were estimated to be 
6.0 per cent in 1999 (OTTER 2003).      




TransGrid commented on the average efficiency of its transmission network: 
The existing high voltage network is about 97 per cent efficient with some components 
such as large transformers achieving 99.8 per cent efficiency. Increased dependence on 
power transported from other States could see a slight increase in average transmission 
losses over time. (sub. 62, p. 4) 
Although average line losses within a NEM region are relatively small, they can 
increase significantly during periods of congestion. Sections of a network can 
experience marginal losses that are much higher than the average losses. 
Microeconomic reform since the 1990s has improved the economic efficiency with 
which electricity is priced. However, actual prices faced by electricity users and 
producers still do not reflect the dynamic and spatial nature of the industry as much 
as they could. As a result, the energy market’s demand- and supply-side responses 
are muted.  
Natural gas markets 
Natural gas markets demonstrate some of the dynamic and spatial characteristics of 
electricity markets. However, unlike electricity, natural gas can be stored and, as a 
result, natural gas markets do not exhibit the same degree of wholesale price 
volatility or network congestion as do electricity markets. 
There has also been considerable reform of natural gas markets since the 1990s 
aimed at ensuring that prices reflect the costs of production. Few participants in this 
inquiry have raised concerns regarding the lack of cost-reflective pricing of natural 
gas — apart from those issues surrounding distributed generation and greenhouse 
gas emissions, both of which are discussed in later sections. This contrasts with the 
extent of participants’ concerns regarding the efficient pricing of the electricity 
market. 
Another exception is the efficient pricing of access to natural gas pipelines. The 
Queensland Government noted: 
Gas pipeline service providers have raised concerns that, under the current regulatory 
environment for gas pipeline access, the level of risk and associated costs involved in 
major pipeline investments is not fully considered in the regulator’s determination of 
reference tariffs included in pipeline access arrangements. 
The Productivity Commission’s Review of [the National] Gas Access Regime indicated 
that whilst the current National Gas Access Regime has delivered benefits, it   
is also likely to be distorting investment in favour of less risky projects. Such issues 
have the potential to impact the introduction of energy-efficient practices if 
infrastructure owners see it as an additional risk. (sub. 38, p. 8)     
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Matters regarding efficient access pricing are discussed in the Commission’s review 
of the Gas Access Regime. Some matters have been incorporated in the work 
program of the Ministerial Council on Energy. As part of this program, the Council 
has developed a set of fundamental principles for the future development of the 
Australian gas market, and explored the feasibility of promoting more competitive 
arrangements (MCE 2004b, 2004d). 
14.2  The regulation of electricity prices 
The existing regulatory arrangements governing electricity retailers and network 
operators are numerous, and their full examination is beyond the scope of this 
inquiry. While one purpose of these arrangements is to encourage economically 
efficient prices, they can have consequences for the incentives of market 
participants to invest in new infrastructure and to undertake energy conservation 
and energy efficiency measures. 
Retail price and network tariff caps 
All jurisdictions have adopted, or are adopting, policies of full retail contestability 
(FRC) in electricity. FRC is intended to encourage price and service competition 
between retailers. Increased competition has the potential to encourage retailers to 
introduce innovative pricing strategies and electrical services (products) that reflect 
the dynamic and spatial nature of electricity markets. In Queensland, FRC has not 
yet been scheduled for residential and small business customers. 
Despite having adopted FRC, all jurisdictions continue to cap retail prices for 
residential and small business customers that have chosen to remain with the 
incumbent retailer and not accept market (negotiated) contracts. Price capping is 
intended to protect residential and small business customers from any residual 
market power in the energy supply industry — although it is not always clear 
whether this is intended to address concerns of market power of generators or 
retailers. Governments also cap transmission and distribution network tariffs (or in 
some cases, revenues) to protect all electricity users from the market power of 
network operators. 
For most governments, an additional objective for capping retail prices and 
distribution network tariffs is to minimise or eliminate the retail price differences 
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan energy users. In many cases, the policy  
     




objectives are achieved by: 
•  directly subsidising residential and small business customers for their 
distribution network costs (for example, the Network Tariff Rebate in Victoria); 
•  directly subsidising distributors funded from general revenue (such as the 
community service obligation payments in Queensland); 
•  requiring metropolitan distributors to make payments to non-metropolitan 
distributors (for example, through the VENCorp administered tariff equalisation 
scheme in Victoria) (ORG 2000a); and 
•  revaluing non-metropolitan network assets (for example, by setting network 
tariffs through government regulation and allowing these to be reflected in the 
value of the assets) (ORG 2000a; ESCOSA 2004).  
In addition, the New South Wales Government has implemented the Electricity 
Tariff Equalisation Fund to reduce the price volatility faced by government-owned 
retailers. Retailers are required to contribute to the fund when pool prices are lower 
than the costs they recover from residential and small business customers. When 
pool prices are higher than the recoverable costs, the fund will compensate retailers. 
Government-owned generators will contribute to the fund if there are any shortfalls 
(NSW Treasury 2000). 
Impediments to more cost-reflective pricing 
Retail price caps for residential and small business customers can limit the ability of 
retailers to use prices to encourage consumers and producers to adjust their demand 
and supply in response to changing market conditions (PC 2005). Retailers do not 
have flexibility in setting the overall price level in any given year or to restructure 
overall price levels between years — that is, to accept low or high prices in one year 
in exchange for high or low prices in another year. Retailers are required to comply 
with price paths that specify the overall prices that can be charged in each year. 
However, retail price caps do provide retailers with some flexibility to set the prices 
for individual electricity users and groups of users, provided the average of the 
individual prices complies with the overall price cap. They can also provide retailers 
with sufficient flexibility to rebalance tariffs for safety net customers (Victorian 
Government, sub. DR125, p. 20). This is because retail price caps are applied to a 
hypothetical basket of individual electricity tariffs. As a result, retailers can adopt 
some forms of time-of-use pricing within the current regulatory framework 
(box 14.1).      
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Box 14.1 Time-of-use  pricing 
Time-of-use pricing includes both time-of-day pricing and real-time pricing.  
Real-time pricing 
Under real-time pricing, retail prices are allowed to vary half-hourly every day, based 
on the actual cost of electricity for that half hour.  
Time-of-day pricing 
Time-of-day pricing is a simplification of real-time pricing, where different prices are set 
in advance for set time blocks during the day (such as off-peak, shoulder, peak and 
critical peak) (US GAO 2004). Critical peak prices can occur at any time for a preset 
number of hours per year. Tariff schedules can also vary each season (such as winter 
and summer). Each tariff is determined from historical use patterns, forecasts of future 
requirements and average costs of supply for each period and/or season. 
The variable component of a time-of-day price can be configured to a declining, flat or 
inclining block tariff. Inclining block tariffs can be used as a demand management 
strategy to reflect costs of network congestion, since network congestion tends to be 
correlated with increasing peak demand. 
 
 
Network operators will not adopt cost-reflective tariffs if retailers are unable to pass 
increased network costs to final energy users because of retail price caps. Network 
tariff caps also restrict network operators from setting and varying overall network 
tariffs. 
Nonetheless, network operators have some freedom to set the tariffs for individual 
customers and groups of customers — provided that the average of the individual 
tariffs complies with the overall cap. This is because network caps are applied as 
either a weighted-average tariff cap, or a revenue cap, or a hybrid of the two 
approaches. However, network operators are unable to vary overall network tariffs 
or revenues between years. 
To date, retailers have not adopted time-of-use prices for residential and small 
business customers except in the case of off-peak hot water systems  —  a very 
simple and limited form of time-of-day pricing. One exception is South Australia, 
where seasonal winter/summer and peak/off-peak tariffs have been introduced 
(South Australian Government, sub. 80). Similarly, distributors have yet to widely 
implement time-of-use network tariffs for residential and small business customers. 
In relation to location-based network tariffs, Origin Energy observed:  
… customers face largely uniform network tariffs regardless of capacity congestion at 
various locations in the network. (sub. 25, p. 10)     




Government policies aimed at equalising or minimising price differences between 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan customers is one reason for the limited adoption 
of location-based network and retail prices. For example, the Victorian Network 
Tariff Rebate limits the extent to which final electricity prices differ between 
locations of customers. And in New South Wales, the Electricity Tariff Equalisation 
Fund provides a disincentive for government-owned retailers to adopt time-of-use 
and location-based pricing. Since the fund provides a hedge against volatile 
wholesale prices, retailers face weakened incentives to manage the demand of their 
regulated customers by adopting more innovative pricing strategies (IPART 2002). 
The real costs of supplying electricity to final users vary significantly in terms of 
both the time and location of its use. Regulatory arrangements governing the 
transmission, distribution and retail price of electricity insulate consumers from 
these variations and dampen demand-side responses. 
The most significant impediment to more cost-reflective retail prices and network 
tariffs is the absence of ‘smart’ metering among residential and small business 
customers. ‘Smart’ meters provide energy users, retailers and distributors with the 
means of obtaining information about energy consumption and network use. 
‘Smart’ meters also provide a means by which retailers and distributors can set 
time-of-use for different locations and to provide various demand-side management 
services such as direct load control (box 14.2) 
 
Box 14.2 ‘Smart’  meters 
A ‘smart’ meter is any meter that provides timely information to the electricity user, 
retailer and distributor about the contemporaneous use of electricity and the electrical 
network. They can also be used by retailers and distributors to set time-of-day or real-
time retail prices and network tariffs. Type 5 interval meters, such as those currently 
being rolled out in Victoria for residential and small business customers, record 
electricity use data in half hourly increments for each day of the year. Information 
recorded by type 5 interval meters are manually read at the end of every billing period. 
Some ‘smart’ meters can provide other functions, such as recording the amount of 
electricity that was used in an immediately preceding period (such as day, week, month 
or year), recording the maximum demand readings (for the purpose of setting 
capacity-related charges), informing the user about their current tariff, allowing the user 
to switch between different electricity tariffs, and allowing users to prepay their 
electricity. Some meters may even have direct communication links via a modem to the 
electricity retailer or distributor (for the purpose of reading meters, setting tariffs and 
controlling loads remotely). 
 
 
FINDING 14.1     
332  ENERGY EFFICIENCY    
 
Effects of current arrangements 
The Commission has argued previously (in its review of Part IIIA of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974, the review on National Competition Policy, and the review of 
the Gas Access Regime) that retail and network price caps may act as a disincentive 
for investment in the industry. If prices are unduly suppressed, the industry will face 
diminished incentives to invest in new capacity despite the demand of consumers 
(PC 2001, 2004c and 2005). 
Undue suppression of retail prices also compromises the long-term sustainability of 
energy supply. Retail price caps limit the ability for retailers to pass on cost 
increases, leaving them exposed to considerable risk of default if they are unable to 
mitigate the effects of increasing wholesale prices. The electricity crisis in 
California in 2000-01 highlighted the dangers, among other things, of unduly 
focusing on containing consumer prices while allowing wholesale prices to rise 
(PC 2005).  
In the case of network industries, tariff regulation can also compromise longer-term 
investment in infrastructure. Differences in the principles applied by individual 
regulators in setting allowable charges, the short-term imperatives confronting 
regulators, and the fact that price regulation ‘taxes’ successful projects but does not 
subsidise unsuccessful ones, have the effect of diminishing the incentive to 
undertake new network investment (PC 2005). 
Current network tariff arrangements also discourage investment in distributed 
generation. In the absence of congestion-based pricing, industry participants face 
suppressed incentives to invest in distributed generation when such generation 
might be otherwise economical to bypass congested network infrastructure. 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) argued that 
current approaches to regulating electricity transmission network tariffs were not 
leading to an underinvestment in capacity. The ACCC argued that investment in 
electricity (and other) infrastructure industries was healthy and that the high rates of 
return on infrastructure were well in excess of those in many other economic 
activities: 
Since 1996, the Utilities Accumulation Index has generated a compound annual return 
of 17.4  per  cent, well in excess of the compound annual return of the ASX200 
Accumulation Index of 11.1 per cent. (Willet 2005, p. 8) 
The Commission notes that evidence that spending in infrastructure has been 
growing is not evidence in itself that there has not been a deterrent or distortionary 
effect on investment (PC 2005).      




Price capping also has the potential to reduce the scope for competition in the retail 
industry. The ESAA argued: 
… the retention of price caps that do not allow for full recovery of costs … has the 
potential to further delay the emergence of a fully competitive market. (sub. DR120, 
p. 2) 
The lack of retail competition also maintains cross-subsidies between different 
customer groups. The New South Wales Independent Pricing and Regulatory 
Tribunal (IPART) argued that current regulatory approaches lead to ‘cross-subsidies 
across different kinds of residential and small business customers’ (IPART 2003, 
p. 8). According to the ESAA:  
…  where individual customers are not exposed to the costs associated with their 
individual consumption patterns, a cross subsidy is effectively paid by lighter users of 
peak electricity to heavier users of peak electricity. In other words, a heavy peak user 
doesn’t pay the full cost of their contribution to the need for investment in generation to 
meet peak demand. (sub. 68, p. 7) 
Effects on demand-side and supply-side management 
The current regulatory arrangements and the absence of ‘smart’ metering combine 
to inhibit the ability of residential and small business energy users to respond to the 
economic costs of electricity supply. This can distort the demand for electricity. The 
Climate Action Network of Australia noted that ‘the lack of time-of-use tariffs for 
most customers masks the real cost of electricity during peak times’ (sub. 19, p. 5). 
As a consequence, final users have an incentive to demand more electricity than it is 
economically feasible for the industry to supply in the absence of peak prices.  
Current arrangements also limit the ability of retailers and distributors to use other 
demand-management strategies to manage the electrical load of residential and 
small business customers. Such strategies include interruptible supply contracts and 
voluntary reduction programs and are currently limited to the largest energy users 
(box 14.3). 
Origin Energy said that current regulatory approaches did not provide distributors 
with sufficiently strong incentives to undertake demand-side practices because: 
…  networks face asymmetric incentives between augmenting network infrastructure 
and implementing initiatives that reduce capacity constraints to the extent that they are 
unable to capture the net saving from avoided or deferred network infrastructure 
expenditure. (sub. 25, p. 10)     
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Box 14.3  Selected demand-side management and related programs 
Voluntary reduction programs 
Voluntary reduction (or voluntary load control) programs are targeted to larger 
commercial and industrial customers. During peak load, the retailer or network operator 
negotiates and compensates customers to reduce their load below an agreed baseline 
level. 
Interruptible supply contracts 
Utilities pay energy users or provide them with discounts on the normal tariff rate in 
exchange for the right of the electricity retailer to interrupt electricity supplies as 
needed. Typically, the customer agrees to reduce electricity usage by a predetermined 
amount, and interruptions are limited to only a few hours per year. 
Direct load control 
Similar to interruptible supply contracts, utilities pay customers for the right to interrupt 
from a distance the electricity use of one or more devices, such as air conditioners. 
Interruptions may last for an hour or more, and may be rotated through several 
appliances. Generally, these programs rely on a switch installed in the appliance that 
the retailer can remotely activate. 
Demand bidding 
Demand bidding allows retailers and large customers to sell back into wholesale 
markets electricity that they otherwise would have consumed. Customers are not 
penalised if they do not bid, but they are penalised if they bid but fail to act on the 
agreed reduction. 
Investment in energy efficiency technologies 
Energy retailers can also sell a range of energy-efficient technologies to reduce 
demand during peak periods. For example, retailers will supply insulation and energy-
efficient appliances to households (and sometimes provide the up-front finance). This 
may be cheaper for the retailer than supplying the additional energy the household 
would have used. 
Distributed generation and energy storage 
Distributed generation is sometimes used to reduce network congestion because the 
distributed generator bypasses the congested part of the network. Where distributed 
generators and energy storages are embedded with energy users, they can also 
provide a standby role. 
Sources: US GAO (2004); IPART (2004a); CR Associates (2004). 
 
     




Similarly, the Total Environment Centre noted: 
The pricing system in the NEM does not impose limitations on distribution network 
augmentations even when more cost-effective demand management alternatives are 
available. (sub. 81, p. 6) 
The limited incentive and ability of network operators to manage the load of their 
customers has meant that regulators are under increased pressure to approve 
expansions in network capacity to meet the growth in demand. IPART noted: 
In most cases, DNSPs [distribution network service providers] have addressed these 
[network] constraints (or potential constraints) by augmenting the network to increase 
its capacity. This has resulted in substantial increases in their capital expenditure and 
reduced their asset utilisation. (For example, 10 per cent of EnergyAustralia’s network 
capacity is used for less than 1 per cent of the time.) (IPART 2004b, p. 89) 
Effects on energy efficiency 
The limited ability of existing pricing arrangements to encourage a demand- or 
supply-side response might also affect energy efficiency. The absence of demand-
side responses in a market can lead to more or less energy being used, for a given 
level of output, than if more cost-reflective prices were used. For example, with 
uniform tariffs, electricity prices will be lower during peak periods than the 
economic costs of supply, thereby encouraging overconsumption. The converse will 
occur during off-peak periods. 
At the same time, users face no penalty from overinvestment in peak-load 
energy-intensive appliances such as air conditioners, nor do they receive much 
benefit from investment in off-peak and energy-efficient appliances. 
The absence of location-based pricing can also discourage energy efficiency. There 
are weakened incentives for distributed generators to locate near their customers 
and to bypass the effects of line losses  —  particularly in rural and regional 
communities where line losses and network costs are greatest. 
Options to improve electricity price regulation 
Suggestions to improve cost-reflective pricing of electricity have included 
deregulating retail prices and taking a more light-handed approach to setting 
network tariffs, and encouraging greater demand-side responsiveness within 
existing regulatory frameworks. Both of these options have implications for the roll 
out of ‘smart’ metering.     
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Freeing-up prices and tariffs 
The first option is to take a more light-handed approach to regulating network tariffs 
and removing retail price caps altogether. Retailers and network service operators 
would have more flexibility in implementing time-of-use and location-based prices 
for individual customers. This has the effect of improving the incentives faced by 
producers to increase investment and the incentive for final customers to use energy 
commensurate with its economic cost.  
However, the regulation of retail prices and network tariffs provides an important 
check on the potential for market power in retail and network markets. For this 
reason, retail price caps should only be removed once effective competition has 
been established, but some form of ongoing regulation of network operators will be 
required to address their monopoly power. 
But network tariffs could be freed up to some extent. This would require removing 
‘postage-stamp’ pricing of electricity networks since, as noted, these policies 
discourage investment in local distributed generation (including energy storage) and 
do not provide any incentive for producers and consumers of electricity to minimise 
costs by locating closer to each other.  
Related to this, is the need to reconsider the treatment of congestion in the regions 
of the NEM. The Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) is currently exploring 
options for financial trading instruments to manage congestion of the transmission 
networks within and between the regions of the NEM (MCE 2005b). 
Some measures may still be needed to ensure that specific customer groups, such as 
non-metropolitan households, continue to have adequate access to services at 
affordable prices. However, these would be better pursued through explicit and 
transparent community service obligations (or other appropriate mechanisms).  
The Commission in its review of National Competition Policy, argued that retail 
price caps should be removed as soon as effective competition has been established, 
and that governments and regulatory agencies should explore opportunities to 
improve the efficacy of price setting arrangements for network operators (PC 2005). 
These would go hand-in-hand to improve the economic efficiency of electricity 
markets. 
Removing retail price caps (as soon as effective competition has been established), 
and exploring opportunities to improve the efficacy of price setting arrangements 
for network operators will improve the economic efficiency of electricity markets. 
FINDING 14.2     




Improving existing incentives 
A second although inferior option would be to encourage demand- and supply-side 
management within existing network and retail price caps. However, this may 
require economic regulators to provide additional incentives for network operators 
to offer demand-side management services and more cost-reflective prices — 
within the constraints of the retail price caps. 
Whether additional incentives need to be introduced will depend on the regulatory 
regime of each jurisdiction. In jurisdictions that regulate their distribution networks 
through price caps and average revenue caps, incentives may be needed to 
encourage the networks to undertake demand-side management. This is because 
total revenues are linked to the amount of service (or throughput) provided by the 
network operator. In contrast, fixed revenue caps are not sensitive to network 
throughput (IPART  2004a and 1999; ERAA sub.  DR114). IPART has already 
signalled that it is prepared to allow New South Wales distributors to be 
compensated for revenue foregone from undertaking demand-side management 
strategies. IPART also encouraged distributors to undertake trials of congestion 
pricing (2004b).  
Distributors have also been trialling demand-side management in other 
jurisdictions. Some Victorian distributors are exploring options to introduce 
time-of-use pricing and expand their demand- and supply-side management 
programs for smaller energy users (ESC 2004a). In South Australia, ETSA Utilities 
is proposing to trial voluntary load curtailment for large customers, direct load 
control for residential equipment (such as air conditioners and pool pumps), and the 
use of standby generation. It is also exploring the use of incentives to reduce 
demand during peak times (ESCOSA 2004). 
At the retail level a constrained form of time-of-use pricing can be offered within 
existing price caps. Country Energy, a New South Wales government-owned 
electricity distributor and retailer, is currently trialling ‘smart’ meters and 
time-of-use prices to improve demand management in parts of New South Wales 
(box 14.4). 
The effect of this option is to improve the incentives and effectiveness of demand- 
and supply-side responsiveness in managing electrical load. It does not, however, 
directly address the disincentives for new investment in the electricity supply 
industry created by retail price caps and existing network tariff caps.     
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Box 14.4  Trialling ‘smart’ meters and time-of-use pricing 
Country Energy, a New South Wales government-owned electricity distributor and 
retailer is trialling a ’smart’ metering technology and time-of-use prices to assist 
households to manage their electricity demands.  
The trial involves 200 households in Queanbeyan and Jerrabomberra in south eastern 
New South Wales. Trial households will use an in-house display unit to receive 
real-time information about their household energy consumption and face time-of-use 
prices that include a fixed charge, a peak price and a critical peak price. 
It is anticipated that the technology and pricing would provide customers with 
information to monitor their energy consumption and modify their behaviour as they 
judge appropriate.  
The trial is scheduled to last for approximately 18 months and include two summers 
and one winter.  
Preliminary results suggest that smart meters in conjunction with time-of-use pricing 
(including critical peak prices) has led to reductions of energy use during peak periods 
which would represent either energy efficiency improvements or energy conservation. 
Source: Country Energy (2005a, 2005b). 
 
 
The Commission, nevertheless, considers the current trials of demand- and 
supply-side management techniques are a welcome development. It encourages 
further trials of ways to signal to consumers and producers the real costs of 
electricity they consume and supply, and monitoring changes in their behaviour and 
electricity use. 
Effectiveness of cost-reflective pricing 
There is an economic efficiency case for more cost-reflective pricing, but it is far 
from clear how much effect such pricing might have on energy efficiency. More 
cost-reflective pricing can potentially change energy use in three ways. Depending 
on whether final energy users are sensitive to electricity prices, consumers can: 
•  improve their energy efficiency — users can reduce their level of energy use for 
some or all periods while maintaining output by adopting more energy-efficient 
appliances and equipment (figure 14.2, chart A); 
•  conserve (curtail) their energy use — users can curtail their electricity demand 
at peak-load prices while reducing the corresponding level of output 
(figure 14.2, chart B); and 
•  shift their energy demand — users can redistribute their energy use from peak to 
off-peak times, leaving total energy use unchanged (figure 14.2, chart C).     




Figure 14.2  Potential demand-side responses to cost-reflective pricing 










  (A)  (B)  (C) 
Load curtailment and load shifting do not necessarily result in energy efficiency 
improvements. Load curtailment is a conservation measure, meaning that some 
output or outcome is foregone leaving energy efficiency unchanged. Load shifting 
similarly does not constitute an energy efficiency improvement, since the end use 
consumption of energy does not change.  
A number of inquiry participants were circumspect about the ability of more cost-
reflective pricing to induce any response by consumers. The National Generators’ 
Forum (NGF) argued: 
… it is unrealistic to assume that this [time-of-use pricing] will better drive energy 
efficiency as electricity use is notoriously unresponsive to price signals. (sub. 65, p. 3) 
The New South Wales Government, in its Energy Directions Green Paper, said: 
Electricity demand is likely to be reasonably inelastic. Even if time-of-use pricing is 
implemented, consumers are unlikely to turn off many ‘essential service’ appliances 
(eg. heating and air conditioning) at times of high demand. (NSW Government 2004, 
p. 44) 
The Australian Consumers’ Association (ACA) argued that time-of-use prices 
would not lead to reductions in air conditioning use: 
It is far from clear exactly how high prices would have to rise to actually deter 
consumers from using their air conditioning units in the circumstances for which they 
bought them, that is when it is very hot. If the consumers continue to use their air 
conditioners in the face of even savage pricing … then the peak reduction sought will 
not be achieved. (sub. 52, p. 4)     
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The Australian Meat Processor Corporation said: 
Some industries, such as the meat processing industries, are limited in terms of 
conservation measures because [of] the strict nature of quality controls [imposed on the 
industry] eg room temperatures are mandatory, hot water delivery temperatures are 
mandatory. (sub. DR95, p. 2) 
Some inquiry participants and commentators argued that consumers would respond 
to more cost-reflective pricing over time. The ESAA pointed out that while 
electricity demand is known to be inelastic in the short term: 
…  behavioural patterns will change over time as consumers are made increasingly 
aware of the economic and environmental costs of the energy they use and are 
equipped with the information required to make better consumer choices. (sub. 68, p. 8) 
Several inquiry participants also said that consumers would be able to respond to 
time-of-use prices, but this would be limited to load shifting or conserving energy 
use in peak periods. For example, the NGF said: 
Responding to price signals, requiring at least a ten-fold price differential between 
lowest and highest prices, will lead to some load shifting where this is practicable (i.e. 
having real loads to shift) … In general, US evidence suggests that consumers may 
curtail some load where possible … (sub. 65, p. 3) 
Indeed, empirical evidence from overseas shows that customers do respond to 
prices by load shifting. In the short term, residential customers have some ability to 
switch the time at which certain appliances are operated (for example, Caves and 
Christensen 1980; Train and Mehrez 1994; Matsukawa 2001). Similar evidence was 
found for industrial and commercial customers (Aigner and Hirschberg 1985). 
Even if load-shifting was possible, some inquiry participants and commentators 
argued that this would not lead to improvements in energy efficiency. The Energy 
Action Group argued that load-shifting responses would not lead to improvements 
in energy efficiency because cost-reflective prices: 
… still provide strong incentives to increase energy consumption in non-peak demand 
periods. (sub. DR139, p. 5) 
Herriges et al. (1993) also found evidence that load-shifting response of industrial 
customers involved increased energy use during off-peak periods. 
An evaluation of time-of-use pricing among Californian residential and small 
business customers found evidence for load shifting but not for energy efficiency 
gains. Between July 2003 and December 2004, 2500 customers took part in a trial 
of time-of-use pricing. The final evaluation report concluded that time-of-use 
pricing, coupled with critical peak pricing, induced a reduction of energy use in     




peak-load periods, but did not change overall energy use over the year 
(CRAI 2005). 
The South Australian Government suggested that load shifting might even decrease 
energy efficiency: 
Not all peak demand management strategies deliver energy efficiency outcomes. 
Measures such as off-peak water heating — one of the most common forms of peak 
load shifting — result in energy inefficiency due to standing losses from storage water 
tanks. (sub. 80, p. 8) 
In addition, load shifting could also be accompanied by an increase in greenhouse 
gas emissions. Load shifting would typically involve increasing the electrical output 
of coal-fired power stations supplying base load power at the expense of gas-fired 
power stations supplying peak loads. Since coal-fired power stations have highest 
greenhouse gas intensity per unit of energy, load shifting effectively increases 
greenhouse gas emissions (AGA sub. DR87; AEPCA sub. 47; ABCSE sub. 50). 
Despite the main outcome being load shifting, several inquiry participants and 
commentators still argued that more cost-reflective pricing would encourage greater 
energy efficiency. The Australian Industry Greenhouse Network noted: 
Correct locational pricing signals also offer some prospect of improved system 
efficiency, and may result in better aggregate energy efficiency overall in power 
generation. But this is not a straightforward issue by any means … (sub. 57, p. 10) 
The South Australian Government commented: 
Greater cost-reflective pricing would allow for energy efficiency and energy 
conservation to be aligned better to peak [load] management objectives  … 
(sub. 80, p. 9) 
Taylor, Schwarz and Cochell (2005) found evidence that day-ahead real-time 
pricing encouraged industrial customers to make energy efficiency improvements. 
The energy efficiency improvements from real-time pricing were stronger than 
those observed for time-of-use pricing. 
Country Energy (2005b) in a preliminary report on its trial of time-of-use tariffs and 
critical peak pricing, found that there were reductions in energy use during the 
summer and the early winter months of 2005, which suggests either improvements 
in energy efficiency or energy conservation (box 14.4). 
There is also some evidence that time-of-use pricing has led to greater energy 
efficiency in the United States: 
Time-of-use rates that charge more for electricity use during peak load, high cost 
periods (and less during off-peak, low-cost periods) can also stimulate energy savings.     
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While time-of-use rates primarily shift electricity use from peak to off-peak periods, 
experience shows that there tends to be a larger reduction in peak period electricity use 
than the increase in electricity use during off-peak periods, meaning some level of 
energy savings at least for residential time-of-use programs  ... (SWEEP  2002, 
chap. 5, p. 11) 
In the Commission’s view, more cost-reflective pricing will influence consumer 
behaviour and encourage improvements in load shifting and curtailment, thereby 
improving economic efficiency. Consistent with the recommendations of the 
Commission’s inquiry into National Competition Policy, governments should 
continue to explore the efficacy of price setting of regulated infrastructure 
providers. Governments should also remove retail price constraints once effective 
competition has been established (PC 2005). 
More cost-reflective pricing may also improve energy efficiency in peak-load 
periods, particularly in the longer term when consumers and suppliers have more 
information and the opportunity to modify their behaviour.  
More cost-reflective pricing should improve energy efficiency in peak-load periods, 
particularly in the longer term when consumers have both more information, and 
the opportunity to modify their behaviour, and suppliers can respond to changed 
market conditions. This would be facilitated by a roll out of ‘smart’ meters. 
Options to improve the roll out of ‘smart’ meters 
The successful implementation of more cost-reflective pricing requires the roll out 
of ‘smart’ meters  —  such as interval meters. The Climate Action Network of 
Australia suggested that the success of time-of-use pricing required ‘a large roll out 
of metering technology’ that would ‘enable householders and businesses to obtain 
information in a straightforward manner’ (sub. 19, p. 7). 
What is not generally accepted is the type of meter that should be rolled out, and 
whether the roll out should be voluntary or made compulsory by governments. 
Type of metering technology 
Various metering technologies are available that can provide residential and small 
business users with information about their energy and network use, to set 
time-of-use or real-time prices, and that are necessary for the delivery of other 
electrical services such as direct load control (box  14.3). Limiting the range of 
FINDING 14.3     




metering that is available to suppliers and users will influence the economic gains 
that result from cost-reflective pricing and other demand-management services. 
The Victorian Government has mandated that type 5 interval meters be rolled out by 
distributors to residential and small business customers for the purpose of providing 
more information to market participants and permitting time-of-use prices at some 
future date (ESC  2004b). However, many inquiry participants have argued that 
type 5 interval meters are not the most appropriate technology. For example, the 
ACA said of type 5 interval meters: 
Metering does not equal billing, and it is misleading to state that metering of any 
variety will send a price signal to consumers … Displaying the actual price being billed 
to the consumer in real time with predictive costs for the next consumption periods, 
along with a cumulative amount for the billing period might be a desirable state of 
affairs ... (sub. 52, p. 2) 
Similarly, the Energy and Water Ombudsman New South Wales also argued that 
type  5 interval meters do not provide for sufficient immediacy to influence 
consumers’ consumption. It also said that an alternative would be to introduce 
prepayment meters: 
Prepayment meters should be one of a range of options to assist customers with energy 
management and payment of accounts. If the Tasmanian experience is any indication, 
prepayment meters would suit customers who want to closely manage their 
consumption, as well as customers who need to budget carefully. (sub. 48, p. 9) 
Jeff Beal argued that interval meters were not necessary to enable energy users to 
better manage their electricity use. He proposed that existing electronic meters 
could be reconfigured to provide more useful information regarding their current 
and past energy use (sub. DR93).  
Several inquiry participants and commentators have argued that type  5 interval 
meters would not provide users with sufficient information for demand-side 
responsiveness. The absence of remote load control technology on type 5 meters 
limits the ability of retailers and distributors to curb the electrical load of smaller 
customers during peak periods (ERAA subs.  26 and DR106; ENA sub.  DR114; 
Pareto Associates 2003).  
The main benefit of limiting the roll out to one or a few metering technologies is 
that the economies of scale of supply and installation will reduce the costs of the 
roll out (ORG 2000b). In contrast, the main benefit of opening up the choice of 
‘smart’ meters is that, through competition, a diversity of energy services would 
arise. For example, AGL argued that competition would allow retailers to introduce 
new metering technologies that include both mass market meters as well as direct 
load control technologies (AGL sub. DR119).     
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It is possible that the roll out of a single appropriate ‘smart’ meter could still permit 
future diversity of electrical services. The Energy Action Group argued that such a 
meter: 
…  should be designed to be upgradable by providing slot and card   
interfaces within the meter to facilitate third party enhancements to the meter and there 
be a single common set of addressing protocols. (sub. DR139, p. 18)  
Should the roll out be mandated or voluntary? 
The other issue is whether the adoption of ‘smart’ meters should be voluntary or 
made compulsory by governments. This is important, because it can influence the 
net social benefits that would arise from the roll out of meters. 
The Victorian Essential Services Commission (ESC) argued that there was a case 
for mandating the widespread roll out of type  5 interval meters. It argued that 
allowing customers, retailers and distributors to choose whether to voluntarily 
invest in meters would not maximise the net benefits of metering because individual 
market participants would not be able to capture the full benefits of the roll out. For 
example, a retailer that sought to introduce interval meters to reduce consumption 
when wholesale prices were high would also reduce coincident peak network use to 
the benefit of the distributor (ESC 2004b). 
The ESC also argued that mandating the roll out of meters would increase net 
benefits by speeding up the adoption of meters by high energy users. Under current 
practices, residential and small business customers are billed according to an 
‘average’ load profile. High-cost energy users, who are cross-subsidised in their 
load profile by low-cost energy users, have an incentive to delay adopting interval 
meters. Requiring high-cost energy users to adopt meters quickly will increase the 
net benefits (ESC 2004b).  
Several electricity retailers argued that a mandated roll out of interval meters 
imposes additional costs on retailers to invest in information and billing systems 
and would not be cost effective for them. They argued that retailers should instead 
be permitted to voluntarily adopt their own metering technologies over time as these 
become increasingly cost effective for retailers and their customers 
(ERAA sub. DR106; AGL sub. DR119; Origin sub. DR129).  
AGL, for example, argued that a mandated roll out of interval meters was not 
desirable: 
Currently there is [a] view among policy makers that energy efficiency price signals 
could be more finely tuned by the wide spread use of interval meters. AGL maintains 
that the cost–benefit of a rollout of Type 5 interval meters to customers using less than     




160MWh annually has not been proven and should not be mandated. The market place 
should be left to work out the most efficient metering solutions rather than have 
potentially inefficient solutions mandated. Retailers are already researching new 
technical solutions, including two way communications, that could create better price 
signals and be cost effective. (sub. 66, pp. 3–4) 
Assessing the benefits and costs 
The case for any roll out of ‘smart’ metering is not straightforward. The main 
benefit is the increased economic efficiency that would arise from the 
implementation of more cost-reflective prices and demand-management strategies 
that the ‘smart’ meters would allow. However, the cost of a widespread roll out is 
likely to be considerable, and for many small customers the cost savings they might 
achieve will not warrant the additional cost. IPART recommended that any roll out 
of interval meters be subject to a benefit–cost analysis (IPART 2003). 
A benefit–cost analysis would need to compare the benefits to economic efficiency 
with the costs of rolling out interval meters. Benefits include the: 
•  reduced network costs — through avoiding the costs of augmenting transmission 
and distribution networks; 
•  reduced electricity generation costs  —  through avoiding the costs of new 
generation capacity; 
•  increased supply reliability — through reducing the number of interruptions; and 
•  fewer environmental externality costs  —  such as reduced greenhouse gas 
emissions (ESC 2004b). 
Where ‘smart’ meters have direct communication links with distributors, benefits 
also could include reduced site visits, quicker connection and disconnection of 
customers and the detection of outages and voltage fluctuations. Finally, where 
‘smart’ metering allows for more precisely specified cost-reflective prices, benefits 
include the increase in welfare that results from the removal of cross-subsidies 
(ORG 2000b). 
A benefit–cost analysis would also include the costs of supplying and installing 
‘smart’ meters, and the costs to distributors and retailers of installing the appropriate 
information technology and management systems (ESC 2004b). 
The Essential Services Commission of South Australia (ESCOSA) commissioned 
an assessment of the net benefits of managing network congestion using interval 
metering and time-of-use pricing. It found that the widespread roll out of interval 
meters in conjunction with time-of-use pricing was not as cost effective in reducing     
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network load as other options, such as correcting for power factors and employing 
standby generation (CR Associates 2004, ESCOSA 2004).1 However, the study did 
not take into account the potential benefits that might be captured by third parties 
from the roll out of metering technologies. 
In its assessment of the net benefits of interval metering, the ESC found that there 
were just sufficient net benefits to warrant the widespread roll out of interval 
meters. The ESC found that metering would provide, among other things, effective 
electricity competition, improved conservation, improved market efficiency through 
demand management, and improved security of supply (ESC 2004b). 
In the Commission’s view, while there may be net benefits in a widespread roll out 
of ‘smart’ meters, prescribing the device or the provider has the potential to limit 
the adoption of alternative technologies and demand management strategies. The 
prescription should be limited to setting the minimum performance standards of the 
meter — such as standard operating protocols. The meters should also be 
upgradable to allow for potential third party enhancements, which would improve 
contestability in the provision of electricity services. 
Any mandated roll out of ‘smart’ metering devices should be subject to a 
comprehensive benefit–cost analysis. Mandated roll out of technologies should 
not preclude choice in the device or competition between service providers. 
14.3  Imperfect competition in electricity generation 
The principle of cost-reflective pricing implies that wholesale energy prices must 
also be economically efficient. Yet imperfect competition in the wholesale 
electricity market has the potential to increase retail prices, thereby distorting the 
end users’ incentives to use energy in a manner that is consistent with economic 
efficiency. 
                                              
1  Power factor is defined as the ratio between the actual load power (measured in terms of 
kilowatts) and the apparent load power (measured in terms of kilovolt Amperes) drawn by a load. 
Inductive loads (such as electric motors) and switching loads (such as switch mode power 
supplies) can distort electrical wave patterns and reduce the efficiency with which energy is used. 
Power factors can be corrected (thereby improving energy efficiency) through the installation of 
capacitors in the equipment itself or in the mains switch. 
RECOMMENDATION 14.1     




Sources of imperfect competition 
Factors that may contribute to imperfect competition in electricity markets include 
the horizontal aggregation of electricity generators, the level of interconnection 
between regional markets and the vertical reintegration taking place in the 
electricity industry. 
Aggregation of electricity generators 
The COAG Energy Markets Review (the Parer Review) was concerned that there 
was insufficient competition among electricity generators. It reported that the 
concentration ratios for the three largest generators were consistent with the 
presence of market power. For example, the concentration ratio for generators in 
New South Wales was 96.4 per cent (COAG 2002). 
It also argued that generators in some jurisdictions were able to exercise market 
power at certain times. This power had the effect of increasing average electricity 
prices. High average retail prices increase the incentives for users to reduce their 
energy use or adopt energy-efficient investments — albeit for the wrong reasons.  
The National Generators’ Forum observed that countries with economically 
inefficient energy markets had high levels of energy use efficiency: 
Globally there is little correlation between energy market reform and energy efficiency. 
Some of the most heavily regulated electricity markets in Europe and Japan also are the 
most energy use efficient … (sub. DR138, p. 3) 
The Parer review also argued that generator market power increased spot price 
volatility. Highly volatile spot prices increase the risk and uncertainty associated 
with current and future NEM pool prices, thereby discouraging investment in 
energy-efficient technologies. 
It made a number of recommendations, many of which were included in the MCE’s 
energy market work program. However, the MCE has adopted only part of the 
package of reforms recommended by the review. It has emphasised a role for 
expanding regional interconnections but did not address the key recommendation of 
structurally disaggregating government-owned generation businesses. 
The Commission considers that, due to the cost to the community, there is scope for 
further disaggregation of publicly-owned generation assets. This represents the most 
cost-effective means of reducing generator market power in a region (PC 2005).     
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Insufficient regional interconnection 
A contributing factor to the imperfect competition in electricity markets is the 
insufficient capacity of regional interconnection. Regional electricity 
interconnectors are high voltage transmission lines that connect the regions of the 
NEM and provide capacity for the interstate trade of electricity. By increasing the 
size of the markets in which electricity is traded, regional interconnectors 
effectively increase the level of competition among generators. 
The Parer Review examined the capacity of regional interconnection and found that 
current interconnectors did not provide sufficient capacity for generators in one 
region to adequately respond to peak demands in other regions. As a result, the 
NEM cannot effectively offset the market power that generators possess in their 
own region. According to the International Energy Agency: 
During periods of peak demand, the network can become congested and the NEM 
separates into its regions, potentially exacerbating reliability problems and market 
power of regional utilities. (IEA 2001, p. 7) 
The Commission notes that the MCE released an energy market reform package in 
2003 that includes policy principles and directions for the investment in new 
transmission assets including regional interconnectors (MCE 2003). 
Vertical reintegration 
In its review of the National Competition Policy reforms, the Commission inquired 
into the adequacy of institutional arrangements in screening the competition 
implications of merger and acquisition activity in the electricity industry. The 
Commission had argued that such merger activity can have the effect of stifling 
competition, particularly in the generation sector when generators merge with 
transmission network providers, and raised concerns regarding the adequacy of 
current institutional arrangements necessary for determining the appropriate levels 
of merger activity (PC 2005). 
The Commission considered it important to have effective institutional 
arrangements in place to deal with potentially anticompetitive mergers between 
generators and transmission operators. Given that the existing regulatory regime 
was developed on the basis of structural separation between generators and 
transmission operators, the Commission found it questionable whether current 
regulatory safeguards were sufficient to deal with anti-competitive mergers and 
acquisitions. The Commission recommended that there be an independent national 
review of the competition implications of cross-ownership of transmission and 
generation assets in the electricity industry. This review should include examining     




the adequacy of the access, prices oversight and merger provisions of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Clth) and whether it is necessary to proscribe some forms of 
cross-ownership that involve the transmission network (PC 2005). 
Effect on energy efficiency 
In the Commission’s view, imperfect competition in the electricity industry 
increases both average electricity prices and their volatility. These can have 
differing and countervailing effects on energy consumption and efficiency. 
Increasing competition (whether through horizontal disaggregation or increased 
regional interconnection) may lower electricity prices and would weaken incentives 
for energy efficiency investments. In contrast, increasing competition may also 
decrease price volatility, which could decrease the risk and uncertainty of future 
electricity prices. This in turn could enhance the economic viability of a range of 
energy infrastructure and energy efficiency investments. 
14.4  Unpriced environmental externalities 
The third important influence on the costs of energy is the costs of pollution and 
other negative externalities associated with its production and use. An externality 
occurs when an action by one person affects the wellbeing of others without that 
effect being reflected in market prices. Negative externalities in the market for 
energy include greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel-powered electricity 
generators and local pollution ranging from car exhaust fumes to the visual impact 
of wind turbines and the environmental impact of hydro-electric schemes. 
Ideally, energy prices would reflect all of the costs of production and consumption 
including these external costs. At the moment, energy prices by-and-large exclude 
these costs, meaning that energy users are encouraged to consume more energy, and 
invest less in energy efficiency, than might be desirable from a communitywide 
perspective.  
Participants’ comments 
There was widespread acknowledgement among participants that externality costs 
were not incorporated in energy prices. For example, Origin Energy noted: 
Energy prices do not reflect the environmental cost associated with consumption and 
production of energy. (sub. 25, p. 10)     
350  ENERGY EFFICIENCY    
 
TransGrid observed that current wholesale prices in the NEM did not take into 
account the environmental costs. It argued that this strengthened the incentive to 
install open-cycle gas-fired generators relative to combined-cycle gas-fired 
generators, even though open-cycle generators emit relatively more greenhouse 
gases and are relatively less energy efficient than do closed-cycle generators 
(sub. 62, p. 4).  
Several inquiry participants said that failure to incorporate externality costs meant 
that energy-efficient (and renewable energy) technologies were uncompetitive. For 
example, TransGrid stated: 
Like renewable energy sources, energy efficiency technologies tend to have a smaller 
impact on the environment and human health than conventional supply of energy. Since 
these ‘external costs’ of supply are not fully incorporated in the market price of energy, 
the resource conserving and other environmental benefits of improving energy 
efficiency are not reflected as a relative cost saving advantage. (sub. 62, p. 3) 
Several inquiry participants noted that if the prices of fossil fuels were raised in 
relation to their carbon content, there would be greater incentive to adopt 
energy-efficient alternatives. According to Origin Energy: 
It is clear however that any valuation of greenhouse gas emissions is likely to cause 
energy prices to increase, which is likely to raise the potential of cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements across the economy. (sub. 25, p. 10) 
The Australian Conservation Foundation said: 
Carbon levies and emissions trading are two ways to change the price of energy in a 
way that drives emission abatement and hence supports energy efficiency actions. It 
makes little sense to exclude energy intensive industry from such arrangements as they 
are amongst the most likely to respond to price. However, for many decision makers 
energy prices alone are insufficient to drive enhanced energy efficiency and other 
policies will be required. (sub. 24, pp. 10–11) 
TransGrid commented that the wholesale electricity prices could be augmented 
with: 
… a universal Australian carbon fuel tax or greenhouse gas emissions tax (or permit 
charge) which would tend to highlight the inefficiency of a poor conversion choice 
(even in a gas fuelled plant) … (sub. 62, p. 5) 
Alternatively, transferable carbon permits could be used to ensure that wholesale 
energy prices could incorporate externality costs of energy supply and use. 
Similarly, subsidies could also be provided to more energy efficient (and renewable 
energy) technologies (IC 1991).     




But there were also warnings that such approaches should be comprehensive, across 
all sources of greenhouse gas emissions and abatement activities. Origin Energy 
argued: 
… it is Origin’s strong contention that the long term interests of the community are best 
served by a comprehensive climate change policy. Such a policy would establish a 
national framework for creating a clear, long term carbon signal across the economy. 
(sub. 25, p. 11) 
The Australian Aluminium Council warned of the effects of addressing greenhouse 
gas externalities for export-oriented producers: 
Inappropriate policy interventions at the national level to address externalities with an 
international reach or impact could be extremely detrimental to national economic 
performance where similar or equivalent action is not taken in a broadly global manner. 
(sub. 29, p. 13) 
Commission’s assessment 
Incorporating the externalities associated with fossil fuel use into the prices of 
energy would make those prices more cost reflective and promote socially efficient 
outcomes. If the external costs can be measured, the price of energy would 
encourage producers and consumers to factor those costs into their decisions, 
leading to the right amount of energy consumption, the appropriate sources of 
energy, and the appropriate mix of energy and other inputs. Use of incentive 
mechanisms such as transferable permits and taxes would also help ensure that the 
environmental objectives are achieved at the lowest possible cost to society. 
Targeting the price of energy would also have the advantage of tackling directly the 
explicit or implicit objective of many energy efficiency policies, viz. pollution 
abatement (including greenhouse gas emission abatement). This would substantially 
obviate the need for many of these policies. For example, efforts to regulate the 
energy consumption of appliances and vehicles captures only part of the life-cycle 
consumption of energy associated with the production, use and scrapping of those 
products. With some interest now being shown in regulating the other stages of the 
product life cycle to achieve greater reduction in greenhouse gases, it might be 
appropriate to ask if there is not a better policy solution. As an alternative, a tax on 
energy would allow market participants to make a judgement on the tradeoffs that 
might be made between the costs of energy used in production (such as aluminium 
in cars) against the lower operating costs (in this case lower fuel bills). 
A policy of pricing energy externalities would not replace all energy efficiency 
policies. As this report argues, there would still be a case for some policy     
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intervention to address market failures associated with imperfect information (such 
as information asymmetry).  
While conceptually appealing, the pricing of energy externalities is fraught with 
problems. In particular, the challenges of setting an economically efficient tax for 
carbon, the economically efficient level of emissions, and the economically efficient 
subsidy for energy-efficient technologies, are formidable. There is little agreement 
on the extent of the costs (and benefits) of increases in the concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, thus making it difficult to settle on the right 
carbon tax or the volume of emissions permits. And the information requirements 
and administrative logistics could make it costly to implement. (Similar problems 
arise in dealing with more localised pollution issues such as urban air quality.)  
Furthermore, greenhouse gas issues are, above all, global issues and require a global 
response. Any country (or group of countries) that takes unilateral action must 
weigh up the benefits of world leadership against the far reaching consequences for 
their economies of imposing higher energy prices on their consumers and 
producers. In particular, higher energy prices would diminish the competitiveness of 
many industries and encourage the migration of the most energy-intensive to 
countries that do not have such policies (IC 1991). This might, nevertheless, be 
manageable if, as the Parer Review suggested, energy-intensive industries were 
exempted from an emissions trading scheme until such time as Australia’s trading 
partners also introduced similar schemes (COAG 2002).  
As the Commission has emphasised, this has not been an inquiry into greenhouse 
policy: it has been about the policies that Australia should follow in promoting 
cost-effective energy efficiency improvements. Such policies might contribute to 
greenhouse gas (and other pollution) abatement — and indeed some are explicitly 
targeted at this objective  —  but they would need to be considered alongside all 
other greenhouse gas policy options, including emissions trading and carbon taxes. 
These are issues that warrant separate consideration. Nevertheless, what is clear is 
that if energy prices incorporated the costs of externalities, and energy prices rose, 
the private incentives to invest in energy efficiency would also rise.      




 A  Conduct of the inquiry 
This appendix outlines the inquiry process and lists the organisations and 
individuals that participated. 
Following receipt of the terms of reference on 31 August 2004, the Commission 
placed a notice in the press inviting public participation in the inquiry and released 
an issues paper to assist inquiry participants in preparing their submissions. The 
Commission received 85 submissions before releasing the draft report. A further 70 
submissions were received following the release of the draft report (a total of 155). 
Those who made submissions are listed in table A.1. 
The Commission also held informal discussions with organisations and government 
departments and agencies. This visit program assisted the Commission to obtain a 
wide understanding of the issues and the views of inquiry participants. 
Organisations visited by the Commission are listed in table A.2. 
In November 2004, the Commission held pre-draft report public hearings in 
Sydney, Brisbane, Canberra and Melbourne. Following the release of the draft 
report a second round of public hearings were held in Brisbane, Sydney, Canberra 
and Melbourne in May and June 2005. Additional hearings were held via telephone 
conference with participants from Adelaide. Presentations were given by 61 
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Table A.1 Submissions  received 
Participant Submission  no. 
AGL  66, DR119 
Alternative Technology Association  13 
AMCER Pty Ltd  DR105 
Australasian Energy Performance Contracting Association  47 
Australian Aluminium Council  29 
Australian Building Codes Board  7, DR111, DR148 
Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy  50, DR121, DR144 
Australian Conservation Foundation  24, DR154 
Australian Consumers’ Association  52 
Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association  85, DR118, DR140 
Australian Gas Association  2, DR87 
Australian Glass and Glazing Association  16, DR144 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network  57 
Australian Liquefied Petroleum Gas Association  37 
Australian Meat Processor Corporation  12, DR95 
Australian Plantation Products and Paper Industry Council  82 
Australian Trucking Association  74 
Australian Window Association  59 
Australian Wood Panels Association  DR91 
Beal, Jeff  64, DR93 
Bell, Graham  73 
Blanchard, Clive  72, DR108, DR135 
BP Australia  60 
Building Products Innovation Council  44, DR128 
Cement Industry Federation  39 
Central West Environment Council Inc NSW  9 
Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets  DR123 
Ceramic Fuel Cells Limited  23 
Clark, Philip  DR147 
Climate Action Network Australia  19, DR116 
Cole, Peter  DR89 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
Conservation Council of Western Australia  54 
Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre  DR107 
CSIRO Manufacturing and Infrastructure Technology  DR126 
CSR Bradford Insulation  15 
Department of Agriculture WA  36 
Department of Energy Qld  38 
Department of the Environment and Heritage  30, 69, DR86, DR131, DR146 
ecoSAVVY  DR145 
Electricity Markets Research Institute  DR110 
Energetics  DR104 
Energy Action Group  DR139 
Energy and Water Ombudsman NSW  48 
Energy Consumers’ Council  DR103 
Energy Networks Association  DR114 
Energy Retailers Association of Australia Inc  26, 55, 71, DR106 
Energy Supply Association of Australia  68, DR120 
Energy Systems and Services  33 
Energy Users Association of Australia  84, DR150 
Engineers Australia  DR136 
Environment Business Australia  DR134 
Environment Victoria  67 
Evasave  DR100 
Exergy Australia Pty Ltd  40, DR97 
Federated Chamber of Automotive Industries  77 
Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd  76 
Foster, Bob  11 
Friends of the Earth Australia  20, DR117 
Gas Appliance Manufacturers Association of Australia  DR98 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates Pty Ltd  10, DR96 
Gipton, Sara  34 
(Continued on next page)     
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Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
Green Building Council of Australia  41, DR137 
GridX Power  5 
Hanley, Paul  DR99 
Housing Industry Association  27, DR130 
Institute of Public Affairs  6 
Insulation Council of Australia and New Zealand  14, DR94, DR144, DR149 
Jameson, Allan  31 
Johnson, Harry, Kingfisher Centre, Aspley Special School  21, DR88 
Laird, Philip  1, 56, DR127 
Lincolne Scott Australia Pty Ltd  53 
Master Builders Australia  DR122 
McGregor and Associates  22 
McNeilly, Tom  DR143 
Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd  18, DR115 
Mushalik, Matt  4, 75 
National Generators Forum  65, DR138 
Nicolosi, Fred  32 
Origin Energy  25, DR129 
Parker, Alan  35, DR112 
Pears, Alan  DR113 
Penny, John  8 
Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association  49 
Public Transport Users Association  63 
Queensland Master Builders Association  DR90, DR92 
Railway Technical Society of Australasia  45, DR142 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Roundtable  DR155 
Rheem Australia Pty Ltd  46 
Rowden-Rich, Murray  61 
Royal Australian Institute of Architects  42, DR124 
Schwieters, Ben  DR109 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.1  (continued) 
Participant Submission  no. 
South Australian Government  79, 80, DR101, DR153 
SPI Electricity Pty Ltd  51 
Steam Link  43 
Sustainable Energy Development Office  DR151 
Sustainable Projects Pty Ltd  3 
Sustainable Transport Coalition  70 
Tasmanian Government  DR152 
Timber Promotion Council  DR141 
Total Environment Centre  81 
TransGrid  62 
Troppo Architects (Qld) Pty Ltd  DR145 
TXU  DR102 
Urban Ecology Australia  DR132 
Victorian Government  DR125 
Virr Laurie  DR99 
Western Australian Government  58 
Western Australian Sustainable Energy Association  17 
Williamson, Terry  28, 78, DR133 
Zorbas, Angelo  83 
Table A.2 Visits 
Organisation 
AMCOR 
Australasian Railways Association 
Australian Building Codes Board 
Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association 
Australian Greenhouse Office 
Australian Industry Greenhouse Network 
Australian Industry Group 
(Continued on next page)     
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Table A.2  (continued) 
Organisation 
Australian Trucking Association 
BP 
Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics 
Centre for Energy and Greenhouse Technology 
Climate Action Network of Australia 
Department of the Environment and Heritage 
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
Department of Transport and Regional Services 
Energetics 
Energy Retailers Association of Australia 
Energy Supply Association of Australia 
Energy Users Association of Australia 
Engineers Australia 
Essential Services Commission (Victoria) 
ETSA Utilities 
Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries 
Foster’s Group Limited 
Master Builders Australia 
National Electricity Code Administrator 
National Generators Forum 
New South Wales Government 
Origin Energy 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Property Council of Australia 
South Australian Government 
Sustainable Energy Authority Victoria 
The Treasury (Australian Government) 
Victorian Government 
     




Table A.3  Public hearing participants 
Sydney 15 November 
Sustainable Projects Pty Ltd 
Penny, John  
GridX Power Pty Ltd 
McGregor and Associates 
Housing Industry Association 
World Wide Fund for Nature Australia and Climate Action Network Australia 
Australian Consumers’ Association 
Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets, University of NSW 
Sydney 16 November 
Australian Meat Processor Corporation 
Energy Retailers Association of Australia 
Railway Technical Society of Australasia and University of Wollongong 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates Pty Ltd 
Brisbane 17 November 
Queensland Government 
Department of Energy (Qld) 
Steam Link 
Friends of the Earth Australia 
Johnson, Harry, Kingfisher Centre, Aspley Special School 
Lincolne, Scott 
Little, Phil  
Canberra 22 November 
Australian Trucking Association 
Royal Australian Institute of Architects 
Department of the Environment and Heritage 
Plastics and Chemicals Industries Association 
Exergy Australia Pty Ltd 
Ocean Research Pty Ltd 
 (Continued on next page)     
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Table A.3  (continued)  
Melbourne 24 November 
Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
Australasian Energy Performance Contracting Association 
Institute of Public Affairs 
Moreland Energy Foundation Ltd 
Williamson, Terry, School of Architecture, University of Adelaide 
Lavoisier Group 
Timber Promotion Council 
Energy Advice 
Melbourne 25 November 
Energy Supply Association of Australia 
Parker, Alan  
Rheem Australia 
Building Products Innovation Council 
Brisbane 30 May 
Friends of the Earth 
Beal, Jeff 
Evasave 
Queensland Master Builders Association 
Cole, Peter 
Sydney 31 May 
George Wilkenfeld and Associates Pty Ltd 
Centre for Energy and Environmental Markets 
Energetics 
Canberra 3 June 
Master Builders Australia 
Australian Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association 
Department of the Environment and Heritage 
Virr, Laurie and Hanley, Paul 
(Continued on next page)     




Table A.3  (continued)  
Melbourne 6 June 
Building Products Innovation Council 
Coolmax Pty Ltd 
Energy Retailers Association of Australia 
Insulation Council of Australia and New Zealand 
Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
Housing Industry Association 
Melbourne 7 June 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Parker, Alan 
Electricity Markets Research Institute 
Urban Ecology 
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 B  Institutional background 
Governments have established a number of mechanisms for developing and 
implementing energy policy and, in particular, energy efficiency policy. Reflecting 
their genesis in greenhouse abatement policies, the state and national administrative 
arrangements for energy efficiency policy have generally been part of the broader 
greenhouse agenda. Some of the key components of this institutional framework are 
summarised here together with an outline of the arrangements for regulating key 
energy markets. 
B.1  Institutional arrangements for increasing energy 
efficiency 
This section provides some background to the development of greenhouse gas 
abatement policies that were an important part of governments’ interest in energy 
efficiency. The main institutional arrangements in place for the development, 
implementation and national coordination of energy efficiency policies in Australia 
are then summarised.  
The Kyoto Protocol 
Control of greenhouse gases is by necessity an international, rather than a state or 
national issue  —  efficient and equitable outcomes can only be achieved via 
international agreement. For this reason an international treaty  —  the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change — was established in 1992.1 
The Convention provides a framework for intergovernmental efforts to address 
climate change and to deal with its impacts.  
In order to develop stronger commitments to address climate change, the Kyoto 
Protocol to the Convention was negotiated and was adopted in 1997. Eighty four 
countries signed the Protocol.2 It established individual country targets for 
                                              
1  The Convention came into force in 1994 after the required 50 countries had ratified it. There are 
now over 180 parties to the Convention, including Australia. 
2 Signing the Protocol (which Australia has done) meant agreeing to continue with the 
treaty-making process but did not bind signatories to the conditions of the Protocol.     
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industrialised countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. In total 
these targets amounted to a minimum 5  per  cent reduction for industrialised 
countries as a whole between 1990 and 2008–12. Australia agreed to a target under 
the Kyoto Protocol of limiting the growth in greenhouse gas emissions to 8 per cent 
above 1990 levels over the period 2008–12. A number of developing countries are 
also Parties to the Protocol but do not have emissions targets. 
The Protocol came into force in February 2005. This followed its ratification by 
industrialised countries that, between them, accounted for at least 55 per cent of 
industrialised country emissions in 1990. The Protocol is binding on those countries 
that have ratified it. Australia has signed but not ratified the Protocol, but is 
committed to achieving its Kyoto emissions target (Campbell 2004). 
The Minister for the Environment and Heritage has indicated that the Australian 
Government considers the Kyoto protocol response to greenhouse gas emissions is 
clearly inadequate and that major international reductions in emissions will be 
needed in order to limit the extent of climate change.  
We’re going to have a 40  per  cent increase in greenhouse gas emissions under the 
Kyoto Protocol and the world needs a 50  per  cent reduction. We’ve got to find 
something that works better. Australia is working on that with partners around the 
world. (Campbell 2005) 
In this regard, the Australian Government has announced the formation of the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, comprising the US, 
China, India, Japan, South Korea and Australia. The partnership will collaborate to 
develop and deploy existing and emerging cost-effective, cleaner energy technology 
and practices. Possible areas for collaboration include: 
… energy efficiency, clean coal, integrated gasification combined cycle, liquefied 
natural gas, carbon capture and storage, combined heat and power, methane capture and 
use, civilian nuclear power, geothermal, rural/village energy systems, advanced 
transportation, building and home construction and operation, bioenergy, agriculture 
and forestry, hydropower, wind power, solar power, and other renewables. (Howard 
et al. 2005b) 
The national greenhouse strategy 
In 1998, the Australian, State and Territory Governments agreed on a National 
Greenhouse Strategy (NGS) to meet Australia’s international commitments on 
greenhouse gas emissions (AGO 1998). The NGS outlined over 80 measures to be 
pursued by governments. The NGS built on the 1992 National Greenhouse 
Response Strategy (which it superseded and which had aimed to address all sources 
and sinks of greenhouse gases across the whole economy), the Australian     




Government’s Greenhouse 21C package of further measures introduced in 1995 and 
its 1997 Safeguarding the Future  initiative. Further Australian Government 
greenhouse policies were announced in the Measures for a Better Environment 
package in 1999 and the Climate Change Strategy detailed in the 2004-05 Budget 
and the Energy White Paper (Australian Government  2004).  
The NGS provides: 
… a broad menu of actions some of which will be implemented by governments acting 
individually, some by joint intergovernmental initiatives and some through partnerships 
between government, various stakeholders and the community. (AGO 1998, p. viii) 
Several components of the NGS involve improving energy efficiency in the 
government, industrial, power generation, commercial, residential and transport 
sectors. In this regard, the NGS focuses on: 
… cost-effective ways to reduce net greenhouse gas emissions in particular through ‘no 
regrets’ actions. The actions will deliver substantial non-greenhouse benefits to 
Australia. (AGO 1998, p. ix) 
Implementation of the NGS was initially overseen by an Implementation Planning 
Group of senior officials from the Australian, State and Territory Governments and 
a representative of local government. It is progressed through a range of other 
bodies including Ministerial Councils (such as the Ministerial Council on Energy, 
formed in 2001, and the Australian Transport Council) that coordinate joint national 
action and various government committees and working groups that further develop 
and implement the diverse range of measures contained in the NGS framework. In 
addition, jurisdictions continue to take independent action on greenhouse and 
energy efficiency issues and some have their own strategies on greenhouse 
abatement. The Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) noted: 
Reflecting Australia’s regional diversity, the NGS contains measures that different 
governments are pursuing through different policy approaches. (AGO 2000b, p. vii) 
At its June 2005 meeting, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed 
to set up a Senior Officials’ group to examine the scope for national cooperation on 
climate change policy (COAG 2005). Areas of focus for this group will include the 
scope to improve investment certainty for business, encouraging renewable energy 
and enhancing cooperation in areas such as technology development, energy 
efficiency and adaptation. 
A progress report on the early stages of the implementation of the NGS was 
produced in 2000 (AGO 2000b). It noted that Australia’s Kyoto greenhouse 
emissions target appeared achievable as long as there was ongoing significant effort 
to control emissions. However, strong economic growth had made the task more 
difficult. The report observed that all jurisdictions had prepared NGS     
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implementation plans that indicated the abatement measures that they would 
undertake, and considerable progress had been made in establishing the majority of 
measures in the NGS. However, the longer-term nature of most of the abatement 
measures meant that many had not been fully implemented and hence had only had 
a limited impact at such an early stage of the NGS. 
A report prepared for the Australian Government on the risk and vulnerability 
assessment of climate change impacts has stated: 
There is little doubt that Australia will face some degree of climate change over the 
next 30 to 50 years irrespective of global or local efforts to reduce greenhouse 
emissions. The scale of that change, and the way it will be manifested in different 
regions is less certain ... (Allen Consulting 2005a, p. vii) 
The report argued that the development of adaptation strategies needed to be an 
important component of climate change policy. 
Ministerial Council on Energy 
In 2001, COAG established the Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) to provide 
‘effective policy leadership to meet the opportunities and challenges facing the 
energy sector and to oversee the continued development of national energy policy’ 
(COAG 2001). The MCE is responsible for broad-ranging energy policy including: 
energy security; energy market reform; and energy efficiency. In doing so, it 
considers both economic and environmental issues.  
The Council comprises Ministers with responsibility for energy from the Australian 
Government and all States and Territories. The Australian Government Minister for 
Industry, Tourism and Resources chairs the Council and the department provides 
Secretariat support. The New Zealand Energy Minister has full member status when 
Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement issues are considered; otherwise the 
New Zealand and Papua New Guinea Energy Ministers have observer status. 
Energy Efficiency Working Group 
Energy efficiency policies and programs, particularly those involving coordinated 
action between the jurisdictions, is one of the MCE’s responsibilities. The Energy 
Efficiency Working Group (EEWG) was established under the auspices of the MCE 
and advises it on the performance of end-use energy efficiency policies and 
programs.3 Its major responsibility is to implement the National Framework for 
                                              
3 The EEWG was originally the Energy Efficiency and Greenhouse Gas Working Group.     




Energy Efficiency (NFEE). It has also developed the administrative guidelines for 
appliance labelling and performance (which are administered by NAEEEC). 
National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency Committee 
The National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency Committee (NAEEEC) 
is responsible for managing Australian end-use energy efficiency programs 
(NAEEEC 2004a). It consists of officials from the Australian, State and Territory 
Government agencies and representatives from New Zealand (box B.1). 
 
Box B.1  NAEEEC institutional arrangements 
The Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) is responsible for the development of the 
programs for appliance and equipment energy labelling and for minimum energy 
performance standards (MEPS). Established under the MCE, the Energy Efficiency 
Working Group has the responsibility for developing administrative guidelines for use 
by each relevant State and Territory in the administration of its legislation covering 
energy-performance labelling and performance standards. 
In turn, the National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency Committee (NAEEEC) 
is charged with the ongoing management of these Guidelines. NAEEEC reports to both 
MCE and the Working Group. 
NAEEEC comprises the State and Territory regulatory agencies that are responsible 
for administering State and Territory legislation concerning energy-performance 
labelling and performance standards.  
The national labelling and MEPS scheme is made up of three elements: 
1. the legislation and subordinate regulations of the States and Territories;  
2. the Australian Standards published by Standards Australia, which are incorporated 
by reference into the State and Territory legislation and contain the detail of the 
minimum energy performance standards and labelling requirements; and 
3. NAEEEC Guidelines. 
While the State and Territory legislation is administered by the relevant State or 
Territory regulatory agency, the legislative scheme is of a national character and is 
‘intended to be administered in a uniform and consistent manner’. Although the 
NAEEEC Guidelines are not a legally binding instrument intended to impose legal 
obligations upon relevant State and Territory regulatory agencies, they are intended to 
‘act as a guide to facilitate uniform and consistent practice’. 
Source:: Adapted from NAEEEC (2004b). 
 
 
NAEEEC’s two major programs relate to mandatory energy labelling and 
mandatory minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) (appendix E). It is     
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currently mandatory for a range of electrical products offered for sale in Australia to 
carry an approved energy label. Several products are also subject to MEPS 
(NAEEEC 2004c). These programs are discussed in more detail in chapter 9.  In 
addition to the these two programs, NAEEEC’s charter encompasses a number of 
broader coordination functions (box B.2). 
 
Box B.2  The NAEEEC charter 
The charter of NAEEEC encompasses the following functions: 
•  to provide assistance to all States and Territories, as required, in the development 
and regulatory implementation of technical, legal, and administrative aspects of 
national appliance and equipment energy-efficiency initiatives;  
•  to coordinate the national development and implementation of energy efficiency 
programs of a non-regulatory nature and enhance existing regulator programs. 
These may include voluntary labelling initiatives, market transformation projects, 
and similar voluntary actions;  
•  to coordinate national marketing and communication projects to support new, and 
enhance existing, energy efficiency programs;  
•  to review existing appliance energy consumption and improve standards and test 
procedures;  
•  to monitor program performance and achievements;  
•  to provide a forum to exchange information on enforcement/compliance issues and 
community information and marketing initiatives;  
•  to administer an effective, coordinated testing regime of the energy efficiency claims 
of suppliers; and 
•  to coordinate broad consultative processes with industry and other interested 
parties in the development and implementation of energy labelling and associated 
programs. 
This charter recognises the maturity of the program and the need for a ‘holistic’ 
approach to government policies for greenhouse gas abatement in the appliance and 
equipment field. The focus of the program continues to be the delivery of nationally 
consistent regulation. The implementation of most voluntary programs remains an 
individual jurisdictional responsibility, although voluntary programs that assist the 
regulatory program to maximise benefits are being added to NAEEEC’s work plans. 
Source: NAEEEC (2004b). 
 
 
Gas appliances are currently subject to voluntary self-regulation run by the 
Australian Gas Association (AGA). The AGA (sub. 2) argued that MEPS should be 
extended to gas appliances on the grounds that coordinating the programs would be     




‘least-cost’ regulation, and allow direct comparison of the energy and greenhouse 
performance of gas and electrical appliances. 
Further details on the operation and history of NAEEEC are provided in 
appendix E. 
National Framework for Energy Efficiency 
In November 2002, the MCE endorsed a proposal to develop the NFEE (box 1.1). 
The NFEE is intended to provide an ongoing framework for national coordination 
of energy efficiency policy and programs. The development of the NFEE is being 
directed by the EEWG, under the auspices of the MCE. 
The purpose of the NFEE is to unlock ‘the significant economic potential associated 
with increased implementation of energy-efficient technologies and processes to 
deliver a least-cost approach to energy provision in Australia’ (EEWG 2003, p. 2). 
The Framework is being developed cooperatively with all jurisdictions and key 
stakeholders. However, individual jurisdictions retain control over program 
implementation. The Victorian Government commented: 
It should be noted that final decisions about whether and when to proceed with 
implementation and detailed implementation arrangements are yet to be determined and 
will be at the discretion of individual jurisdictions. [emphasis in original] 
(sub. DR125, p. 15) 
The NFEE will largely focus on demand-side energy efficiency in the domestic, 
industrial and commercial sectors. However, it will also consider energy use in 
energy conversion and address intermediaries with the ability to influence energy 
efficiency choices, such as energy retailers, builders, suppliers of appliances, 
equipment and materials, and financiers. It does not cover the transport sector. 
An EEWG discussion paper released in November 2003 argued that a number of 
barriers prevented adoption of cost-effective energy-efficient practices. The paper 
called for stakeholder comment on the existence of a perceived energy efficiency 
gap and on the specific barriers to improving energy efficiency. A summary of the 
views of those who were consulted about, or responded to, the discussion paper, has 
been published (EEWG 2004). 
Stage One of the NFEE, announced by the MCE in August 2004, involves a set of 9 
integrated packages of measures designed to improve coordination among 
jurisdictions in delivering energy efficiency programs. The measures involve 
nationally consistent minimum energy efficiency design standards (including 
expansion of the existing MEPS scheme), mandatory disclosure of energy     
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performance, mandatory assessment and reporting of energy efficiency 
opportunities for large users, government leadership on energy efficiency, and 
education and training for consumers, the finance sector and a range of industry 
operatives (box 1.1). The NFEE will involve spending of around $33 million over 
three years. 
The MCE noted: 
With the implementation plans now agreed, governments will also consider possible 
further measures, which could include broad-based incentives under a Stage Two 
NFEE … (MCE 2004e, p. 1) 
State and Territory Governments have a range of mechanisms for implementing 
jurisdiction-based energy efficiency policies developed under the NFEE (see below 
and sectoral chapters).  
The energy White Paper 
In June 2004, the Australian Government released a White Paper on energy policy, 
Securing Australia’s Energy Future. The paper outlined policies covering 
exploration and resource development, energy markets, energy security and energy 
efficiency, together with environmental, taxation and innovation issues. A taskforce 
covering a number of Australian Government departments, reporting to the Energy 
Committee of Cabinet, prepared the paper. 
The white paper noted the importance of improved energy efficiency for a 
cost-effective greenhouse gas abatement strategy and also the potential economic 
benefits of such improvements. The White Paper brought together a range of new 
and ongoing policies aimed at improving energy efficiency. These included: 
reforms to energy markets (particularly improving pricing signals); increasing 
minimum efficiency standards and an expansion of the range of appliances and 
buildings subject to MEPS; improving and extending energy efficiency information 
provided to energy consumers for appliances, buildings and motor vehicles; 
introducing compulsory audits (and public reports) of energy efficiency 
opportunities of firms using more than 0.5 petajoules of energy per year; and 
improving energy efficiency of Australian Government agencies. Many of these 
initiatives were subsequently incorporated in NFEE Stage One. 
In addition, the Solar Cities initiative  —  a series of demonstration projects in 
sections of at least four cities and receiving $75 million in government funding — 
was announced. Solar Cities will involve the subsidised large-scale uptake of solar 
power together with energy efficiency measures and more effective energy market     




price signalling (including the use of ‘smart meters’). It is to be implemented by the 
AGO. The White Paper also foreshadowed the establishment of this inquiry. 
Jurisdictional energy efficiency programs 
All jurisdictions have in place policies aimed at improving energy efficiency in both 
the private and public sector. These policies were often developed, initially at least, 
as part of greenhouse gas abatement strategies (for example, under the NGS) and in 
some cases pre-date the national coordination mechanisms now in place.  
Some jurisdictional energy efficiency initiatives are discussed in more detail in the 
following sectoral chapters and are outlined in appendix C. Only selected examples 
from some jurisdictions are provided below. While these programs are often part of 
the national institutional framework outlined above, individual jurisdictions also 
take energy efficiency policy actions within their own greenhouse gas abatement or 
energy policy frameworks. These programs sometimes go beyond the national 
strategy requirements. Most jurisdictions have developed or are developing their 
own greenhouse strategies which include a diverse range of energy efficiency 
initiatives (see below). With regard to implementation of the NGS, the AGO noted: 
A key feature of this process is recognition of Australia’s regional diversity, and the 
capacity for different governments to pursue effective greenhouse response through 
different policy approaches. (AGO 2005a) 
For example, in 2002 the Victorian Government released a Greenhouse Strategy 
which: 
… does more than just meet Victoria’s commitments under the NGS — it represents a 
significant strengthening of action beyond these commitments. (DNRE 2002, p. 15) 
The strategy incorporates a number of energy efficiency elements: For example, all 
new residential buildings in Victoria are required to achieve a five star energy 
efficiency rating, while existing and new Environment Protection Authority 
licensees and works approval applicants that are medium to large energy users are 
required to undertake energy audits and implement those options to reduce energy 
use that have a payback period of three years or less (chapter 7). The Victorian 
Government has recently released an update of its greenhouse strategy (DSE 2005). 
As part of this update, a Victorian Energy Efficiency Strategy is being prepared that 
will further develop existing measures and initiate new policies and programs as 
well as incorporate actions from NFEE Stage One. 
The Queensland Government released a greenhouse strategy in 2004 (EPA 2004). 
Energy efficiency initiatives include the ecoBiz program to encourage and assist 
business to identify and exploit energy efficiency opportunities, and grants to assist     
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commercialisation of new and substantially more energy-efficient products or 
technologies. The Western Australian Government produced a greenhouse strategy 
in 2004 that requires companies with large annual greenhouse emissions (above 
100 000 tonnes of carbon dioxide from 2006-07) to develop strategies to minimise 
emissions. The strategy also contains the Building Code of Australia mandatory 
minimum energy efficiency standards for new homes. The South Australian 
Government is to publish an industry-wide greenhouse strategy by 2006 that will 
exceed the State’s current National Greenhouse Strategy commitments.  
The New South Wales Government has introduced a compulsory greenhouse gas 
abatement scheme for electricity generators and suppliers, for which certain energy 
efficiency projects can qualify as abatement activities. It also requires government 
agencies and other designated energy users to submit an energy savings action plan 
every four years. The ACT Government requires an energy efficiency rating 
statement to be supplied for residential property sales. It also subsidises home 
energy audits and provides rebates for wall insulation.  
All jurisdictions place emphasis on government entities taking a leadership role in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, particularly through reducing energy use, 
including by increasing the energy efficiency of their operations (chapter 8). 
B.2  Recent reforms to regulation of energy markets 
The terms of reference raise the possibility of achieving cost-effective energy 
efficiency improvements through energy market reform to facilitate improved 
demand and supply management. This section briefly outlines some of the 
important changes to the regulatory framework for the electricity, gas and 
petroleum markets since 1990. While many of these developments may have 
limited, if any, direct implications for energy efficiency, they provide the regulatory 
framework and incentive structure against which energy efficiency initiatives by 
energy producers and users are undertaken. 
Microeconomic reforms of the electricity and gas industries began in some 
individual jurisdictions during the 1980s — largely involving corporatising 
government-owned, vertically integrated monopolies and introducing competitive 
neutrality reforms. The electricity industry reforms were brought together under the 
umbrella of COAG, with jurisdictions agreeing to introduce greater competition and 
vertical separation of the industry, and later, to establish a National Electricity 
Market (NEM). In 1994, COAG agreed to a timetable and framework to introduce 
free and fair trade in natural gas. In 1995, both the national electricity and gas     




reforms were incorporated as related reforms to the National Competition Policy 
(NCP). 
National Competition Policy reforms 
The NCP reforms were, among other things, focused on improving economic 
efficiency of the gas and electricity industries. One objective of these reforms was 
making energy prices more reflective of costs of production at both the aggregate 
level and for different classes of consumers. Following structural separation, 
industries were either opened to competition where markets were contestable or 
were subject to pro-competitive price and access regulation where there were strong 
natural monopoly characteristics. 
Electricity 
In 1993, COAG agreed to the development of a competitive NEM in the southern 
and eastern jurisdictions. The creation of the NEM, which commenced operation in 
1998, and the related reforms to the structure and governance of the industry, 
involved a variety of fundamental changes to the production and distribution of 
electricity including:  
•  structural separation of generation, transmission and distribution activities; 
•  corporatisation of government owned electricity utilities; 
•  allowing customers to choose their supplier (whether generators, retailers or traders); 
•  establishing an interstate transmission network and non-discriminatory access to the 
interconnected transmission and distribution network; 
•  removing all discriminatory barriers to entry for new participants in generation or retail 
supply, and to interstate and/or intrastate trade; 
•  implementing cost-reflective pricing for transmission services with greater scope for 
averaging for distribution network services, and transparency and inter-jurisdictional 
consistency of network pricing and access charges; and 
•  facilitating inter-jurisdictional dispatch and sourcing of generation capacity, (where 
cost effective). (PC 2005, p. 21) 
Competition has been introduced into the generation and retail sectors. In the case 
of retail competition, eligible users were permitted to negotiate directly with 
suppliers of their choice. Full retail contestability is (or will be) available to all users 
in Australia, except residential and small business customers in Queensland. 
Structural separation of previously vertically integrated electricity providers has 
been completed in all jurisdictions. Electricity utilities have also been either 
corporatised or privatised or assets have been leased to the private sector.     
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Natural gas 
In 1994, COAG agreed to the free and fair trade in natural gas. Since then, reforms 
to the gas market have focused on increasing the extent of competition in the gas 
industry. Reforms included: 
•  removing all legislative and regulatory barriers to free trade in gas; 
•  corporatisation of government-owned utilities; 
•  structural separation (or ring fencing) of transmission and distribution activities in each 
State and Territory; 
•  introduction of a national framework for third party access to gas transmission and 
distribution pipelines (the National Gas Access Code); and 
•  full retail contestability allowing consumers to choose gas suppliers. (PC 2005, p. 23) 
Most of these reforms have been implemented, the main exception being the 
absence of retail contestability in Queensland and the assessment of the Queensland 
gas access regime by the National Competition Council as not being ‘effective’ 
(PC 2005). 
COAG Review of Energy Market Directions (Parer Review) 
While the reforms of the 1990s had transformed energy markets, there were 
concerns regarding the efficiency of regulatory arrangements and the need for 
further reforms to develop efficient and integrated national energy markets. In 2001, 
COAG established an independent review of the strategic direction for market 
reform in the electricity and gas industries — the Parer Review.  
The Review reported in December  2002 and, while noting the significant 
achievements flowing from the previous decade’s reforms, found opportunities for 
regulatory reform to further improve the economic efficiency of the electricity and 
gas industries. The Review’s key findings were: 
•  the energy sector governance arrangements are confused, there is excessive regulation 
and perceptions of conflict of interest; 
•  there is insufficient generator competition to allow Australia’s gross pool system to 
work as intended; 
•  electricity transmission investment and operation is flawed, and the current regions do 
not reflect the needs of the market; 
•  the financial contracts market is extremely illiquid, in part reflecting large regulatory 
uncertainty; 
•  there are many impediments to the demand side playing its true role in the market;     




•  there is insufficient competition in the east coast gas market, and too much uncertainty 
surrounding new pipeline development; 
•  greenhouse responses so far are ad hoc, and poorly targeted; and 
•  the NEM is currently disadvantaging some regional areas. (COAG 2002, p. 9)  
Of particular relevance to energy efficiency issues, the Review noted that 
impediments to demand-side responses to market developments meant that NEM 
pool prices were more volatile than necessary and generation capacity was greater 
than necessary because of insufficient peak demand pricing signals. For example, 
retail price caps limited the price incentives for residential users to vary the time 
pattern of energy consumption. 
The MCE and the NEM Ministers’ Forum (now subsumed into the MCE) have 
sought to address these deficiencies in the operation of the markets for electricity 
and gas. Major initiatives have included: 
•  the establishment of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) to regulate the 
operations of the national energy market. Initially, the AER has taken over 
electricity transmission regulation from the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the electricity code enforcement functions 
of the National Electricity Code Administrator. Its regulatory responsibilities are 
to be extended to include gas transmission. Following the development of an 
agreed national framework, the AER will be responsible for the regulation of 
distribution and retailing (other than retail pricing) by the end of 2006; 
•  the establishment of the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) as a 
separate statutory commission to make changes to energy market rules (codes) 
and to undertake reviews and other market development functions. It will be 
accountable to the MCE; 
•  the MCE to assume the national policy oversight role for the Australian energy 
market and to oversee the policy framework under which the AER and AEMC 
will operate; 
•  all jurisdictions where full retail competition is operating, to align retail price 
caps with costs and the need for these caps to be periodically reviewed; 
•  an examination of the scope for facilitating the commercialisation or 
establishment of a demand side response pool in the NEM; and 
•  the introduction of a range of reforms relating to pricing, planning and 
investment in electricity transmission facilities. 
In addition, the MCE (2004b) has released a statement on principles for wholesale 
gas market development and a report has been prepared on options for the future 
development of that market (Allen Consulting Group 2005b). Further, the MCE     
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proposes to respond to the Productivity Commission’s 2004 review of the national 
gas access regime (PC 2004c) in November 2005 (MCE 2005a). 
Petroleum 
While not possessing the natural monopoly characteristics of some parts of the gas 
and electricity markets, the petroleum market has been subject to significant 
government regulation for many years. In the retail sector, the Petroleum Retail 
Sites Act (1980) (Cwlth), places quotas on the number of retail sites that may be 
operated on behalf of each of the four major oil refining companies in Australia. 
The quotas are determined on the basis of average wholesale market share and 
currently limit the number of oil company-operated sites to just over 400. A key 
objective of the Act is to limit the role of vertically integrated oil companies in 
setting retail prices.  
The  Petroleum Retail Marketing Franchise Act (1980) (Cwlth),  provides lessee 
service station operators of oil company-owned sites with protection of tenure, 
prohibits discrimination in the price of motor fuel sold to franchisees and requires 
certain disclosures of information by oil companies to potential franchisees. 
However, the Australian Government has announced that it intends to: 
… commence consultations with all key industry groups over the next few weeks to see 
if we can reach an acceptable level of consensus on the introduction of an industry 
Oilcode and the repeal of the existing legislation ... (Macfarlane 2004)  
The Government has proposed that this reform package be implemented in the 
second half of 2005 (Macfarlane 2004). 
The Australian Government or State Governments were involved in price regulation 
of petroleum products at various times from 1939 until 1998 (IC 1994a). From 1973 
to 1998, various Australian Government authorities determined maximum 
wholesale prices for petrol and diesel. There was often substantial discounting 
below these maximum prices, especially in capital city markets. In 1998, the 
Australian Government deregulated petrol and diesel prices and gave the ACCC an 
informal price monitoring role. The ACCC presently monitors and analyses retail 
prices in the capital cities and around 110 country towns.     




B.3  Improving regulatory practice 
In 1995, COAG endorsed principles and guidelines for national regulation making 
and assessment that were consistent with the objectives of the NCP (COAG 2004).4 
The principles and guidelines incorporate the best practice processes to follow in 
determining whether a standard (and associated laws and regulations) is the most 
appropriate course of action. COAG agreed that all proposed standards requiring 
consideration by Ministerial Councils or national standard-setting bodies be subject 
to this assessment.5 
The major element of the process is the preparation of a regulation impact statement 
(RIS), the purpose of which is to: 
… draw conclusions on whether regulation is necessary, and if so, on what the most 
efficient regulatory approach might be. Completion of a RIS should ensure that new or 
amended regulatory proposals are subject to proper analysis and scrutiny as to their 
necessity, efficiency and net impact on community welfare. Governments should then 
be able to make well-based decisions. (COAG 2004, p. 14)  
RISs are mandatory for significant regulations that have the potential to affect 
business or individuals, or to restrict competition. Numerous RISs have been 
undertaken for standards and regulations related to energy efficiency (for example, 
those prepared for the National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency 
Program listed in DEH, sub. DR131). RISs related to energy-performance labelling, 
mandatory energy efficiency standards for buildings, and minimum energy 
performance standards for appliances and equipment, are discussed in chapters 9 
and 10.  
The Office of Regulation Review (ORR), which is part of the Productivity 
Commission and shares its statutory independence, is required under the COAG 
guidelines to provide advice and assistance on the preparation of RISs and to 
monitor compliance with the requirements of those guidelines (COAG 2004, 
attachment A). In particular, the ORR should provide advice on whether a RIS is 
necessary, and it should assess the adequacy of the RIS at two stages — prior to 
public consultation and prior to decision making by the Ministerial Council or 
national standard-setting body.  
A department or agency is considered to be compliant with the COAG requirements 
if it meets the adequacy criteria set out in box B.3. 
                                              
4   COAG principles and guidelines were amended in 1997 and 2004. 
5   Regulatory decision making by the States and Territories is therefore excluded from this 
process, although individual jurisdictions each have their own regulation assessment processes.      
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Box B.3  Adequacy criteria for COAG RISs   
The ORR assesses: 
•  whether the RIS guidelines have been followed; 
•  whether the type and level of analysis are adequate and commensurate with 
the potential economic and social impact of the proposal; and 
•  whether alternatives to regulation have been adequately considered. 
For proposals which maintain or establish restrictions on competition (such as barriers 
to entry for new businesses or restrictions on the quality of goods and services 
available), it must be established that: 
•  the benefits to the community outweigh the costs; and 
•  the objectives of regulation can be achieved only by restricting competition; 




There appears to be a degree of misunderstanding among some participants to this 
inquiry regarding the role of the ORR in the RIS preparation process. Participants 
commented that the Productivity Commission should not be critical of the analysis 
in particular RISs, or of the regulatory options implemented, because the ORR (a 
part of the Commission) had ‘signed-off’, ‘approved’ or ‘endorsed’ those RISs. 
For example, the Australian Business Council for Sustainable Energy argued: 
To state that energy efficiency regulations are not justified when there are several 
Office of Regulatory Review approved regulatory impact statements available to say 
they are, necessitates some substantial substantiation. (sub. DR121, p. 11) 
The Victorian Government commented (in regard to Draft Report 
Recommendation  8.2 that recommended that energy efficiency standards for 
commercial buildings should not be introduced without a more thorough evaluation 
of the costs and benefits and of other policy options): 
The Draft RIS published by ABCB in April 2005 supporting the proposed BCA energy 
efficiency measures for non-residential buildings was signed off by the Commission 
through its Office of Regulation Review. (sub. DR125, p. 12)   
And Alan Pears stated: 
The Commission also questions the economic analysis in Regulatory Impact 
Statements for appliance energy efficiency measures, a curious position given RISs are 
approved by the Office of Regulatory Review within the Productivity Commission. 
(sub. DR113, p. 16)     




The ORR provides independent advice on regulatory best practice processes. This 
includes providing advice on whether a RIS should be prepared and whether it 
meets minimum adequacy standards given the significance of the regulatory issue 
under consideration. The ORR bases its assessments on information provided by 
those preparing the RIS and on information included in each RIS. In undertaking 
this role, the ORR has not verified the underlying data or methodology. Nor does 
the ORR endorse, support or offer a view on the merits of regulatory options or 
outcomes. It is the Ministerial Council or national standard-setting body, not the 
ORR, which is responsible for the content of RISs.     
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  C  Government energy efficiency 
programs 
This appendix provides information on government energy efficiency programs that 
currently operate in Australia and recent programs that ceased operation in the last 
few years. Programs whose main aim is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or 
encourage the adoption of alternative sources of energy, but that have a component 
aimed at improving energy efficiency, have been included. The appendix has been 
compiled primarily from information provided to the Commission by the 
Australian, State and Territory Governments. 
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Table C.1  Abbreviations used in this appendix 
Acronym Agency  name  Jurisdiction 
ABCB  Australian Building Codes Board  Australian Government 
DAIS  Department for Administrative and Information Services  South Australia 
DEH  Department of the Environment and Heritage  Australian Government 
DEUS  Department of Energy, Utilities and Sustainability  New South Wales 
DHS  Department of Human Services  Victoria 
DHW  Department of Housing and Works  Western Australia 
DIPE  Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Environment   Northern Territory 
DIPNR  Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural 
Resources 
New South Wales 
DITR  Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources  Australian Government 
DLGPSR  Department of Local Government, Planning, Sport and 
Recreation 
Queensland 
DOH  Department of Housing  Queensland 
DOI  Department of Infrastructure  Victoria 
DPW  Department of Public Works  Queensland 
DTEI  Department of Transport, Energy and Infrastructure  South Australia 
DTF  Department of Treasury and Finance  Victoria 
EPA Qld  Environmental Protection Agency, Queensland  Queensland 
EPA SA  Environmental Protection Agency, South Australia  South Australia 
EPA Vic  Environmental Protection Agency, Victoria  Victoria 
NAEEEC  National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency 
Committee 
All jurisdictions 
SAHT  South Australian Housing Trust  South Australia 
SEAV  Sustainable Energy Authority Victoria  Victoria 
SEDA  Sustainable Energy Development Authority  New South Wales 
SEDO  Sustainable Energy Development Office  Western Australia 
SENRAC Sustainable  Energy  Research  Advisory Committee  South Australia 
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Table C.2  Energy efficiency programs that are jointly administered by all jurisdictions 
Program 
name 


























The Building Code has been adopted by 
each State and Territory as a technical 
standard for the design and construction of 
buildings. In January 2003, energy efficiency 
standards were introduced into the Building 
Code for new houses and additions to 
existing houses. Standards for 
multiple-occupancy buildings were introduced 
in May 2005. It is planned to introduce 
standards for all other commercial buildings 
in 2006. Further information on the Building 
Code is included in appendix D. 
•  To reduce the demand for energy for heating 
and cooling for human comfort, thereby 
reducing Australia’s greenhouse emissions. 
Mandatory 
standards 


















NAEEEP is a collection of coordinated 
end-use energy efficiency programs relating 
to household appliances and equipment and 
commercial and industrial equipment. The 
main policy instruments used are minimum 
energy performance standards, mandatory 
energy efficiency labelling and voluntary 
measures including endorsement labelling, 
and training. Further information on NAEEEP 
is included in appendix E.  
•  Improve the energy efficiency of appliances 
and equipment more rapidly than the market 
has in the past.  
•  Deliver nationally consistent regulation of 
appliances and equipment.  
•  Assist State and Territory Governments to 
work consistently and in a manner that 











Table C.3  Australian Government energy efficiency programs 
Program 
name 



















Encourages participants to demonstrate 
corporate greenhouse performance through 
emissions inventory reporting and the 
development and implementation of action 
plans to achieve cost-effective abatement. 
Certifies products and/or services with zero 
net greenhouse gas emissions and provides 
for collaboration between government and 
industry to identify technical best practice for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in key 
sectors. Successor to the Greenhouse 
Challenge program. 
•  Reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
•  Accelerate the uptake of energy efficiency.  
•  Integrate greenhouse issues into business 
decision making.  










recipients of fuel 
excise credits in 
excess of $3 
million. 


















Encourages local councils to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions. Provides 
participating councils with funding and 
information on emission abatement strategies 
including energy efficiency. 
•  Reduce greenhouse gas emissions through 
changes in council’s own operations and 
















Practical demonstrations and advice in 
delivering innovative energy savings projects 
in parallel with improvements in productivity 
and energy management systems. 
•  Demonstrate that even when energy is 
managed closely, significant and additional 
energy efficiency savings and productivity 
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Table C.3 (Continued) 
Program 
name 















Large energy users will be required to 
complete an energy efficiency opportunities 
assessment and report publicly on the 
outcomes. While the assessment and public 
reporting are mandatory, all decisions on 
investments in energy efficiency opportunities 
will be at the discretion of the business. 
•  To improve the uptake of commercial energy 






regime to be 
introduced in 
2005-06) 














Requires electricity generators to sign 
agreements with the Australian Government 
which commit them to reducing the 
greenhouse gas intensity of their generation. 
The agreed actions must be implemented 
within five years. Applies only to electricity 
generation facilities that exceed stated size 
levels. Now incorporated into Greenhouse 
Challenge Plus program. 
•  Encourage electricity generators that use 
fossil fuels to adopt energy efficiency best 

















Provided technical advice to firms about 
measures they could take to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions. Often these were 
measures to encourage energy efficiency in 
building design or use. Incorporated into 
Challenge Plus program in 2005. 
•  Reduce greenhouse gas emissions through 











Table C.3 (Continued) 
Program 
name 



















Provides funding for programs that will lead 
to large scale, sustainable, cost-effective 
abatement of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Funding is based on a competitive process 
under which applicants must demonstrate 
that their proposed project will provide 
cost-effective greenhouse gas abatement. 
Funded projects have included subsidies for 
the replacement of industrial equipment with 
more energy-efficient technologies. 
•  Assist Australia to meet the 108 per cent 
Kyoto Protocol target. 
Financial 
incentives 












Previous versions of this program: provided 
grants for projects and research on 
approaches to reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases from the residential 
sector; and, with non-government 
conservation organisations, provided 
assistance to households. In 2004, the new 
program was introduced, drawing on 
elements of the previous versions and the 
Cities for Climate Protection program, to 
engage a larger number of Australians in 
actions to reduce household emissions. 
•  Reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the 
household sector through effective and 
sustainable partnerships. 
•  Increase the demand for, and the effective 



















Specified targets for reductions in energy 
intensity by Australian Government 
departments and budget-dependent 
agencies. Annual reporting on energy use is 
required. 
•  Reduce energy costs for the Australian 
Government. 
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Table C.3 (Continued) 
Program 
name 









DEH Ongoing  Users  of 
electric 
motors 
Provides users of electric motors with 
information that allows them to compare 
motors with case studies demonstrating the 
efficiency gains to be made by choosing 
more efficient motors. 
•  Encourage users of electric motors to 
consider the energy efficiency of their motors 
and adopt best practice when choosing 
motors. 
•  Reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Information 
provision 
           











Will involve the large scale implementation of 
energy efficiency initiatives, smart meters, 
cost-reflective pricing and new technology in 
urban sites. Four or more discrete trials in 
urban centres will be supported. The first trial 
will take place in Adelaide. The program will 
bring together interested parties from both 
the electricity supply and demand sides. 
•  Support the exploration of new sustainable 

























Provides information through printed and 
electronic materials and public seminars. 
Offers professional development training 
programs through industry organisations. 
•  Encourage industry and the community to 
voluntarily adopt better energy and 









Table C.4  New South Wales Government energy efficiency programs 
Program 
name 



















Enables commercial office building owners, 
managers and tenants to voluntarily rate the 
greenhouse impact of their buildings on a 
scale of one to five. The program is 
coordinated nationally by DEUS with 
Australian and State Government funding, 
and implemented locally through State and 
Territory Government agencies and nationally 
accredited assessors. 
•  Provide a nationally consistent benchmark 
for commercial office building energy use 
and greenhouse performance, against which 
owners and managers can compare and 
improve their facilities’ operation.  
Energy efficiency 
rating scheme 













Requires all new homes in Sydney to have a 
BASIX certificate. To receive a BASIX 
certificate, dwelling design must offer the 
potential for a 25 per cent reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions compared to the 
average house of the same type in New 
South Wales. This requirement will be 
strengthened to 40 per cent in July 2006. 
Mains water consumption must be potentially 
40 per cent lower than the average. The 
scheme will be extended to include new 
residential buildings (including multi-unit 
buildings) from 1 July 2005 and alterations to 
existing dwellings anywhere in New South 
Wales from 1 October 2005.  
•  Reduce water consumption and greenhouse 
gas emissions and thereby reduce the 
demand on existing infrastructure and 
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Table C.4 (Continued) 
Program 
name 




















Cofunded feasibility studies to assess the 
viability of small-scale gas fired cogeneration 
at sites in NSW, at no cost to the site owner. 
In return, the site owner committed to calling 
for expressions of interest if the project was 
found to be viable. Private companies 
cofunded the studies, which were carried out 
by private consultants under contract to 
SEDA. Communications activities were 
undertaken to raise awareness of 
cogeneration in industry, and to provide 
information and advice to those investigating 
cogeneration. 






















Designated energy users are required to 
submit an energy savings action plan every 
4 years. The plan must include a description 
of the energy use of the reporting entity, a list 
of potential measures to reduce energy use 
and a statement of the measures proposed to 
be implemented over a 4 year period. The 
Minister can introduce regulations to mandate 
the implementation of measures. 























A $40 million annual fund to support energy 
savings initiatives by large private sector 
energy users, government and the residential 
sector (primarily on a contestable basis). The 
fund will, in effect, be financed by taxing 
electricity consumers. 
•  Encourage energy savings. 
•  Address peak demand for energy. 
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Table C.4 (Continued) 
Program 
name 
















Assists businesses that have energy bills of 
over $300 000 per year to identify and 
implement cost-effective energy efficiency 
measures. Participating businesses pay a fee 
to join the program and receive technical 
advice and assistance with marketing and 
communication.  
•  Assist businesses to reduce energy 














Assists NSW Government agencies to meet 
energy reduction targets by implementing 
cost-effective energy efficiency upgrades. 
Promotes the uptake of Energy Performance 
Contracting as a tool for financing large 
energy efficiency upgrades and the 
Government Energy Efficiency Investment 
Program for smaller projects.  
•  Reduce the energy consumed by NSW 
Government facilities by 25 per cent by 













Households Offers  two  options for rating the energy 
performance of existing homes. The first is a 
web-based self-assessment tool. The second 
is an official rating with a home energy audit 
conducted by accredited assessors. This 
enables home owners to rate and improve 
their greenhouse gas performance. 
•  Provide a consistent and credible 
greenhouse performance benchmark for 
existing homes. Deliver energy savings 















Assisted NSW Councils to implement a 
model energy-efficient housing policy by 
providing energy rating tools, design 
alternatives and minimum energy 
performance standards for new homes.  
•  Assist NSW Councils to implement 
energy-efficient housing policy. 
Voluntary 
arrangements 
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Table C.4 (Continued) 
Program 
name 















Provides practical advice on residential 
energy efficiency and renewable energy 
applications to consumers, home builders, 
renovators, appliance purchasers, and 
primary and secondary school students. 
Offers a telephone information service and 
appointments with consultants to provide 
advice on household energy use. 
•  Provide consumers with commercially-















Operates a website that teaches school 
students to 'live energy smart'. Includes 
interactive exercises that encourage students 
to adopt energy efficiency practices in their 
homes and schools. 
•  Support the NSW 'Human Society and its 
Environment' syllabus, the 'NSW Science & 
Technology' syllabus and the 'Environmental 
Education Policy for Schools'. 
Teaching 
materials 














Assisted manufacturers of sustainable energy 
technologies, including manufacturers of 
energy efficiency products. Membership 
entitled firms to use the Energy Smart logo 
on packaging and in marketing material. 
Information was disseminated through local 
governments, retailers, financial institutions, 
installers and builders’ associations.  




















Provides funding for research and 
development initiatives in energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, low greenhouse emission 
transport fuels and enabling technologies. 
•  Assist the development of new technologies 
in the field of sustainable energy. 
Financial 
incentives 
Sources: Adapted from NSW Government response to Commission request for information (unpublished); NSW DEUS (2005a); NSW DEUS (2005b).  
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Table C.5  Victorian Government energy efficiency programs 
Program 
name 


















Provides support for projects that invest in 
new and innovative energy efficiency 
solutions, or in solutions that combine energy 
efficiency with sustainable industry practices. 
This can involve: identifying and assessing 
new technology options; performing detailed 
technical and commercial appraisals; 
installing and commissioning new solutions 
and securing local and international expertise 
for energy efficiency initiatives. The focus is 
on productivity improvement through 
innovative demonstrations of sustainable 
energy supply, design and operation of state-
of-the-art production facilities, and the 
development of new energy efficient or 
renewable energy products. SEAV may 
contribute up to $150 000 matched dollar for 
dollar with the business partner. 
•  Demonstrate commercially viable energy 
efficiency and sustainable energy projects to 
manufacturers and potential new investors in 
manufacturing in Victoria. 
Financial 
incentives 
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Table C.5 (Continued) 
Program 
name 



























Provides investment funds and support 
services for the development of new 
sustainable energy technologies. Facilitates 
investment in new sustainable energy and 
greenhouse pollution reduction technologies 
to capitalise on Australia's specific energy 
sector requirements and existing global 
export opportunities. Focuses exclusively on 
driving energy technology towards 
commercialisation in areas such as: 
energy-efficient processes and products; 
demand management; greenhouse pollution 
reduction; renewable and fossil fuel energy 
generation; and energy transmission and 
distribution systems. 
•  Promote energy efficiency practices and 
technology uptake.  
•  Function as a source of expertise and 
knowledge to the energy, greenhouse gas 
emitting and investment sectors.  
•  Successfully coinvest in new sustainable 
energy technologies and technologies that 





















Makes resources available to property 
industry leaders to support the development 
of projects that demonstrate high quality and 
energy efficiency in commercial property. It is 
estimated that within 15 years, the 
demonstration projects will influence 30 per 
cent of office building activity. 
•  Stimulate greater investment in high quality, 
energy-efficient commercial property. 
Demonstrate innovation in the design and 
application of sustainable energy in new and 
existing office buildings. 
•  Apply a broad range of other sustainability 
measures, such as water conservation and 
waste reduction to Victoria's commercial 
buildings. 
•  Improve the quality and value of Victoria’s 
commercial buildings and reduce 
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Table C.5 (Continued) 
Program 
name 


















Obliges agencies within the general 
government budget sector to reduce their 
energy use by 15 per cent by 2005-06 
against their 1999-2000 consumption and 
purchase 10 per cent of their electricity from 
'green power' sources. Agencies appoint an 
energy manager and develop action plans for 
meeting the targets. SEAV assists agencies 
to meet these targets, but agencies have the 
flexibility to determine and pursue the most 
cost-effective options for reducing energy use 
within their operations. No additional funding 
is provided for meeting the target. However, 
agencies retain the revenue saved from the 
reduced energy use.  
•  Reduce Victorian Government energy 
consumption by 15 per cent and to purchase 
10 per cent of the electricity consumed by 
Government agencies from 'green power' 
sources by 2005-06. 
•  Assist in expanding the market to support the 























Previously required that all new homes and 
multi-unit housing built in Victoria achieve 
either:  
•  a 5 Star energy rating on the building 
fabric; or  
•  a 4 Star energy rating on the building fabric 
plus the installation of either a solar hot 
water service or a rain water tank. 
From 1 July 2005 all new housing is required 
to achieve a minimum 5 star energy rating 
and have installed either a solar hot water 
service or a rain water tank. 
•  Reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from 
residential buildings.  
•  Improve the quality of Victoria's housing 
stock.  
•  Divert resources from the capital-intensive 
energy sector to the more labour-intensive 
building sector, generating new jobs and 
stimulating economic growth. 
Mandatory 
standards 
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Table C.5 (Continued) 
Program 
name 
















Provided information and advice to 
consumers through six centres in Melbourne 
and regional Victoria. Areas covered include: 
energy-efficient appliances, energy-efficient 
buildings, energy-saving practices with the 
potential to reduce energy costs, renewable 
energy technologies and promotion of other 
SEAV services. 
•  Improve the efficiency of energy use in the 
community through increased access to 
information and expertise. 
Information 
provision 











Provided builders with support in designing 
and marketing 4 and 5 Star energy rated 
homes. The Energy Smart Builders program 
was aimed at the largest builders in Victoria. 
Five builders – including the largest builder in 
Victoria – joined the program. The SEAV 
provided building companies with technical 
support and training to assist in the redesign 
and marketing of energy-efficient homes. The 
Energy Smart Estates program required all 
houses built on the estate to achieve a 
minimum 4 Star energy rating. Participating 
builders were permitted to use Energy Smart 
Estate branding. 
•  Increase the number of energy-efficient 
homes offered to new home buyers.  
•  Increase the capacity of builders and 






















Developed partnerships with organisations 
and offered financial assistance to help them 
undertake energy audits and prepare plans 
for implementing energy-saving actions. 
Replaced by the Business Energy Innovation 
Initiative. 
•  Reduce energy use and carbon dioxide 
emissions and achieve ongoing energy 
management in line with the Victorian 
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Table C.5 (Continued) 
Program 
name 
















Provided information on energy management 
and energy efficiency to 'hosts' such as large 
companies and industry associations. It was 
intended that the concepts would then 
'cascade' to smaller companies from their 
industry peers. Participants were expected to 
establish an energy management program 
and an energy policy and action plan for 
improving energy efficiency. 
•  Assist large companies to establish energy 
management programs.  
•  Reduce Victoria’s greenhouse pollution 


















Promoted changes in the home energy-use 
habits of Victorian households and 
consumers. Used television, radio, daily 
newspapers, magazines, seminars and 
displays to raise awareness of the benefits of 
energy saving. In addition, energy-saving tips 
were incorporated into commercial radio 
weather bulletins and newsletters mailed to 
retail energy consumers by energy supply 
companies AGL, Origin and Pulse. 
•  Raise awareness and facilitate the uptake of 
energy efficiency by Victorian households.  
•  Promote energy saving measures to 
Victorians with an emphasis on reducing 
energy use for cooling. 
Information 
provision 
(Continued next page)  
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Provided a range of technical, advisory and 
information support services to schools to 
assist them to introduce improved energy 
management in school facilities. Member 
schools were provided with a resource kit, 
software for monitoring and benchmarking 
school energy use, and ongoing 
communication and technical support. Three 
training seminars for school energy 
managers were conducted. Casual relief 
teacher grants were provided to enable 
classroom teachers to implement the 
program's initiatives. Subsidies were 
delivered to 13 schools for minor energy 
efficiency works. Additional funding was also 
provided for the Schools Low Energy 
Challenge initiative to highlight energy 
savings achievable in schools. 
•  Facilitate improved energy efficiency in the 
design, construction and operation of school 
facilities.  
•  Encourage schools to establish energy 
management programs that would lead to 
sustained reductions in energy consumption, 

















Offers energy retrofitting to low income 
households to improve the comfort of their 
homes and reduce their energy bills. Energy 
efficiency retrofits managed by local 
community organisations are conducted by a 
number of small mobile work teams that are 
engaged and trained as part of a 
government-funded labour market program. 
•  Provide opportunities for unemployed 
Victorians to gain skills in energy auditing 
and retrofitting and to increase people’s 
participation in their local community.  
•  Reduce energy consumption.  
•  Foster the development of community-based 
enterprises to undertake energy efficiency 
improvements in public, low income and 
other housing.  
•  Engage energy utilities in the energy 
efficiency retrofit projects, & encourage them 
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Households  Provides rebates of up to $1000 to 
concession card holders, and $600 to others 
for the purchase of highly energy-efficient gas 
heaters. The rebates are only available to 
consumers living in certain rural and outer 
metropolitan areas and are only available to 
subsidise the purchase of energy-efficient 
gas heaters to replace electricity or wood as 
the household's main source of heating. 
Houses built after 1 January 2002 are not 
eligible to receive the rebate. 
•  Assist regional and outer metropolitan 
Victorians to convert to an energy source 
that causes lower greenhouse gas emissions 
and is more cost effective.  
•  Provide access to affordable and sustainable 
energy supplies for all Victorians.  
•  Address the shortages of firewood in some 
country areas of Victoria. 
Financial 
incentives 















Supports local governments in rural and 
regional areas to provide examples to their 
local community of what can be achieved by 
implementing energy efficiency measures in 
their own facilities. With the assistance of the 
Moreland Energy Foundation, participating 
councils will develop business and 
community awareness programs to facilitate 
the replication of demonstration projects 
across each municipality. Partnerships have 
been established with 15 rural and regional 
councils. 
•  Promote the benefits of specific energy 
efficiency investments. 
•  Demonstrate how local residents and 
businesses can achieve similar energy 
savings.  


















Includes minimum energy performance 
standards for new offices and existing offices. 
•  Help project teams achieve environmentally, 
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Households  Provides rebates for solar water heaters that 
replace conventional gas, wood, briquette or 
oil-fuelled water heaters. The amount of the 
rebate is up to $1500 depending on the 
performance and capacity of the system. 
•  Reduce end-use energy consumption. 
•  Promote the development of the solar water 
heater industry in Victoria. 
Financial 
incentives 
















Requires EPA licence holders to: consider 
their energy use and associated greenhouse 
gas emissions; conduct an energy audit if 
required by the Act; prepare an action plan 
including all audit recommendations with a 
payback period of three years or less; and 
complete implementation of the plan by 2006. 
They must then report annually to the EPA on 
their energy use, associated greenhouse gas 
emissions and progress with implementation 
of their action plan. Those applying for a 
works approval to construct or modify plant 
must demonstrate that the plant will be of 
world’s best practice for energy efficiency. 
•  Reduce energy use and carbon dioxide 
emissions in line with the Victorian 

























Provides a hub for the exchange of 
international, national and local information 
and expertise on sustainable energy. 
Operates a bookshop and resource centre 
offering a wide range of information on 
sustainable energy drawn from around the 
world. Hosts events and workshops and is 
equipped with video conferencing and 
multimedia equipment to facilitate exchange 
with experts from around the world. 
•  Provide external stakeholders with timely and 
accurate information on sustainable energy.  
•  Bring together people from many different 
organisations to discuss and debate new 
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Involves developing closer working 
relationships with local and regional 
organisations that have strong connections, 
expertise, networks and knowledge and are 
well placed to provide independent 
information on sustainable energy in their 
local areas. Local organisations involved in 
the program provide information to residents, 
small businesses and community groups 
through a range of communication channels, 
such as physical information access points, 
workshops and regional events. 
•  Expand the reach of sustainable energy 
information to Victorian businesses and 
households.  
•  Develop new and innovative information 
products, services and channels. 
•  Reach consumers, small business and 
community organisations at a point where 
they are making key decisions in regard to 
energy use. 
•  Encourage choice and action which has a 
significant impact on the uptake of 
sustainable energy products and practices.  
Information 
provision 










Establishes partnerships between the SEAV, 
local government and other key stakeholders 
to identify opportunities to maximise the 
sustainability of public lighting. For example, 
by replacing mercury vapour lighting with 
other technologies that consume less energy 
and require the disposal of lower levels of 
heavy metals. 
•  Reduce the energy consumption of lighting, 
and to encourage the adoption of 
technologies that result in the disposal of 
lower levels of heavy metals. 
•  Provide leadership to public lighting owners, 





           
TravelSmart 
Local 







Works in cooperation with local governments 
to encourage changes in travel behaviour. A 
particular focus is to reduce dependence on 
cars and the associated greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
•  Achieve small scale, measurable changes in 
travel behaviour.  
•  Develop the capacity of local government 
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Encourages the innovative use of solar 
energy design and technology, and 
demonstrates its application in community 
facilities such as schools, kindergartens, 
childcare and community health centres. 
Most projects involve the incorporation of 
passive solar design features into the building 
shell, which decreases energy use and 
increases energy efficiency. 
•  Showcase the application of solar technology 
and design in community buildings 









Table C.6  Queensland Government energy efficiency programs 
Program 
name 














Businesses  Provided support to businesses in conducting 
'eco-efficiency' assessments on their 
premises and assisted in implementing 
recommendations. Participants received a 
$1000 grant to support the appointment of a 
consultant to identify 'eco-efficiency' 
opportunities, with a possible follow up $9000 
to support the implementation of the 
consultant's recommendations. 
•  Support businesses in the identification and 




           















Offers tools and extension services to 
support the establishment of the 'eco-
efficiency' baseline of businesses and to 
assist with action planning. Offers financial 
incentives (rebates) to support the 
implementation of best practice technologies 
in 'eco-efficiency' action plans, and branding 
to capitalise on market influence as a ‘green 
company’. 
•  Improve the capacity of individual companies 
to achieve improved business 
competitiveness through 'eco-efficiency' and 
brand differentiation.  
•  Provide local company case studies that can 
be diffused to the wider sector through 
industry networks (via the Greenhouse 










EPA Qld  Ongoing  Households 
and 
consumers 
Provides advice on energy efficiency in the 
home, access to information, resources and 
basic program information. 
•  Provide impartial, free advice on energy 
efficiency and renewable energy 
Information 
provision 
(Continued next page) 
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Encourages Queensland Government 
departments and agencies to adopt practices 
which contribute to efficiencies in energy use, 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 
generate financial savings. Assists agencies 
to tender for preferred suppliers to audit, 
design, install, monitor and guarantee energy 
savings. Assists agencies in implementing a 
generic smart metering program at key 
facilities to monitor electricity usage patterns, 
select the best available tariffs and position 
agencies to take advantage of potential 
savings from the bulk purchase of electricity. 
•  Improve the efficiency of energy 
consumption and unit acquisition values in 
Queensland Government departments and 
agencies.  
•  Achieve annual savings of $20 million by 
June 2008. The first target of $2 million is to 

































Provided grants of up to $100 000 to support 
the identification of 'eco-efficiency' 
opportunities, implementation of findings and 
the diffusion of findings across the relevant 
sectors to encourage wider uptake. Offered 
'eco-efficiency' assessments for businesses 
and local government facilities, and a 
regional sustainability project. The program 
included several components:  
•  the Industry Partnerships Program  
•  the Local Government Greenhouse 
Partnership Program  
•  the Greenhouse Building Rating Tool was 
used to encourage 4 star standard 
buildings  
•  the Gladstone Large Industry Program. 
•  Support energy efficiency in Queensland 
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Provides information on: better practice site 
development; building and landscape design; 
material selection; and energy efficiency 
(including building design and appliance 
selection). 
•  Encourage better practice site development, 


















Offers firms training, workshops and 
education programs that support the diffusion 
of business-level innovations in 'eco-
efficiency'. Provides grants of up to $100 000 
to support the diffusion of innovative 
approaches across sectors to encourage 
wider uptake. Particular focus on 
agribusiness, food processing, and urban 
development projects. 
•  Improve capacity for sustainability within 
priority sectors.  
•  Achieve improved business competitiveness 





           
Power for a 
Sustainable 
Future  









Provides schools with material to enable 
upper primary and lower secondary students 
to explore ideas and issues relating to 
sustainable energy. 
•  Meet objectives in the Queensland Science 
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Provides grants of up to $200 000 to support 
the development of new sustainable energy 
products or technologies, new process 
improvements or the creation of centres of 
expertise. Funds are focused on innovative 
projects dealing with research, development, 
demonstration or commercialisation of energy 
efficiency or renewable energy. Part of the 
cost of each project is offset, with the 
applicant or project partners expected to 
provide a significant input of cash, expertise, 
facilities, intellectual property and/or other in-
kind contributions. 
•  Promote innovation in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy technology and practices. 
•  Establish Queensland as a market leader in 
energy innovation and sustainable energy.  
•  Support the commercialisation of new 
sustainable energy products or technologies 
by Queensland-based companies.  
•  Support wide adoption of process 
improvements that reduce energy 
consumption and environmental impacts.  
•  Support expertise and capability to 
commercialise sustainable energy 
technologies.  
•  Reduce adverse environmental impacts 
resulting from fossil fuel use. 
Financial 
incentives 














Offers good practice guidance to all 
stakeholders involved in the design and 
construction of residential dwellings. Energy 
efficiency measures, including site planning 
and orientation, building design and 
appliance selection, are included in the 
advice to those planning to build, buy or 
renovate a house. 
•  Advance a set of principles embodying good 
practice in housing design, building and 
renovation.  
•  Establish a common understanding of 
sustainability in terms of the 'triple bottom 
line' and a shared vision across State and 
local government and the housing industry.  
•  Ensure there is a consistent and 
complementary message across all arms of 
Government in regard to good practice 
housing design and construction.  
•  Influence supply and demand, bringing about 
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Proposes measures (in addition to the energy 
efficiency standards in the Building Code of 
Australia) to make housing more sustainable. 
Proposals include mandatory measures to 
reduce energy and water use in new houses. 
A discussion paper on the proposed 
measures is to be made available for public 
comment. 
•  Reduce energy and water use in new 
houses. 
Regulation (most 
likely to be 
included under 
the Building Act 























Incorporates the design, construction, and 
public display of a four-bedroom family home 
in Rockhampton to demonstrate sustainable 
design. A family of two adults and three 
teenage children lives in Research House. 
Data are collected on heating, cooling, 
performance of appliances, insulation, 
glazing and lighting technologies. 
•  Facilitate research in ecological building 
design and construction. 
•  Demonstrate social sustainability principles 

















Encourages the use of environmentally-
friendly transport such as public transport, 
cycling, walking and car pooling. Supports 
voluntary change in the behaviour of 
individuals and organisations. Uses 
awareness campaigns, providing tailored 
information and improving access to 
'TravelSmart' modes of transport. 
•  Achieve a 14 per cent reduction in single-
occupancy car use.  
•  Reduce vehicle kilometres travelled.  





Sources: Adapted from Queensland Government response to Commission request for information (unpublished); EPA (2005a); EPA (2005b).  
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Provides training and accreditation for the 
use of energy rating software for new and 
existing commercial buildings. 




           




Provides brochures dealing with energy 
efficiency themes in homes and commercial 
business, either online or in hard copy 
through the Energy Smart Line. 
•  Provide access to information on energy 




           




Encourages industry to consider electricity 
cogeneration. Provides information, including 
reports on cogeneration and case studies of 
cogeneration projects. 
•  Contribute to the development of the 




           
Community 
Seminars 
SEDO Ongoing  Community 
groups 
Invites industry experts to present seminars 
to the community. Seminars are designed 
around key areas of SEDO community 
programs and topics including energy 
efficiency. 
•  Enable easy access for the community to 
experts in the essential SEDO program 
areas of energy efficiency. 
Information 
provision 




Table C.7 (Continued) 
Program 
name 













Provides seminars on a range of key topics 
on sustainable energy solutions for small to 
medium sized businesses, including lighting, 
air conditioning and energy audits. 
•  Provide the business community with easy 




           
Energy Smart 
Directory 
SEDO Ongoing  Consumers 
and 
businesses 
Provides a web-based search engine for 
finding Western Australian businesses that 
provide sustainable energy products and 
services. 
•  Facilitate access within Western Australia to 
sustainable energy products and services, 
for business and the community. 
Information 
provision 













Obliges State Government agencies to 
reduce their energy consumption by 12 per 
cent by 2006-07 compared to their 2001-02 
consumption. Sets incremental targets of 5, 
6, 8, 10 and 12 per cent over five years. 
Provides grants ($350 000 each year) to fund 
energy audits and studies to encourage 
energy management projects, and capital 
advances ($16 million over four years) to 
fund identified financially viable energy 
efficiency projects. Awareness raising and 
training are also undertaken. Financial 
penalties are applied to agencies that fail to 
reach their reduction targets. 
•  Instil energy management as an ongoing 
element of the operation of Western 
Australian Government agencies. 
•  Provide an example to businesses and the 










           
Energy Smart 
Line 
SEDO  Ongoing  Households  Provides expert energy efficiency and 
renewable energy advice via a telephone 
service which responds to more than 5000 
calls each year and provides brochures on 
request. 
•  Provide access to independent, expert 
advice to facilitate the adoption of energy 
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Sets energy performance requirements for 
government buildings and tenancies. 
•  Reduce government energy costs and 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
•  Raise the profile of energy efficiency in the 
commercial building sector.  
•  Drive market transformation and improve the 
energy efficiency of Western Australian 









SEDO Ongoing  Residential 
building 
industry 
Involves accredited assessors, who use 
house energy rating software to rate the 
relative thermal energy performance of house 
design, either during design and construction 
or for existing homes. 





           
Reach for the 
Stars 





Raises industry and consumer awareness of 
the energy rating label and the benefits of 
high efficiency appliances. 
•  Reduce energy costs and greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with the use of energy 
labelled appliances.  



















Offers residents of regional towns: 
information on energy efficiency; free energy 
audits to business; free compact fluorescent 
lights to households; and rebates for the 
purchase of energy-efficient air conditioners, 
refrigerators, freezers and insulation. 
•  Reduce average and peak electricity demand 
in regional areas resulting in savings for 
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Provides grants for research, demonstration 
and education projects that increase the 
uptake and understanding of energy 
efficiency.  
•  Increase the uptake of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy measures. 






















Uses a purpose-built house in the Perth 
suburb of Subiaco as a tool to educate the 
community about energy-efficient house 
design. For two years the house will be open 
to the public to demonstrate the technology 
behind such developments. During that time 
data on the thermal performance of the home 
will be collected. 
•  Show that an environmentally friendly and 
energy-efficient home can also be 
architecturally impressive, aesthetically 





Sources: Adapted from Western Australian Government response to Commission request for information (unpublished); SEDO (2005).  
  411 
Table C.8  South Australian Government energy efficiency programs 
Program 
name 

























Provides audits and ratings of energy and 
water use of 10 office buildings in the 
Adelaide CBD (three government and seven 
private sector buildings). Informs building 
owners of the results of the audits and of 
strategies to improve the performance of their 
buildings. Encourages building operators to 
achieve a one star Australian Building 
Greenhouse Rating (ABGR) improvement. 
•  Demonstrate cost-effective opportunities to 
improve the energy and water efficiency of 
commercial office buildings.  
•  Reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the 















Provides 30 businesses in Adelaide with 
subsidised energy efficiency assessments 
and assists them to formulate action plans to 
reduce their energy consumption. Results 
from the first 19 energy audits show the 
potential to reduce energy use by an average 
of 10 per cent with an average payback of 3.3 
years (including the audit costs). 
•  Reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  
•  Improve SA business competitiveness. 
Financial 
incentives 









Provides information and assistance to South 
Australian councils involved in the Australian 
Government Cities for Climate Protection 
program. 
•  Assist South Australian local councils to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in line 
with the 108 per cent Kyoto Protocol target. 
Funding, 
information 




Table C.8 (Continued) 
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Involved retrofitting a standard three bedroom 
house with energy-efficient appliances, high 
levels of insulation to walls and ceilings and 
other initiatives. The public were able to walk 
through the house to observe energy 
efficiency technologies, and collect 
information brochures about the products and 
services in the home. 
•  Demonstrate to the public the energy-saving 





           
Eco-efficiency 
program 





Involves the provision of information, 
voluntary agreements and assistance with 
funding and expertise for projects that 
demonstrate ecologically sustainable 
development principles. Addresses the 
objectives of the Environment Protection Act, 
1993.  
•  Promote the benefits of 'eco-efficiency' to 
small business and to provide tools for 
























Involves the retrofit of one ‘double unit’, with 
one unit operating as an information centre 
open to the public. Information is available 
about the retrofit, and the energy and water 
use is monitored. The information is made 
available through the website.  
•  Demonstrate how the energy efficiency of 
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Provides voluntary audits to identify 
opportunities for energy efficiency in the 
home. Following the audits, households 
receive energy-efficient light bulbs, a shower 
head and a draught-excluder, and may be 
eligible for buy-back schemes to 'retire' 
inefficient refrigerators. Some households 
receive interest-free loans to enable them to 
purchase energy-efficient appliances. 
•  Assist low income households reduce energy 






           
Energy 
Friends 






Provides training to community groups to 
enable them to take action in their local 
community. The program may involve home 
energy audits, community forums or other 
information programs. 
•  Reduce house energy use and bills without 
reducing comfort.  



















Provides information on greenhouse gas 
abatement and energy efficiency measures 
via visitor centres, telephone advice lines, the 
Energy SA website, literature distribution, 
seminars and workshops. 
•  Provide independent information, advice, and 
resources to motivate the target audience to 
implement sustainable energy practices. 
Information 
provision 




Table C.8 (Continued) 
Program 
name 










Energy SA  Ongoing  Businesses, 
government 
Operates an annual Energy Efficiency 
Conference and Trade Fair. Attendees 
include: representatives of the energy 
services industry from the commercial, 
industrial and residential sectors; government 
representatives; and interested members of 
the public. Attendees can visit trade booths to 
learn about specific energy efficiency related 
products and services. 
•  Provide an opportunity for companies 
involved in the energy services industry and 
potential customers in the commercial, 
industrial and domestic sectors to exchange 
information.  
•  Highlight the key issues of relevance to the 
energy services industry such that attendees 
are up to date and informed, and appreciate 

















Government  Sets the South Australian Government's 
targets for reduced energy use by 
Government agencies and proposes 
strategies for achieving those targets. Sets a 
target of a 15 per cent reduction in energy 
use in Government buildings before 2010 
(against 2000-2001 levels). This target has 
been extended to 25 per cent by 2014. 
•  Reduce energy use, energy costs and 
greenhouse gas emissions from public sector 
operations.  
•  Maintain a comprehensive inventory of 
greenhouse gas emissions from public sector 
operations. 
•  Provide leadership in addressing climate 









DTEI  Ongoing  Government  Involves replacement of globes in traffic 
signals equipped with energy-efficient light 
emitting diodes (LEDs). 
•  Reduce energy use and greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with the operation of 
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Offers assistance to South Australian local 
governments to implement sustainable 
energy initiatives, both within their own 
operations and within their communities. 
Assistance includes: information provision; 
promoting Energy Performance Contracts 
and other energy management tools; and 
assistance with staff training. 
•  Assist local governments to reduce the 
energy use, energy bills and greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with their own 




           
Reach for the 
Stars 








Raises industry and consumer awareness of 
the energy rating label and the benefits of 
high efficiency appliances. 
•  Reduce energy costs and greenhouse gas 
emissions associated with the use of 
energy-labelled appliances.  






















Provided targeted rebates on compact 
fluorescent lamps and insulation to 
households and businesses in off-grid 
communities in regional and remote South 
Australia. 
•  Assist off-grid communities to reduce their 
energy use, energy costs and greenhouse 
gas emissions.  
•  Reduce Government expenditure on 
electricity subsidies provided to communities 






           
Schools 
Program 









Encourages a focus on sustainable energy in 
the South Australian school curriculum and 
provides field demonstrations using the 
Energy SA solar powered caravan and trailer. 
•  Provide teachers with resources to use in 
their sustainable energy curriculum in order 
to raise awareness of energy efficiency and 
sustainable energy generation. 
Information 
provision 




Table C.8 (Continued) 
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Energy SA  Ongoing  Small 
businesses 
Provides information to small businesses 
advising them how they can save money and 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
adopting energy efficiency measures. This 
may include recommending that businesses 
implement energy management programs 
and purchase energy-efficient appliances and 
equipment. 
•  Provide businesses with strategies to reduce 
their energy consumption and bills. 
Information 
provision 




Energy SA  Commenced 
July 2001; 
ongoing 
Households  Provides rebates of up to $700 for the 
installation of solar hot water systems that 
meet eligibility criteria. 
•  Promote sustainability and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Financial 
incentives 







SAHT Ongoing  Tenants  of 
SAHT 
properties 
Involves developing and promoting programs 
and initiatives in line with broader 
government directions in energy efficiency. 
Includes measures to: renovate and upgrade 
existing housing stock to improve energy 
efficiency; construct new properties with a 
minimum four star energy rating; develop and 
implement awareness programs for SAHT 
tenants on how to reduce energy use; identify 
opportunities to create energy efficiencies in 
properties where the SAHT provides landlord 
power; develop a low-cost, low energy, roof 
integrated solar heating system; and install 
solar hot water systems in selected SAHT 
properties. 
•  Place clients of SAHT in energy-efficient 
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Provides research and development grants to 
sustainable energy projects that have strong 
prospects of commercialisation, achievement 
of environmental benefits and the potential to 
reduce energy costs for South Australian 
consumers. Focuses on grants for 
sustainable and renewable energy 
technologies, and on demand-side 
management technologies. 
•  Enable more efficient use of energy, reduce 
peak energy demand and reduce energy-
related greenhouse gas emissions. 
Financial 
incentives 
           
TravelSmart 
SA 




Encourages voluntary travel behaviour 
change including increased walking, cycling 
and public transport use. 
•  Reduce energy use and greenhouse gas 
emissions by changing travel behaviour. 
Information 
Provision 




Table C.9  ACT Government energy efficiency programs 
Program 
name 



















Provides audits to identify home energy 
efficiency improvements that will reduce 
household greenhouse gas emissions. Offers 
rebates of up to $500 to householders who 
make energy efficiency improvements 
identified in the audit. Subsidised products 
may include insulation, window treatments, 
weather stripping, pelmets, lined curtains or 
blinds, fluorescent lights and permanent 
external shading. 
 
•  Increase the energy efficiency of existing 
homes in the ACT and reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
•  Leverage expenditure by homeowners in 
energy efficiency upgrades of their homes 
beyond normal maintenance and renovation 
programs. 
•  Encourage the development of a local 
energy efficiency services sector. 
•  Raise awareness among homeowners of the 
greenhouse issue and the potential to 
increase their home’s energy efficiency. 
•  Complement other residential greenhouse 
gas abatement measures. 
•  Complement and eventually subsume the 
existing cavity wall insulation and solar hot 
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Requires developers of new residential 
properties to use the energy rating software, 
FirstRate, to rate the energy efficiency of their 
proposed designs. New residential buildings 
must achieve a minimum 4 star energy 
efficiency rating. Requires vendors of existing 
homes to undertake an energy efficiency 
rating assessment and to disclose the rating 
in all advertisements for sale and to include 
the rating statement as part of the contract for 
sale. 
•  Increase the energy efficiency of all new 
homes in the ACT. 
•  Foster awareness in the community and 
























Households  Provided a total of $360 000 in discounts to 
ACT residents over three years. A 25 per 
cent discount was offered to 900 households 
that installed cavity wall insulation. The 
subsidy was offered on a 'first come, first 
served' basis. Environment ACT asked those 
taking up the scheme to complete a survey to 
measure dollar and energy savings from 
installing cavity wall insulation. 
•  Increase the energy efficiency of existing 
homes in the ACT and reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
•  Leverage expenditure by homeowners in 
energy efficiency upgrades of their homes, 




           










Offers workshops which address waste 
management, energy efficiency and water 
efficiency in the commercial sector. 
•  Encourage commercial businesses to 
develop and implement water and energy 
conservation measures and minimise solid 
and liquid wastes via reuse and recycle 
systems. 
•  Encourage businesses to implement 
environmental management systems. 
Information 
provision 
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Promoted the uptake of Energy Performance 
Contracts (EPCs) by ACT businesses, and 
provides limited subsidies. Participating 
owners and occupiers of commercial 
buildings entered into contracts with energy 
performance contractors. The contractors 
undertook energy efficiency improvements in 
the buildings and guaranteed a level of 
energy savings over the project pay-back 
period. This was to reduce the risk to 
business that the energy efficiency measures 
would not be cost effective. 
•  Demonstrate the cost effectiveness of EPCs 
to the commercial sector. 






           















Collects energy use data from all ACT 
Government agencies (including electricity 
and gas use and transport fuel consumption) 
using an internet-based program called 
EDGAR (Energy Data Gathering And 
Reporting). Tracks progress against 
greenhouse targets set in the ACT 
Greenhouse Strategy 2000. 
•  Accurately measure energy use in ACT 
Government operations. 
•  Enable abatement measures to be 



















Mandates ACT Government agencies to 
consider environmental sustainability, 
including energy efficiency, in the 
procurement of goods, services and works. 
•  Add value to procurement outcomes through 





(Continued next page)  
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Provides free advice on home energy 
efficiency, energy appliances, service 
providers and products. Provides the services 
of technical advisers for new home buyers 
and renovators. 
•  Increase the energy efficiency of existing 
homes in the ACT and reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
•  Encourage the development of a local 
energy efficiency services sector. 
•  Raise awareness among home owners of the 
greenhouse issue and the potential to 



















Allocates $4 million to supplement the ACT 
Government capital works program to 
enhance environmental performance 
(including energy efficiency). 
•  Provide supplementary funding to projects 
that have value as demonstrations of energy 
efficiency, but may not have been 





           
Water and 
Energy 















Trial program to provide energy audits, 
information, advice, refit work and access to 
no-interest loans for low income households 
having difficulty paying their utility bills. 
•  Raise household awareness of the key 
contributors to high energy and water use.  
•  Assist low income households to address 
key issues around energy and water 
consumption. 
•  Reduce energy and water consumption of 
low income households. 
•  Reduce the potential for at-risk households 
to accumulate large utility debts. 





Source: Adapted from ACT Government response to Commission request for information (unpublished)  
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Table C.10  Northern Territory Government energy efficiency programs 
Program 
name 
















Provides energy audits, energy awareness 
materials, building design advice, technical 
investigations, project brief and tariff 
analyses, energy efficiency and energy 
management advice and some 
implementation funding to NT Government 
agencies. Encourages reductions in 
government energy consumption, energy 
expenditure and associated environmental 
impact. 
•  Reduce NT Government energy expenditure 
and environmental impact. 
•  Develop and implement whole-of-
government energy management policies. 
•  Provide professional energy management 
services and tools to NT Government 
agencies.  
•  Promote energy-efficient and ecologically 




Source: Adapted from Northern Territory Government response to Commission request for information (unpublished). 
     




  D  Australian energy efficiency 
standards for buildings 
D.1  The Building Code of Australia 
In Australia, the building industry has traditionally been regulated by State and 
Territory Governments, with some responsibility delegated to local governments. 
Since at least the 1960s, there have been moves toward cooperation and consistency 
of building regulation across jurisdictions. The main instrument used to encourage 
consistency is the Building Code of Australia (the Building Code) (PC 2004a). 
The first edition of the Building Code was released in 1990. Since then, it has been 
progressively refined and amended. The Building Code covers technical aspects of 
building design and construction, including building structure, fire safety and 
certain aspects of building amenity. The provisions in the Building Code have 
recently been extended to include energy efficiency standards for some classes of 
buildings. 
Administrative arrangements 
In 1994, the Australian, State and Territory Governments signed the 
Inter-Government Agreement to establish the Australian Building Codes Board 
(ABCB). This made the ABCB the peak body responsible for the development of 
nationally consistent building regulation through the Building Code. The ABCB 
seeks to maintain and upgrade the Building Code to ensure that its provisions are 
cost effective, easily understood and do not impose standards that go beyond the 
public interest. 
The ABCB is made up of the chief executives responsible for building matters in 
the Australian, State and Territory Governments, one local government 
representative and four representatives of the building industry. A chair is appointed 
by the Australian Government. 
A number of project committees and working groups also exist to inform and assist 
the ABCB in its administration of the Building Code. Among them is an Energy     
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Efficiency Steering Committee. The stated objectives of the Energy Efficiency 
Steering Committee are:  
… to assist the Australian Building Codes Board (ABCB) to develop cost-effective 
energy efficiency measures suitable for introducing under building law and in so doing, 
assist the Australian Governments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. (ABCB 2004c, 
p. 1) 
The roles of the Energy Efficiency Steering Committee include: 
•  providing policy advice on cost-effective building energy efficiency standards to 
the ABCB, Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) and Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources (DITR); 
•  coordinating and expediting the development of energy efficiency standards for 
inclusion in the Building Code; 
•  facilitating the communication, understanding, acceptance and adoption of 
proposed changes to the Building Code; and 
•  assisting the ABCB to facilitate the training of builders and energy rating 
practitioners (ABCB 2004c). 
The Energy Efficiency Steering Committee consists of: 
•  a Chair nominated by the ABCB; 
•  the Executive Director of the ABCB;  
•  three representatives of State and Territory statutory bodies responsible for 
building regulation;  
•  a representative from the AGO; 
•  an ‘eminent person’ as a community advocate; 
•  a representative from the DITR; 
•  a representative from the Australian Local Government Association; and 
•  three industry representatives (ABCB 2004c). 
Implementation of the Building Code 
The Building Code is given legal effect only when it is adopted by the individual 
State and Territory Governments. It has been adopted by each State and Territory as 
a technical standard for the design and construction of buildings. For example, in 
Victoria, all building work must comply with the Building Act 1993 (Vic.) and the 
Building Regulations 1994 (Vic.). The Building Regulations 1994 (Vic.) ‘call up the     




BCA [the Building Code] as a technical reference … thereby giving it legal status’ 
(Victorian Building Commission 2003, p. 2). 
There is no compulsion for any State or Territory to adopt the Building Code in full, 
or as the exclusive instrument of building policy. In practice, State and Territory 
Governments adopt additional or alternative legislation and regulations relating to 
building matters. 
The Building Code includes appendices for each State and Territory. The 
appendices detail any provisions that apply in individual jurisdictions. These may 
be in addition to the standards in the main text of the Building Code, or may 
override them. Energy efficiency is one policy area in which State and Territory 
Governments have made policies in addition, or as an alternative to, the main text of 
the Building Code. For example, the Victorian appendix to volume two of the 
Building Code contains the energy efficiency requirements for new houses in 
Victoria, which are more stringent than the requirements in the main text. 
Enforcement of building regulations is primarily the responsibility of State and 
Territory Governments, but they have delegated some of the regulatory tasks to 
local councils. The relevant administrative and compliance issues have tended to be 
a lower priority for the ABCB than the technical aspects of the Building Code, 
although the early 1990s saw the introduction of model building legislation that 
included reforms to administration and certification (PC 2004a). States and 
Territories have adopted the model legislation to varying degrees, leading to 
jurisdictional inconsistencies in the administration of the Building Code. In its 
review of building regulation, the Productivity Commission noted that: 
There are concerns that the current compliance and enforcement systems for building 
regulation may be deficient, to varying degrees across jurisdictions. (PC 2004a, p. 191) 
Overview of the Building Code 
The Building Code comprises two volumes, with each volume covering particular 
classes of buildings. In essence, volume one covers commercial and 
multiple-occupancy buildings while volume two deals with single dwellings 
(detached or attached). The contents of the Building Code specify minimum 
standards for both building practices and for building performance. 
The Building Code is amended annually. Proposed amendments are subject to an 
extensive consultative process including regulatory impact assessments and public 
comment. Amendments are formally adopted on 1 May each year 
(ABCB, sub. 7, p. 4).     
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Following an extensive review of building regulations in 1991, the Australian, State 
and Territory Governments agreed that the ABCB should specify 
performance-based building codes (PC 2004a). Performance-based codes specify a 
desired outcome, rather than prescribing the means by which that outcome is to be 
achieved. 
D.2  The Building Code and energy efficiency of 
housing  
On 1 January 2003, the ABCB introduced energy efficiency standards into volume 
two of the Building Code. The standards cover new houses and additions to existing 
houses. The ABCB chose to incorporate energy efficiency standards for houses 
before commercial buildings because: 
… industry had expressed concern at the proliferation of residential ‘energy codes’ 
being implemented at a regional level and called for the expedient development of 
mandatory measures in the BCA [Building Code]. (ABCB 2004b, p. C2) 
The introduction of energy efficiency provisions into the Building Code followed an 
announcement in July 2000 that the Australian Government had reached an 
agreement with State and Territory Governments to ‘develop suitable national 
energy efficiency provisions for domestic and commercial buildings, through the 
introduction of minimum mandatory requirements in the BCA [Building Code].’ 
(ABCB 2004d, p. 4). 
To progress the development of energy efficiency standards in the Building Code, 
the AGO provided $2.3 million to the ABCB from 2001 to 2005. The ABCB also 
financed the project from its own budget. Total funding amounts to $4.75 million to 
30 June 2005 (PC 2004a). 
The stated objective of the energy efficiency standards for houses is ‘to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by efficiently using energy’ (Building Code of 
Australia 2004 (volume 2), s.O2.6, p. 87). The standards cover the building fabric 
and domestic services. Domestic services are defined as the basic engineering 
systems of a house that use energy or control the use of energy. The standards apply 
to central heating water piping, and heating and cooling duct work. They do not 
include water heaters, space heaters, air conditioners and cooking appliances. These 
are subject to mandatory appliance energy performance labelling schemes and 
minimum energy performance standards (MEPS) (appendix E).     




Compliance with the energy efficiency standards 
Buildings must meet performance requirements to satisfy the technical standards in 
the Building Code. The performance requirements relating to energy efficiency state 
that: 
•  a building must meet a level of thermal performance to ‘facilitate the efficient 
use of energy for artificial heating and cooling’ (Building Code of Australia 
2004 (volume 2), s. P2.6.1, p. 87); and 
•  domestic services must have features that ‘facilitate the efficient use of energy’ 
(Building Code of Australia 2004 (volume 2), s. P2.6.2, p. 88).  
Builders have a number of options available to meet the performance requirements: 
1.  use the ‘deemed-to-satisfy’ construction methods and materials prescribed in 
detail in the Building Code (box D.1); or 
2.  formulate an ‘alternative solution’ that: 
(a)  complies with the performance requirements; or 
(b)  is shown to be at least equivalent to the deemed-to-satisfy provisions; or 
3.  apply a combination of options 1 and 2 (Building Code of Australia 2004 
(volume 2), s. 1.0.5, p. 25). 
 
Box D.1 Deemed-to-satisfy  provisions 
Although the Building Code is performance-based, it includes extensive 
‘deemed-to-satisfy’ provisions. These provisions detail building techniques that are 
considered to be acceptable forms of construction that meet the legislative 
requirements for complying with the performance requirements. Builders who use 
these forms of construction are deemed to have met the requirements of the Building 
Code.  
There is no obligation to adhere to these forms of construction. Other construction 




Proof that an alternative solution complies with the performance requirements can 
be demonstrated by: 
•  providing documentary evidence (for example, from an accredited testing 
authority or an appropriately qualified person) that the solution meets the 
performance requirement or a deemed-to-satisfy provision; or     
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•  using a verification method such as: 
–  the verification methods in the Building Code; or 
–  some other verification method that is accepted by the appropriate State or 
Territory authority; or 
•  comparison with the deemed-to-satisfy provisions; or 
•  the judgement of a qualified expert that the solution satisfies the performance 
requirement (Building Code of Australia 2004 (volume 2), s. 1.2.2, p. 41). 
Deemed-to-satisfy provisions in the Building Code for house energy efficiency  
Builders can satisfy the energy efficiency standards for houses if they adhere to the 
forms of construction prescribed in s. 3.12 of the Building Code, which includes a 
range of ‘acceptable construction practices’ relating to the: 
•  building fabric (including insulation, roofs, walls and floors); 
•  external glazing (including shading); 
•  building sealing (including construction of roofs, walls, floors, windows, doors 
and chimneys); 
•  air movement; and 
•  services.  
Builders who do not follow the deemed-to-satisfy provisions must use an alternative 
solution to demonstrate that their building complies with the energy efficiency 
standards. The Building Code allows two verification methods for builders to prove 
that their buildings meet the energy efficiency standards: 
•  use a software package to model the energy consumption of the building, which 
is compared to a regulated maximum energy consumption or star rating; or 
•  model a ‘reference building’ to which their proposed design is compared. 
In practice, ‘most building designers choose to develop a solution following the 
Deemed-to-Satisfy Provisions’ (ABCB, sub. 7, p. 3). 
Verification using calculated building energy load  
The two approved verification methods in the Building Code require that builders 
calculate the ‘energy load’ of the building. The energy load is the amount of energy 
that will be added to the building (by artificial heating) and removed from the 
building (by artificial cooling) in order to maintain the desired temperature.     




The ABCB (2005d) has published a Protocol for House Energy Rating Software 
that details the method for calculating the house energy load. Software packages 
that are considered to comply with the Protocol are NatHERS (Nationwide House 
Energy Rating Scheme) (and its successor AccuRate), BERS (Building Energy 
Rating Scheme) and FirstRate (box D.2). These packages calculate the annual 
energy load of the house. The energy load can be used to assign a star rating. The 
higher the star rating, the more energy efficient the building. 
While the Building Code recognises NatHERS, BERS and FirstRate as complying 
with the Protocol: 
… the individual State and Territory jurisdictions take responsibility for the 
identification of suitable software and operator accreditation. While the BCA [Building 
Code] provides information about software options, it neither makes recommendations 
nor imposes requirements in that regard. (ABCB 2002, p. 7) 
In Victoria, for example, two packages are in use (NatHERS and FirstRate) 
(box D.2). The Victorian Government imposes restrictions on the use of the two 
packages. For example, FirstRate may not be used if: 
•  the total area of glazing is greater than 60 per cent of the net conditioned floor 
area; and 
•  the glazing of any one orientation is greater than 35 per cent of the 
net conditioned floor area. 
Verification using a star rating or stated value 
The energy efficiency standards introduced into the Building Code in January 2003 
divided Australia into eight climate zones. One verification method requires that 
houses built in the northern zones (climate zones 1–3) achieve a 3.5 star rating, and 
houses built in the southern zones (climate zones 4–8) achieve a 4 star rating. 
The Building Code allows builders of houses in the northern climate zones to use an 
alternative approach when using energy modelling software. Instead of being 
required to achieve a certain star rating, they may refer to a table of allowable house 
energy load. The table prescribes the allowable energy load (in megajoules per 
square metre of floor area per year). Energy load predicted by the energy modelling 
software must not exceed this value. The maximum allowable energy load is set at a 
level that is equivalent to the required star rating in each climate zone. 
The allowable energy load depends on the location of the proposed house. Houses 
that install either solar or heat pump hot water systems are permitted to consume an 
additional 20 megajoules per square metre per year.     
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Box D.2  Energy rating software 
NatHERS 
The Nationwide House Energy Rating Scheme (NatHERS) is an Australian 
Government program administered by the Department of the Environment and 
Heritage. As part of the scheme, a NatHERS software package has been developed to 
rate the energy efficiency of residential buildings. 
Assessors must input data relating to the building fabric, including building dimensions; 
insulation levels; roof and wall colour; window sizes; and overshading by buildings or 
trees. Building characteristics, hourly local climate data and user occupancy patterns 
are analysed to simulate the operational energy use in the home. From this 
information, the software generates energy ratings which range from 0 to 5 stars. The 
higher the star rating, the more energy efficient the building. 
BERS 
The Building Energy Rating Scheme (BERS) software package was developed by the 
Australian renewable energy consultancy firm Solar Logic. BERS is based on the same 
software engine as NatHERS, and like NatHERS, it uses hourly local climate data to 
simulate household energy use. The simulation data is used to calculate star ratings. 
In addition, BERS allows the assessor to select whether mechanical cooling is to be 
used in the house, and can assess the performance of natural ventilation. These 
options are not available in NatHERS. BERS also uses a different method of data entry 
to NatHERS, which its designers claim is easier to use. 
While BERS is designed for use in areas ranging from alpine to tropical, it is currently 
used mainly in Queensland. 
Star ratings calculated by BERS are the same as those calculated by NatHERS, 
except when the house is located in Queensland. Ratings within Queensland are 
similar to NatHERS ratings, but not identical. 
FirstRate 
The FirstRate package was developed by the Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria. 
FirstRate does not simulate household energy use. Instead it takes the energy load 
predictions in NatHERS and combines them with building element properties entered 
by the assessor. The software then assigns points for individual building elements. 
A star rating is calculated from the total points scored. FirstRate has been designed so 
its ratings are consistent with the ratings produced by NatHERS. 
FirstRate is considered particularly useful at the sketch design stage because of its 
simplicity. 
Sources: Reardon (2001); SEAV (2004a); Solar Logic (nd); WA Department of Housing and Works (nd). 
 
 
The different requirements adopted in the 2003 edition of the Building Code for 
different climate zones reflected the inability of the then available energy rating     




software to adequately account for the benefits of natural ventilation in hot climates. 
NatHERS has been revised (and relabelled as AccuRate) to overcome this problem. 
Verification using a reference building 
The second verification method set out in the Building Code requires builders to use 
energy modelling software to model the proposed building and a ‘reference 
building’. The reference building is a hypothetical building that is similar to the 
proposed building, but is modelled with building features that may be different to 
the proposed design.  
The building features that must be included in the modelled reference building do 
not necessarily represent the most energy-efficient building features. Some features 
are based on the deemed-to-satisfy provisions. For example, roof insulation must be 
modelled to adhere to the deemed-to-satisfy provisions in table 3.12.1.1 of the 
Building Code. Other features are mandated in table V2.6.2 of the Building Code. 
For example, reference buildings must be modelled with a 2.4 metre high horizontal 
ceiling, regardless of the type of ceiling in the proposed design. 
The builder must model the energy load of both buildings for heating and cooling. 
The proposed design will only be verified as compliant with the performance 
requirements if the predicted energy load of the proposed building does not exceed 
the predicted energy load of the reference building. 
When calculating the energy loads of reference buildings, the requirements 
regarding energy modelling software are less restrictive. As stated previously, only 
three packages are currently approved for calculating a star rating or comparison 
with a stated value (NatHERs, BERS and FirstRate). When modelling a reference 
building, builders are not restricted to these three packages. Instead, the Building 
Code permits builders to use ‘a broad range of Australian and international energy 
analysis software’ (Building Code of Australia 2004 (volume 2), s.V.2.6.2, p. 89). 
The same calculation method must be used to model the proposed and reference 
buildings. 
It is anticipated that the reference building method would be applied mainly to more 
complex designs. 
Stringency of the energy efficiency standards for houses 
When the ABCB first began considering including energy efficiency standards in 
the Building Code, Victoria, South Australia and the ACT already had energy 
efficiency provisions in their State and Territory building regulations. At that time,     
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there were no explicit measures in the Building Code that dealt with energy 
efficiency. 
The decision to adopt 3.5 stars as the minimum rating was based on the fact that the 
Energy Smart Homes policy adopted by some local councils in New South Wales 
set a minimum 3.5 star standard for energy efficiency (ABCB 2002).  
By September 2003, Victoria had imposed a five star energy efficiency rating 
requirement on all new homes and apartments, exceeding the stringency of the 
Building Code energy efficiency standards. The New South Wales Government had 
announced requirements that new residential buildings meet certain sustainability 
criteria that included energy efficiency standards. In light of this and ‘to facilitate a 
nationally consistent approach …’ (ABCB 2004d, p. 1), the ABCB agreed that the 
energy efficiency provisions in the Building Code should be reviewed and tightened 
where appropriate. 
In November 2004, the ABCB released a regulatory proposal to raise the energy 
efficiency standards in the Building Code for houses. This did not constitute a 
change in the technical aspects of the energy efficiency standards, merely a proposal 
to increase their stringency to 5 stars on the NatHERS scale, and to provide greater 
consistency between the star rating approach and the deemed-to-satisfy provisions 
(ABCB 2004d). This would involve strengthening the deemed-to-satisfy provisions 
to meet the new, more stringent standards. The intention is to incorporate the 
changes into the 2006 version of the Building Code. 
D.3  The Building Code and energy efficiency of other 
buildings 
Energy efficiency standards for buildings other than houses are being incorporated 
into the Building Code in two phases. Standards for multiple-occupancy buildings 
(class  2–4  buildings) such as apartment buildings, hotels and motels were 
introduced into the main text of the Building Code on 1 May 2005. Regulations for 
non-residential buildings (class 5–9 buildings) will be finalised during 2005 for 
inclusion in the 2006 version of the Building Code. In addition, some jurisdictions 
(New South Wales, Victoria and the ACT) have energy efficiency standards for 
class 2–4 buildings in their appendices to volume one of the Building Code. 
Compliance with the energy efficiency standards  
The standards for class 2–4 buildings cover building fabric and building services. 
Building services are engineering systems that use energy for heating, cooling,     




water heating, lighting and vertical transport. Lighting and vertical transport are not 
included in the definition of domestic services that applies to the existing energy 
efficiency standards for houses. 
Energy efficiency standards for building services 
Provisions for building services apply only to class 3 buildings and the communal 
areas of class 2 buildings. The section sets the performance requirement that: 
A building’s services must continue to perform to a standard of energy efficiency no 
less than that which they were originally required to achieve. (ABCB 2004b, p. A8) 
The deemed-to-satisfy provisions in the Building Code state that to satisfy this 
provision, services must be maintained in accordance with Australian and New 
Zealand Standard 3666.2 (Building Code of Australia 2004 (volume 1), s. I1.2, 
p. 428). 
Energy efficiency standards for building fabric 
The performance requirement for building fabric is that: 
A building, including its services, must have, to the degree necessary, features that 
facilitate the efficient use of energy appropriate to: 
(a) the function and use of the building and service; 
(b) the internal environment;  
(c) the geographic location of the building;  
(d) the effects of nearby permanent features such as topography, structures and 
buildings;  
(e) solar radiation being: 
  (i)  utilised for heating; and  
 (ii)  controlled  to  minimise energy for cooling; and  
(f) the sealing of the building envelope against air leakage;  
(g) the utilisation of air movement to assist heating and cooling; and 
(h) the energy source of the service. (ABCB 2004b, p. A10) 
The text includes extensive deemed-to-satisfy provisions that builders may follow 
to meet the performance requirement. For builders proposing an alternative 
solution, three verification methods are available to demonstrate compliance with 
the performance requirement: 
•  a star rating scheme      
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•  comparison to a maximum allowable energy consumption 
•  comparison to a reference building. 
Verification using a star rating scheme 
For class 2 buildings (buildings containing two or more separate dwellings) and 
class 4 parts of buildings (dwellings in commercial buildings, provided it is the only 
dwelling in the building), the star rating scheme will apply. For these buildings or 
parts of buildings, each unit must achieve a minimum 3 star rating and the average 
star rating for the building must be 3.5 stars in tropical areas and 4 stars in 
temperate zones (ABCB 2004b). 
Verification using a stated value 
Buildings in class 3 (a residential building that is a common place of long term or 
transient living for a number of unrelated persons, for example, boarding houses, 
hotels, motels, residential sections of schools or hospitals) must not exceed a 
maximum allowable annual energy consumption. The value is taken from a table 
that sets out the allowable energy consumption in megajoules per square metre of 
floor area. The allowable energy use depends on the: 
•  type of building 
•  location of the building 
•  energy source used for heating (gas or electricity). 
The builder must prove that the energy use of the building under their proposed 
design will not exceed this target (ABCB 2004b). 
Verification using a reference building 
The reference building verification method that is available to builders of houses is 
also available to builders of class 3 buildings who choose not to use the stated value 
method. Builders must model the energy load of the proposed building and the 
hypothetical reference building. The reference building must be modelled according 
to a set of criteria set out in table JV3 of the proposed text of the Building Code. 
If the predicted energy load of the proposed building does not exceed the predicted 
energy load of the reference building, the proposed design will be verified as 
compliant with the performance requirements.     




It is anticipated that the reference building method will be of particular use for more 
complex designs.  
Energy efficiency standards for class 5–9 buildings 
Energy efficiency standards for class 5–9 buildings are currently under 
development. These building classes include buildings such as offices, retail outlets, 
industrial buildings and buildings of a public nature (such as health and aged care 
buildings). It is proposed that two verification methods will be approved to 
demonstrate compliance with the energy efficiency standards for class 5–9 
buildings: 
•  the maximum allowable annual energy consumption method 
•  the ‘reference building’ method (ABCB 2004b). 
The text of the proposed changes applies the same technical standards as are applied 
to class 2–4 buildings, but extends their coverage to class 5–9 buildings. 
D.4  State-based energy efficiency building schemes 
In New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the ACT, additional or alternative 
requirements are placed on builders of new homes, and in some cases, on those 
planning to sell or renovate existing homes. 
New South Wales 
The NSW Building Sustainability Index (BASIX) scheme provides the sole set of 
guidelines relating to sustainability for residential development in New South 
Wales. The BASIX scheme is designed so that new dwellings meet the NSW 
Government’s targets of up to a 40 per cent reduction in mains potable water 
consumption and a 25 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, compared 
with the average home. The greenhouse gas emission target will increase to 
40 per cent from July 2006. 
BASIX covers a range of ‘sustainability indices’ for: 
•  energy use 
•  water use 
•  thermal comfort.     
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From 1 July 2004, all new homes in Sydney have been required to have a BASIX 
certificate. On 1 July 2005, the scheme was extended to include new single and dual 
occupancy dwellings built anywhere in New South Wales. It will apply to multi-unit 
dwellings from 1 October 2005 and residential alterations and additions from 
1 July 2006. 
Under the BASIX certificate application process, a proposed building is compared 
with statewide per person benchmarks for water and energy use: 
•  90 337 litres per person per annum of water 
•  3292 kilograms of carbon dioxide emissions per person per annum. 
Occupants of all dwelling types in all regions are assessed against these 
benchmarks. Prior to July 2005, buildings were benchmarked against a dwelling of 
the same type in the same area. For example, for a proposed three bedroom 
detached house in Sydney to receive a BASIX certificate, the water consumption 
and greenhouse gas emissions of the proposed house were compared to the average 
water consumption and greenhouse gas emissions for all existing three bedroom 
detached houses in Sydney. 
To get a BASIX certificate, data about a building’s design must be entered into an 
internet-based software package available at http://www.basix.nsw.gov.au. The 
software then calculates whether the design meets the reduction targets. Once the 
design complies, a BASIX certificate can be printed.  
The energy-related information required for a BASIX certificate includes 
information used to assess thermal comfort. This can be provided using either a 
‘simulation method’ or ‘deemed-to-comply method’. The simulation method 
involves providing predictions of the building’s heating and cooling loads from the 
NatHERS simulation software (NatHERS is described in box D.2). The 
deemed-to-comply method involves compliance with a prescriptive list of building 
materials and methods that are considered to be energy efficient. At the time of 
writing this report, the deemed-to-comply method was only available for basic 
single storey dwellings. The NSW Government intends to eventually make the 
deemed-to-comply approach available to a wider range of building types. 
If the internet-based BASIX software cannot calculate the water and energy indices 
required for a BASIX assessment, then an ‘alternative assessment’ option is 
available. This enables qualitative as well as quantitative assessment of 
development proposals by the NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning and 
Natural Resources. Similarly, if a building’s heating and cooling loads cannot be 
simulated (for a thermal comfort index) by the NatHERS software (and the     




deemed-to-comply option is not used), then designers have access to an ‘expert 
opinion’ compliance option. 
Proposed buildings are assessed against a list of criteria relating to the household 
fixtures, fittings and appliances. Points are awarded for the use of: 
•  energy-efficient fittings, technologies and appliances; 
•  technologies that use renewable energy (for example, solar hot water systems); 
and 
•  energy sources that produce lower greenhouse gas emissions (for example, 
natural gas). 
BASIX is enacted through the Environmental Planning and Assessment Amendment 
(Building Sustainability Index: BASIX) Regulation 2004 (NSW)  and the State 
Environmental Planning Policy (Building Sustainability Index: BASIX) 2004 
(NSW). The Policy includes the condition that it ‘prevails over any other 
environmental planning instrument, whenever made, to the extent of any 
inconsistency’ (p. 4). 
A BASIX certificate may include obligations to: 
•  plant a certain area of indigenous vegetation; 
•  install a rainwater tank of a prescribed minimum size, and to configure the 
house’s plumbing system to use the rainwater for prescribed tasks; 
•  use roofing materials of a prescribed colour; 
•  install certain types of fittings (for example, shower heads, taps, toilets); 
•  install prescribed areas of glazing and shading (for example, eaves); 
•  install prescribed types of insulation; 
•  install ceiling fans, and not install ducting that could be used to accommodate 
any other cooling system; 
•  install gas heating, and not install ducting that could be used to accommodate 
any other heating system; 
•  install fluorescent lighting; and 
•  install clothes drying lines (inside and outside) or drying cupboards (inside) 
(NSW DIPNR 2004c). 
The BASIX program was justified by the New South Wales Government on the 
grounds that it would lead to significant reductions in water consumption and 
greenhouse gas emissions, and that this would reduce the demand on existing 
infrastructure and increase affordability of energy and water to consumers.     
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A benefit–cost study prepared by the Allen Consulting Group for the NSW 
Government concluded that implementing the BASIX scheme for houses with 
targets of a 25 per cent reduction in energy use and a 40 per cent reduction in water 
use would lead to: 
•  a reduction in water consumption of 287 gigalitres over 10 years (value 
estimated at $287 million); 
•  a saving of 9.5 million tonnes of greenhouse gases over 10 years (value 
estimated at $47.5 million); 
•  combined energy and water savings of $300–$600 per annum for an ‘average 
family in an electric household’; and 
•  compliance costs of $3878 for the energy and thermal comfort target and $5110 
for the water target for a 3 bedroom, 2 bathroom detached house with a gross 
floor area of 250 square metres on a 550 square metre site (NSW 
DIPNR 2004a). 
In a separate study, the NSW Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural 
Resources advised that: 
In general, estimates for BASIX compliance range from $3000 to $9000 depending on 
size, location and available options … (NSW DIPNR nd2, p. 2) 
The Allen Consulting Group concluded that implementation of the BASIX scheme 
for houses would lead to benefits to the community in net present value terms of 
between $193 million and $339 million over the first ten years of the program 
(NSW DIPNR 2004a). The size of the benefits would depend on the stringency of 
the program. The more stringent target was found to lead to higher benefits. 
A more recent study undertaken for the NSW Department of Infrastructure, 
Planning and Natural Resources estimated that imposing BASIX requirements on 
multi-unit residential buildings would raise the cost per dwelling (excluding GST) 
by: 
•  $7571 for a 5 unit townhouse development 
•  $9078 for a 190 unit high-rise building 
•  $6773 for a 49 unit medium-rise development (BMT and Associates 2005). 
However, the sample of buildings examined were not intended to be representative 
of all multi-unit buildings in New South Wales.     





Since 1 July 2005, most new houses in Victoria have been required to both: 
•  achieve a 5 star rating for building fabric; and  
•  have either a solar hot water heater system or a rain water tank connected to all 
sanitary flushing systems (Victorian Building Commission 2005).  
The exceptions are houses of timber floor or earthwall construction, which until 
30 April 2006 can be constructed to achieve either:  
•  a 5 star rating for building fabric; or  
•  a 4 star rating and have either a solar water heater system or a rain water tank 
connected to all sanitary flushing systems (Victorian Building 
Commission 2005).  
From 1 May 2006, houses with timber floor or earthwall construction will have to 
satisfy the more stringent requirements mentioned above for other houses. 
For class 2 buildings (those containing two or more separate dwellings), an average 
5 star rating is required for the whole building, and each sole occupancy dwelling 
within the building must not achieve a rating of less than 3 stars. 
In most cases, a software package is used to demonstrate whether a building 
achieves the required star rating. The exception is the interim 4 star option for 
houses of timber floor or earthwall construction, which can be satisfied by 
following the deemed-to-satisfy provisions of the Building Code. 
Two software packages have been approved for use in Victoria (FirstRate and 
NatHERS). The rating scores generated by FirstRate are based on the energy loads 
predicted by NatHERS, and so the two packages are closely related. The relevant 
regulations allow software other than FirstRate or NatHERS to be used to 
demonstrate compliance. The Victorian Building Commission (2005) recommends 
that if other software is used, it should meet the ABCB (2005d) Protocol for House 
Energy Rating Software and Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria (SEAV) 
accreditation requirements for software training. 
The Allen Consulting Group (2002) conducted a benefit–cost analysis of the 
building energy efficiency standards for the SEAV and the Victorian Building 
Commission. The MMRF-Green economic model was used to model the impact of 
the proposed measures on the Victorian economy. The analysis relied on a number 
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of assumptions about consumer behaviour. Two possible scenarios were modelled: 
•  a ‘forward-looking’ scenario that assumed that consumers are rational and that 
once they are aware of the net financial benefits of higher cost but more 
energy-efficient housing they will not reduce their level of consumption of 
housing; and 
•  a ‘myopic’ scenario under which buyers of houses react to the higher prices of 
more energy-efficient houses by consuming less. Such buyers would not take 
into account the potential benefits of more energy-efficient housing (Allen 
Consulting Group 2002). 
The authors of the study asserted that their ‘forward-looking’ scenario was more 
realistic. 
The study found that the introduction of 4 or 5 star energy efficiency standards 
would lead to gains in Victoria’s Gross State Product (GSP), and that these gains 
would be higher under the more stringent 5 star standard. 
The size of the gains differed depending on how consumers were assumed to 
behave. Under the ‘forward-looking’ scenario, GSP increased by between $233 
million and $566 million. Under the ‘myopic’ scenario, GSP increased by between 
$30 million to $67 million. These gains represent between 0.001 per cent and 
0.016 per cent of Victoria’s GSP over the 15 year period 2002–2017. The gains 
were estimated by comparison with a base case under which the energy efficiency 
standards were not imposed (Allen Consulting Group 2002). 
The study also concluded that the standards would lead to significant abatement of 
greenhouse gas emissions. Under the 4 star scenario, the reduction would amount to 
500 kilotonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent by 2021. The imposition of a 5 star 
standard would lead to a reduction of 700 kilotonnes over the same period (Allen 
Consulting Group 2002). 
The study recommended the adoption of a 5 star standard for new housing in 
Victoria, which it described as: 
… one of very few regulations designed to increase an individual’s consumption of a 
product in their own best interests. (Allen Consulting Group 2002, p. 21) 
As well as welcoming the economic and greenhouse gas benefits identified in the 
Allen Consulting Group study, the Victorian Government justified the more 
stringent energy efficiency compliance program by claiming that houses that meet 
the new standard will be better quality, more comfortable and consume less energy, 
resulting in lower energy bills for households (SEAV 2004b).      





In December 2004, the Queensland Government released a discussion paper and a 
regulatory impact statement dealing with proposed changes to building regulations 
in Queensland. The changes were designed to encourage sustainable housing 
development. The discussion paper defined sustainable housing as ‘planning, 
designing and building dwellings that are more socially, environmentally and 
economically sustainable’ (Queensland Government 2004b, p. 3). 
The aims of the proposed policy changes are to increase water and energy efficiency 
and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These aims come in the context of 
concerns about potential water shortages (particularly in the rapidly growing south 
east of Queensland), the impact on peak electricity demand of air conditioning, and 
the desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Intervention was justified by the 
Queensland Government on the grounds that the issue is ‘too important to leave 
solely to market forces’(Queensland Government 2004a, p. 5). 
In the regulation impact statement, the Queensland Government confirmed that in 
September 2003 it had adopted the energy efficiency provisions in the Building 
Code, but noted that ‘there is no nationally consistent approach to [the broader issue 
of] sustainable housing’ (Queensland Government 2004a, p. 9). It then indicated its 
intention to go beyond the provisions of the Building Code (which deals only with 
the fabric of the building and indirectly with heating and cooling), and to introduce 
measures dealing with household fixtures and appliances. 
This would be achieved by amending the Standard Plumbing and Drainage 
Regulation 1993  (Qld) and the Standard Building Regulation 1993 (Qld)  to 
incorporate mandatory energy and water efficiency measures. The proposed 
regulations would apply only to new residential buildings. 
The regulation impact statement included calculations of the net present value of the 
total costs and benefits of the various measures over a 15–20 year period. Below is 
a list of the proposed Queensland Government regulations and the net benefit of 
each measure as calculated in the regulation impact statement (Queensland 
Government 2004a). The net benefits were estimated as changes from a base case of 
no change. They are expressed in net present value terms and benefits are assumed 
to accrue over 15 or 20 years. The value of the reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions is included as a benefit. Proposals under consideration include 
requirements for the installation of:  
•  solar electric hot water heaters in all new homes (net benefit of $184 million); 
•  solar gas hot water heaters in all new homes (net cost of $375 million); 
•  energy-efficient lighting in all new homes (net benefit of $18 million);     
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•  AAA-rated shower roses in all new homes (net benefit of $92 million); 
•  dual-flush toilets in all new homes (net benefit of $2 million); 
•  require the installation of water pressure limiting devices in all new homes (net 
benefit of $52 million); and 
•  (under local council regulations) rain water tanks in all new homes (net cost of 
$28 million). 
The regulation impact statement also estimated that local councils would face 
recurrent annual costs of between $1 million and $3 million for administration of 
the scheme. The impact on Queensland industry was predicted to be neutral. 
The ACT 
The ACT House Energy Rating Scheme (ACTHERS) has been operational since 
1  July  1995. Under ACTHERS, anyone intending to build a new residential 
property in the ACT must obtain an energy efficiency rating assessment. All new 
residences must meet a minimum 4 star standard. The star rating is calculated using 
the FirstRate software model. This part of the scheme is consistent with the energy 
efficiency standards for new houses in the Building Code. 
In addition to the requirements for new homes, ACTHERS places conditions on the 
sale of existing homes. From 31 March 1999, anyone wishing to sell an existing 
property has had to obtain an energy efficiency rating assessment. There is no 
minimum energy efficiency standard for existing dwellings, but sellers must 
disclose the energy rating of the home in all advertisements and the contract for 
sale. This element of the program was implemented by the Energy Efficiency 
Ratings (Sale of Premises) Act 1997 (ACT). 
The aim of the ACT Government in implementing ACTHERS was to adopt a 
scheme that would: 
•  encourage awareness in the community and building industry of the benefits of 
energy efficiency; 
•  demonstrate the Government's commitment to the National Ecologically 
Sustainable Development and Greenhouse Strategies, the COAG’s agreement on 
residential energy efficiency of 1993 and the ACT Greenhouse Strategy; and 
•  conform to the national benchmark program NatHERS.     




D.5  Self-regulatory building energy efficiency schemes 
In addition to the mandatory building energy efficiency standards, there are several 
energy efficiency programs currently operating that are based on self regulation. 
These programs include: 
•  voluntary building practice programs 
•  voluntary energy ratings for residential and commercial buildings 
•  policies to reduce energy use in government buildings. 
Voluntary building industry initiatives (Australian Government) 
The AGO sponsors a range of initiatives to encourage building and construction 
practitioners to adopt practices that will reduce building-related greenhouse gas 
emissions. Programs funded under this initiative include: 
•  Window Energy Rating Scheme — windows are rated on a 5 star scale. 
Windows that minimise unwanted heat gain or loss are awarded higher star 
ratings. 
•  Environmental Design Guides — the Australian Council of Building Design 
Professions Ltd (BDP), the peak body for architects, engineers, quantity 
surveyors, landscape architects and planners, produces a series called the BDP 
Environmental Design Guide. The AGO has assisted the BDP to produce a 
series dealing with greenhouse gas emission minimisation. 
•  BDP Making Energy Pay — the AGO funded a series of seminars in which 
building design professionals were encouraged to reduce building energy use by 
applying new technologies and energy efficiency principles into building 
designs. 
•  Building Design Association of Australia (BDAA) Marketing Sustainable 
Design Workshops — the BDAA is the peak body for building designers. The 
AGO has funded a series of workshops to encourage over 700 building designers 
to incorporate good environmental design principles into their building designs. 
•  Housing Industry Association Limited (HIA) Greensmart Professional 
Accreditation Course — the HIA is Australia's peak building, renovating and 
development industry association. The AGO provided funding for the HIA’s 
GreenSmart Training and Accreditation program. The program trains builders in 
energy efficiency, waste minimisation and soil and sediment pollution reduction. 
•  Master Builders Australia (MBA) Energy Wise–Dollar Wise Training Course — 
the MBA is Australia’s peak body for commercial and industrial builders. The     
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AGO provides funding for a program to train commercial building contractors in 
energy efficiency practices. 
•  Lighting Best Practice Project — aims to reduce the amount of energy used for 
lighting by encouraging the use of natural light and energy-efficient lighting 
products. (AGO nd) 
Voluntary building energy efficiency schemes 
Owners and tenants of residential and office buildings are able to use the voluntary 
schemes outlined below to rate the energy performance of their buildings, and to 
identify opportunities for reducing building energy use, including by improving 
energy efficiency. Two of the schemes operate nationally, one operates only in New 
South Wales. 
Australian Building Greenhouse Rating scheme 
The Australian Building Greenhouse Rating (ABGR) scheme promotes voluntary 
audits of office buildings to determine the greenhouse gas emissions resulting from 
energy consumption. The program promotes energy efficiency as one strategy to 
reduce building greenhouse gas emissions. The ABGR scheme was developed and 
is administered nationally by the New South Wales Department of Energy, Utilities 
and Sustainability (DEUS). In Victoria, the scheme is administered by SEAV; in 
Western Australia by the Sustainable Energy Development Office; and in 
Queensland by the Environmental Protection Agency. In other jurisdictions the 
scheme is administered by DEUS. 
The scheme consists of two elements: 
•  Internet-based tools for calculating energy use and identifying opportunities to 
reduce energy consumption; and 
•  star ratings calculated by ABGR accredited assessors.  
Buildings that have undergone accredited assessments are eligible to use the ABGR 
logo and star rating to advertise their greenhouse performance. The scheme 
promotes the ABGR logo and ratings as tools for attracting tenants who are 
concerned about the greenhouse performance of the buildings they occupy. 
National Australian Built Environment Rating System 
The Australian Government Department of the Environment and Heritage has 
developed a voluntary building rating scheme called the National Australian Built     




Environment Rating System (NABERS). NABERS can be used to rate the 
performance of existing commercial office buildings and residential buildings 
against a number of criteria. The system is based on self assessment using 
spreadsheets made available on a website by the Department of the Environment 
and Heritage. The spreadsheets use data on building usage to calculate performance 
in a number of areas and assign a rating out of five. Building characteristics 
assessed by NABERS are: 
•  energy use 
•  greenhouse gas emissions 
•  refrigerant use 
•  water use 
•  stormwater runoff  
•  stormwater pollution 
•  sewage outfall volume  
•  transport (including building location and modes of transport used) 
•  landscape diversity 
•  toxic materials 
•  waste 
•  indoor air quality 
•  occupant satisfaction. 
It is possible to calculate building performance with respect to one or all of these 
characteristics. 
Energy Smart Home Rating (New South Wales) 
In New South Wales, DEUS runs the Energy Smart Home Rating website. Two 
tools are available on the program website — a star rating tool, and a virtual home 
audit. The star rating tool calculates a star rating (out of five) for existing houses, 
while the virtual audit compiles personalised ‘energy action plans’ which identify 
opportunities for reducing household energy use. Access to the tools is not restricted 
to New South Wales residents.     
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 E  Framework for appliance labels and 
standards 
Domestic and commercial appliances are subject to a range of energy performance 
standards, both mandatory and voluntary. Many of the current requirements evolved 
from those originally established by State and Territory Governments, and have 
been expanded so that their coverage is now national. Other programs were 
developed overseas and have been adopted in Australia.  
E.1  National Appliance and Equipment Energy 
Efficiency Program 
The National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency Program (NAEEEP) is 
an initiative of the Australian, State and Territory Governments. The aim of the 
program is to develop and oversee measures to improve the energy efficiency of 
appliances and equipment used by households and firms. The program is 
administered by the National Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency 
Committee (NAEEEC), which is ultimately directed by the Ministerial Council on 
Energy (MCE) (NAEEEC 2004a). 
Currently, NAEEEP only covers electrical appliances. Gas appliances are managed 
by an industry body, the Australian Gas Association (AGA). However, the MCE 
has recently set up new arrangements for gas appliances (AGO 2005f). This change 
is in line with the National Framework for Energy Efficiency (NFEE) Stage One 
measures, which include a commitment to broaden the scope of NAEEEP to 
incorporate mandatory energy performance labelling and minimum energy 
performance standards (MEPS) for gas appliances (MCE 2004a). 
Electrical appliances covered by NAEEEP are subject to mandatory labelling and/or 
MEPS.  
Mandatory labelling schemes make it compulsory to affix energy performance 
rating labels to specific domestic appliances at the point of sale. The labels are 
designed to enable consumers to easily compare the energy performance of 
appliances. They include a star rating, which enables a comparative assessment of     
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the model’s energy efficiency and an estimated annual energy consumption of the 
appliance. 
MEPS prescribe a minimum allowed energy performance for specific appliances. 
Appliances that are less efficient than the relevant standard are excluded from the 
market. 
History 
The origins of the NAEEEP labelling scheme can be traced to the late 1970s, when 
the New South Wales and Victorian Governments proposed energy labelling for 
appliances. The Australian Government first raised the issue in 1982, and it was met 
with considerable resistance from the appliance industry. Instead, the appliance 
industry favoured a voluntary program over mandatory labelling and wanted any 
program introduced to be nationally uniform (NAEEEC 2004a). 
No such national program was established. In 1986, New South Wales and Victoria 
introduced their own labelling schemes. Initially, these schemes covered 
refrigerators and freezers. Room air conditioners were included in 1987 and 
dishwashers in 1988. Victoria introduced labelling requirements for clothes dryers 
in 1989 and clothes washing machines in 1990. In 1991, South Australia introduced 
labelling requirements for the five appliance types regulated in Victoria 
(NAEEEC 2004a).  
Two documents released by the Australian Government during the 1990s — the 
National Greenhouse Response Strategy (1992) and the National Greenhouse 
Strategy (1998) — included proposals to extend and strengthen the existing energy 
labelling and MEPS schemes. NAEEEC was established under the auspices of the 
National Greenhouse Strategy (IEA 2000; NAEEEC 2004a). 
In October 1999, nationally consistent MEPS and labelling schemes were adopted 
across Australia. Since then, mandatory labelling has been extended to include other 
classes of appliances (table E.1) 
In 2000, rating scales for all electrical appliance labels were recalibrated, leading to 
most products receiving a lower star rating than they had previously. This was 
intended to provide an incentive for manufacturers to increase the efficiency of their 
appliances, and to avoid the problem of appliances clustering around the high end of 
the star ratings (thus making labels less useful for comparing appliances).     




Table E.1  Mandatory energy performance standards (MEPS) and labelling 
for electrical appliances 
  Introduction of current requirements 
Appliance/equipment type  Labelling  MEPS
Household   
Refrigerators  October 1999  January 2005
Freezers  October 1999  January 2005
Clothes washers  October 1999  na
Clothes dryers  October 1999  na
Dishwashers October  1999  na
Electric water heaters  na  October 1999
Single phase air conditioners  October 2001  October 2004
Three phase air conditioners (up to 65 kilowatt cooling 
capacity)  naa October  2001
Commercial and industrial   
Three phase electric motors  na  October 2001
Ballasts for linear fluorescent lamps   nab March  2003
Linear fluorescent lamps  na  October 2004
Commercial refrigerators  na  October 2004
Distribution transformers  na  October 2004
na Not applicable. a Energy labelling is voluntary for three phase air conditioners. b Fluorescent lamp ballasts 
subject to MEPS must be marked with an energy efficiency index. 
Sources: Harrington and Holt (2002); AGO (2004a); AGO (2005d). 
Administrative arrangements 
NAEEEC is responsible for the administration of the mandatory energy 
performance labelling and MEPS programs, and reports to the MCE. The MCE was 
established by the Council of Australian Governments in June 2001. It comprises all 
Australian, State and Territory Government energy ministers, and a New Zealand 
representative. 
Role of State and Territory legislation and regulation 
NAEEEC has no regulatory powers of its own. For the regulations developed by 
NAEEEC to become mandatory, they must be adopted by State and Territory 
Governments. The State and Territory legislation is based on ‘model regulation’. 
The relevant State and Territory legislation and regulations are detailed in table E.2.     
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Table E.2  Legislation and subordinate regulations relating to appliance 
energy performance 
Jurisdiction  Title of legislation and regulations
New South Wales  Electricity Safety Act 1945
Electricity Safety (Equipment Efficiency) Regulation 1999
Victoria  Electricity Safety Act 1998 
Electricity Safety (Equipment Efficiency) Regulations 1999 
Queensland  Electricity Act and Regulation 1994
South Australia  Electrical Products Act 2000
Regulations under the Electrical Products Act 2000 (No. 224 of 2001)
Western Australia  Electricity Act 1945
Electricity Regulations 1947
Tasmania  Electricity Industry Safety and Administration Act 1997
Electricity Industry Safety and Administration Regulations 1999
ACT  Electricity Act 1971
Electricity Safety Regulations 1971
Northern Territory  Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Act 2004
Consumer Affairs (Product Information) Regulations 1993
Source: NAEEEC (2004a). 
Testing arrangements 
Appliances that are required to carry an energy performance label or to meet MEPS 
must be registered before they can be sold in Australia.  
Manufacturers must apply to have their appliance (or family of similar models) 
registered in one of four jurisdictions: 
1.  New South Wales 
2.  Victoria 
3.  Queensland 
4.  South Australia. 
A registration accepted in any of these jurisdictions is valid throughout Australia, 
and remains valid for up to five years, after which the product must be re-registered. 
Applications for registration must include a test report or other data to demonstrate 
that the appliance meets the relevant Australian Standard. The Australian Standards 
for products that are required to carry energy-performance labels or meet MEPS 
generally consist of two parts: 
•  Part One relates to the testing procedure (including the test method, ambient 
conditions, performance measures and test materials).     




•  Part Two contains the detailed technical requirements for energy labelling and 
MEPS, including algorithms for the calculation of star ratings and comparative 
energy consumption that appears on the energy-performance label. 
This approach to regulating the labelling and MEPS schemes has been operating 
since 1991 (NAEEEC 2004a). Because the testing procedures and technical 
requirements for appliances are incorporated into the applicable Australian 
Standards, the State and Territory legislation simply refer to the relevant Australian 
Standards. This approach simplifies the State and Territory legislation, and makes it 
relatively straightforward to maintain national consistency of appliance and 
equipment energy efficiency standards, even when standards are continually being 
revised. 
Australian Standards are developed by committees that are part of Standards 
Australia, and must be jointly approved by State and Territory regulatory agencies 
before they are published. When adopting Australian Standards for appliance 
energy efficiency, State and Territory Governments: 
… support a policy of adopting international standards and contributing to international 
standards development wherever appropriate. This support is intended to minimise the 
prospect of Australian Standards becoming unintended trade barriers and to reduce 
business compliance costs in meeting differing standards in differing markets for the 
same appliance. (NAEEEC 2004a, p. 7) 
The approach to labelling and MEPS was originally based on ‘no regrets’ measures 
(Harrington and Holt 2005). ‘No regrets’ policy options have been defined as 
measures that have net private benefits (or at least no net cost) in addition to the 
social benefits associated with decreased energy use (such as lower greenhouse gas 
emissions) (IC 1997).  
The overarching concern for climate change shifted the basis for NAEEEP to 
‘world’s best regulatory practice’ (NAEEEC 2004c;  Harrington and Holt 2004, 
p. 2). The Department of the Environment and Heritage (DEH) noted:  
… [the aim of] the Australian approach is to match, for each appliance regulated, best 
practice levels imposed by Australia’s major trading partners. This approach overcomes 
arguments regarding the technical feasibility of meeting the proposed MEPS levels and 
avoids elaborate and expensive testing procedures being conducted locally. 
(sub. 30, p. 15) 
The ‘world’s best practice’ basis for labelling and MEPS was reviewed in 
December 2004 by the MCE. After the review, the Council decided to extend the 
mandate to ‘lead the world if that option … [is] cost-effective for the Australian 
community and … [has] widespread stakeholder support’ (DEH, sub. DR146, p. 2). 
However, if a particular option is not cost-effective, then MEPS will be set to     
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‘match, for each appliance regulated, best practice levels imposed by Australia’s 
major trading partners’ (DEH, sub. 30, p. 15). 
The DEH (sub.  DR146) claimed that the current policy setting has widespread 
support from interested parties. 
NAEEEC plays an active role in the development of standards. For instance, in 
2002, NAEEEC committed over $350  000 to standards development work, 
including: 
•  funding of testing designed to develop industry competency with a new or 
developing standard; 
•  funding of testing programs designed to inform the process of the setting of 
MEPS levels; 
•  commissioning of round robin testing programs designed to ensure that 
enforcement programs are based on robust and reproducible test methods; 
•  provision of technical expertise to Standards Australia’s standards committees; 
•  assistance to Standards Australia to maintain representation on key international 
standards committees; 
•  assistance in the development and maintenance of the supply of materials used 
in testing; and 
•  providing (with Standards Australia) financial support to Australian delegates 
attending international standards meetings (AGO 2003d). 
Evidence that an appliance meets the requirements set out in the relevant Australian 
Standard can be obtained from a laboratory that is accredited by the National 
Association of Testing Authorities (NATA), or another body that is recognised by 
NATA, or by an independent third-party laboratory. 
Check testing 
Check testing is a quality assurance measure that: 
… provides consumers with confidence that performance characteristics are correctly 
identified and protects the investments made by manufacturers in developing more 
energy-efficient products. (SEAV 2003, p. 27) 
Appliances that have been registered and are available for sale are purchased 
anonymously. NATA accredited laboratories are then commissioned to test that the 
appliances meet the claims made on the energy-performance label and that they 
satisfy any applicable MEPS.     




Failing a check test can lead to a range of consequences: 
•  The laboratory that conducted the pre-registration tests may be barred from 
preparing test reports in the future. 
•  The registration holder may have to show cause why the appliance should not be 
deregistered. 
•  The registration holder may be required to pay for further testing. 
•  The model may be withdrawn from sale, either permanently or until the 
registration holder can demonstrate that alterations have been made to all units to 
ensure compliance with the relevant standards (NAEEEC 2004a). 
In 2004, NAEEEC conducted check tests on seven appliance types. Out of 58 
appliances tested, 28 wer e  f o u n d  n o t  t o  m e e t  t h e  c l a i m s  m a d e  o n  t h e  
energy-performance labels. Eleven products were deregistered, and action was 
pending on the remaining 17 products (NAEEEC 2005b). 
Other regulatory actions undertaken in 2003 included fines of $3000 and $8000 
against two Western Australian retailers who were found to have sold appliances 
without energy-performance labels. Queensland and Victorian retailers received 
infringement notices and fines totalling $10 000 (AGO 2003c). 
Information provision 
NAEEEC, in conjunction with Australian,  and State and Territory Government 
agencies, provides information about appliance labelling and standards. General 
information is made available on the Energy Rating website 
(http://www.energyrating.gov.au). More recently, NAEEEC, as part of a joint 
initiative, has set up another website detailing all of the top energy-performing 
appliances (http://energyallstars.gov.au). The Energy Allstars website provides 
product listings that can be used to compare appliances, work out how much the 
appliances cost to buy and run, and how much energy and water they will use. 
Planned future changes to NAEEEP labelling and MEPS 
Stage One of NFEE included a commitment to expand the scope of NAEEEP: 
… through the introduction of new or more stringent MEPS for residential, commercial 
and industrial products, with a key focus on increasing the number of commercial and 
industrial products regulated. (MCE 2004e, p. 2) 
The NAEEEC work program includes plans to regulate some classes of appliances 
that are not currently subject to MEPS or mandatory labelling, and to revise the     
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regulations on some appliances that are already covered. Table E.3 outlines the 
planned changes. 
Table E.3  Planned changes to NAEEEP mandatory energy performance 
standards (MEPS) and labelling 
Appliance/equipment type  Labelling  MEPS 
Small mains pressure electric storage 
water heaters (< 80 litres) and low 
pressure and heat exchanger type water 
heaters 
No planned change  To be introduced      
October 2005 
Oil-fired boilers  Investigated but no  
action to be taken 
Investigated but no  
action to be taken 
Single phase air conditioners  No planned change  Revised MEPS to be  
introduced October 2007 
Three phase air conditioners up to 65 
kilowatt cooling capacity 
No planned change  Revised MEPS to be  
introduced October 2007 
Televisions Mandatory  labelling 
proposed for introduction 
October 2006 
MEPS proposed for  
introduction April 2006 
Digital set top boxes  No planned change  MEPS proposed for  
introduction April 2006 
Computers No  planned change  MEPS under  
consideration for possible  
introduction in 2007 
Computer monitors  No planned change  MEPS proposed for  
introduction April 2006  
Revised, more stringent  
MEPS proposed for  
introduction April 2008 
External power supplies  No planned change  MEPS proposed for  
introduction April 2006  
Revised, more stringent  
MEPS proposed for  
introduction April 2008 




Ice makers and ice storage bins  No planned change  MEPS proposed for  
introduction October 2006 
Wine storage cabinets  Investigated but no  
action to be taken 
Investigated but no  
action to be taken 
Three phase electric motors  No planned change  Revised MEPS proposed  
for introduction April 2006 
Source: AGO (2002c, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e, 2004f, 2004g, 2004j, 2004k).     




Regulation impact assessments 
Proposed revisions to mandatory labelling requirements and MEPS for electrical 
appliances have to be accompanied by a regulation impact statement that specifies 
the likely benefits and costs of the proposal. These are prepared for, and must be 
formally approved by, the MCE. The benefit–cost assessments have often been 
undertaken by consultants that have relevant expertise in appliance energy 
performance (for example, George Wilkenfeld and Associates and Energy Efficient 
Strategies 1999; Syneca Consulting 2003a, 2004). 
E.2  Energy efficiency standards for gas appliances 
The current minimum standards and labelling requirements for gas appliances are 
administered by the AGA. The administrative arrangements are currently being 
revised to meet the NFEE Stage One commitment to broaden the scope of NAEEEP 
to include mandatory energy-performance labelling and MEPS for gas appliances. 
History 
In 1981, the Gas and Fuel Corporation of Victoria introduced energy labelling for 
gas water heaters. This was the first labelling scheme for gas appliances in 
Australia, and was taken over by the AGA in 1985. In 1988, a six star 
energy-performance label was introduced. This label was intended to be visually 
consistent with the star rating labels already familiar to consumers of electrical 
appliances. 
Domestic nonducted gas heaters have been subject to labelling since 1993, and 
domestic ducted heaters since 1994 (SEAV 2003). Currently, only gas water heaters 
and domestic space heaters (ducted and nonducted) are subject to mandatory energy 
labelling. 
As with electrical appliances, labelling schemes for gas appliances are reviewed 
from time to time. Water heater label scales were revised in 1988 and modified in 
1999 to include half star rating increments. The labels for domestic space heaters 
(ducted and nonducted) were reviewed in 1998 and 2003 (SEAV 2003). 
Gas appliances have been subject to minimum standards since the 1960s. Currently, 
gas water heaters, gas space heaters and gas cookers are subject to minimum 
standards. The current minimum standards levels were set in 1983 and ‘the majority 
of models currently on the market appear to exceed current requirements by a 
comfortable margin’ (SEAV 2003, p. 23).      
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Administrative arrangements 
The greatest difference between the minimum standards and labelling programs for 
gas and electrical appliances is that the gas appliance scheme is administered by an 
industry body. Before any mass-produced gas appliance can be made available for 
sale or installation in any State or Territory, it must receive AGA certification. To 
receive certification, the appliance must meet certain standards of safety, reliability 
and energy efficiency. 
As is the case with electrical appliances, the technical standards that define 
minimum standards and energy labelling requirements are incorporated into 
Australian Standards. In 2000, the AGA gained accreditation as a Standards 
Development Organisation, meaning that it was permitted to write Australian 
Standards for gas appliances (SEAV 2003). Since July 2003, the section of the 
AGA responsible for developing gas appliance standards has been incorporated into 
Standards Australia. 
Testing and compliance 
Manufacturers of gas appliances must currently submit a specification of their 
appliance to the AGA. The AGA then develops a test program for the appliance, 
and the appliance is tested at an independent laboratory that is accredited by NATA 
and registered with the AGA. If the laboratory report indicates that the appliance is 
compliant with the relevant Australian Standard, the manufacturer receives a 
certificate that permits them to affix the AGA Maker’s Warranty Badge to the 
appliance, and make it available for sale and installation. 
The requirement for the test to be conducted at a laboratory accredited by NATA is 
similar to the requirements for electrical appliances (which also permit testing at 
laboratories accredited by bodies recognised by NATA).  
Product verification audits 
Certified gas appliances are periodically subject to product verification audits 
(PVAs). The audit program typically involves annual product inspections, although 
inspections may be more or less frequent. The aim of PVAs is to help confirm that 
an appliance adheres to the currently certified design specifications and regulatory 
requirements (AGA 2004b). If the audit identifies noncompliance with the relevant 
standard, the product’s certification may be cancelled. 
The aim and potential consequences of PVAs are similar to those for check testing 
of electrical appliances, although the process is slightly different. Whereas check     




testing is conducted on appliances purchased anonymously, PVAs are conducted on 
the manufacturer’s premises. In addition, check testing is carried out on only a few 
products annually, whereas all gas appliances are subject to periodic PVAs. 
Planned changes to gas appliance labelling and MEPS 
The administrative arrangements for the regulation of gas appliances are currently 
undergoing transition (AGO 2005f). The National Greenhouse Strategy, released in 
1998, included a commitment to: 
… working with industry to improve gas appliance minimum energy performance 
standards (MEPS) and labelling programs. (AGO 1998, p. 48) 
The AGA (2004a, pp. 1–2) recognised that ‘there is a clear need for a nationally 
consistent approach [to gas appliance MEPS and energy labelling]’, and that the 
existing scheme ‘is in need of updating and the Standards and MOTs [methods of 
test] need to be updated and modernised’. The AGA proposed that any new scheme, 
if it is mandated through legislation, should be nationally consistent and should be 
based on the existing MEPS and labelling schemes administered by the AGA, rather 
than being completely new schemes. 
The NFEE Stage One measures announced in August 2004 included plans for 
NAEEEP to be: 
… broadened in scope to include mandatory minimum energy performance standards 
(MEPS) and labelling for gas products. (MCE 2004e, p. 2) 
In April 2005, the Australian Greenhouse Office (AGO) published a work plan 
which outlined the introduction of mandatory gas labelling and MEPS (table E.4) 
(AGO 2005f; 2004m). 
It is proposed that the new arrangements will: 
… steadily incorporate those products already subject to energy labelling and standards 
under the existing industry scheme. It will expand to include any product that consumes 
mains pressure natural gas or LPG gas within the domestic, commercial and industrial 
sectors, subject to economic analysis and community consultation. (AGO 2004m, p. 5) 
The proposed scheme for gas appliances:  
… will match, or where viable and economically feasible, lead the world in regulatory 
standards. (AGO 2004m, p. 5)     
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Table E.4  Proposed changes to gas appliance mandatory energy 
performance standards (MEPS) and labelling 
Appliance/equipment type  Proposed changes 
Domestic gas water heaters and space 
heaters (ducted and nonducted)  New MEPS and labelling standards 
to be introduced in 2008 
Domestic gas cookers (ovens and cook tops) 
Commercial gas water heaters 
Commercial gas space heaters 
Industrial gas boilers 
New MEPS and/or labelling standards 
to be developed 2008–11  
and introduced 2012–15 
Gas clothes dryers 
Some priority gas catering equipment 
New MEPS and/or labelling standards 
to be developed 2012–15  
for introduction at a later date 
Source: AGO (2005e). 
Officials from the AGO, Sustainable Energy Authority of Victoria (SEAV), and 
Victorian Office of Gas Safety have taken key roles on the Implementation 
Committee charged with establishing the new gas labelling and MEPS 
arrangements. The Committee will initially focus on the formal establishment of the 
Gas Appliance and Equipment Energy Efficiency Program (GAEEEP) as part of the 
NAEEEP (AGO 2005f). In the longer term, representatives from all jurisdictions 
will be involved in maintaining, updating and administering the GAEEEP 
arrangements (George Wilkenfeld and Associates 2004a). 
E.3 Voluntary  programs 
In addition to the mandatory energy performance labelling and MEPS requirements 
that apply to some gas and electrical appliances, voluntary labelling and standards 
programs also operate in Australia. The Energy Star and Top Energy Saver Award 
programs use voluntary endorsement labels to identify appliances and equipment 
that meet particular standards of energy efficiency. The Standby Power program 
focuses on reducing the energy consumed by appliances when they are not in use.     





Energy Star is a voluntary endorsement labelling program developed by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). It has been operating since 1992, and 
has been adopted by a number of countries, including Australia. Energy Star sets 
voluntary standards for reducing the electricity consumption of electronic 
equipment when it is not performing its core function.  
This can be accomplished by: 
•  switching the appliance into a ‘sleep’ mode after a period of inactivity; and/or 
•  reducing the amount of electricity consumed by the appliance in ‘standby’ mode 
(box E.1). 
In 1996, the New South Wales Sustainable Energy Development Authority 
implemented part of the Energy Star program under licence from the US EPA. In 
1999, the Authority was commissioned by NAEEEC to expand its scheme into a 
national program to cover home entertainment and office equipment (AGO 2002b). 
State and Territory environment and energy agencies now promote Energy Star in 
their jurisdictions. 
 
Box E.1 Standby  power 
Standby power is the energy drawn by an electrical appliance when it is not performing 
its core function. Many appliances consume energy constantly, including when they 
are not in active use. In this mode they may be performing non-core functions such as 
sensing remote control signals or keeping the appliance’s internal clock running. These 
non-core functions are valued by many consumers. 
In 2000, standby power was estimated to constitute 11.6  per  cent of Australia’s 
residential electricity use, costing households over $500 million and leading to the 
emission of over 5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (AGO 2002b). Holt and 
Harrington (2004) estimated that standby power consumption in Australia could be 
reduced by 56 per cent by 2020. 
 
 
Currently, the Australian Energy Star program covers: 
•  photocopiers 
•  printers and fax machines 
•  scanners 
•  multi-function devices (combined photocopying, fax and scanner functions) 
•  computers and monitors     
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•  consumer audio products 
•  consumer DVD products and VCRs 
•  televisions. 
Manufacturers of appliances that comply with the technical requirements of the 
Energy Star program are permitted to use the Energy Star logo on their products and 
in promotional material. Retailers are encouraged to sell and promote the benefits of 
Energy Star compliant appliances. Australian, State and Territory Government 
agencies promote the purchase of appliances that meet the requirements of Energy 
Star. In addition, Australian Government departments and agencies: 
… are required to purchase only office equipment that complies with the US EPA 
Energy Star standard, where it is available and fit for purpose. (DISR 2000, p. 477) 
The US Energy Star program has been extended beyond electronic appliances and 
currently covers over 40 categories of products, including: 
•  heating and cooling products 
•  refrigerators and freezers 
•  water coolers 
•  clothes washers 
•  lighting products 
•  commercial food preparation equipment 
•  insulation 
•  windows, doors and skylights (US EPA 2005). 
Many of these products are not covered by the Australian Energy Star program, 
although some are subject to mandatory energy-performance labelling or MEPS, 
and others are covered by other voluntary programs, such as the Window Energy 
Rating Scheme. The US EPA has agreed in principle to the extension of the 
Australian Energy Star program to cover products included in the US program 
(AGO 2002b). 
One Watt program 
In addition to their support for the Energy Star program, the Australian, State and 
Territory Governments have agreed to adopt the International Energy Agency’s One 
Watt program. The One Watt initiative was first mooted in 1997. Its aim is to 
reduce the standby power consumption of all appliances to less than one watt by 
2010 (IEA 2002).     




In 2000, the MCE agreed to: 
… pursue efficiencies in standby power consumption of energy-consuming products, 
through support for the International Energy Agency’s One Watt program, and endorse 
its incorporation into the … program of work. (AGO 2002a, p. 7) 
Australia was the first country in the world to endorse the initiative (IEA 2002). 
Since then, Australia has actively participated in international forums on standby 
power, and has funded work done by the International Electrotechnical Commission 
on the measurement of standby power consumption (Holt and Harrington 2004). 
Currently, the standby power program is based on voluntary compliance and 
information. To further the program, NAEEEC has developed product profiles that 
assess the standby power performance of particular classes of appliances and 
equipment. The profiles include targets for the standby power consumption of the 
product (generally expected to be in line with the Energy Star levels of 
consumption). The profile is circulated for comment, and the voluntary target is 
then included in the relevant Australian Standard, to ensure industry familiarity. 
NAEEEC collects data on standby power consumption, and these data will be 
monitored to assess the performance of the industry against the voluntary target 
(AGO 2002a). 
If the voluntary targets do not accomplish the desired reductions in standby power 
use, mandatory measures, including MEPS, may be considered. This would only be 
done with the approval of the MCE, and would be accomplished by changing the 
relevant Australian Standard to incorporate a mandatory target for standby power 
use (AGO 2002a). 
Top Energy Saver Award 
The Top Energy Saver Award program awards manufacturers of specific models of 
electrical and gas appliances that meet high standards of energy efficiency. Each 
year NAEEEC releases documents developed in consultation with manufacturers 
that set benchmarks for electrical and gas appliance energy efficiency (for example, 
a certain star rating). Appliances that meet or exceed this level of efficiency are 
awarded a Top Energy Saver Award (AGO 2004n). Electrical appliances are 
automatically assessed for eligibility when they are registered. Manufacturers of gas 
appliances must apply to the AGA for consideration.  
Winners of the awards are permitted to use the Top Energy Saver Award label on 
the appliance and in promotional material for one year. They may then reapply for 
the award, and the appliance will be assessed against the revised energy efficiency 
benchmark for that year.      
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 F  Discount rates 
Energy efficiency investments often involve an upfront capital cost, while the 
benefits are realised in increments in the future. In order for benefits and costs to be 
compared, both for a given investment and across different investments, they should 
be converted to a common unit of measurement that removes the effects of timing 
differences. This conversion is done by using a discount rate. 
Discounting the benefits and costs of a project allows them to be compared in 
present value terms. That is, what they are worth today. If the net present value for a 
project (present value of benefits less present value of costs) is positive, the 
investment is expected to be financially rewarding for the investor. When assessing 
multiple investments, the investment with the highest net present value would be the 
most financially rewarding (assuming the investor does not face a capital constraint) 
(Feldstein 1972).  
This appendix outlines key issues that have to be considered in selecting a value for 
the discount rate: 
•  whether it is based on the rate of time preference or cost of capital; 
•  whether the investment evaluation is undertaken from the perspective of an 
individual or society as a whole; 
•  how to account for investment risk; and 
•  whether it is appropriate to assess private cost effectiveness using a social 
discount rate. 
F.1   Time preference versus cost of capital 
In undertaking an investment, an investor may have to forgo: 
•  consumption today in return for consumption in the future 
•  investment in other projects. 
Forgoing consumption has a cost because people generally prefer to receive a dollar 
today, rather than a dollar in the future. The rate at which an investor is willing to     
464  ENERGY EFFICIENCY   
 
exchange current consumption for (higher) future consumption is their rate of time 
preference (RTP). 
Forgoing investment in other projects also has a cost if at least one of those projects 
is expected to have a positive rate of return. The highest rate of return that could be 
earned from another investment (after adjusting for differences in risk) is the 
opportunity cost of capital (OCC). 
A discount rate could therefore be based on either an RTP or an OCC (or a 
weighted combination of both). They will only be the same under very restrictive 
conditions, including perfect competition in capital markets, no transaction costs 
and an absence of distortionary taxes (Layard 1977; Department of Finance 1991; 
Layard and Glaister 1994; Boardman et al. 2001).  
In practice, the OCC is typically used as a discount rate for investment evaluations 
in Australia, particularly those undertaken in regulation impact assessments, 
because it is easier to implement and less prone to measurement error (Department 
of Finance 1991; Partnerships Victoria 2003). 
F.2  Social versus private investment evaluations 
The appropriate discount rate to use in an investment evaluation depends on whose 
perspective is being considered.  
If an investment is assessed from a public perspective (taking account of all benefits 
and costs to society), the discount rate should reflect the perspective of society as a 
whole. Thus, the guidelines for public sector investments and regulation impact 
statements in Australia recommend using the social OCC as a discount rate (for 
example, Department of Finance 1991; Partnerships Victoria 2003; COAG 2004).  
If an investment is assessed from a private perspective, the discount rate should 
reflect this. An appropriate discount rate would be the relevant party’s private OCC. 
A similar distinction between social and private analyses applies when the discount 
rate is based on an RTP. 
In summary, there are four possible discount rates, depending on whether an RTP or 
OCC is used, and whether a private or societywide perspective is taken (table F.1)1.  
                                              
1 Assuming that a weighted combination of both an RTP and OCC is not used.     
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Table F.1  Discount rates that could be used in an investment evaluation 
 Whose  perspective 
Unit of measurement  Individual  Society 
Forgone investment  Private opportunity  
cost of capitala 
Social opportunity  
cost of capitalb 
Forgone consumption  Private rate of  
time preferencec 
Social rate of  
time preferenced 
a The rate of return that an individual investor forgoes from the next best investment. b The rate of return that 
society forgoes from the next best investment. c The rate at which an individual investor is willing to exchange 
current consumption for (higher) future consumption. d Society’s preference for present as opposed to future 
consumption. 
F.3  Accounting for investment risk 
Most energy efficiency investments involve an element of risk because, among 
other things, benefits depend on future energy prices, which are uncertain, and 
implementation costs can vary from expectations. 
In order to take account of risk, investment evaluations often use a risk-adjusted 
discount rate. This is calculated by estimating the investor’s weighted average cost 
of capital, with weights based on the relative magnitude of the investor’s debt and 
equity (assuming an OCC-based discount rate is used). 
The cost of an investor’s debt finance is usually transparent. This is not the case for 
the cost of equity, which is typically estimated by using the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) (box F.1). 
Ideally, the CAPM would be used to estimate project-specific discount rates. 
However, this can be difficult to implement in practice due to data limitations. In 
light of this problem, the Department of Finance (1991) has recommended a 
general-purpose ‘benchmark’ social OCC rate of 8  per cent (in real terms) for 
government investment evaluations. This rate is loosely based on an application of 
the CAPM framework: 
This rate is reconciled with the CAPM framework, which might suggest a discount rate 
in the order of 10–11 per cent, on the presumption that many activities in the general 
government sector are characterised by less than average market risk in the sense that 
their returns are not significantly increased or decreased when economic activity is 
respectively strong or weak. (Department of Finance 1991, p. 57)      
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Box F.1  The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
The CAPM assumes that investors are rational in the sense that they eliminate all 
asset-specific risk by holding a diversified portfolio. As a result, the theory asserts that 
investors only need to be compensated for risks that affect the whole market of risky 
investments. Examples of such nondiversifiable risks are those arising from 
macroeconomic policy, recessions, and political unrest. 
The CAPM attributes differences in returns between investments to the divergent 
responses that investments have to risks that affect the whole market. Accordingly, the 
CAPM specifies that an investment’s expected return depends on how its returns vary 
relative to the total market of risky investments: 
[ ] [ ] () if i m f ER R ER R β =+ −  
where  [ ] i ER  is the expected rate of return on equity;  f R  is the rate of return on the 
risk-free asset (typically interpreted as a government bond);  i β  is an investment’s 
equity ‘beta’ (a measure of how returns vary in response to nondiversifiable risk, 
relative to how the market for all risky assets responds to such risk) and  [ ] () mf ER R −  
is the expected risk premium for the market of all risky investments.  
Finding values for the variables in the above equation so as to determine the required 
return on equity  [ ] i ER is not straightforward.  f R  is usually based on the return on 
government bonds. But it is unclear what maturity should be used and whether it 
should be the return on a particular day or an historical average. If it is an historical 
average, it is unclear what time period should be used. The Department of 
Finance (1991) recommended that the risk-free rate should be based on a ten year 
average of the Treasury ten-year bond rate. In contrast, Partnerships Victoria (2005) 
currently uses a five-year average of the ten year bond rate.  
There is no single widely agreed estimate for the market risk premium  [ ] () mf ER R − . 
Indeed, this premium might be changing over time and hence be difficult to estimate 
econometrically. Nonetheless, a recent study has estimated the market risk premium to 
be 6 per cent (Dimson et al. 2003). A rate of 6 per cent is commonly used in practice 
(Department of Finance 1991; Partnerships Victoria 2003). 
Estimating beta is a complex task. Betas differ across industry sectors as well as 
projects within sectors. Atech Group (2003) claimed that energy efficiency investments 
have substantially less risk than general investments in a particular sector (that is, the 
sectoral beta should be adjusted downwards for energy efficiency investments). In 
contrast, Greely et al. (1989) found that very few predictions of energy savings came 
within 20  per cent of measured results. Sutherland (1991) argued that energy 
efficiency investments were quite risky given that the actual savings cannot be 
predicted accurately.  
Sources: Bruce et al. (1989); PC (2004c). 
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Similarly, the Victorian Government has set three benchmark discount rates for 
infrastructure projects (Partnerships Victoria 2005). They have been specified in 
order to allow for differences in risk across the following sectors:  
•  accommodation and related services (social OCC of 5.5 per cent in real terms) 
•  water, transport and energy (6.5 per cent)  
•  telecommunications, media and technology (9 per cent).  
Despite the widespread use of the CAPM, it has significant deficiencies. This can be 
largely attributed to the many questionable assumptions used in the model. For 
example, the CAPM assumes that asset returns are normally distributed, and so the 
standard deviation of returns is a valid measure of risk. In practice, an investment 
may have a skewed distribution of possible returns.  
The weaknesses of the CAPM have been extensively documented in the financial 
literature, including empirical tests that have found that the model has a poor record 
in quantifying the relationship between risk and returns (for example, Fama and 
French 2004). Thus, the validity of CAPM-based discount rates is questionable. 
F.4  Use of social discount rates to assess private cost 
effectiveness 
Regulation impact assessments typically use an estimate of the social OCC to 
determine whether a policy is privately cost effective. This could be justified on the 
grounds that private cost effectiveness is assessed for the ‘average individual’, and 
their cost of capital — the average private OCC across all members of society — 
will equal the social OCC. 
However, the social OCC used in regulation impact assessments is not derived by 
calculating the average private OCC across all individuals. Instead, it is usually a 
general-purpose rate that is loosely based on an application of the CAPM approach 
to a limited number of firms. The previously-mentioned benchmark rates 
recommended by the Department of Finance and the Victorian Government are 
examples of this. Given how such estimates are derived, it is doubtful that they are 
an accurate measure of the average private OCC. 
The average private OCC could be much higher than the discount rates used in 
regulation impact assessments. For example, contrary to CAPM assumptions, many 
individuals face constraints on how much they can borrow and this will tend to raise 
their opportunity cost of using capital. In addition, many people do not have highly 
diversified investment portfolios that eliminate asset-specific risk.     
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A further problem is that the average private OCC (even if accurately measured) 
may not be representative for many individuals. This would be the case if the 
diverse circumstances of individual producers and consumers causes many of them 
to have a private OCC that is very different from the average. 
At the extreme, poor households may have to forgo basic needs (such as for food 
and clothing) if they are to invest in an energy efficiency measure. The private 
OCCs for such households are probably much higher than the social OCC estimates 
used in regulation impact assessments (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat 1998; 
Dubin and McFadden 1984; Brill et al. 1999). Similarly, the private OCC for small 
businesses may tend to be higher than that for larger businesses, given differences 
in access to capital and borrowing costs.  
One way to take account of diversity among individuals would be to carry out a 
disaggregated analysis that assessed private cost effectiveness for different groups 
and tested the sensitivity of the disaggregated results to a wide range of discount 
rates. The disaggregation could, for example, be based on socioeconomic 
characteristics for consumers and turnover for businesses. 
The COAG guidelines for regulation impact assessments recommend distributional 
analyses in order to identify the extent to which different groups would be affected 
by a proposed regulation: 
Distributional implications can be obscured by the aggregating character of the           
cost–benefit process. Analyses should include all the information available to ensure 
that decision-makers are aware both of the identity of the groups likely to gain and to 
lose as a result of government action, and of the nature and size of the gains and losses. 
This information should be carefully presented, most usefully in the form of a 
distributional incidence chart or matrix. (COAG 2004, p. 33) 
Similarly, the Department of Finance (1991) has noted that a distributional analysis 
should be included in investment evaluations where the distributional effects are 
unclear. 
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